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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The history of art and religion is intricately linked in Western culture. This thesis 
focuses on one strand of this relationship and is concerned with the role of 
performance practices in relation to spirituality in the West. Contemporary 
performance practice and theory are at the centre of this research. Case studies on 
the Roman Catholic Liturgy and the performance artist Marina Abramovi! are 
used to show how traditional analyses of spiritual performance have not 
accounted for the effects and affects of metaphysics in how we understand belief. 
I argue that examinations of spiritual performance are needed which do not try to 
understand such performances in terms of their representative meaning, but 
rather, seek to account for their performative qualities as practices that both 
instantiate and manifest belief. Performative theory has been used extensively to 
analyse language and human action, specifically the performance of gender. Here 
belief is taken as the subject of performative action and rituals are examined as 
performance practices which perform belief. Starting with Jacques Derrida, I 
begin a discussion of metaphysics and representation, tracing the nature of 
Western understandings of belief from Plato, to Friedrich Nietzsche, to Derrida, 
and to contemporary theological investigations into the nature of the human soul. 
This establishes the metaphysical history of the treatment of belief as well as 
various theoretical attempts to move past this model. The work of J.L. Austin, 
John R. Searle, Judith Butler and Saba Mahmood is employed to examine belief 
through speech act theory as a verb and finally through performative theory as an 
action. The first half of the thesis contextualises Western belief as a culturally 
specific entity that has not been analysed or understood in relation to its physical 
and material aspects, as well as developing an analysis of performative action. 
The second half applies the performative approach to the case studies. 
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 7 
INTRO DUCTIO N 
The interplay of metaphysics, Christianity, belief and material practices is 
misunderstood. Western critical discourses around belief demonstrate a strong 
tendency to conceive of belief, including, and most particularly, Christian belief 
in relation to transcendence. Conceptions of the material practices of belief tend 
towards the metaphysical. To demonstrate this claim and start to fill the 
disciplinary gaps that contribute to this misunderstanding, this thesis undertakes 
an examination of belief across disciplines, and grounds the findings in a 
performative reading of the physical and material1 practices of both the Roman 
Catholic liturgy and the performance art of Marina Abramovi!. I argue that it is 
necessary to re-examine belief through a variety of disciplines and establish a 
framework through which bodily practices will be given serious consideration as 
part of how we understand belief. Belief is traditionally analysed 
representationally and here we will look at how it can also be analysed 
performatively: the performative is interested in what happens, whereas, the 
representational focuses on possible meanings of that which happens. It is 
through treating belief as performative that we will see embodied2 practices as 
                                                
1 These two terms are problematic because what is really needed is a word that describes and 
encompasses the entire body/mind/spirit/soul. All sorts of terms have been used to divide the 
human experience and part of what I am aiming to articulate in this thesis is the realm of 
experience that is embodied (see definition below) and difficult to put into words. This is 
experienced through all the senses and thus through the body, but it is not limited to the ‘body’ in 
a strict sense where body is divided from mind and spirit/soul. Instead the body is understood as a 
totality, a unified whole instead of a set of parts. Above, I have used the terms physical and 
material to cover all the experiences that can happen during the liturgy or a performance piece. By 
physical I mean those experiences that are available with and through the senses and perception, 
and by material I mean those experiences available through interaction with objects, with the 
tangible world. For lack of an overarching term that covers all of what is apprehended through the 
use of the senses and the ‘body’ I will use the word ‘body’ to mean the totality of the person. I use 
physical and material as a way to account for all that the totality of the person comes into contact 
with. 
2 The term embodied is used extensively in performance studies to talk about practices that 
express ideas through physical forms. These might highlight practices that involve all the senses 
and a deep awareness of the self in response to the senses. It has been used as the opposite to 
approaches that emphasise only cognitive thought as a way to explain or find meaning. Among 
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relevant to academic study in both performance studies and theology. It is 
through this perspective on religious ritual and performance art that a fuller 
picture of religious and spiritual performance practices emerges. Performative 
analysis allows for actions and objects to be examined in relation to the moment 
of performance instead of only one part of a broader representative analysis. I 
show how traditional analyses of spiritual performance have not accounted for the 
effects and affects of metaphysics in how we understand belief. Examinations of 
spiritual performance are needed which do not try to understand such 
performances in terms of their representative meaning, but rather, seek to account 
for their performative qualities as practices that instantiate, and manifest belief. 
To support this position I offer a reading of belief through its treatment across the 
fields of philosophy, theology, religious studies, anthropology and performance 
studies, in order to show the necessity of taking these influences into account in 
examinations of ritual and performance art. Ultimately this thesis looks to expose 
inherent structures that shape conceptions of belief and open up the potential of 
understanding belief as performative for performance studies as well as other 
fields that analyse religious/spiritual3 practices. 
                                                
theorists who have done extensive work on this are Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Connerton and 
Mary Douglas. This idea that belief can be part of an embodied practice is linked to the work of 
both performance scholars and philosophers who are interested in the performative and in 
physical practices. Paul Connerton explains embodied practice: “It is through the essentially 
embodied nature of our social existence, and through the incorporated practices based upon these 
embodyings, that these oppositional terms provide us with metaphors by which we think and 
live.” Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
p. 74. Connerton uses the term “incorporating practice” to discuss conscious behaviour, that is 
spatially located, and framed by social and communal structures. Thus, the “incorporating 
practice” performs embodied knowledge in real time (p. 73). These theories are valuable in the 
study of performance practices because, as Aaron Turner explains, “[e]mbodiment seems to shift 
the study of society and culture to an examination of processes at work in everyday experience 
and interaction” Aaron Turner, ‘Embodied ethnography. Doing culture’, Social Anthropology, 8 
(2000), 51–60 (p. 53). 
3 Throughout the dissertation I refer to both overtly religious practices, i.e. liturgy, and also 
spiritual practices, i.e. “human practice that maintains contact between the everyday world and a 
more general meta-empirical framework of meaning by way of the individual manipulation of 
symbolic systems.”  Wouter J. Hanegraaff, ‘Spectral Evidence of New Age Religion: On the 
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 This dissertation is positioned after the poststructuralist attacks on 
metaphysics and is allied with Derrida’s interest in, and reading of, the history of 
metaphysical thought. Taking my cue from Derrida, who carried out the most 
sustained attempt in the twentieth century to unpick the foundations of Western 
thought, I turn to his influences in philosophy and theatre in my own survey of 
writing on metaphysics. Specifically, my examinations of Plato and Friedrich 
Nietzsche are indebted to Derrida’s theories. I do not attempt an historical 
investigation of metaphysical thinking, but rather a thematic one that focuses on 
the disruption of metaphysical structures. Derrida identifies Plato as the most 
crucial of Greek thinkers in relation to metaphysics, and engages with Plato’s 
writing to ground his own development of deconstruction, perhaps most clearly in 
his piece ‘Plato’s Pharmacy.’4  The jump from Plato to Nietzsche is a large one 
through time, but Nietzsche’s work repositions Plato in line with the advent of 
modernity. It is also through Nietzsche that Derrida comments on much of Plato’s 
influence. Nietzsche is often credited with setting the foundation necessary for 
poststructuralist theories; a tradition in which Derrida figures prominently.5 Most 
importantly for this dissertation, Nietzsche, as the most famous atheist and critic 
of Christianity, unites an attack on Christianity with an attack on metaphysics 
demonstrating the connection between the two. In the second half of the 
Introduction I discuss Derrida’s writing on Antonin Artaud. It is here that Derrida 
                                                
substance of ghosts and the use of concepts’, Journal of Alternative Spiritualities and New Age 
Studies, 1 (2005), 35-58 (p. 42). I try to use either religion or spirituality to avoid constantly 
repeating them both. My use of one does not discount the potential for a participant to think of 
their practice as either term. In Chapter 4 I do provide a discussion of the differences between 
religions and spiritualities. However, there will always be slight nuances that are associated with 
one word or the other that are not accounted for in any one definition. Spirituality in this 
application is thus the combination of knowledge and practices associated with meta-empirical 
frameworks.  
4 Jacques Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, in Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (London: 
Continuum, 2004), pp. 67-186. 
5 See Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative As a Socially Symbolic Act (London, 
Routledge, 1983), pp. 13, 103, 114. 
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links Plato, Nietzsche, metaphysics, theatre, the spiritual, and the problems of 
representation. 
This thesis evolved out of research in performance studies that led to an 
interest in the performative utterance ‘I believe.’ The idea that belief was 
performed proved profitable and developed to include the question of how 
analyses of belief in performance could take into account performative action. 
The criticisms of spiritual performance practices that I read rarely addressed 
belief. They were frequently focused on representative analyses that drew on 
Eastern spiritual practices to explain the actions in the piece. I found these 
unsatisfactory and they contributed to my concern that there was a lack of 
research into Western spiritual practices by performance scholars. The potential 
ability of Western tradition to inform Western performance practices was 
unrecognized. Research into the problem revealed that interest in this area was 
spread over multiple fields but that little communication was happening between 
the disciplines. From liturgical theology and religious studies to anthropology, 
ethnography, ritual studies, philosophy, critical theory, theatre theory and 
performance studies, each area had developed their own accounts of Western 
performance practices, and their own analyses of the spiritual. Yet, connections 
exist between all of these fields, both historically and methodologically. 
My work is part of the discipline of performance studies, and I want to 
clarify what I mean by ‘performance.’ On one level performance is an 
overarching term that includes all human behaviour, yet it can also be applied to a 
specific instance of performance involving one performer and one spectator. It is 
used to discuss societal and cultural performance as well as traditional theatrical 
presentations. In this dissertation when I refer to performance practices, be they 
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theatrical, ritual, spiritual, religious or all of the above, I refer to actions 
undertaken by the performer(s)/participant(s) which effect the performance at 
hand.6 Contemporary performance art and performance practices, at least the 
kinds of performance that started in the 1960s, are usually based on the performer 
being themselves or alternating between being themselves and a persona. 
Performance practices such as cultural or religious rituals also understand the 
participants to participate as themselves, even as they might adopt a role within 
the performance, e.g. a choir member or lay reader in a Mass. Performance 
practices do not function in opposition to theatre, but exist alongside traditional 
theatrical forms. 
 
PERFORMATIVITY AND THEATRICALITY  
In this dissertation I use the terms performance, performative and 
performativity almost to the exclusion of theatre, theatrical and theatricality. The 
trajectories and developments of these terms are different but their usages do 
overlap at times. This short section introduces both sets of terms and provides 
discussions from various theorists about the implications of both. I focus almost 
exclusively on performance, performative and performativity in my own analysis 
here because the points of comparison between my two main objects of study 
arise from their shared concern with performance rather than from any relation 
either might have to the practice of theatre.  
The terms theatre and theatrical are often applied metaphorically, to 
indicate usually superficial ways in which the presentational aspects of a church 
                                                
6 In the case of rituals, such as the Roman Catholic liturgy, those performing might not view their 
participation as a performance. As well, those who attend a performance by a performance artist 
might not understand their presence as participation. Yet in both these cases, performance theory 
includes these people and their actions as part of the analysis of the performance. 
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service, for example, might resemble theatre.7 Another typical application is to 
refer to the use of objects in performance art as theatrical. Discussions that 
involve the terms theatrical and theatricality, whether in relation to the liturgy or 
performance art, regularly analyse the action as representational. To insist on the 
performative, rather than the representation is to focus on what is happening, 
what transformations may be taking place, which behaviours enacted and re-
enacted, rather than what the event resembles, or which absent actions, objects or 
persons it might represent. Before explaining performative action in more detail I 
first provide background to the terms theatre, theatrical and theatricality. 
As I am not discussing the kind of performances that take place in a 
theatre the absence of this one term from my discussion is understandable. While 
liturgy has been compared to theatre, for the purposes of my work, I want to 
move away from this perspective. Later in the dissertation I explain that the 
structure of the liturgy more clearly mimics that of performance art, with its 
facilitator and participants, than the theatre with actors and an audience.  
The adjective form – theatrical – as it relates to the overarching event is 
                                                
7 In Sacred Drama Patricia Wilson-Kastner uses theatre and drama as metaphors for what happens 
in the liturgy, for example: “Plays do need to be rewritten and people’s roles changed. The drama 
of the liturgy has an established essential plot, but the roles of its participants must always be 
changing, because human awareness of our relation to God and the world is never complete” (p. 
15); and “The liturgy proclaims the judgement of God as hope and mercy for the world, even if 
that mercy and hope will also require the world’s transformation. We don’t have all the details of 
the script. In that regard we are involved in something more like improvisational theatre” (p. 21). 
Patricia Wilson-Kastner, Sacred Drama: A Spirituality of Christian Liturgy (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1999). Kevin J. Vanhoozer also uses theatre metaphorically and as a simile: “What 
is of special interest in this section, however, is the church’s performance of Christ’s cross. For 
here, as perhaps nowhere else, the church achieves its own distinct “A-effect”: nothing is more 
revolutionary, or alienating, than the scandal of the cross. […] The particular A-effects of the 
church’s cruciform performances are two: martyrdom and reconciliation. The church is never 
more Brechtian than when it proclaims and performs the cross.” Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama 
of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2005), p. 428. 
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also not as pertinent to the kinds of descriptions I want to articulate. Objects can 
be used in theatrical ways, but my research in Chapter 2 shows that liturgical 
objects have already been treated to such a comparison, specifically by theology. 
Theatricality is finally the one term from the three which is more applicable 
because it is more complex and relates to theories of presentation which are much 
less bound to theatre forms, structures and buildings. It also has routinely been 
applied to a range of non-theatrical social activities. As such, this term in 
particular deserves explanation. 
Interest in theatricality has been positioned historically by Josette Féral as 
being a recent phenomenon; its use is consonant with a fascination with 
theorizing itself. The attempt to “conceptualize the notion of theatricality” she 
argues is part of “recent preoccupations with the theory of theater.” 8 While she 
provides synopses of many views of the theatrical, she chooses to foreground 
theatricality as, “a process that has to do with a “gaze” that postulates and creates 
a distinct, virtual space belonging to the other, from which fiction can emerge.”9 
This ‘gaze’ can originate in either the performer or the spectator and the fiction 
that results can be apparent to one or many people. If it is the gaze of the 
performer, then the “space [is] created by the conscious act of the performer, 
understood here in the largest sense of the word to include the actor, director, 
designer, lighting director, and architect.”10 Those who plan and execute the 
performance are thus responsible for creating the ‘theatricality,’ and the space in 
which this happens is fundamental, whether it is a theatre building or a public 
space. Awareness is also primary as the spectator must be able to identify what is 
                                                
8Josette Féral, ‘Theatricality: The Specificity of Theatrical Language’, SubStance 31 (2002), 94-
108 (p. 95). Féral links a specific theoretical interest in theatricality to research in the 1970s. 
9 Féral, p. 97. 
10 Féral, p. 97. 
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watched as a fictional event created by others.  
If it is the gaze of the spectator,  
the spectator's gaze create[s] a spatial cleft from which illusion emerge[s] 
– illusion whose vehicle the spectator ha[s] selected from among events, 
behaviors, physical bodies, objects and space without regard for the 
fictional or real nature of the vehicle's origin.11 
In this scenario the spectator makes a decision to “inscribes theatricality in the 
space surrounding him.”12 The events and people who are involved do not choose 
this theatricality and only the spectator is aware. She summarizes her theory thus: 
theatricality appears to be more than a property; in fact, we might call it a 
process that recognizes subjects in process; it is a process of looking at or 
being looked at. It is an act initiated in one of two possible spaces: either 
that of the actor or that of the spectator. In both cases, this act creates a 
cleft in the quotidian that becomes the space of the other, the space in 
which the other has a place. Without such a cleft, the quotidian remains 
intact, precluding the possibility of theatricality, much less of theater 
itself.13 
Now, of course what happens in the liturgy or in a piece of performance art can 
and does include the act of looking, of establishing a gaze. The gazes in these 
situations do not include that of an actor in the same way as a piece of theatre, but 
they do include the spectator in the sense that all the people in the space of a 
liturgy are watching all the other people in the space. And all the people at the 
gallery who attend Abramovi!’s performance piece, including the performer, are 
able to establish a gaze with others.14 In both of my case studies the point of the 
gaze is not to create a fictional world. While it could be argued that ‘a cleft in the 
quotidian’ is possible, this is not the desired outcome either. We attend a liturgy 
or a performance piece in a place outside of the quotidian. Their common purpose 
is not to provide an escape from reality or a cleft in what could be called a 
                                                
11 Féral, p. 97. 
12 Féral, p. 98. 
13 Féral, p. 98. 
14 In Abramovi!’s piece, The House With the Ocean View, the establishment of a gaze is essential 
for the piece itself, and I will return to this in Chapter 4.  
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theatrical manner, but rather, one might say, to heal clefts in social relations, to 
make community rather than to cleave it. They are meant to be occasions where 
the focus is placed on the processes of performing, the collaborative endeavour 
that constitutes the event, rather than the product. 
 To follow the same sequence of the discussion of ‘theatre,’ I use the term 
performance throughout the dissertation partially because it is a term that I can 
apply to both the liturgy and performance art.15 Using ‘performance’ enables 
discussions of the actions of the facilitators and participants at any point in the 
event. Janelle Reinelt has provided a model for understanding these three terms:  
“Performance” has been used to differentiate certain processes of 
performing from the products of theatrical performance, and in its most 
narrow usage, to identify performance art as that which, unlike “regular” 
theatrical performances, stages the subject in process, the making and 
fashioning of certain materials, especially the body, and the exploration of 
the limits of representation-ability.16 
Where ‘theatrical’ is normally conceived as display, representation, spectacle, 
distance, and separation, performance is about the process of efficacious actions. 
The application of the term performance as a way to highlight the process of the 
performer is one that I draw on throughout the dissertation. I also apply Reinelt’s 
narrow usage to Abramovi!’s work, and to the liturgy, too, in order to draw out 
the making and fashioning of the materials of performance. I pay specific 
attention throughout to a discussion of the limits of ‘representation-ability’ by 
highlighting the myriad meanings that are present and potential for all those who 
participate.   
 Reinelt’s second definition includes the wider concept of performance as 
a field constituted by the broad scope of inquiry now institutionalised as 
                                                
15 Whereas theatre is applicable to neither.  
16 Janelle Reinelt, ‘The Politics of Discourse: Performativity Meets Theatricality’, SubStance, 31 
(2002), 201-215 (p. 201). 
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‘performance studies.’ From its beginnings in the 1970s and early 80s this 
broader view of what constituted performance gave “equal status to rituals, 
sports, dance, political events, and certain performative aspects of everyday life. 
[This] [l]inking…enabled a political project of great potential as it developed 
through the 1970s and 1980s.”17 The field of performance has thus shaped my 
own approach and methods. The trajectory begun in the 1970s and 1980s and that 
has continued to the present day was concerned with “deliberate socio-political 
analyses” with the aim of “articulating an acute awareness of cultural differences 
and historical specificities, producing work on race, gender, and sexuality as they 
are asserted and inscribed in performance: as they become performative.”18 It is 
this work that has engendered my interest in exploring belief in terms of 
academic study. One of the key reasons for conducting such an exploration from 
within performance studies instead of some other field, such as ritual studies, is 
that performance studies emphasizes the significance of performance-as-process 
rather than performance-as-text. As Reinelt explains, this has been an underlying 
issue in the development of performance studies as a field: “[this] institutional 
struggle for territory and legitimacy links to a long history of conflict within 
theater studies between privileging dramatic texts or the processes and events 
produced in concrete performances.”19 A similar emphasis on the text may be 
observed in much study of liturgy.20 
 Reinelt’s third focus is on the philosophical usage of performativity. In 
Chapter 1, I draw on her references to the work of J.L. Austin who coined the 
term performative as part of his work as a linguistic theorist. His work has been 
                                                
17 Reinelt, p. 202. 
18 Reinelt, p. 202. 
19 Reinelt, p. 203. 
20 Examples of text-based analyses of liturgy from my research can be found in the section on 
Textual Liturgy in Chapter 2. 
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developed by prominent writers in linguistic theory, such as John Searle, as well 
as by critical theory and philosophy, most notably by Jacques Derrida and Judith 
Butler – each of whom I examine in Chapter 1. This philosophical engagement 
with performativity is “part of an ongoing poststructural critique of agency, 
subjectivity, language and law.”21  
As Reinelt points out, it is somewhat ironic that Austin’s account of 
performativity has been embraced by performance studies and applied to theatre 
and performance, since Austin himself specifically excluded theatre from 
consideration, famously arguing that any apparent performative speech act 
uttered on stage is ‘etiolated.’22 This line of argumentation has been challenged by 
Derrida and other philosophers as well as by performance scholars who have 
linked this ‘desire to exclude’ back to a more general anti-theatrical prejudice.23 
The role of performance, however, understood as something that takes place both 
within and beyond the theatre, itself takes precedence over any historical 
tendency to relegate theatre to the sidelines of philosophy. I am interested, 
therefore, in specific aspects of performance that have been informed by the 
emphasis within performance studies on process. As Reinelt explains:  
Performance theory…isolates performative processes in order to subject 
them to a de-representation and a close scrutiny for lingering traces of the 
theological stage—the text-dominated, logocentric stage of European 
                                                
21 Reinelt, p. 203. 
22 “[A] performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an 
actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar 
manner to any and every utterance – a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such 
circumstances is in special ways-intelligibly-used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its 
normal use-ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All this we are 
excluding from consideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood 
as issued in ordinary circumstances.” J.L. Austin, How to do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), p. 22. 
23 For more on this see Jonas M. Barish, The Anti-theatrical Prejudice (London: University of 
California Press, 1981); Tracy C. Davis and Thomas Postlewait, ‘Introduction’, in Theatricality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1-39; Jacques Derrida argues for the general 
iterability of all language whether in everyday speech or in theatrical context in his essays 
‘Signature Event Context’ and ‘Limited Inc abc …’. Both are found in Limited Inc (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
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theater and culture. And by aligning theater studies with other disciplines 
under the rubric of Cultural Studies, the comparativist work that has 
emerged opened a political project that made sex, gender, race, and class 
central analytic categories of the new “performance studies.”24 
 
My work is indebted to this larger project: while my own concerns are not with 
the performative dimensions of ‘sex, gender, race and class’, such considerations 
have motivated my interest in exploring the performative dimensions of belief.  
 At this point it should be clear that my decision to use performativity 
instead of theatricality is driven both by my disciplinary influences and the 
specifics of my research focus. Another way of putting this is to say that I 
constitute the objects of my research in terms of performance. Another 
dissertation might undertake a discussion of the operations, in either liturgy or 
performance art, of a theatrical gaze “that postulates and creates a distinct, virtual 
space belonging to the other, from which fiction can emerge.”25 The foundation of 
this thesis in the study of performance and my approach to the topic is 
interdisciplinary with the main secondary disciplinary engagement being that of 
theology. This will be clarified in the following outline of the structure of the 
dissertation. 
  Chapter 1 has three distinct sections. In the first I examine metaphysics 
through the perspective of Derrida’s writings, starting with Plato – investigating 
the problem of salvation in relation to both Greek thought and Christianity – and 
then move on to Nietzsche, Derrida and Nancey Murphy (a contemporary 
theologian who argues for a holistic understanding of the body and soul together 
as a ‘God breathed’ unity). These theorists take into account important criticisms 
of metaphysical dualism and its effect on the concept of salvation. The second 
                                                
24 Reinelt, p. 205. 
25 Féral, p. 97. 
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section picks up the problem of language. Through an examination of the noun 
and verb ‘belief’ and ‘believe,’ with emphasis on the work of Malcolm Ruel and 
Jean Pouillon, I explain the impact of the word on philosophical and theological 
structures establishing why this is crucial to a discussion of performance 
practices. The first two sections set the ground work for the last section on 
performativity where I trace the development of conceptions of the performative 
from J.L. Austin to John R. Searle to Judith Butler to Saba Mahmood. I contend 
that it is through a performative reading of belief that the material nature of 
religious or spiritual performance practices is best addressed. 
In Chapter 2, I introduce Christian liturgy as a Western performance form 
and explain ritual aspects of the Roman Catholic liturgy. Through examples from 
religious studies I detail the kinds of analyses that have been applied to this 
practice. This constitutes a literature review and helps me to establish the 
disciplinary gaps I am filling with my research. Next is a section that details the 
history of the collaborations that exist between performance studies and 
anthropology. The advent of performance studies in the 1970s was closely linked 
to the use and development of anthropological methods for theatre research. 
Extensive use of these methods has shown their usefulness to the field; however, 
it has also led to somewhat skewed readings of religious ritual.26 Since the 1970s 
performance studies has not prioritized keeping abreast of current developments 
                                                
26 As Arne Røkkum explains methods taken for granted by anthropology foreground and reinforce 
Western modes of thinking and analysing the world even while attempting to allow the ‘other’ a 
unique and authentic voice: “At the present time, a generalization with discipline-wide import 
seems to be this: whereas Western worldviews subsist on a Cartesian premise of a split between 
mind and body, the non-Western worldviews lack this philosophically authored discrepancy. 
Anthropology’s specific contribution for dissolving an assumption of a mind-body polarity comes 
pre-eminently with the less cerebral non-Western alternative, as in the case of knowing oneself as 
an instance of embodiment. Somewhat paradoxically, then, while accenting the non-Western ways 
of knowing, we – the anthropologists – may encourage people to sort out their experiences with 
the crispness of a Cartesian worldview, as their articulations.” Arne Røkkum, Nature, Ritual, and 
Society in Japan’s Ryukyu Islands (Routledge: London, 2006), p. 1. 
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in anthropology, which as I discuss, are changing the understanding of the 
methodologies themselves. One recent strand of anthropological research looks at 
Christianity in depth and I focus on a reading of anthropological research by 
Fenella Cannell that situates Christianity as the repressed of anthropology. I show 
how this information is important to the ongoing project of performance analysis 
in performance studies. I conclude with a consideration of theories of theatre 
reception from Helen Freshwater, Gay McAuley and Jacques Rancière.  
Chapter 3 is a case study of the Roman Catholic liturgy in the Czech 
Republic over Easter Week in 2005. I attended seven Masses in two towns during 
the week while living with a Czech family. My interest in the physicality and 
materiality of Western practices led me to undertake research for a case study in 
another country. As I could not rely on language for meaning, the experience 
demanded that I foreground the event, i.e. what I could observe and understand 
through physical and material experience and through watching the actions and 
use of objects around me. Attending Roman Catholic services in the UK would 
not have provided the same experience. The case study comprises a short history 
of the development of the Mass, an analysis of meaning-making in the Eucharist, 
descriptions of what happened over Easter week, and an analysis that foregrounds 
performative action. I argue that this results in valuable information that would 
otherwise not be observed. Representational analyses tend to focus on how 
specific ritual practices conform to supposed norms in order to repeat familiar 
meanings.  
Chapter 4 is the longest and brings together the arguments of the previous 
three. It centers on a case study of the work of Serbian performance artist Marina 
Abramovi!. I begin by introducing a brief history of Christian iconography in 
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visual art, drawing out the aspects that most link to Abramovi!’s work. This 
provides a clear connection from the liturgical practices to the artistic 
performances. I then provide some historical background to Abramovi!’s 
upbringing and artistic practices. Alongside this history I offer a discussion of the 
role of performance documentation in the field of performance studies and an 
examination of two spiritual practices to which Abramovi!’s work is often 
compared: Shamanism and the New Age. I then describe three of her pieces and 
conduct a detailed analysis, both comparing them to liturgical action as well as 
presenting an examination of the performative actions. I conclude by introducing 
academic and art criticism of her 2002 piece The House With the Ocean View and 
finally, reconnect back to the visual art practices from the beginning of the 
chapter. These texts enable a close reading of critical discourses around spiritual 
performance that returns to the linguistic, performative and philosophical 
arguments from earlier chapters. This project is crucial because of the unseen 
biases of interpretations of performance practices. At stake is a reorientation of 
critical processes within the field of performance studies. Throughout Chapter 4 I 
demonstrate the claims made in the earlier chapters and incorporate the ideas I 
have already theorized. 
The primary question of the dissertation is ‘What is the performance of 
belief?’ For the purposes of reading through the first part of Chapter 1, with its 
discussion of Plato’s theory of Forms, and the descriptions of the belief 
engendered by these theories of transcendence, it is sufficient to rely on standard 
definitions of belief: a conviction of the truth or reality of something; a tenet or 
body of tenets held by a group; a state; mental act; or condition or habit of 
placing of trust in another. Yet, importantly, what unfolds in this dissertation is 
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the sheer volume of information contained by the concept of belief; it cannot be 
reduced to a one line definition. The dissertation takes the reader through the 
nuances of the word and it is the contested nature of the term as a construction of 
Western culture and religion that comes through. I do not use or discuss ‘belief’ 
as shorthand for ‘I think’ or ‘I know,’ as in ‘I believe he is coming at three 
o’clock,’ or, ‘I believe she likes blueberries.’ In neither of these cases is the use 
of the word necessary. It is simply a synonym for ‘know’ or ‘think’: ‘I think he is 
coming at three o’clock’ and ‘I know she likes blueberries.’ I am interested in the 
situations where belief must be used, or, as the case may be, where to use belief 
becomes potentially problematic, as anthropologist Malcolm Ruel explains: “I 
stopped using the word ‘belief’ or ‘belief system’ or writing about what a people 
‘believe’ in discussing a non-Christian religion.”27 I argue that the word and 
concepts of belief are specific to Western-Christian traditions. 
 
VARIETIES OF BELIEF  
Belief is layered, socially specific, difficult to explain in words, and ever 
shifting depending on the kind of belief at hand. Catherine Bell offers a clear 
explanation of belief in relation to religion that I think provides a good starting 
place for any discussion of belief: 
Religious beliefs have been understood in a variety of ways—as 
pseudoscientific explanations, rationalizations of customary behaviour, 
personal or communal ideologies, or highly structured doctrinal 
formulations whose content has little import on behaviour.28 
Bell’s list highlights that there cannot be one understanding of ‘belief’ because it 
is applied to a wide array of subjects. By and large the written work that exists on 
belief falls into a diverse categories. There are academic linguistic accounts that 
                                                
27 Malcolm Ruel, Belief, Ritual and the Securing of Life (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), p. 5. 
28 Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 182. 
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use mathematic equations to determine the truth claims and status of various 
types of sentences, for example Isaac Levi’s article ‘Knowledge as True Belief.’29 
Then there are theological discussions that examine belief as an idea from the 
Christian religious perspective, for example John Habgood’s Varieties of 
Unbelief.30 These books presuppose that the reader holds the same belief system 
as the writer and takes it largely for granted that the existence of religious belief 
is a topic for serious discussion. There are also academic works, primarily in 
theology or philosophy which argue for the logic of religious belief, either as a 
sort of apologetic or as an historical tracing of a religion’s belief system. An 
example of the former is Andrew Collier’s On Christian Belief: A Defence of a 
Cognitive Conception of Religious Belief in a Christian Context. This book is 
really a discussion of faith, belief and knowledge and how they relate. In this 
Collier states that his aim is to show that religious belief is just as valid as any 
other belief and that such belief constitutes knowledge, and not just faith.31 
                                                
29 In Levi’s article knowledge is situated as something that can be reasoned with logic and 
formulas. In this manner he equates belief and knowledge: “X’s state of full belief K is used to 
distinguish between serious possibilities (logical possibilities consistent with K) that are open to 
“real and living” doubts and serious impossibilities inconsistent with K whose falsehood is from 
the point of view of the inquirer absolutely certain. X fully believes that h if and only if the 
potential state of full belief is that h is a consequence of K.” Isaac Levi, ‘Knowledge as True 
Belief’, Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of 
Science, 21 (2011), 269-302 (p. 269). 
30 Habgood discusses the societal shift that has led to the contemporary unease with serious 
discussions of the practice of religion. He uses the examples of real people as much as possible to 
highlight the varieties of unbelief/belief. While he does reference theologians and philosophers, it 
is not an academic work: John Habgood, Varieties of Unbelief (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd, 2000). 
31 “This is a book of philosophy, not of theology. I do not aim principally to defend the truth or 
rationality of any particular Christian belief. I aim to show that the sort of belief involved in 
Christianity is cognitive in nature, can be rational, and is made rational by things very like those 
which make other sorts of belief rational. It might be thought that for this reason the title ‘on 
religious belief’ would have been better. However, although some of my arguments could be used 
to defend the rationality of those other religions which claim to base themselves on God’s self-
revelation through scriptures – namely Judaism, Islam and the Bahai faith – there are so many 
arguments in the book that apply only to Christianity that it would be arrogant to claim to speak 
for religion in general. In defending the rationality of Christian belief, I am defending its claim to 
constitute knowledge. Since it has become almost a received opinion that Christian belief is ‘faith’ 
and that faith is not the same thing as knowledge, I want to get clear some points about the various 
meanings of words like ‘faith’, ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’, and their mutual relations. I shall be 
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Collier’s purpose seems to be to convince those who refuse to engage with 
religious belief as a serious subject.  
The other areas of academic enquiry that deal with the rubric of belief are 
situated broadly in the social sciences that use ethnographic, cultural and ritual 
studies approaches. The following section investigates how different areas of 
academic research approach the concept of belief: epistemology, the sociology of 
knowledge, cultural theory, anthropology and ritual studies. In each area belief is 
associated with a variety of ideas and practices. This variety provides a rich 
resource of angles on what and how belief ‘mean.’ While my project seeks to 
explore what might be added to our understanding of belief by considering it in 
terms of performance. These other examples demonstrate how each field provides 
for its own disciplinary needs. Belief can be researched in many ways.  
 
Epistemology 
Epistemology is concerned with “the study of knowledge and justified belief.”32 
This approach links belief with knowledge and truth. The method of analysis is 
highly theoretical where ideas are examined as propositions in order to show 
whether knowledge is justifiable as belief dependent on whether or not it is true. 
The primary outcome of epistemology when working with belief is to equate 
belief to knowledge – although even this is not always the case. An example from 
Alvin I. Goldman shows the kind of logic employed in such arguments: 
What is knowledge? More specifically, what is propositional knowledge: 
what is it to know that something is the case? To know a proposition p is 
                                                
pointing out different uses of the words, but I shall also be stating how I use the words and why.” 
Andrew Collier, On Christian Belief: A Defence of a Cognitive Conception of Religious Belief in 
a Christian Context (London: Routledge, 2003), p. iix. 
32 Matthias Steup, ‘Epistemology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/epistemology/> [accessed 9 May 2011]. 
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to know that it is true. But you cannot know that p is true unless it is true. 
So a necessary condition for knowledge is truth. Equally, you cannot 
know that p unless you are of the ‘opinion’ that p is true, unless you 
believe p. So belief, like truth, is necessary. But true belief is not 
sufficient for knowledge, at least not in the strict sense of ‘know.’ If it is 
just accidental that you are right about p, then you do not know that p, 
even if you are correct in believing it.33 
Goldman explains the basic function that links belief to knowledge, but the nature 
of this definition of belief is quite broad, i.e. you have to be “of the opinion that p 
is true.” And this is all based on the logic that you cannot know something is true 
unless it is true. For example: 
Suppose you wake up in a foul mood one morning and think to yourself, 
‘Today is going to be a miserable day’; and lo, a miserable day ensues. It 
does not follow that you knew in the morning that it was going to be a 
miserable day. It is just a fluke if such a feeling is right, and flukes are not 
sufficient for knowledge.34 
This implies that belief is something that is only possible when the object of 
belief is provable. This is clearly different from belief as it is understood in 
relation to religious faith where to believe is to trust in that which cannot be 
proven.  
 The epistemological approach to belief discusses the content of a belief, 
references belief-types and analyses statements for truth claims and proofs. A 
result of this is that belief becomes a term that can be logically accounted for as 
one would account for concepts. David J. Chalmers equates concepts with beliefs 
explaining them both as mental entities:  
I take concepts to be mental entities on a par with beliefs: they are 
constituents of beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) in a manner 
loosely analogous to the way in which words are constituents of 
sentences. Like beliefs, concepts are tokens rather than types in the first 
instance. But they also fall under types, some of which I explore in what 
follows. In such cases it is natural to use singular expressions such as ‘the 
concept’ for a concept-type, just as one sometimes uses expressions such 
as ‘the belief’ for a belief-type, or ‘the word’ for a word-type. I will use 
                                                
33 Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 
p. 42. 
34 Goldman, p. 42. 
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italics for concepts and beliefs throughout.35 
This approach to the discussion of belief is clearly focused on that which can be 
logically argued and proved and not directed to looking for patterns of behaviour 
and practices.  
 
Sociology of Knowledge 
The sociology of knowledge belongs to the field of sociology but is not a subset 
of the field. It can be better understood as a “tradition of inquiry” that has looked 
above all to address two key ideas: that “knowledge is socially determined” and 
that “knowledge constitutes a social order.”36 E Doyle McCarthy summarizes the 
history of the sociology of knowledge in Knowledge as Culture: The New 
Sociology of Knowledge. At a high level the interests of sociology are similar to 
those necessary to the analysis of performance practices, as McCarthy puts it - 
“Knowledge and experience are coterminous—they arise and develop 
simultaneously in human acts.”37 
Throughout the book the concept of belief is mentioned and most often in 
relation to power. The logic behind this link is ideology – beliefs are linked with 
ideologies and these are in turn seen as integral to how social groups function and 
maintain or gain power.38 Not only interested in the ideas behind behaviour, 
sociology examines materiality as well. Even in relation to materiality, it is 
                                                
35 David J. Chalmers, ‘The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief’, in Consciousness: 
New Philosophical Perspectives, ed. by Q. Smith and A. Jokic (Oxford University Press, 2003), 
pp. 220-272 (p. 223, footnote 2). 
36 E. Doyle McCarthy, Knowledge as Culture: The New Sociology of Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 12. “Its ideas address the broadest sociological questions about the extent 
and limits of social and group influences in people’s lives and the social and cultural foundations 
of cognition and perception” (p. 11). 
37 McCarthy, p. 4.  
38 “These descriptions bring us to another special mark of ideologies: ideologies belong to the 
category of beliefs. But they are not just any kind of belief; they are contentious beliefs that 
become fully articulated and asserted in situations involving conflicts and interests, struggles over 
right and power. In other words, ideas and beliefs in themselves are not ideological, but they can 
become so in practices of particular kinds” (McCarthy, p. 32).  
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ideology which is emphasized, as this example that includes ideas from political 
and critical theory demonstrates:  
The meaning of ideas and belief systems, the Marxist theory claimed, 
could be read from the material domain. “Ideology” involved both the 
separation and opposition of ideas and reality, the “real foundation” out of 
which ideas grew. “Ideology” also furthered cultural ideas set in motion 
by industrial capitalism—what Ricoeur has called “a kind of realism of 
life,” which we identify with this epoch, one where materiality is thought 
to precede ideas.39 
That which is experienced by each person in daily interactions with materials is a 
key part of formation ideas and beliefs. There are implications for theories of 
embodied experience if, as Ricoeur thought, “materiality precedes ideas.” This 
puts more emphasis on the performative and the interactions that are enabled 
though action.   
 Another way to understand how the sociology of knowledge engages the 
concept of belief is through an example based on Althusser’s work on the 
functioning of ideologies. Here identity is identified as a product of knowledge, 
beliefs and thought: “For what I know and believe and think are not merely 
knowledges or beliefs or thoughts; they are what I know and what I believe and 
what I think. They inscribe themselves in what I do, who I am—my identity.”40 
This explanation is still rather vague and McCarthy then describes in detail the 
kinds of logics that enable elements of practice to be situated clearly in relation to 
other aspects of the overall pattern. She uses “Althusser’s more general 
descriptive examples” in the following passage: 
If a person believes in God, she goes to church or to temple or to the local 
assembly. She prays and meets with others who are of her faith. She 
speaks to her children about God and goodness and faith. There are duties 
that she knows to be right. These are inscribed in what she does (and 
doesn’t do) when her parents or children get sick, and in what she does for 
her husband. These actions are given meaning, such as in a community or 
                                                
39 McCarthy, p. 40.  
40 McCarthy, p. 44.  
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in an assembly of prayer, in marriage and friendships, and in the feelings 
that she is allowed to express (or not to express). Her actions are also 
given meaning in the speeches of churchmen and politicians she listens to 
about family values and motherhood, in what she is told by those 
authorities from whom she seeks advice. Then there are the familial, 
social, and religious rituals attendant upon these actions, providing the 
occasions where even her bodily gestures express authority in one 
instance, dependency in another. Then there are the forms and degrees of 
sentiment attached to these attitudes and ideas. In each of these ways a 
person’s ideas are her actions and sentiments and gestures. Her ideas exist 
in actions; her actions are inserted into practices; practices are governed 
by the rituals she chooses to undergo.41 
As is clear from her application, beliefs are directly tied to ideologies which in 
turn are linked with material and mental practices. These are then seen as part of 
larger social structures including the political dimension of life. All of these 
combine into an approach which is quite applicable to the kind of work done by 
some parts of performance studies. This is a productive way to look at the overall 
pattern of human behaviours, and it is comprehensive. It would complement 
research done in performance studies if the goal was to analyse performance as 
part of a totality of social behaviour, with an emphasis on ideology and the 
political.  
 
Cultural Theory 
Many disciplines claim cultural theory, which is a necessarily interdisciplinary 
area of research. The field of sociology uses it in a way congruent to my approach 
to the integration of theory. A primary aspect of all fields that use cultural theory 
is the use of theories themselves – from Marx, to Foucault, Stuart Hall to Pierre 
Bourdieu – the theories come from critical theory, philosophy and sociology. 
Sociology’s use of theory demonstrates a sustained interest in the application of 
theories to the practical applications of the field. Case studies and practical 
                                                
41 McCarthy, p. 44.  
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examples are balanced with theoretical concepts. In the book Cultural Theory: 
Classical and Contemporary Positions the essays on applied theory tackle a wide 
range of topics, for example, feminist epistemology and participatory action 
paired with a reconsideration of the Frankfurt School and phenomenology. This is 
typical of the work of contemporary cultural theory.  
An example of work by Ann Brooks on the Chinese diaspora and ‘politics 
of veiling’ in Islamic groups combines examples from case studies with theories 
on feminism, subjectivity and identity.42 As Tim Edwards explains, when faced 
with research that demands wide ranging engagements with culture, Brooks 
comes to the conclusion that in order to address such broad topics 
interdisciplinarity is the best method to employ: 
Through a wide-ranging discussion, often placing a heavy emphasis upon 
questions of feminist praxis, she concludes that neither the traditions of 
sociology nor cultural studies alone are wide enough to incorporate the 
complexities of contemporary culture. Implicit within this…is an 
engagement with interdisciplinarity or, more basically, an argument for 
what one might call subject hybrids combining and drawing on an array of 
disciplinary backgrounds.43 
Brooks explains that in her research multiple fields are brought to bear. This is 
necessary and relevant because the use of multiple fields is reflective of the 
contemporary reality of the social world: 
The interdisciplinary matrix of cultural studies including feminism, 
postcolonialism, postmodernism, critical ethnography, film, literature and 
cultural politics have been shown to produce a dynamic interplay of 
epistemological and representational discourses more reflective of the 
transnationalization of genders, classes, ethnicities, and publics which 
frame the contemporary social world.44 
I echo her assertion that this approach yields more comprehensive results when 
                                                
42 Ann Brooks, ‘Reconceptualizing Representation and Identity: Issues of transculturalism and 
transnationalism in the intersection of feminism and cultural sociology’, in Cultural Theory: 
Classical and Contemporary Positions, ed. by Tim Edwards (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 183-209. 
43 Tim Edwards, ed. ‘Introduction’, Cultural Theory: Classical and Contemporary Positions 
(London: Sage, 2007), pp. 1-4 (p. 4).  
44 Brooks, p. 206.   
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the subject of the research is an aspect of the contemporary social world. 
Bringing together multiple approaches is multifaceted and subtler than discipline-
bound analyses. While not overtly a cultural theory approach to performance, my 
work is still consonant with the aims and practices of this area of research.   
 
Anthropology and Ritual Studies 
Two more fields closely related to sociology and cultural theory are anthropology 
and ritual studies. Both deal directly with belief as it impacts the rituals and 
actions of the people who are researched. However, belief is often treated as a 
given in the work. Traditional approaches to anthropological research have led to 
belief being taken for granted in a specific manner. A cursory glance at the field 
reveals a pattern of analysis focused on the understanding that “ritual is symbolic 
activity as opposed to the instrumental behavior of life.”45 Talal Asad positions 
the development of this understanding as historical in his book Genealogies of 
Religion. With reference to major figures in the field, such as Clifford Geertz, 
Asad rehearses standard explanations of ritual and religion, e.g. Geertz’s 
definition of religion as a “system of symbols.”46 In this formulation rituals are 
symbols that communicate what Geertz calls the “general order.” To use an 
example, an interpretation of participation in the Eucharist would be to see it as 
an expression of belief in Jesus Christ as the son of God. The Eucharistic ritual 
can be seen as symbolic activity that also references a deeper belief; the ritual is 
                                                
45 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (London: Johns Hopkins, 1993), p. 55. 
46 “A religion, he proposes, is “(1) a system of symbols which act to (2) establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a 
general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.” (Geertz [90] in Asad 30) This is 
referenced later in Chapter 4 where Wouter J. Hanegraaff reformulates it in the section on the 
New Age. 
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an “outward sign” of an “inward meaning.”47 Ethnographers and scholars of 
religion thus try to communicate the beliefs that the rituals are meant to express. 
As most of the rituals examined since the advent of anthropology have come from 
outside of the Western paradigm one of the key tasks that the anthropologist 
fulfills is, as Asad clarifies, to frame the actions as symbolic before they become 
“candidates for interpretation.” 48 Rituals are constantly undergoing translation, 
but these translations are always with the anthropologist’s culture in mind, 
because it is there that the work will be read. The ‘text’ that is read is a 
compilation of the signs that have been deciphered to ‘reveal’ the presumed inner 
meaning of the ritual. 
Asad goes on to explain why he is not satisfied with this theory of ritual. 
He presents a different framework through which to read ritual activity that takes 
him from medieval Christian practices through various definitions throughout the 
centuries. He emphasizes instead, that to theorize ritual as symbolic activity 
expressive of an inner state limits understandings of how religion and ritual 
function.   
A primary text for Asad’s argument is the 1973 essay “Techniques of the 
Body” by sociologist Marcel Mauss. Mauss’ approach to human behaviour talks 
of learned capabilities instead of habits or customs. Employing the Latin word 
habitus, Mauss developed a framework that linked repeated actions not just to 
individual idiosyncracies but social context: “we should see the techniques and 
work of collective and individual practical reason rather than, in the ordinary 
way, merely the soul and its repetitive faculties.”49 “Practical reason,” in this 
sense is the ‘learned capacities’. He does not want the body understood as one 
                                                
47 Asad, p. 59. 
48 Asad, p. 61. 
49 Mauss in Asad, p. 75. [My emphasis.] 
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half of a binary set with the soul/mind on the other side. This would cast it as a 
“passive recipient of ‘cultural imprints.’”50 This is particularly problematic if the 
body can be conceptualised as “readable sign,” of an “inner character,” as if a 
person can be read by observing the body.51 The entire person should, instead, be 
seen to be a “developable means for achieving a range of human objectives” 
(physical, emotional, and spiritual objectives).52 An example of an “embodied 
aptitude” is a ballet dancer. The body “knows” the steps to Swann Lake 
differently than the mind knows it.53 The body as a term is not equal to the task at 
hand. The entire person performs embodied practices which are not necessarily 
based on logical thought processes. 
Asad uses the theory of habitus because he finds it particularly compelling 
in relation to ritual: “[it] invites us to analyze the body as an assemblage of 
embodied aptitudes, not as a medium of symbolic meanings.”54 I raise Asad’s 
work because it complements the approach I am taking in relation to putting 
emphasis on the embodied practices in ritual.55  
 Many discussions of belief only mention the word tangentially. In fact, 
this is a wide-ranging problem for anyone in any field who wants to look in depth 
at belief because most academic engagements talk around belief itself. This 
happens because belief is difficult to articulate, because all people use examples 
and metaphor to explain the relationship belief has to daily life, and because it is 
often through ritual and action that belief has been explained. This is partly due to 
                                                
50 Mauss in Asad, p. 76. 
51 Mauss in Asad, p. 76. 
52 Asad, p. 76. 
53 Asad, p. 76. 
54 Asad, p. 75. 
55 This discussion of Asad’s work is indebted to conversations with, and an unpublished article by, 
Jerilyn Sambrooke, “Meaningless Rituals: Embodied Practice and Freedom in Purple Hibiscus”, 
(2011).  
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the prevalence of the idea that outward signs could prove belief. The variety of 
ways that belief has been defined has led more to confusion than to clarity, as 
Catherine Bell explains: 
When defined in terms of the mental states of individuals, belief has been 
deemed beyond the reach of social analysis. Yet belief has also been 
described as irreducibly social in nature, a matter of collectively 
significant activities rather than personally held concepts or attitudes. 
More frequently, belief systems are understood to be a matter of cultural 
worldviews or communally constructed ideological systems, quite beyond 
what a particular person may or may not hold to be true.56 
This multivalent view of how belief has been defined points to the problems of 
both defining the term too closely and too loosely.  
Many studies into what people believe have shown that belief does not 
work by producing the same ideas and concepts in all the practitioners. In fact, 
more and more it has been shown that the practice of communal rituals, including 
prayer, work because they allow for multiplicity of vision, understanding and 
practice. As Bell writes: “Hinduism for Hindus is not a coherent belief system, 
but, first and foremost, a collection of practices.”57 Yet, after a few hundred years 
of anthropological study the same topics are still being investigated. Perhaps the 
questions themselves differ slightly, but it could also be that it is the answers 
themselves that are changing as contemporary research continues to see a need to 
interrogate ritual action. Bell succinctly summarizes what it is about ritual that 
remains ephemeral: 
[H]ow does ritual do what we keep saying it does: How does it actually 
inculcate cultural or political values, converting beliefs about another 
world into facts about this one and vice versa, and “inventing” traditions 
even as it purports to be transmitting them? These questions reflect a 
concern to analyze symbols and rites as real, effective, and powerful, not 
as simply secondary and expressive or as mere ideological tools that 
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brainwash by dint of redundant assertions and group enthusiasm.58  
 
A completely different approach to the answer of ‘how does ritual do 
what we say it does’ comes from those who write about their lived experiences as 
members of religious groups. Lauren F. Winner is a professor of Christian 
Spirituality, but has also written extensively about her life as an Orthodox Jew 
and her conversion to Christianity. In Mudhouse Sabbath she shares her 
meditations on various shared practices between Judaism and Christianity. 
Winner comments on the practices associated with the Sabbath, food, mourning, 
hospitality, prayer, the body, fasting, ageing, candle-lighting, weddings, and 
doorposts. In each case she looks at the historical and scriptural reasons that 
Judaism engages with the practices. Overarchingly she makes the case that, “for 
Jews, the essence of the thing is a doing, an action. Your faith might come and 
go, but your practice ought not waiver. (Indeed Judaism suggests that the 
repeating of the practice is the best way to ensure that a doubter’s faith will 
return.)”59 This focus on action is drawn out through each chapter and the context 
is given for each practice in Christianity. Her point is that practices are what form 
people at a foundational level. One example in particular is about prayer, 
specifically liturgical prayer: 
Judaism is not the only religion to pray liturgically. Salah, the five-times-
a-day Muslim prayer, is also liturgical. The American Buddhist Congress 
is developing a Buddhist liturgy, urging a “flexible standardization of the 
liturgy so that anyone attending [a] service anywhere in the country could 
feel at home, understand, and join in.” And many Christians—in 
particular Anglicans, Catholics, and the Eastern Orthodox—rely on prayer 
books, reciting set prayers at set hours of each day.60 
The daily rhythms of life are directly linked to the beliefs people hold and how 
these are integrated into the overall pattern of life. Indeed, as the dissertation will 
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show, beliefs are at the foundation of more than just cultural ritual. They inform 
every aspect of how we act and interact with the world around us.  
To question what is meant by belief is clearly to enter into a large and 
wide ranging discussion. In this dissertation I start with metaphysics and the 
foundations of Western thought. Greek philosophy and Christian theology 
together form the basis for conceptions of salvation, the metaphysical and the 
body in Western culture. Despite their inherent contradictions, which I explain in 
detail later, they have and continue to affect all understandings of the entire 
person in relation to belief. It is Derrida who shows most clearly that these 
structures cannot go away, that every thought and piece of writing is already 
caught even where it seeks to escape. Derrida reads Plato, Nietzsche and Artaud 
through this idea – that the processes of metaphysics make it impossible to 
formulate anything from outside of the system. Derrida’s essay, ‘The Theatre of 
Cruelty and the Closure of Representation’ on Artaud’s most famous text, The 
Theatre and its Double, brings together all the strands I have talked about thus 
far. Here Derrida places Nietzsche next to Plato, next to theology, next to theatre 
and shows the circularity of metaphysics, and the process of representation. 
 
THE CLOSURE OF REPRESENTATION 
Artaud’s theories provide the basis for Derrida to discuss the full scope of 
the influence of metaphysics in relation to theatrical practices. Artaud discusses 
theatre, not performance, and I do not use him again in the dissertation. This short 
example of how Derrida treats Artaud’s work acts as a primer for the extensive 
discussion of metaphysics and representation that happens throughout the thesis. 
In The Theatre and its Double Artaud takes to task the theatre itself, critics, 
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philosophers, theorists and all those involved in producing and directing Western 
theatre.61 He vehemently disagrees with theatre as simple entertainment and make 
believe, and advocates for a theatre like that of the Balinese that “does away with 
entertainment, that aspect of useless artificiality, an evening’s amusement so 
typical of our own theatre.”62 Artaud does not want the audience to have to 
‘disbelieve’ what they are watching and experiencing, yet the kind of belief he is 
looking for is not simply a reversal of that which currently exists. Part of what he 
wants to change is the style of presentation itself in order to ‘fix’ the problem of 
representation, or as he calls it here, lies and illusion: 
[I]f we have all finally come to regard theatre as an inferior art, a means of 
coarse distraction, using it as an outlet for our worst instincts, this is 
because we have for too long been told theatre is all lies and illusion. 
Because for four hundred years, that is since the Renaissance, we have 
become accustomed to purely descriptive, narrative theatre, narrating 
psychology.63 
Artaud’s call for change in theatre is not just an irate rant, he has suggestions for 
the direction Western theatre can look for inspiration. In particular he is interested 
in the forms of expression he saw in a piece of Balinese theatre (shown at an 
exposition in Paris), as his comments about the show demonstrate: “There is 
something of a religious ritual ceremony about them, in the sense that they 
eradicate any idea of pretence, a ridiculous imitation of real life, from the 
spectator’s mind.”64 The form and structure of religious ritual allowed, or so 
argues Artaud, for the performers to be themselves, to put aside representation 
and engage with objects and action that accomplished something tangible, e.g. 
eating, singing, touching a sacred object, etc. It is this engagement with the 
physical and material that Artaud is specifically interested in activating: “Theatre 
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is the only place in the world, the last group means we still possess of directly 
affecting the anatomy.”65 
In order to really affect people it was necessary to make them feel and 
experience theatre through the physical and material. To do this Artaud 
developed his own theory of theatre and called it the Theatre of Cruelty. By 
cruelty, Artaud does not refer to acts of physical violence, but rather to the task of 
building an awareness of the human position in the world: 
[A] “theatre of cruelty” means theatre that is difficult and cruel for myself 
first of all. And on a performing level, it has nothing to do with the cruelty 
we practice on one another, hacking at each other’s bodies….but the far 
more terrible, essential cruelty objects can practice on us. We are not free 
and the sky can still fall on our heads. And above all else theatre is made 
to teach us this.66 
In order to succeed in affecting people at a deep emotional level Artaud called for 
drastic changes in how theatre makers thought of every aspect of theatre, from 
dialogue, to objects themselves: 
Yet to change the purpose of theatre dialogue is to use it in an actual 
spatial sense, uniting it with everything in theatre that is spatial and 
significant in the tangible field. This means handling it as something 
concrete, disturbing things, first spatially, then in an infinitely more secret 
and mysterious field permitting more scope.67 
He demands that theatre be thought of firstly in relation to its physical and 
material aspects, which lead to discussions of the intangible and mysterious, or in 
other words, the spiritual. It is the physicality and materiality of theatre that 
Artaud foregrounds. He wants theatre to affect the entire person because he 
understands spiritual experiences to be linked to that which is experienced by the 
whole being. What he does not want is for the theatrical experience to be limited 
to intellectual ruminations which do not lead anywhere.  
 In ‘The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation’ Jacques 
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Derrida expands on Artaud’s theories, applying them to a wider discussion of the 
affects of metaphysics on Western artistic practices. Derrida agrees that the 
binary of real and representation is at the heart of the problem with Western 
theatre: “The menace of repetition is nowhere else as well organized as in theatre. 
Nowhere else is one so close to the stage as the origin of repetition.”68 His 
criticism is not, however, just with theatre but with all of Western culture: “This 
representation whose structure is imprinted not only on the art, but on the entire 
culture of the West (its religions, philosophies, politics), therefore designates 
more than just a particular type of theatrical construction.”69 The impact of 
metaphysics and representation is insidious, and the theatre has been subject to 
these processes perhaps more than other art forms.  
In his reading of Artaud, Derrida continually references other writers 
whose work impacts the vision of theatre that Artaud promoted. Derrida 
comments on theatre directly as the art form which might best destroy imitation 
and mimesis, which both Nietzsche and Artaud worked towards in their writing.70 
Derrida links Nietzsche to Artaud repeatedly in relation to the role of the 
audience, the weakness of imitation compared to reality, and the nature of being. 
Making these connections is crucial because Derrida shows a genealogy of 
thought that stems from Plato. He uses the concept of being to make these 
connections and he defines ‘being’ thus: “Being is the form in which the infinite 
diversity of the forms and forces of life and death can indefinitely merge and be 
repeated in the word. For there is no word, nor in general a sign, which is not 
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constituted by the possibility of repeating itself.”71 The definition of being is at 
the heart of this argument about representation, and Derrida makes explicit the 
commonalities between his own writings and those of Artaud, Nietzsche, and 
Plato: “Like Nietzsche…Artaud refuses to subsume Life to Being.” Derrida 
identifies Artaud’s thinking as part of the tradition of critiquing metaphysics; 
Artaud uses the phrase “the beyond of being” which Derrida calls a 
“[manipulation of] this expression of Plato’s…in a Nietzschean style.”72 It is 
through this discussion of being that Derrida builds links to the idea of theatre 
and nonrepresentation. The only way to think of theatre which allows for any part 
of it to not be representative is to call on its performative qualities, i.e. how it 
exists in the moment of its performance and how that existence cannot be 
captured. Derrida puts it this way: theatre “is neither a book nor a work, but an 
energy, and in this sense it is the only art of life.”73 
Yet, Derrida does not produce a manifesto endorsing the Theatre of 
Cruelty as the saving force against metaphysics; “Artaud knew that the theatre of 
cruelty neither begins nor is completed within the purity of simple presence, but 
rather is already within representation.”74 Derrida brings his essay to a close by 
systematically enumerating all the reasons why the theatre Artaud aspired to 
remains impossible. One key reason was Western theatre’s dependence on words. 
Artaud and Derrida agree that Western society focuses on language as the locus 
of information and power. When theatre is dominated by language and 
metaphysics Derrida refers to it as theological: 
The stage is theological for as long as it is dominated by speech, by a will 
to speech, by the layout of a primary logos which does not belong to the 
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theatrical site and governs it from a distance. The stage is theological for 
as long as its structure, following the entirety of tradition, comports the 
following elements: an author-creator who, absent and from afar, is armed 
with a text and keeps watch over, assembles, regulates the time or the 
meaning of representation, letting this latter represent him as concerns 
what is called the content of his thoughts, his intentions, his ideas.75 
In other words, theatre currently looks outwards to texts which dictate what 
happens on stage, as well as to the author who is understood as the expert on the 
text. The stage is a space used to represent all that the author, through the text, 
deems important. Derrida sees this arrangement as one of the main limits to the 
potential of the stage, and lists what theatre would have to avoid in order to be 
freed from representation: 
The stage, certainly, will no longer represent, since it will not operate as 
an addition, as the sensory illustration of a text already written, thought, or 
lived outside the stage, which the stage would then only repeat but whose 
fabric it would not constitute. The stage will no longer operate as the 
representation of a present, will no longer re-present a present that would 
exist elsewhere and prior to it, a present whose plenitude would be older 
than it, absent from it and rightfully capable of doing without it: the being-
present-to-itself of the absolute Logos, the living present of God. Nor will 
the stage be a representation, if representation means the surface of a 
spectacle displayed for spectators. It will not even offer the presentation of 
a present, if present signifies that which is maintained in front of me. 
Cruel representation must permeate me. And nonrepresentation is, thus, 
original representation, if representation signifies, also, the unfolding of a 
volume, a multidimensional milieu, an experience which produces its own 
space.76 
Theatre cannot but be circumscribed by the structures of representation: there is 
no way to step outside of the logics of representation as it is always already 
present. In which case, what is Derrida’s reason for starting the discussion in the 
first place? Typically, Derrida uses the problems he lists in the article as an 
opportunity for a discussion which ultimately is not about theatre so much as it is 
about representation. It is at the end of the article that Derrida adds another 
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perspective on representation that complicates the notion of repetition ending or 
beginning: 
Because it has always already begun, representation therefore has no end. 
But one can conceive of the closure of that which is without end. Closure 
is the circular limit within which the repetition of difference infinitely 
repeats itself. That is to say, closure is its playing space. This movement is 
the movement of the world as play.77 
It is the way that theatre fits into the problem of repetition itself that is of interest 
to Derrida. As he explains, “[Artaud] cannot resign himself to theatre as 
repetition, and cannot renounce theatre as nonrepetition.”78 The theatre of cruelty 
is interesting because it allows for a discussion of this playing space, of the 
movements at the closure of representation. 
 It is not productive to argue a way out of representation because there is 
no escape, yet there must be ways to put representation to the side in order to look 
at what happens within the cycle of representation. If one of the greatest problems 
with representation is the idea of imitation, mimesis, or the repetition of that 
which has already been signified, then what is needed is a way to conceive of 
action as nonrepresentative, if only for a moment. Even Derrida, as previously 
mentioned (theatre “is neither a book nor a work”), recognizes that theatre or in 
my examples – performance – does have an aspect to it which seems to be about 
the present moment and nothing else: “theatrical representation is finite, and 
leaves behind it, behind its actual presence, no trace, no object to carry off.”79 My 
proposition is to focus on this moment of presence, the moment of action, not to 
negate the text or texts from which a piece of theatre or performance may 
originate, nor to ignore the representation(s) which must take place in order for 
theatre to happen. The closure of representation will happen, indeed the closure 
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that Derrida explains may be helpful as it is bound up with movement and play, 
and with actions. It is to action and the analysis of action that I turn to propose a 
method of analysis that is precisely suited to this task: the performative. 
 Performative action is a never ending process of human action (verbal and 
spoken) that is based in repetition, but this repetition produces something new 
that evolves with each repetition. In other words, as representation cycles back, or 
closes in on itself, to start a new repetition there is the potential for developments, 
shifts, new meanings, to emerge. This is discussed at length in Chapter 1 and so I 
will not rehearse the entirety of the theory of performativity here. What is 
important about the approach I am using is its applicability and usefulness in 
relation to performance practices, especially ones which are religious/spiritual in 
nature. As already mentioned in the descriptions of the chapters, my two case 
studies are on Roman Catholic liturgy and the performance art of Marina 
Abramovi!.   
The Roman Catholic liturgy is an example of a performance form which 
developed in the West and has been the main influence on spiritual practices for 
close to 2,000 years. Its rhythms and structures permeate Western literature but 
its relevance to contemporary performance theory and practices is under-
developed. It might seem strange to use a form which exists not only as a text, but 
as one of the most highly controlled and contextualised texts. The Roman 
Catholic Church oversees the administration of the liturgy to the smallest detail 
and revisions to the text are only allowed after long and serious debate. Liturgy 
cannot escape from its textual roots but I argue that any performance of the 
liturgy must also be seen as an enactment of liturgical action and not just the 
enactment of text. I do not argue for a Christian reading of performance, nor for 
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liturgy that is a perfect representation of worship. This is not a theological 
reading but one focused on performative action. 
Throughout its history Christian understandings of the metaphysical have 
predominated over physical and material aspects of being. I introduce the 
performative nature of belief to the discussion of what has typically been 
metaphysical to bring out precisely that which Artaud and Nietzsche found 
lacking both in metaphysics and in Christianity. In the process, I show how 
liturgy is not about spectators who passively receive, but participants who act and 
create the liturgy through their bodies and their interaction with objects. This is 
an analysis that examines how the materials of the liturgy are part of the 
instantiation and manifestation of belief. Instead of insisting that Western 
religious practice is reliant on thinking and reason, representation and 
metaphysics, this dissertation identifies how belief in the West is about the bodies 
of those present and what happens to those bodies. This also avoids the problem 
of comparing the liturgy to another practice or using drama or theatre as a 
metaphor for the way in which liturgy functions. The analysis focuses on the 
practices themselves in order to understand the performative function of the form. 
The liturgy is ideal as a performance form because even as it exists as a text, it is 
only through its enactment by the body of believers that it, the liturgy, comes into 
being. It confuses the clear lines of argumentation about the theatre as presented 
by Derrida and demonstrates that the Christian performance form is not just about 
the metaphysical. 
The two case studies are ultimately focused on four main points.  
1) The analysis of the liturgy shows that a performative approach is 
necessary and productive to the study of the liturgy the field of 
theology; 
2) An argument is also made for the relevance of the liturgy to the 
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study of rituals from within the field of performance studies; 
3) The case study on performance art highlights that the 
religious/spiritual themes and images are rarely critiqued or 
understood as belonging to Western tradition; and 
4) That performance studies is as deeply embedded in Western 
discourse as any other field, yet has little to no awareness, or 
ability to identify, discuss or treat Christian symbols or themes. 
These points build one upon the other throughout the dissertation. They are not 
meant to be comparative, instead they show different problems from different 
fields. These ultimately overlap in terms of relevance to the overall study of 
belief in religious/spiritual performance. 
 When Western artists and academics are confronted with a performance 
that either the artist or the spectators/participants frame as religious/spiritual, the 
critic immediately reaches for Eastern spiritual practices as the basis of 
comparison. Yet, as my research shows, when these practices are put next to 
Christian ones it becomes obvious that Christian practices are also grounded in 
bodily and material practices. Both rely on stimulating the senses through the use 
of objects, and both Eastern and Western traditions, in all their variations, have a 
full range of practices from the ascetic to the communal. Western religious 
practices need to be understood as relevant, in the same way that the Eastern 
currently are, to contemporary Western performance practices. The case study on 
performance art is used to make this argument and to highlight how the structure 
of Western belief is also at play in performance art. It is these links between 
belief and the entire person, between belief and tangible physical demands and 
experiences that is missing. Simply making the case for analyses of performance 
art in order to compare it to liturgy is not the answer. This would just produce 
comparisons which were based on representation and would thus fall into the 
same kinds of logics which Derrida, Nietzsche and Artaud argue against. As with 
 45 
the liturgy, an analysis that highlights the performative action in performance art 
allows belief itself to be conceptualised in a more complex way. The result of 
which is a broader understanding of how performance, spirituality and belief are 
interconnected in Western practice. 
 Placing the contemporary performance art of Marina Abramovi! next to 
Christian liturgy might have seemed like an idiosyncratic choice, but recent 
publications point to other connections being made between the fields that treat 
Christian practice and performance studies. Performance Research’s issue On 
Congregation (2008), is an example of this interest. Of the seventeen articles in 
the issue, twelve make reference at least once to the word ‘Christian.’ A third 
discuss some aspect of liturgy, and all are invested in bringing together 
theoretical concerns with their accounts of embodied practices. This is all positive 
in terms of the field being open to the idea of studying the Christian tradition that 
has been so long neglected. However, the approaches of these articles are very 
different to my own. All are interested in the representational and historical 
whether through an examination of preaching, dance, the drama of the liturgy or 
church led theatrical events in the Netherlands in the mid twentieth century.  
I want to highlight two articles from the issue whose approach comes 
closest to what I advocate. Addressing the concept of the post-Christian narrative, 
Rina Arya examines two performance artists, Herman Nitzsch and Marina 
Abramovi!, but she chooses to work with performance from the 1960s and 1970s 
(the one exception is a mention of Abramovi!’s 1997 Spirit House). Arya is 
interested in what can be discussed when theology and performance studies are 
brought together around ideas of “the sacred and the profane, the relationship 
between wounding and healing, and finally the establishment of the communal or 
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the congregational.”80 She is interested in the role of the body, and in her 
assessment what performance studies offers is a way to relook at established 
practices, and see their importance as material practices. How she does this is not 
innovative, but her comment on where Christian practice should fit is apt: 
Christianity is often kept out of the performance arena, but in this meeting 
of theology and performance practice we experience a synergy, which 
rehabilitates both practices. Theological thinking is revised, updated and 
moved from its doctrinal and institutionalized focus to a post-Christian 
understanding of the significance of its rituals and practices.81 
It is on this point – that performance theory enables a revision of theological 
understandings and leads to broader understandings of the rituals and practices – 
that Arya’s work is in line with my argument.  
Another article in the same journal also examines liturgy as ritual 
however, not as performative. Claire Maria Chambers Blackstock’s argument 
brings to mind my use of performativity, but she does not use the term in her 
work: 
In the same way that rhetoric in language is the effective and persuasive 
use of words, the rhetoric of ritual effectively and persuasively uses 
rhetorical elements such as dance, gesture, word, visual art, music, food 
and incense to demonstrate liturgy as a communal practice that moves 
beyond the repetition of a creed to an argument for a radical reality. To be 
fully present in the liturgy is to be fully present to the entirety of life, 
inside and outside the church building.82 
Comparing the effects of language with those of ritual action she argues that it is 
through embodied repetition that the beliefs (as expressed through the liturgy) are 
made reality for the participants. Her article focuses on “the dancing congregation 
at St. Gregory of Nyssa Episcopal Church in San Francisco, California” and 
positions “liturgical congregational dance as theory-making practice danced out 
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in theory-making space.”83 Blackstock engages more directly with the subjects of 
her case study and interviews them about their experiences with this form of 
liturgy. She also uses liturgy as a metaphor for the spiritual relationships that 
exist between the participants and each other, and the participants and God. Her 
approach emphasises the material nature of Christian ritual and its effect on the 
people who perform. None of the other articles in the journal attempt what this 
dissertation argues, neither in scope nor in approach. The two articles from 
Performance Research are examples of work that engages both sides of my own 
interests, and demonstrate that the study of Christian ritual is relevant to 
contemporary research.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Throughout the dissertation I use examples and other fields to argue for the 
importance of performative action in all its forms; in meaning-making, in relation 
to agency and for affecting and effecting belief. Through this research belief is 
seen as an embodied practice, encompassing the entire person. The performances 
associated with belief are shown to require more from participants than mental 
acceptance with no physical aspect, or physical participation with no mental 
engagement. The whole person is implicated in the instantiation and 
manifestation of the performance of belief. 
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CHAPTER 1  
BEYOND THE METAPHYSICS OF BELIEF 
 
Belief is instantiated and manifested through embodied practices that engage the 
entire person. To substantiate this claim from the introduction I turn first to 
philosophy, which in the Western tradition began with the Greeks. From the 
vantage point of the twenty-first century a discussion of metaphysics, philosophy 
and belief can happen through many philosophical routes. I have chosen to take 
my lead from perhaps the best known critic of metaphysical structures of recent 
times, Jacques Derrida. Derrida asks provocative, difficult questions which often 
lead to a surprising range of answers. The question below is no different; it seems 
to be about religious discourse however Derrida implicitly references the history 
of Western thought, as well as how languages communicate salvation:  
Pretext for a first question: can a discourse on religion be dissociated 
from a discourse of salvation: which is to say, on the holy, the sacred, the 
safe and sound, the unscathed, the immune (sacer, sanctus, heilig, holy, 
and their alleged equivalents in so many languages)?1 
Within Derrida’s question is the assumption that religion leads to salvation, and 
that salvation is metaphysical. Derrida also situates his question squarely within a 
Western paradigm by listing the word ‘holy’ in a few Western European 
languages. Western cultural understandings of religion presuppose that these 
topics are related and need to be examined together, but as with all of Derrida’s 
questions, there are many possible answers. He asks whether a discussion of 
religion needs to be framed by salvation and metaphysics, and regardless of the 
answer an idea that follows from the first question is – what would the 
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conversation look like without salvation and metaphysics?  The question opens 
up the possibility of thinking about religion in physical and material ways which 
in turn might allow for other understandings of religious practice.  
Religion is, of course, concerned with that which cannot be physically 
apprehended, but the rituals which adherents of a religion use are by their nature 
embodied practices. The engagement with material things and places is a dynamic 
and important part of the lived experience of the spiritual. Christianity, for all of 
the emphasis put on how dependent it is on its metaphysical heritage, has 
developed performative rituals which rely on the physical and material aspects of 
spiritual experience, e.g. the Roman Catholic liturgy. The ways in which this 
inheritance continues to influence us in the West are complex. I seek to 
interrogate contemporary and historical understandings of belief and propose that 
the Christian foundations of Western culture provide embodied forms and 
structures integral to the practice of belief itself. This chapter is theoretical and it 
sets up the analyses of performance in the case studies of Chapters 3 and 4; 
however, it also stands on its own as an independent contribution to the concept 
of the performance of belief.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. I start by taking up Derrida’s 
question in specific relation to belief. I begin with Plato and rehearse his concept 
of metaphysics with emphasis on the binary structure of body/soul. I then move to 
the advent of Christianity and the role of belief within this tradition. The very 
different conceptions of the body/soul are discussed at length. This leads to 
Friedrich Nietzsche and his writings that sought to undermine truth claims 
whether from Christianity or from philosophy. This thread is then taken up by 
Jacques Derrida who takes a different approach to dissecting the metaphysical 
 50 
structures inherited from Plato. This first section finishes with a short introduction 
to Nancey Murphy’s contemporary work in theology arguing for a revisiting of 
the Hebrew concepts of the ‘God breathed body.’ 
The second section shifts disciplines to anthropology and religious 
studies. The focus is on scholars who address the use of language and its effects 
on the people they study. A particularly enlightening study was done by Jean 
Pouillon who compares the use of ‘belief’ and ‘to believe’ in Christian cultures to 
an African language used by members of a syncretic religion. Together these 
examples make the case for the specificity of Western belief and the role that 
language plays in expressing and explaining belief; language and belief evolve 
together in continuous interaction.  
The third section introduces yet another area of study, speech act theory. 
This theory originates in linguistics, but has been adopted and developed by 
theorists from many fields. I rehearse the basic workings of the linguistic theory 
as articulated by J.L. Austin and John R. Searle and then move to Judith Butler 
who has done significant work on the performative nature of human behaviours. 
While it is her theories on gender and the capacity of speech to injure that have 
been most influential in performance studies, another theorist, Saba Mahmood is 
introduced for her use of the performative in research with religious groups. To 
return to Derrida: What does a discourse on religion look like without a focus on 
salvation?  
 
REREADING METAPHYSICS 
Plato 
Plato did not call his ideas a ‘salvation theory,’ but they have contributed directly 
to Western notions of salvation. Plato discussed the transcendental, celestial, 
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other-worldly, divine, spiritual and religious, alongside his thoughts on the city 
state, the arts, philosophy, and of course the theory of Forms (or Ideas). In an 
examination of a section of The Republic, Gregory Vlastos comments on how 
integrated the spiritual is within the writing: “Plato passes here within a single 
sentence and without any transitional marker from the moral to the religious 
dimension. And this he does time and time again.”2 The texts in The Republic are 
full of Plato’s spiritual ideas and these are not separated structurally or 
grammatically from the rest. For Plato a discussion of the unseen and unknown 
was necessary, so necessary that the eternal life of the soul depended on a person 
striving for the ‘intelligible place.’3 Salvation was only possible when the soul 
sought out higher planes of existence. With this in mind I rehearse some of the 
most well known passages about the Forms to highlight the way in which 
salvation is implicit in Plato’s metaphysics.4 This section sets the ground work for 
how salvation became a structural principle in Western philosophical discourse. 
For Plato, all earthly experience, such as that of beauty, justice, etc., is 
dependent on the existence of the Forms5, as G.M.A. Grube elaborates: 
The theory of ‘ideas’ is the belief in eternal, unchanging, universal 
absolutes, independent of the world of phenomena; in, for example, 
absolute beauty, absolute justice, absolute goodness, from which whatever 
we call beautiful, just or good derives any reality it may have.6 
The Forms are eternal and as they exist independently of what is experienced on 
                                                
2 Gregory Vlastos, ‘A Metaphysical Paradox’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association, 39 (1965 - 1966), 5-19 (p. 14). 
3 Plato, The Republic, trans. by R.E. Allen (London: Yale University Press, 2006), 517b-517c. 
4 It is thought that the idea of Forms was a well known term in contemporary philosophy during 
Plato’s time and thus it barely receives an explanation in the text. In the section titled The Theory 
of Forms the use of the word ‘form’ only occurs once. 
5 G.M.A. Grube explains the Theory or Forms or Ideas thus: “Its meaning and scope—for there 
are Ideas of much more than ethical concepts—will become clear as we proceed, but a warning is 
necessary at the outset: it is well known, but cannot be too often repeated, that the word Idea in 
this connexion is a very misleading transliteration, and in no way a translation, of the Greek word 
!"#$ which, with its synonym %!"&', Plato frequently applies to these supreme realities. The 
nearest translation is ‘form’ or ‘appearance’, that is, the ‘look’ of a person or thing.” G.M.A. 
Grube, Plato’s Thought (London: Athlone Press, 1980), p. 1. 
6 Grube, p. 1. 
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earth they require a location. This place was referred to by Plato as ‘the 
intelligible place’ in his Allegory of The Cave. As this allegory is well known I 
will not elaborate in great detail, but a quick retelling of the story is useful to 
situate the argument. 
In Plato’s imagined location a group of people are kept tethered at the 
back of a cave such that they can only see the shadows of puppets and objects 
which are projected onto the wall in front of them. Everything they see is defined 
by where it is in relationship to the light source, and what they hear is 
contextualised by whether sounds accompany the shadows. Through dialogue 
form Plato’s analogy progresses from a fanciful story to a discussion of what is 
‘true’:  
Such prisoners, then, I replied, would not acknowledge as true anything 
except shadows of artificial objects. 
Quite necessarily, he said. 
Consider then, I replied, what release and healing from the bonds of 
unwisdom would consist in […] whenever one of them was released, and 
suddenly compelled to stand upright and turn his head and walk and look 
upward to the light….What do you suppose he would say, if someone told 
him that what he had seen before was foolishness, but that now, being 
somewhat nearer to what is and turned toward more real objects, he would 
see more correctly? […] Don’t you suppose he would be perplexed, at a 
loss, and believe the things he saw before more true than those pointed out 
to him now?7 
Plato opposes truth and perception to show that what is understood to be true is 
constructed by circumstance. However, regardless of what each person believes 
to be true, Plato argues that unchanging truth exists and can be grasped. In this 
example the person who is freed and looks at the whole cave would have no 
trouble accepting that the shadows were but partial truths – they did correspond to 
real objects but were unable to show depth, colour, texture, realistic size, etc. 
Once forced to go above ground the person would have no choice but to 
                                                
7 The Republic, 515c-515d. 
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acknowledge that there is a larger reality outside of the cave.8 The previous 
understanding of the world would have to be reconciled with radical new 
concepts of what is real.  
Plato hypothesizes that a person who had had such an experience would 
not want to return to the cave, and, that even if forced to return, would not find it 
easy to adapt. This is not just an analogy to explain that change in life is difficult. 
Plato makes sure that this story is understood in relation to larger philosophical 
debates:  
If you assume that the ascent upward and the vision of things above is the 
upward journey of the soul to the intelligible place, you will not mistake 
my surmise […] In the intelligible place, the Idea of the Good is seen 
finally and with difficulty, but once seen, it must be inferred that it is the 
cause of all things right and beautiful.9 
That which is ‘right and beautiful’ is found above and thus that which is found 
below is of lesser value. The soul seeks higher and better knowledge and finds it 
in the intelligible place which is not accessible with the body (for it is ‘the soul’ 
that makes the ‘ascent upward’). If the Form Good is the source for all things, the 
nature of everything else is determined by, or flows from the Good. Plato sets up 
a type of metaphysical determinism necessary for maintaining the structure of 
belief, i.e. in order to give substance to the intangible focus of belief (the Good), 
all that is ‘right and beautiful,’ and tangible is attributed to the Good. Once this 
attribution has been established, all that is good, right, beautiful and true is 
dependent on the Good for its existence and its nature. In this way, lived 
experiences of good things are thought of as representations of the larger, more 
                                                
8 “Then I suppose he would have to become accustomed to it, if he is going to see the things 
above. It would be easier first to look at shadows, next at images in water of men and other things, 
and afterward at the things themselves; after this, it would be easier to contemplate things in the 
heaven and the heaven itself by night, and gaze at the light of the stars and the moon, than at the 
sun and its light by day” (The Republic, 516a-516b). 
9 The Republic, 517b-517c. 
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important Good. The association of the experience of good things with the 
intangible Good is thus what gives rise to a belief in the intangible upon which 
that which we experience is grounded. The idea of the intangible is produced as a 
necessary condition for an understanding of the Good. 
To agree with the theory of forms is to believe in the forms, as explained 
in the earlier quotation - the “belief in eternal, unchanging, universal absolutes, 
independent of the world of phenomena.”10 Plato specifies that it is the soul 
which is able to ascend to this place, but not the body.11 The soul and the body, to 
continue his logic, are two even as they exist together. So the soul extends beyond 
the body while the person is alive and then leaves the body when the person dies. 
Alongside the ideas of absolutes Plato sets up further binaries which are 
concerned with defining the eternal more specifically. 
All that is unchanging is real, but the real is not accessible except via the 
soul.12 The binaries and the Forms have a direct affect on the body and soul. 
While aspects of the Forms are experienced through the body, the body itself is 
part of the material world and only has access to the immaterial and eternal 
during the time the soul is present in the body. Only the soul is capable of truly 
participating in the eternal and immaterial. Plato’s explanation of the soul 
provides insight into how he arrived at these distinctions and how he understood 
the function of salvation. The discussion of the soul in Phaedrus offers a clear 
account of Plato’s thought on the question of salvation. 
In Phaedrus Plato uses a dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus about 
                                                
10 As in the introduction belief in this case refers to a trust in something which cannot be seen or 
known and thus must be believed. 
11 As Plato used the body in opposition to the soul this section applies these words as he would, 
unless otherwise noted. 
12 This is a simplistic way of explaining the effects of the binaries on the human experience, but it 
serves to show what kind of divide Plato was trying to achieve for the good of the soul. 
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the properties of the soul to communicate his ideas. Plato thought that the soul 
existed from the beginning of the universe, and thus did not come into being 
when a person was born, nor cease to exist when a person died. In the following 
section of dialogue Socrates and Phaedrus discuss the immortality of the soul: 
Socrates: All soul is immortal. For that which is always in movement is 
immortal; that which moves something else, and is moved by something 
else, in ceasing from movement ceases from living. […] But it is also 
source and first principle of movement for the other things which move. 
[…] that which moves itself is a first principle of movement. It is not 
possible for this either to be destroyed or to come into being, or else the 
whole universe and the whole of that which comes to be might collapse 
together and come to a halt, and never again have a source from which 
things will be moved and come to be. And since that which is moved by 
itself has shown to be immortal […] the soul will necessarily be 
something that neither comes into being or dies. 13 
This is Plato’s rationale for why the soul is immortal when the body is not. His 
thoughts about motion lead him to posit that the soul cannot have been created; it 
must always have existed. This also implies that the soul does not change, 
because it is compared with first principles, such as absolute goodness, beauty 
and justice, and these do not change. The soul is given an ‘eternal home’ in this 
dialogue, i.e. the soul of the individual originated in and will return to ‘the 
intelligible place.’ Belief in the metaphysical thus includes the reuniting of the 
soul with all that is good and right and true. 
Plato used the analogy of a wing to explain how the soul accesses the 
divine: 
Socrates: The natural property of a wing is to carry what is heavy 
upwards, lifting it aloft to the region where the race of the gods resides, 
and in a way, of all the things belonging to the sphere of the body, it [the 
soul] has the greatest share in the divine, the divine being beautiful, wise, 
good and everything which is of that kind; so it is by these things that the 
plumage of the soul is nourished and increased most of all, while the 
shameful, the bad and in general the opposites of the other things make it 
                                                
13 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. by Christopher Rowe (London: Penguin, 2005), 245c5-246a. 
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waste away and perish.14 
Here Plato clearly describes two places: the divine place and the earth. The divine 
place is what feeds the soul and makes it possible for the soul to continue existing 
while on earth, where it is exposed to the decay of the material world. The soul 
needs to ascend, according to Plato, because it has been separated from the 
divine. It yearns for ‘the intelligible place’ until the body dies and it can be 
reunited with the Good. When it is freed from the body (at death) the soul is 
saved from the problems of earth and delivered to a safe place. 
The goal of Phaedrus is to posit that souls are equal to, or at least as 
important as the absolute truths of the universe. The belief in truth, and in 
salvation as the way to attain truth, remains central to European thought, as 
evidenced by the recurring of this pattern in religion, politics, psychoanalysis, 
philosophy, etc.15 The discussion in Phaedrus of the soul existing from the 
beginning of time provides an example of how Plato explained why salvation was 
necessary. The soul, while bound to the earth, is missing a piece of itself (access 
to truth) and yearns to be reunited. When this is accomplished the soul is ‘saved’ 
by the truth. To believe in metaphysics is to believe in a spiritual structure which 
elevates the soul and saves it as the most prized part of human existence. From 
this point of view, the eternal nature of the soul has two consequences: first, we 
know, or our souls know, the truth, know the absolute truths in their true form 
because they (our souls) existed with them (truths) from the beginning; and, 
secondly, we can only be free when we return to this state, when we can free 
                                                
14 Plato, Phaedrus, 246d5-246e5. 
15 “It may be, for example, that the ‘ultimate’ (saving) truth is a truth about oneself that has 
become obscured, as in psychoanalysis. For others this truth may have to do with political or 
economic social organization. For some it is the truth that human beings are part of the natural 
order.” Giles Fraser, Redeeming Nietzsche: On the Piety of Unbelief (London: Routledge, 2002), 
pp. 45-6. 
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ourselves from the restrictions of the earth and its appearances. 
 Much of what Plato wrote sounds quite normal to Western contemporary 
society, because these ideas have been part of Western culture for so long. As 
Richard Kraut explains, Plato was the first to present such ideas in a cohesive 
structure: “Plato’s hypothesis that there is an independent realm of noncorporeal, 
imperceptible, and unchanging entities was a bold and new idea, but it belonged 
to a tradition of thought that posited the existence of unobtrusive servable but 
basic realities.”16 Plato was not, however, building a form of religious thinking 
from scratch and he distinguished between styles of spiritual expression. Vlastos 
states that Plato was more interested in the depth of a mystical experience than an 
outward showing of devotion: 
The religion to which he alludes in such contexts is not that blend of high-
order patriotic entertainment and white magic which makes up so much of 
the public cult of the city-state, but that radically different kind of piety, 
intense, fervent, and other-worldly, fostered by the mystic rites, Bacchic 
or Eleusinian, the only kind that moved Plato deeply.17 
An examination of Plato’s work therefore needs to take into account the 
seriousness which he accorded experiences of the metaphysical. This was not 
simply a structure for Plato but also a tangible experience that should be taken 
seriously and not as public entertainment. 
 The view Plato had of spiritual knowledge was different than that of his 
contemporaries. Charles H. Kahn has emphasized the significance of the change 
in conceptions of the afterlife that Plato started: 
[Plato’s] otherworldly vision is entirely at home in the spiritual 
atmosphere of late antiquity, in the age of Gnosticism and theurgy. But it 
would be difficult to overstate the discrepancy between this view of 
human destiny and the typical attitudes and values of Greek society in the 
                                                
16 Richard Kraut, ed., Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. 
x. 
17 Vlastos, pp. 14-15. Vlastos discusses Plato’s love of the Form of Beauty in greater detail (pp. 
13-15). Even if he appreciated some ‘rites,’ Plato was ultimately focused on the intangible.  
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fifth and fourth centuries BC.18 
Human destiny before Plato did not include the idea of the soul, at least not in the 
amount of detail Plato devotes to the topic, nor the notion of the soul being 
indestructible, nor the idea of a place for the soul to reside. Kahn elaborates 
further that for Plato’s audience he was a “metaphysical visionary” who was 
“convinced that the unseen, intangible world, accessible only to rational thought 
and intellectual understanding, is vastly more meaningful, more precious, and 
more real than anything we can encounter in the realm of ordinary experience.”19 
This is key because it clearly explains that only through “rational thought and 
intellectual understanding” can someone be saved.20 Plato conceived of the 
human being as parts and for him the body did not play a role in thought or 
understanding.21 His conviction that the intangible world was where true meaning 
was created led to the development of what is now called ‘salvation theory.’  
Soteriology, or the doctrine of salvation, is made possible by the structure 
of Plato’s metaphysics, through his conception of a place where the soul is saved. 
The principle behind soteriology is that humans have lost, or are alienated from, 
“something of fundamental importance” and salvation is “the means by which 
that alienation is overcome.”22 Since Plato soteriology has become embedded in 
Western culture. As Giles Fraser affirms: 
                                                
18 Charles H. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 [1996]), p. 67. Kahn explains in detail what 
contemporary Greek society was like: “The world we know from Attic tragedy and comedy, from 
the history of Thucydides and the pleading of the orators, is a world of petty pride, heroic passion, 
ordinary lust and greed, unlimited ambition and utter ruthlessness. In such a world the 
metaphysical vision just described seems almost grotesquely out of place,” (p. 67). 
19 Kahn, p. 66. 
20 Plato does not use the word ‘saved’ but readings of his texts have led to the development of 
salvation theory. 
21 Nancey Murphy comments on the workings of the entire person as a unified whole in Bodies 
and Souls or Spirited Bodies? and Steven R. Guthrie uses balance as a way to explain how there 
are difference kinds of knowledge and ways of assessing experience in ‘Temples of the Spirit: 
Worship as Embodied Performance.’ 
22 Fraser, p. 45. 
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This basic soteriological pattern is not limited in use to, nor indeed was it 
invented by, Christianity. It is at least as old as Plato and as contemporary 
as the current concern for the environment. These stories, and they are 
deeply woven into the pattern of European thought, present salvation as 
'becoming one with', as 'being one with' something that has been lost, 
stolen, defaced or forgotten.23 
Regardless of the reason for the alienation, the ‘something’ which is always being 
sought is assumed to be a way of accessing the absolute truth. Each soteriological 
point of view posits its own reasons for needing truth – truth can be personal, 
political, environmental, etc. As Fraser explains, “[s]o fundamental is the belief 
that truth lies at the very centre of human need that few have ever felt the need to 
question it. Thus the most basic of all soteriological lemmas: the truth will set you 
free.”24 Yet it is precisely the questioning of truth and truths which is relevant to 
belief. Plato’s writing led to the development of theories whereby salvation is 
found through the Forms, which was itself an intellectual exercise. But this was 
entirely dependent on a dualistic formula which has reproduced itself throughout 
Western history and led to an emphasis being placed on the intangible as it can be 
accessed by thought.25 In the following section I consider what happens when this 
metaphysical and dualistic structure of thought encounters the challenge of a new 
religious movement with its origins outside the world of Greek philosophy. 
 
 
                                                
23 Fraser, p. 45. 
24 Fraser, p. 46. 
25 Plato’s ideas were but one aspect or part of Greek philosophy. As Nancey Murphy explains, “It 
has become common to associate ancient philosophers with something like modern Cartesian 
Dualism, but this is an oversimplification, first […] because the philosophers of Greece and Rome 
were not at all united on these issues. Second, it is difficult to think our way back to these ancient 
sources; we have a fairly precise concept of the material, which allows for a sharp distinction 
between the material and the non-material. However, one of the contentious issues in ancient 
philosophy was the nature of matter itself.  For many Greek thinkers, reality was conceived of as a 
hierarchy of beings exhibiting varying degrees of materiality.  One important question in ancient 
philosophy was whether or not the soul belonged to this gradation of material realities. The stoics 
regarded the human soul as but an aspect of an all-pervading cosmic logos, but Epicureans 
provided an atomist-materialist account of the soul.” Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls or 
Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 11-12. 
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Metaphysics and Christianity 
 Belief, since the time of Plato, has been explicitly linked with salvation, 
but both belief and salvation have adapted as other movements and theories have 
arisen. One aspect of Plato’s metaphysical belief which has dominated is the 
stress he placed on the role of philosophy. He uses philosophy to explain both his 
ideas and his belief, indeed he relies on them. Logic was at the heart of how he 
thought and communicated. Vlastos explains the relationship of philosophy to the 
spiritual for Plato: 
For such a visionary, the domain of unseen reality is the place of origin 
from which the human spirit or the rational psyche has come, and to 
which it may under favourable circumstances return. Philosophy is 
essentially the practice of spiritual liberation by which the rational psyche 
prepares itself for a successful voyage back to its transcendental 
homeland.26 
Together mysticism and rational thought produce the kind of belief system Plato 
could recommend to others. This was clearly not an embodied spiritual practice.  
With the advent of Christianity this logical, philosophically-based belief 
system met a very differently structured concept of the human person. While 
overarchingly Christianity can be said to have flourished, the Greek focus on the 
power of the mind to access the mystical was retained. While the Judeo-Christian 
tradition conceived of the entire person as one unit that had access to God, the 
addition of Plato’s metaphysical structures led to more emphasis being placed on 
the mind at the expense of the body.  
From the oldest texts used by both Judaism and Christianity there are 
instructions to worship, to use the body in an embodied way that is not part of 
Plato’s conception. Throughout what Christian tradition calls the Old and New 
Testaments there appear descriptions and exhortations to actively engage with 
                                                
26 Kahn, p. 66. 
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worship. As Steven R. Guthrie explains, 
[t]he worship of the Old Testament is worship in motion. It is vital, alive, 
active, and richly sensual. And many of these same activities appear in the 
New Testament. Singing (Acts 16:25), raising hands (1Timothy 2:8), 
kneeling (Ephesians 3:14), fasting (Acts 13:2), the sharing of wine and 
bread (Acts 2:46-7) – all of these are closely associated with the 
worshiping church. The Apostle Paul even describes the universal 
affirmation of Christ’s lordship in strikingly embodied language: ‘at the 
name of Jesus, every knee should bow…and every tongue confess that 
Jesus Christ is Lord’ (Philippians 2:10-11).27 
The entire person is engaged in embodied practices that link thought, word, 
speaking, and physical positions of the body to the same origin – the person as a 
whole. The language in the Old and New Testaments echoes this focus on the 
physical in descriptions of worship. The word hishtachaweh is often used in the 
Old Testament for worship and also denotes the verb ‘to bow down’ or ‘to 
prostrate.’28 The same pattern emerges in the New Testament where the verb ‘to 
worship’ (proskynein) is also the term used to describe “the oriental custom of 
bowing down…as a total bodily gesture of respect before a great one.”29 What 
this points to is the repeated emphasis in the Bible on linking worship “with some 
sort of bodily activity or gesture – kneeling, singing, raising of hands and so on,” 
and beyond this, that “the idea of worship [is] often described in terms of bodily 
actions and gestures.” 30 While I am not focusing on worship as such, what 
Guthrie demonstrates is the importance of embodied practices as an active part of 
the expression of belief necessary to Christian worship. 31 
                                                
27 Steven R. Guthrie ‘Temples of the Spirit: Worship as Embodied Performance’, in Faithful 
Performances, ed. by Trevor A. Hart and Steven R. Guthrie, (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 
2007), pp. 91-107 (p. 97). [Original emphasis.] 
28 Yoshiaki Hattori, quoted in Guthrie, p. 97. 
29 David Peterson, quoted in Guthrie, p. 98. 
30 Guthrie, p. 98. 
31  Actions which appear throughout the Bible (in particular see the Psalms), include the 
prostration of the body, kneeling, lifting the hands, clapping the hands, shouting, feasting, singing, 
dancing, processing and the playing of instruments (see Guthrie pp. 96-97.) These behaviours are 
not undertaken simply because they are enjoyable, but are part of how belief manifests and is 
sustained, as Steven Guthrie explains:  
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Much metaphysical thinking seems to fit well with Christian beliefs, e.g. 
the existence of opposites such as good and evil, heaven and hell. However, 
although a metaphysical position might seem consistent with contemporary 
Christianity, Christianity also contains within it a challenge to the metaphysics of 
Plato. Christianity accords a central position to the physicality and materiality of 
the body as Nancey Murphy explains: 
Notice that Christians have two strikingly different conceptions of what 
happens after we die.  One is based on dualism: the body dies and the soul 
departs to be with God. The other is the expectation of bodily resurrection.  
For centuries these two ideas have been combined.  The body dies, the 
soul departs, and at the end of time the soul receives a resurrected or 
transformed body.32   
The dualism that Murphy mentioned here is the same as Plato’s, albeit with God 
                                                                                                                                
Moreover, since in worship we all sing together, we develop a common lexicon of 
movement and gesture. The music and movement of worship become, not an obstacle, 
nor a supplement to Christian transformation, but a means and resource for that 
transforming work. They are not the emotional complement to the rational content of 
worship, but do themselves fund our conceptual vocabulary. […] But the image into 
which we are transformed it is not merely that of our own bodies. Rather, as we offer our 
bodies in worship (musical and of other sorts) we lay hold of resources the Holy Spirit 
may use to transform us into the image of Christ. These frail and mortal bodies become 
singing, dancing, kneeling temples; their very gestures and patterns of bodily experience 
tracing out the dimensions of a space in which the Holy Spirit may live and work. 
(Guthrie, pp. 106-7) 
Contemporary practices continue to place importance on the use of the body. A specific 
example from Judaism is the celebration of Simchat Torah which as Lauren Winner explains is 
“the holiday that immediately follows Sukkot, [and] the day Jews set aside to celebrate reading.” 
(Lauren F. Winner, Girl Meets God (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 20.)  On this day the 
last section of the Torah is read culminating a year of reading through the entire text. The 
response of the participants is bodily; Winner describes the action:   
Simchat Torah is one of the few times you will find men and women mingled together in an 
Orthodox synagogue. After maariv, the evening prayers, the women come down from their 
balcony, and all the Torah scrolls are taken out of the ark, and everyone dances them around, 
scroll by scroll, person by person, making what in Hebrew is called hakafot, circling or rings, 
dancing around the synagogue in a circle that mirrors the circle danced through the Torah each 
year. As you dance, you pray, Ana Adonai, hoshia na. “Oh Lord, save us,” The congregation 
makes seven hakafot, seven different circular parades, carrying our scrolling circular book 
around and around the shul. The hakafot can last hours, on and on. (p. 21) 
 
Repetition of actions undertaken as a group are often explained as the outward signs of an inner 
belief. Yet, as Guthrie discusses, in Christianity “the Holy Spirit of God is revealed as the 
incarnating Spirit – One who works in and through bodies” (Guthrie, p. 102). The Eucharistic 
celebration (Communion) is completely based on what happened to Christ’s body. The church 
speaks of itself metaphorically as a body of believers, those who participate in communion say 
that they ‘become one body through his body.’ The body is used on many levels and is directly 
linked to the bodies of the participants through the senses and through metaphor. In Chapter 3, I 
discuss the role of the body in the performance of the liturgy in more detail. 
32 Murphy, p. 7. 
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substituted for the Forms, or ‘ideal place,’ while the second idea of bodily 
resurrection is derived from Hebraic traditions. So accepted is the idea of dualism 
in the West that it was only in the twentieth century that scholars first asserted 
that “dualism was not the original Hebraic understanding.”33 Murphy explains 
that translations of the Old Testament into English are full of references to the 
‘soul,’ but these are based on translations from the Septuagint – a Greek 
translation of the text. The word used in Hebrew refers not to a separate soul, but 
to the entire living person.34 Thus, salvation would have to include the body 
because there was no differentiation between parts. Christianity, with its belief 
that Jesus’ body was resurrected from the dead, cannot be thought to agree with 
Plato’s binary of mind/body.35 Where Plato focuses on and elevates the soul 
above the body and above physical experiences, Christianity, as expressed in the 
Bible, does not.36 
Another structural difference between the two is the source of salvation – 
for Plato salvation is found in the universe, in absolute Forms, outside of the self, 
                                                
33 Murphy, p. 9. Distinctions can, of course, be made between Plato and Descartes and others who 
have influenced the development of the concept of dualism. I do not elaborate further in this 
thesis. 
34 “It is widely agreed now that the Hebrew word translated “soul” in all these cases – nephesh – 
did not mean what later Christians have meant by “soul.” In most of these cases, it is simply a way 
of referring to the whole living person. Here is how more recent version translate some of these 
same passages:  Psalm 16:10: (KJV) “For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell”; (REB) “for you 
will not abandon me to Sheol…” Psalm 25:20: (KJV) “Oh keep my soul and deliver me”; (NIV) 
“Guard my life and rescue me,”” (Murphy, p. 18). 
35 There is a case to be made that the Bible and Christian theology can accommodate various 
understandings of salvation, but dualism is difficult to reconcile with the teachings as seen from 
Murhpy’s research: “It would be very bold of me to say that dualism per se is ruled out, given that 
it has been so prominent in the tradition.  However, the radical dualisms of Plato and René 
Descartes, which take the body to be unnecessary for, or even a hindrance to, full human life, are 
clearly out of bounds,” (p. 22). 
36 Murphy’s analysis of the New Testament leads her to make the following assertions: “What the 
New Testament authors do attest is, first, that humans are psychophysical unities; second, that 
Christian hope for eternal life is staked on bodily resurrection rather than an immortal soul” (p. 
22) There are other differences and similarities between these two philosophies or belief systems. 
I choose to focus on the issue of the soul/body because of its explicit connection to salvation and 
influence on belief. A discussion of the shortcoming of both areas can be found in After the Death 
of God by John D. Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, ed. by Jeffrey W. Robbins, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007). 
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whereas, for Christianity salvation is achieved through belief in God who dwells 
in each person. It is God who is responsible for resurrecting the body, rather than 
just the soul, at the end of time. This idea of material resurrection goes hand in 
hand with a personalisation of the metaphysical structure of salvation. Gianni 
Vattimo explains how Christianity first affected metaphysical thought: 
Christianity accomplished the first attack against metaphysics construed 
exclusively as objectivity. Accordingly, Kant only taught us centuries later 
what Christianity had already affirmed, hence the idea of Saint Augustine 
that in interiore homine habitat veritas (“truth lives in the inner human”). 
Christianity announces the end of the Platonic ideal of objectivity. It 
cannot be the eternal world of forms outside ourselves that saves us, but 
only the eye directed toward the interior and the searching of the deep 
truth inside us all.37  
Plato’s salvation is objective and impersonal whereas Christianity’s is subjective 
and personal. Plato’s is concerned with the general idea of the person whereas 
Christianity addresses the individual’s interior being. As we shall see in the next 
section on language, this subjective, personal nature of Christian salvation 
influences the language used in the West to discuss salvation and thus shapes how 
belief is articulated.38 Now I turn to a consideration of philosophical articulations 
of these ideas that seeks to challenge the predominance of metaphysical thought 
in the West, beginning, perhaps inevitably, with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
To say that Western theories of salvation did not sit well with Friedrich Nietzsche 
would be an understatement. He disagreed with many aspects of belief, but the 
                                                
37 Gianni Vattimo in After the Death of God, by John D. Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, ed. by 
Jeffrey W. Robbins (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 31. This is not an 
endorsement of the radical Christian position that nothing is required of the person but faith and 
that once saved all other thoughts, actions or inactions are irrelevant because salvation has been 
assured.  
38 Differences do exist across Christian denominations and sects as to what constitutes salvation, 
when it will occur, and exactly how the body and soul will be affected. 
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concept that the soul was eternal and could ascend to ‘heaven’ was especially 
problematic, as he states in Beyond Good and Evil (BGE): “that belief which 
regards the soul as being something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a 
monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be ejected from science!”39 As we have 
seen, both Western Christianity and metaphysics believe the soul to be eternal, 
albeit in slightly different ways. The salvation of the soul in Plato’s thought took 
the form of what Michael Tanner calls a “completely worked-out system, which 
[…] was regarded by Nietzsche as the hideous perfection of optimism in its 
positing of a world more real than this one, a world immune to change, and thus 
to decay and death.”40 It was inconceivable for Nietzsche that eternity would not 
include change given that everything else in the universe was obviously subject to 
constant reordering. Stephen Houlgate has commented on the reoccurrence of this 
theme throughout Nietzsche’s work: “Nietzsche’s thinking was dominated by the 
conviction that everything has its origins in time and history, and that 
consequently everything in the world is finite and is destined to be destroyed.”41 
Clearly this opinion is in opposition to the idea of an ‘intelligible place’ or 
‘heaven.’ There was no room in Nietzsche’s concept of existence for this kind of 
salvation. His low opinion of both systems is evident in his comment that 
“Christianity is Platonism for ‘the people’,” suggesting that anyone who believed 
in such structures was being deceived.42 
Nietzsche is perhaps best known for his attack on Christianity. This attack 
was not simply that of an atheist who did not like the idea of God; his 
                                                
39 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale, (London: Penguin, 
2003), 12 p. 43. 
40 Michael Tanner, ‘Introduction’, in Beyond Good and Evil, by Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. by 
Michael Tanner (London: Penguin, 2003), pp.7-26 (pp. 9-10). 
41 Stephen Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Criticism of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p. 39.   
42 Nietzsche, BGE, p. 32. 
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philosophical objections to Christianity were strongly linked to its metaphysical 
presuppositions and its views of salvation. These objections then extended into a 
critique of the concept of ‘truth.’ He specifically problematises the belief in truth 
in Will to Power (WP): “The entire Christian teaching as to what shall be 
believed, the entire Christian “truth,” is idle falsehood and deception: and 
precisely the opposite of what inspired the Christian movement in the 
beginning.”43 Here Nietzsche singles out truth as the focus of belief, which 
became his key to dismantling the structure of both Christianity and 
metaphysics.44 
A common method for arguing against religion is to question the ‘truth’ of 
God’s existence. Nietzsche’s approach was rather more comprehensive: he 
questioned the truth of ‘truth’ itself. God falls away as a by-product of the attack 
on truth. As Giles Fraser explains: 
Nietzsche's line of attack, however, is to challenge the other pole of that 
alliance [God and truth] and question the ultimate value of truth. This line 
is potentially just as devastating to religion, but is equally, and by the 
same token, just as potentially devastating to the interests of traditional 
philosophy; for, if successful, it undermines the very means by which the 
philosophical atheist seeks to challenge religion.45 
The foundation of philosophy is Nietzsche’s focus and in the end his ideas 
implicate philosophy as much as Christianity. His critique of philosophy was that 
it too caused problems that led to untenable dogma. As he explains, the problems 
always begin “as soon as a philosophy begins to believe in itself.  It always 
creates the world in its own image, it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this 
tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to ‘creation of the world’, 
                                                
43 Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 159 p. 98. 
44 Nietzsche did not try to destroy every aspect of Western beliefs: “Between ourselves, it is not at 
all necessary by that same act to get rid of ‘the soul’ itself and thus forgo one of the oldest and 
most venerable hypotheses.” Nietzsche, BGE, 12 p. 43. 
45 Fraser, p. 63. 
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to causa prima.”46 For Nietzsche, if the system, whether philosophy or theology, 
was the problem then the system had to change. 
Against this criticism of the truth espoused by philosophers Nietzsche 
offers his own definition:  
“Truth” is therefore not something out there, that might be found or 
discovered—but something that must be created and that gives a name to 
a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end—
introducing truth, as a processus in infinitum, an active determining—not 
a becoming conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined.47 
To undermine conceptual binaries Nietzsche articulates a more fluid truth that 
could not be universal, eternal, absolute, etc. He resituates truth as something 
which each person discovers through a process, “an active determining.” L.P. 
Thiele explains this process with artistic metaphors: “In the absence of God, the 
redemption of life rests with man; he must behold himself as a work of art, as his 
own creation. He must become both the playwright and spectator of the ongoing 
drama of his will in the world.”48 Truth in this understanding must be conceived 
of by the individual in relation to personal experience and beliefs; truth is ever 
changing as the person changes. Nietzsche's ideal was that a person could create 
himself through becoming himself and in this process find truth(s). 
While the control of the development of truth rested with the individual, 
for Nietzsche the drive for truth originated neither in the person nor in the 
universe.  He questioned why truth was the focus of Western philosophy and the 
world around him: “The zeal and subtlety, I might say even slyness, with which 
the problem ‘of the real and apparent world’ is set up on all over Europe today 
                                                
46 Nietzsche, BGE, 9 p. 39. 
47 Nietzsche, WP, 552 p. 289. 
48 L.P. Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 137. 
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makes one think hard and prick up ones ears.”49 This metaphysical thinking was, 
according to Nietzsche, insidious because it spread without people realising what 
they were believing. Even when people claimed to no longer believe in God 
Nietzsche remained unconvinced by assertions that they were free agents. He did 
not see a possible escape from the history of Western thought: “They pose as 
having discovered and attained their real opinions through the self-evolution of a 
cold, pure, divinely unperturbed dialectic.”50 Nietzsche saw that the structure of 
metaphysics had infiltrated culture and language to such an extent that people 
were blind to the effects. 
On the one hand, Nietzsche objects to Christianity and the version of 
redemption espoused in the nineteenth century. On the other, he attacks 
metaphysics as the vehicle for values he disagreed with, as well as for its own 
structure of flawed redemption. Nietzsche identifies Plato’s metaphysics as 
having shaped Western thought and language to such an extent that the ideas and 
values of Christianity, which had since come to be almost indissoluble from 
metaphysics, could no longer be taken out of Western culture even through a 
process of secularisation. Even if religious practices and beliefs disappeared 
altogether, the foundation of Western culture itself was already so dependent on 
such ideas for the very structures of its language and thought that it would be 
impossible to break free.  
Nietzsche rejects accepted norms and addresses the structural problems of 
the system by forcing the discussion away from another argument about 
appearance and reality. If truth is not at the centre, if it cannot save, then the 
structure of the Forms or the idea of God, along with the location – an intelligible 
                                                
49 Nietzsche, BGE, 10 p. 40. 
50 Nietzsche, BGE, 5 p. 36. 
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place or heaven – are thrown into question. If truth is changeable, the rest of the 
structure falls apart with nothing at the centre of the belief and thus no prospect of 
salvation through truth. Nietzsche’s project was thus to find a way for salvation to 
exist in the philosophical uncertainty of a world that changes; how is it possible to 
be saved if the parameters for salvation are also subject to change? In contrast 
with Plato’s version which has truth as an absolute which can never be 
questioned, Nietzsche wants to know why humans put such value on truth: “What 
really is it in us that wants ‘the truth’?” Nietzsche asks.51  
What Nietzsche articulated has proven to be both controversial and 
incredibly fruitful for philosophers of many persuasions, notably, Jacques Derrida 
who returned to the root of metaphysics in his writings, and much of whose work 
constitutes an ongoing dialogue with Plato.52 This next section continues the 
thread of metaphysics adding perhaps the most significant challenge to it: 
deconstruction. 
 
Jacques Derrida 
Greek metaphysics was articulated by Plato, folded into Christianity and critiqued 
by Nietzche. Where Nietzsche failed to find a way to dismantle metaphysics the 
work of Jacques Derrida has both an answer and a suggestion to the philosophical 
problem. He posits that metaphysics cannot be escaped from, but that there is a 
way to exist within in and comment on it. In response he articulates a process of 
reversal and re-inscription which he calls deconstruction: 
What interested me then, that I am attempting to pursue along other lines 
now, was… a kind of general strategy of deconstruction.  [This] is to 
                                                
51 Nietzsche, BGE, 1 p. 33. 
52 Among others, Heidegger’s take on Nietzsche is well known, but has been criticised by critical 
theory, specifically Derrida in ‘Nietzsche and the Machine: Interview with Jacques Derrida by 
Richard Beardsworth’, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 7 (1994), 7-66 (pp. 25-26). 
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avoid both simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics and 
simply residing within the closed field of these oppositions, thereby 
confirming it. 53 
Deconstruction, as Derrida explains it here, acknowledges the problems of 
metaphysics and seeks to unsettle the oppositions instead of simply refuting or 
accepting them. Throughout his writing Derrida insistes that deconstruction is not 
a method. He often describes or demonstrates how he undertakes the 
deconstruction of a text, but refuses to define deconstruction itself. In Positions 
he explains that the structure of metaphysics requires the overturning of 
hierarchies as well as a systematic analysis to reveal the interdependency of the 
oppositions. Here he focuses on the idea of overturning instead of replacing one 
idea with another: 
[We] must traverse a phase of overturning. To do justice to this necessity 
is to recognize that in a classical philosophical opposition we are not 
dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a 
violent hierarchy.  One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, 
logically, etc.), or has the upper hand.  To deconstruct the opposition, first 
of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment.  To overlook this 
phase of overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating 
structure of opposition. Therefore one might proceed too quickly to a 
neutralization that in practice would leave the previous field untouched, 
leaving one no hold on the previous opposition, thereby preventing any 
means of intervening in the field effectively.54 
Derrida is concerned with effecting a critique of metaphysics that does not simply 
rearrange the oppositions for a limited period of time. 
He identifies how in each pairing of two terms there is an inequality which 
gives one term more power than the other. Overturning the hierarchies is a way to 
engage in an analysis without tacitly agreeing with the nature of the system. The 
analysis has to effect something and yet the structure of metaphysics works 
against any lasting reordering. Derrida explains that the analysis, once started, 
                                                
53 Derrida, Positions (London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 41. [Original emphasis.] 
54 Derrida, Positions, p. 41. [Original emphasis.] 
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had to continue indefinitely, because oppositions want to exist in tandem and will 
realign themselves according to the preexisting hierarchy. Derrida sought to shift 
the structure of metaphysics itself and the only way he could conceive of this was 
through a series of adjustments to allow for the whole system to be 
reconceptualised: 
We know what always have been the practical (particularly political) 
effects of immediately jumping beyond oppositions, and of protests in the 
simple form of neither this nor that.  When I say that this phase is 
necessary, the word phase is perhaps not the most rigorous one.  It is not a 
question of a chronological phase, a given moment, or a page that one day 
simply will be turned, in order to go on to other things.  The necessity of 
this phase is structural; it is the necessity of an interminable analysis: the 
hierarchy of dual oppositions always reestablishes itself.55   
In this way Derrida emphasizes that attempting to get beyond binary oppositions 
is an ongoing project that will no doubt continue. His insistence on understanding 
the project of deconstruction as a process also shows that any analysis of these 
attempts will reestablish the original structure. 
In Derrida’s reading, each of Plato’s binary oppositions becomes the 
context for an investigation of the two terms and the spectrum on which they 
operate. Instead of seeing them as fixed positions far apart in meaning, a series of 
theoretical moves highlights their inter-relatedness. What Derrida alters through 
his strategy of deconstruction is the relationship of the concept to its opposite. 
The rethinking of difference between, e.g. reality/appearance is thus approached 
in a new way in Western philosophy. Barbara Johnson explains the results of 
working with such a strategy: 
These polar opposites do not, however, stand as independent and equal 
entities.  The second term in each pair is considered the negative, corrupt, 
undesirable version of the first, a fall away from it. Hence, absence is the 
lack of presence, evil is the fall from good, error is a distortion of truth, 
etc. In other words, the two terms are not simply opposed in their 
                                                
55 Derrida, Positions, pp. 41-2. [Original emphasis.] 
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meanings, but are arranged in a hierarchical order which gives the first 
term priority, in both the temporal and the qualitative sense of the word.56 
Derrida affirms the impossibility of doing away with metaphysical thought by 
showing that the system relies on its own categorisations. 
It would seem that if Plato invented it, we ought to be able to stop using it, 
but it is part of Derrida’s contention that everything we think, say, write and do in 
the West has been so firmly built on the structure of metaphysical thinking that 
we are effectively incapable of even conceiving of a world without this system: 
But all these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a 
kind of circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relation 
between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of 
metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts of 
metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no 
syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce 
not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into 
the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks 
to contest.57 
Derrida’s conclusion about our capacity to escape the influence of Western 
metaphysics is that we cannot; language and its users are trapped in a circle. The 
circle is circumscribed by the history of metaphysical thought and there is no way 
to break through. The kind of critique Derrida facilitates operates in conjunction 
with the inherent problem. The person effecting the critique can thus see the 
structure of the concept as well as the logics the structure depends on in order to 
function, but is unable to work outside the system.58 Instead of simply trying to 
                                                
56 Barbara Johnson, ‘Introduction’, in Dissemination by Jacques Derrida, (London: Continuum, 
2004), pp. vii- xxxiii (p. viii). 
57 Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play' in Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass 
(London: Routledge, 2001 [1978]), pp. 351-370 (p. 354). 
58 Derrida connected the problems of metaphysics and deconstruction with the arts and 
performance as well. As already discussed in the Introduction, in his essay on Antonin Artaud’s 
ideas Derrida positions some art as being able to attempt to at least look at metaphysics 
differently: “The theatre of cruelty is not a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to which 
life is unrepresentable. […] Is not the most naïve form of representation mimesis? Like 
Nietzsche—and the affinities do not end there—Artaud wants to have done with the imitative 
concept of art, with the Aristotelian aesthetics in which the metaphysics of Western art comes into 
its own. “Art is not the imitation of life, but life is the imitation of a transcendental principle 
which art puts us into communication with once again.”” Jacques Derrida, ‘The Theatre of 
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take apart the flawed structure, deconstruction simultaneously questions the entire 
foundation of the logic– in other words, disabling the relationships as well as the 
rationale which were previously stable.59 Even if we accept that Derrida, and 
others, have changed the awareness of the “unique” circle of metaphysics we are 
still trapped by more than just binaries.60 
Where Nietzsche tried to rework the existence of truth and salvation in 
relation to belief, Derrida was more subtle and more severe at the same time. 
Deconstruction admits its inability to make meaning outside metaphysical 
structures, but simultaneously calls the structure into question at every turn. 
Belief is thus affirmed as a part of Western thinking while concurrently limited as 
a viable form of meaning. What Nietzsche and Derrida have done is to provide us 
with alternative ways of understanding the structure of belief and salvation. They 
have shown the extent to which metaphysical thought is embedded in linguistic 
and cognitive structures. Their critiques highlight the innate problems of building 
a belief system upon binaries which are inherently co-dependent. 
The discussions enabled by Nietzsche and Derrida are by no means 
finished as philosophy and theology continue to debate the nature and influence 
of metaphysics. Recent scholarship in theology, for example, has been engaging 
with developments in neuroscience and physics in relation to discussions of the 
                                                                                                                                
Cruelty and the Closure of Representation’ in Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass 
(London: Routledge, 2001 [1978]), pp. 232-250 (p. 234). 
59 Derrida’s famous example of deconstruction using Plato’s work is from Phaedrus and 
published in Dissemination. The word pharmakon is used by Plato in Greek and the word is 
variously translated within Phaedrus as either ‘remedy’ or ‘poison.’ Derrida’s analysis looks 
critically at the problems of Plato’s binaries, translation, and writing in Western philosophy. See 
Jacques Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, in Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (London: 
Continuum, 2004), pp. 67-186. 
60 In The Gift of Death, trans. by David Wills (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), Derrida 
analyses Jan Pato(ka’s Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History and writes extensively 
about the relationship between Christianity and Platonism. A concern of Pato(ka’s is that the 
Christian ‘self’ has not been sufficiently thought through. In the passage from one system to the 
other, in this case from Platonism to Christianity, there is always a failure to realise what has been 
lost and what has been gained. 
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soul, in ways which seem to extend, in the field of religious studies, some of the 
implications of the philosophical critique of metaphysics. Christian philosopher 
Nancey Murphy posits another way of addressing the problems of binary thought 
by dispensing with dualism within the human: 
My central thesis is this, first, that we are our bodies – there is no 
additional metaphysical element such as a mind or soul or spirit. But, 
second, this “physicalist” position need not deny that we are intelligent, 
moral, and spiritual. We are, at our best, complex physical organisms, 
imbued with the legacy of thousands of years of culture, and, most 
importantly, blown by the Breath of God’s Spirit; we are Spirited 
Bodies.61 
Murphy’s interdisciplinary research, incorporating Biblical texts, Christian 
theology, anthropology and philosophy, as well as scientific research, is clearly in 
line with contemporary developments in other fields. Performance theory in 
particular has taken up non-dualistic ideas concerning the body from many 
perspectives, but until now has not engaged with current theological research.62 
Murphy’s approach is also concerned with physicality and materiality, both that 
which is experienced in ritual, but also that of a believer who believes that the 
presence of God is felt by and through the entire person.  
From this philosophical section I now move on to look concretely at the 
other part of Derrida’s question – the importance of language in understanding 
religion and the sacred. Language is how we communicate what we think about 
belief, and therefore needs to be analysed for its role in articulating what it means 
to believe. 
 
 
                                                
61 Murphy, p. ix. 
62 Work that discusses the body in a non-dualist manner includes Bert O. States, ‘The 
Phenomenological Attitude’, in Critical Theory and Performance, ed. by J.G. Reinelt and J.R. 
Roach (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 369-379; and Herbert Blau, Take 
up the Bodies: Theater at the Vanishing Point (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982). 
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SPEAKING BELIEF: PHILOSOPHY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
We believe we can pretend to believe […] that we share in some pre-
understanding. We act as though we had some common sense of what 
“religion” means through the languages that we believe (how much belief 
already, to this moment, to this very day!) we know how to speak. We 
believe in the minimal trustworthiness of this word.63 
Language has the difficult job of explaining and communicating the intricacies of 
belief. Given the inherent problems of explaining belief through language, as we 
have seen in the work of Nietzsche and Derrida, an investigation into language 
itself is necessary. In this section I examine research by anthropologists in order 
to expand the discussion to include concrete examples of language use in various 
cultures. Through a combination of case studies and linguistic theory these 
writers have approached the same problem from a different angle than 
philosophy. They also show how the religious practices and beliefs of a society 
influence language as much as language influences belief. Interest in the 
influence of belief is evident in publications from various decades, e.g. Claude 
Lévi-Strauss (‘La structure des mythes,’195564), Rodney Needham (Belief, 
Language and Experience, 1972), and Fenella Cannell (The Anthropology of 
Christianity, 2006). The focus here is in language as it is used and applied by 
anthropologists. 
With increasing frequency anthropologists have undertaken critical 
analyses of their own field. In his book, The Meaning and End of Religion, 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith identifies a bias that often surfaces in anthropological 
research – the Christian understanding of religion has been cast as primarily a 
question of belief. And this has been the default point of comparison used to 
                                                
63 Jacques Derrida ‘Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason 
Alone,’ in Acts of Religion, ed. by Gil Anidjar (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 42-10 (p. 44). 
[Original emphasis.] 
64 This article was published in Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale (Paris: Plon, 
1958). 
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analyse cultures and religions. Smith identifies the assumption that understanding 
belief is primary to understanding a culture:  
The peculiarity of the place given to Christian history is a monumental 
matter, whose importance and relative uniqueness must be appreciated. So 
characteristic has it been that unsuspecting Westerners have...been liable 
to ask about a religious group other than their own as well, ‘What do they 
believe?’ as though this were the primary question, and certainly were a 
legitimate one.65  
When the term belief is applied uncritically to other cultures and languages 
problems arise in interpretation and analysis that misrepresent the practices 
observed.66 Examinations of older research reveal biases, and the influence of 
both metaphysical and Christian logics.  
Faced with this problem anthropologists in the 1970s and early 1980s 
began to engage with belief from many angles, trying to understand the 
genealogy of anthropological approaches. As Rodney Needham explains in his 
book Belief, Language and Experience,  
the notion of belief is not appropriate to an empirical philosophy of mind 
or to an exact account of human motives and conduct. Belief is not a 
discriminable experience, it does not constitute a natural resemblance 
among men, and it does not belong to ‘the common behaviour of 
mankind.’67  
Needham found through his own research that belief is different for every society 
and that comparisons between the beliefs of different cultures are of doubtful 
                                                
65 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (London: SPCK, 1978[1962]), p. 
180. The reasons that Smith offered for belief being taken for granted include the role of Greek 
philosophy in Western ‘reason,’ which leads to belief being rationalised and the problematic use 
of the verb ‘to believe’ to represent the term ‘faith.’ It is on this distinction that most of his 
argument hinged in all three books published around this time: The Meaning and End of Religion 
(1978 [1962]), Believing – An Historical Perspective (1998 [1977]) and Faith and Belief (1979). 
66 This is discussed in detail in the second part of the Chapter 1. 
67 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972). p. 188. 
Needham concluded that belief had not been adequately examined by ethnography in relation to 
human experience and action. His book is interesting as it attempted to look at philosophy, 
linguistics and anthropology but the sections on other cultures and how belief is or is not relevant 
to their practices did not go into much detail. Overall there was more of a focus on philosophical 
debates than on anthropological case studies. While he did include a history of the linguistic uses 
of belief in the West it was quite brief. Needham’s work was part of a larger project in 
anthropology which included writers such as E.E. Evans-Prichard and was heavily influenced by 
linguistic theorist Émile Beneviste. 
 77 
value. There is no basis from which to study belief cross-culturally and thus it 
cannot be used to accurately explain behaviour.  
Both Smith and Needham felt that anthropologists ought to take 
responsibility for clarifying their own belief systems before attempting to 
describe those of other cultures. But how is it possible to explain an experience 
which as Needham said, is not ‘discriminable’? Malcolm Ruel and Jean Pouillon 
used detailed accounts of language usage as one way to address the problem. 
They found that, at the very least, it is possible to assert that there is more than 
one way to conceptualise belief and its relationship to human action. To assume 
that all cultures ‘believe’ in the same way as in the West is to mistake the 
Western understanding for a universal paradigm. They both explain through 
linguistic and cultural examples why it is not possible to transpose the Western 
system onto other cultures. 
In his article ‘Christians as Believers’ Malcolm Ruel chooses to focus on 
the linguistic roots of belief in the Hebraic and Hellenistic traditions as a way to 
then account for contemporary usage of the concept.68 He structures his 
arguments around a discussion of fallacies which have developed about belief in 
Western culture:  
“(1) That belief is central to all religions in the same way as it is to 
Christianity.” 
“(2) That the belief of a person or a people form the ground of his or their 
behaviour and can be cited therefore as a sufficient explanation for it.” 
“(3) That belief is fundamentally an interior state, a psychological 
condition.” 
“(4) That the determination of belief is more important than the 
determination of the status of what it is that is the object of belief.”69 
                                                
68 Although the Hebrew, Greek and English words do not have the same meaning, or even a 
constant meaning, Ruel argued that, “their range of meaning is historically and semantically 
continous.” Malcolm Ruel, ‘Christians as Believers’, in Religious Organization and Religious 
Experience, ed. by J. Davis (London: Academic Press, 1982), pp. 9-31 (pp. 10-11). 
69 Ruel, pp. 27-8. [Each line listed above is the first of a longer paragraph in which Ruel develops 
the separate points.] 
 78 
Numbers 2-4 might seem familiar because they have already been discussed, 
albeit in slightly different form, in the Introduction (pages 30-32). Talal Asad 
argues that ritual has been treated as a symbolic activity that expresses a deeper 
belief functioning as an “outward sign” of the “inward meaning.” This was 
deemed to be a simplistic and unworthy understanding of ritual and the beliefs 
associated with. Number 1 was not addressed in the Introduction and it is where 
Ruel focuses for most of his essay.70 Starting with two of the languages used to 
write and translate the earliest version of the Bible – Hebrew and Greek – he 
traces the history of the term belief in relation to English. While most of the 
Hebrew Bible or Old Testament was written in Hebrew (with some Aramaic), it 
was translated into Greek, Latin and then into English centuries later. It is through 
the Greek translations that the text became part of Western cultures.71  Both the 
Hebrew ‘mn and the Greek pisteuo “express centrally the notion of trust or 
confidence.” 72 It is from these words that the function of ‘belief’ in the Bible was 
established and our contemporary understanding is continuous with this history. 
Clearly these concepts are still part of belief today, but the term has more 
associations than most people realise.  
What Ruel, and others, highlighted was not simply the etymological roots 
of a word, but the development of a concept that was unique to the earliest 
Christian societies. The name the earliest Christians chose to call themselves, as 
recorded by the texts in the New Testament, was ‘believers.’ The term thus 
                                                
70 For more on this problem see Ruel, pp.10-23. As Ruel explains, in the West discussions of 
religion “slip from talking about religion to talking about Christianity, and back again, without 
clear distinction”, (p. 27). This, at the most basic level, shows the degree to which Christianity is 
taken to be the norm in the West. 
71 More and more scholarship is appearing which focuses on the influence not only of Greek 
language but Greek philosophy on the translations of the Bible. It is argued that the word soul 
only appears in the current Bible because of the influence of the Greek translations. For more on 
this see Nancey Murphy, pp. 16-22. 
72 Ruel, p. 11. 
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acquired “a technical use” to identify a group of people who believed in a specific 
person, in a specific manner.73 Where some groups congregate around an activity 
or an interest, this group based its membership on an event and a person which 
altered the nature of religious belief at the time. It was through conversion that 
people became ‘believers’ and the New Testament is full of various uses of the 
term including “those believing,” “those of the belief,” and importantly, an 
explanation of the “identifying features” of believers from the book of Ephesians 
4:4-5 “one Lord, one belief, one baptism.”74 Activities undertaken by the group 
grew out of the belief, not the other way around. Belief was thus a shared, 
collective experience that was based not just on what Jesus said, but what was 
claimed about him – that he was raised from the dead. In other words, belief was 
related not just to a god who existed and in whom trust could be placed, but in an 
event and a god who had acted. Belief itself was therefore descriptive (they have 
belief in God and Jesus and the resurrection), and active (I believe in/that…) in 
relation to a precise moment in time. The performative nature of belief is twofold; 
it can be expressed as a performative verb ‘I believe…’ or belief can be 
understood as a performative process in a similar manner to gender or ethnicity. I 
take these ideas up in the next section in relation to the work of Judith Bulter and 
others.  
Ruel explains that historically the connection of belief to the resurrection 
made belief both the acceptance of a fact (the resurrection) and the “assertion of a 
proposition.”75 Thus, ‘believers’ believed in Jesus Christ and they believed that 
he died and rose again. Belief was not just one aspect of the religion, it was the 
core concept without which a person could not belong; it became “a badge, a 
                                                
73 Ruel, p. 12. The term Christians was applied by the Jews to the new group. 
74 Ruel, p. 12. 
75 Ruel, p. 12. 
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symbol, something that is explicitly affirmed where the act of affirmation has its 
own functional value.”76 Membership in society was defined by beliefs, in this 
case religious beliefs. The value of belief is evident in the history of the church 
through the centuries in the creeds, baptism, etc. So central was belief to the 
culture of Christianity that to deny belief set a person outside of society; it was a 
moral as well as a social statement. To deny belief was “to deny the Word of 
God, that is, the action of God in the world.”77 Refuting belief was not simply to 
disagree with an opinion but to question the entire relationship of God to humans. 
This belief as described by Ruel is performative in that it constitutes more than a 
simple opinion; it defines the user and is understood as integral to their actions as 
well as their thoughts. 
Belief went from being an expression of ‘trust or confidence,’ to having a 
technical use, defining those who believed in Jesus, explaining the specific kind 
of belief necessary to being a Christian, as well as being an affirmation of 
membership, and the name of the group – ‘the believers.’ Contemporary usage, 
Smith explains, is still affected by this history and ‘unsuspecting Westerners’ do 
simply not realise “how rooted the concept [of belief] is in our own cultural 
religious tradition, Christian and post-Christian, and thus how loaded any 
statement concerning “belief” easily becomes.”78 While the majority of people in 
contemporary Western society no longer participate in the Christian religion the 
uses of the term belief and its cognates still reflect its religious heritage.  
These examples have all served to show that there is more embedded in 
language than we are often aware. While Ruel is focused on a mostly theoretical 
discussion, Jean Pouillon uses concrete examples of language usage, which I will 
                                                
76 Ruel, p. 13. 
77 Ruel, p. 12. 
78 Ruel, p. 9. 
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introduce in a moment. However, it is necessary to first discuss the somewhat 
blinkered view we have come to have of belief in what we assert is a secular 
society.  
The importance of belief as a core concept in Western culture did not 
disappear with the rise of secular culture: 
“Believing” in the sense of being committed to some definable set of 
values has become secularized, detached from Christian believing but not 
demoted as a concept, so that in a post-Christian, secular culture the 
phrase “I believe...” [...] still gives promise of a personal statement of 
some significance, a declaration of moral identity.79 
There are, of course, various ways to use the word ‘believe’ and some are less 
important than others, e.g. ‘I believe he is coming at two o’clock’ is a weak use of 
the word, as Ruel explains:  
…the word [belief] is current English and in this its weak sense is not 
likely to be misunderstood. It is when the word is given a strong sense that 
it may well mislead: for example, when it forms part of a definition or 
categorization or is used in posing a problem. Here I would argue that it is 
almost impossible not to draw on connotations from its Christian use. 
Moreover, these connotations, contextually transposed, create false 
assumptions that then lead to fallacies.80 
In other words, when belief is used in important situations its history comes into 
play, even if the person using it is not aware of this history. The word is chosen 
because it carries with it a range of meanings and history of usage. 
The first fallacy identified by Ruel, that belief is as central to all religions 
as it is to Christianity, is related to the problems with metaphysics addressed by 
Derrida. Belief is central to Christianity both because of the linguistic reasons 
outlined by Ruel, but also because of the history of Western thought as discussed 
in the previous section. Indeed, Derrida with his word-based overthrow of 
binaries showed the constructed nature of language. Because belief is so central 
                                                
79 Ruel, pp. 9-10. 
80 Ruel, p. 27. 
 82 
to the philosophical and religious structure in the West it is hard to imagine how 
another system might function. Thus, to assume that other cultures ‘believe’ as 
we ‘believe’ is natural. Yet, as Jean Pouillon demonstrates, this is a problematic 
assumption to have.  
Pouillon’s article, ‘Remarks on the Verb “To Believe”,’ addresses Ruel’s 
first fallacy from yet another point of view, linking grammar with philosophy. 
Pouillon examines the chronic problem of the anthropologists’ treatment of 
‘belief’ as a constant:  
What anthropologist would deny that he seeks to uncover the beliefs of 
those whom he studies, to compare them with our own beliefs or those of 
other peoples, as if this object of study and its designation presented no a 
priori problem, as if it were obvious that every human being “believes” 
[...] – this being one of our beliefs–in the same way, if not, of course, in 
the same things?81 
It is human nature to analyse experiences in relation to the known – but in the 
case of belief it has become a stumbling block to understanding other cultures. 
Through the philosophy of language, as well as an example from a case study, 
Pouillon begins his discussion of the French verb ‘croire’ (to believe), with a 
detailed analysis of the potential meaning of each manifestation of ‘to believe’ (to 
believe in, to believe that, to believe with a direct or indirect object). Using 
another language as a comparison, in this case Dangaleat, which is spoken in 
northern Chad, Pouillon shows that while every meaning of ‘to believe,’ whether 
‘in’ or ‘that,’ can be translated into Dangaleat, the verb itself cannot.82 That is, the 
verb as it is used in French cannot be translated because there is no one term in 
Dangaleat which means the same things in the same variety as in French. Other 
                                                
81 Jean Pouillon, ‘Remarks on the Verb “To Believe”’, in Between Belief and Transgression: 
Structuralist Essays in Religion, History, and Myth, ed. by Michael Izard and Pierre Smith, trans. 
by John Leavitt (London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1-8 (p. 4). 
82 Ideas from this section have appeared in: Megan Macdonald, ‘The Liturgical Lens: 
Performance Art and Christianity’, Performance Research: On Congregation, 13.3 (2008), 146-
153. 
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European languages, including French, have a unique way of containing many 
religious and spiritually significant ideas in one word. Pouillon shows in his 
detailed examination the extent to which linguistic structures are reinforced by 
Western understandings and preconceptions about belief. 
The unity that exists in the Western European languages is (for this 
pattern is also true of English and German, etc.) unique. Cultures with other belief 
structures have different linguistic structures as well. The fact that the single term 
‘belief’ needs to be translated into a group of expressions in other languages 
invites the question – what is it about belief which allows all the meanings to be 
contained by one word in the West? Belief, as we have already seen in Ruel’s 
work, is obviously related to religion, and in this sense Pouillon’s conclusions are 
not that surprising. Pouillon goes a step further, however, looking at how the 
religious practices of two cultures are informed by language.  
To make his argument Pouillon analyses contemporary usages of ‘to believe’ 
in French, noting when they pointed to a religious past, as well as to other 
associations. He begins by listing the most obvious of the usages (these 
correspond well to their English equivalents);  
– croire à – to state that something exists; ‘to believe in the Devil’ [this 
does not require the person to put their ‘belief’ in the Devil, only to 
believe in the existence of the Devil’] 
– croire en – to have confidence or faith; ‘to believe in (trust in) God’ 
– croire que – for something to be represented a certain way; ‘to believe 
that God exists’83 
In all of these examples, it is of course also possible to ascribe belief to situations 
involving other people, e.g. to put faith in a person, to believe that someone is 
something. The difference between the three kinds of belief listed above is 
sometimes subtle and thus meaning is determined in the speaking by both speaker 
                                                
83 Pouillon, p. 2. [Original emphasis.] 
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and hearer. As he develops his argument Pouillon elaborates on the first 
definitions adding: 
– croire en – to give someone credit ‘to believe what someone says’  
– croyance en – trust in a god such that there is a credo, “a group of 
statements which become the direct object of belief.”84 
Belief, in the examples above, can refer to existence, trust, confidence, credit, or 
to a representation, or the development of a creed.  
All these meanings can be understood by the use of one word, as Pouillon 
demonstrates: 
“Croyance en [“belief in, trust in”] God does imply croyance à [“belief 
in”] his existence, but implication is not identity. On the other hand, this 
implication seems so obvious that it often goes unformulated: a believer 
believes in [croire en, “trusts in”] God, he feels no need to say that he 
believes in [croire à] God’s reality; he believes in [croire à] it, one would 
say implicitly. […] If I have confidence in a friend, if I belief in [croire 
en, “have faith in”] him, will I say that I believe in [croire à] his 
existence? Certainly not; that existence is, simply, undeniable. It is only if 
it were not unquestionable that I would have to believe [croire à] it, and 
believe in it explicitly. …it will probably be said that this is playing on 
words.85 
The meanings held within the term create an internal uncertainty at the same time 
as they are being used to affirm belief. To claim ‘belief in’ or ‘belief that’ is to 
acknowledge that others might ‘believe in’ other things, or ‘believe that’ God 
does not exist. It is possible in these constructions to affirm the existence of 
something without affirming belief in the something, as in the example of the 
Devil. 
Another way Pouillon explains the language of belief is in relation to “the 
certain and the questionable” – the division in Western thinking between man and 
God, or as Plato would put it, between appearance and reality: 
[M]an’s existence by definition, is not on the same level as that of the 
                                                
84 Pouillon, p. 3. [Pouillon separates these examples from the others and I have followed his 
structure in my presentation of his ideas. Original emphasis.] 
85 Pouillon, p. 2. [Original emphasis.] 
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deity. […] It is this distinction between two modes of existence that leads 
to a distinction between two ways of apprehending what exists: perception 
and knowledge on one side, belief…on the other. From this kind of 
perspective, the existence of supernatural beings can only be an object of 
belief, and this is why wherever this distinction is made the phenomenon 
of belief as the affirmation of existence takes on this ambiguous aspect, 
between the certain and the questionable.86 
The distinction is between not only what is ‘known’ and what is ‘believed’ but 
also that the ‘known’ is linked with the natural world and that the ‘believed’ is 
part of the spiritual world. Pouillon clearly explains that it is the Western division 
between “modes of existence” echoed in the linguistic construction which allows 
for the possibility of doubt even in an affirmation of belief in the supernatural. 
The manner of expressing the belief is directly linked to the kind of belief held by 
the culture, “that, above all, there is always doubt at the heart of conviction.”87 It 
is the Christian separation of ‘known’ and ‘believed’ or ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ 
that makes doubt a natural part of belief. Doubt is possible in the usage of belief 
because of the linguistic construction itself; this is not true of every belief system. 
Pouillon analyses the linguistic uses of belief to explain the differences 
between Western and other cultural approaches, showing how the philosophical 
idea finds representation in language. The application of Western ideas to case 
studies from other cultures includes the application of linguistic structures and 
logics. This highlights the problem of cultural specificity. By necessity anyone 
seeking to understand another culture or language must use their mother tongue to 
make sense of the new. What has been problematic are analyses that fail to 
acknowledge that the two cultures in question might not share similar linguistic 
forms, philosophies, structures and logics. An example of this comes from a 
series of lectures given in 1962 by anthropologist E.E. Evans Pritchard who 
                                                
86 Pouillon, p. 2. 
87 Pouillon, p. 5. 
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comments that Western anthropologists had attributed beliefs to the cultures they 
studied, which made sense to the Western view, but had nothing to do with the 
cultures’ views. While discussing the problem of translation he uses the 
understanding of witchcraft as an example88:  
We use the word ‘supernatural’ when speaking of some native form of 
belief, because that is what it would mean for us, but far from increasing 
our understanding of it, we are likely by the use of this word to 
misunderstand it. […] [T]he word ‘supernatural’ conveys to us something 
outside the ordinary operation of cause and effect, but it may not at all 
have that sense for primitive man. For instance, many peoples are 
convinced that deaths are caused by witchcraft. To speak of witchcraft 
being for these peoples a supernatural agency hardly reflects their own 
view of the matter, since from their point of view nothing could be more 
natural. They experience it through the senses in deaths and other 
misfortunes, and the witches are their neighbours. Indeed, for them, if a 
person did not die from witchcraft, it might be better said, at least in a 
certain sense, that he did not die a natural death, and that to die from 
witchcraft is to die from natural causes.”89  
The preconceptions of the anthropologist, and not the beliefs of those studied, can 
significantly alter the presentation of a case study. 
Not every language allows these elements to coexist in one word, as 
shown by Pouillon’s examples from Dangaleat. For the Hadjeraï, who speak 
Dangaleat and ‘believe in’ spirits called the margaï, there are multiple ways of 
expressing what we would call belief. In an example drawn from a dictionary 
Pouillon explains the variants of ‘belief’ in Dangaleat: 
…we find the verb àbidé “to perform the rites faithfully.” It comes from 
the local Arabic abada, “to adore God,” adoration being understood as a 
ritualized activity. It is a matter of worship…of faith in action, and not of 
the representation of a being whose existence must also be affirmed. This 
verb is used with a direct-object complement: this being God for converts 
to Christianity or Islam, or the margaï for others. The best way to translate 
it is thus “to serve,” in the biblical sense of the term: to worship….No 
                                                
88 The quotation from E.E. Evans-Pritchard does not specify a specific country but Evans-
Pritchard’s work in various countries often mentioned witchcraft. See Witchcraft, Oracles and 
Magic Among the Azande (London: Oxford University Press, 1976) and Theories of Primitive 
Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
89 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 
 pp. 109-110. 
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abday maragi, “I serve the margay.”90 
This is but one word in their language which was translated into French as 
believe. Here, to believe in these spirits is sometimes to serve them, but not 
necessarily ‘to serve’ as a Christian would understand what it means to serve in 
the mono-theistic tradition. To serve could mean to pray regularly, to worship, to 
trust, to tell others about the belief, etc. To believe in God in the Western 
understanding of the Christian God does include the idea of serving God, but this 
God is personal and not a conglomeration of various spirits. The kind of serving 
implied by the statement “I believe in God” is different to that implied by “I 
believe in spirits.” The Hadjeraï relationship to the word belief, according to the 
above quotation, is accurately translated as ‘believe’ insofar as serving is what is 
being discussed, but not in terms of the kind of deity they serve. Problems arise 
when this is not explained, leading to misunderstandings for the Western reader 
of an anthropological text on the Hadjeraï. To say that they believe in spirits and 
thus serve the spirits is still too vague because the understanding of ‘to serve,’ in 
this case, is dependent on what belief entails for the Western reader.  
Pouillon criticises translations from Dangaleat which make it seem that 
they ‘believe’ in the margaï, yet their ‘belief’ is quite different than the above 
description of two modes of existence: 
they believe in [croire à] the existence of the margaï like they believe in 
their own existence, in that of animals, things, atmospheric 
phenomena….Or rather, they do not believe in [croire à] it: this existence 
is simply a fact of experience: there is no more need to believe in [croire 
à] the margaï than to believe if you throw a stone it will fall. One fears 
and/or trusts in them, one gets to know them, one gets used to them…91 
While Dangaleat has words which have been translated as ‘belief’ the language 
has no one unifying term that can be used to encompass all understandings and 
                                                
90 Pouillon, p. 4. [Original emphasis.] 
91 Pouillon, p. 7. [Original emphasis.] 
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usages.92 The Hadjeraï have no need for one word partly because their religion is 
based on what they see, feel and experience in the world around them; if there are 
spirits then the spirits are just as much a part of the world as the people. 
Pouillon’s conclusion was that the history of Western religion has had a 
significant influence on the uses of the word believe which are found in French 
(and other European languages). The interdependence of language and religion is 
particularly relevant where the concept of Western ‘belief’ is applied to other 
cultures and situations. 
The originating culture (Western) includes more possible actions in one 
expression (in this case the word belief) than does the destination culture 
(Hadjeraï). Of course the Hadjeraï have other phrases which encompass related 
ideas, but all the ideas related to belief are not held in one word. The Hadjeraï 
also have a different kind of deity – not the personal mono-theistic God of 
Christianity. When such a term is applied to the destination culture which is not 
mono-theistic the differences between the two cultures are hidden by the carry-
over of the term. If this is not clearly explained the risk is that the idea that ‘the 
Hadjeraï believe in spirits’ will be seen as consonant with the Christian idea of 
believing in God. To serve one God with whom believers have a personal 
relationship is quite different than to serve a series of spirits who are 
unpredictable. The implications of transposing ‘belief’ which relates to “a being 
whose existence must also be affirmed” onto ‘belief’ which relates to spirits who 
do not require affirmation, are clearly of a different order. 
As Pouillon explaines, to even use the term ‘Dangaleat religion’ is 
problematic if it is being compared to Western understandings because:  
                                                
92 Pouillon, p. 5. 
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it is not in the sense in which the faithful share a single elaborated body of 
beliefs about supernatural beings, but rather in the etymological 
sense…that of a meticulous concern for the carrying out of the cult, 
without, however, being able to define the necessary correctives in 
advance; at every occasion, one takes aim with uncertainty.93 
Another verb in Dangaleat signifies “to bestow one’s trust on,” “to rest on,” “to 
believe in” and is also used beyond religious contexts.94 There are two other verbs 
which translate “to believe that,” which in Dangaleat also mean “to find out, to 
know, to know about something” and “think, suppose, figure out, foresee”95 
These translations reflect the anthropologist and not the Dangaleat’s 
understandings. This way of relating to other cultures assumes that there is an 
equivalent, but Pouillon’s point is that there is none. The differences tell us 
important information about our own tradition. 
The Hadjeraï ‘experience’ the spirits; they do not need to believe in them 
because they simply exist and therefore there is also no need for doubt. The 
spirits are part of the known world, local environment and everyday experiences. 
In contrast to the Christian view where language use suggests that knowing or 
experiencing God involves having access to another world – a different reality, a 
place where life continues after death – it makes sense that Dangaleat does not 
have a single term to represent belief. 
Ruel’s work addresses the word belief as its meanings have been affected 
by Christian culture and usage in relation to anthropological studies. Meanwhile, 
Pouillon delves deeper into linguistic philosophy to demonstrate that the 
linguistic use of belief in the West is a product of the demands of a specific 
religion on a specific culture and that this does not translate or transpose well.  
The philosophy at the beginning of this chapter gave us to understand that 
                                                
93 Pouillon, p. 7. 
94 Pouillon, p. 5. 
95 Pouillon, p. 5. 
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belief is both structured and influenced by Christianity and Greek philosophy. 
The legacy of metaphysics holds the discussion of belief hostage to the ever 
spiraling closure of representation. Binary structures must be deconstructed in 
order to access some of the physical and material aspects of Christian 
performance. In this way action can be understood as relevant to the overall 
performance of belief. The preconceived linguistic ideas of anthropologists are a 
good example of both the causes and the results of the cultural biases. As such, 
belief can be understood as linguistically and culturally encoded. Any one version 
of belief only makes sense as part of the larger web of concepts. These layers of 
argument lay the foundation for the following theories which explain the 
functioning of speech act theory and the explicit performative.  
 
THE PERFORMATIVE BELIEF ACT 
Performative is a term that comes out of linguistic theory, but it is also used 
extensively in philosophy and performance studies. “Philosophers rarely think 
about acting in the theatrical sense.” So begins Judith Butler’s 1988 essay on 
‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution.’96 Philosophy may not be directly 
interested in acting, but it does investigate ‘acts,’ e.g. ‘action theory’ in moral 
philosophy, the theory of ‘acts’ in phenomenology and ‘speech acts’ in linguistic 
theory.97 As a noun performative “indicates a word or sentence that does 
something,” and it is in this context that is most often used in linguistic theory.98 
                                                
96 Judith Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory’, Theatre Journal, 40 (1998), 519-531 (p. 519). 
97 Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution’, p. 519. “Further, ‘action theory,’ a domain 
of moral philosophy, seeks to understand what it is ‘to do’ prior to any claim of what one ought to 
do. Finally, the phenomenological theory of ‘acts,’ espoused by Edmund Husserl, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and George Herbert Mead, among others, seeks to explain the mundane way in 
which social agents constitute social reality through language, gesture, and all manner of symbolic 
social sign.” 
98 Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 110. 
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The adjective form is used across disciplines and “inflects what it modifies with 
performance-like qualities.”99 
When J.L Austin first defined speech acts in 1955 he proposed the idea 
that verbs are not just descriptive or constative but can be used to ‘do’ things.100 
Speech contains actions, which are not reliant on physical action for their 
expression. Within speech acts he identifies a sub-category of words that are 
themselves actions; these have come to be known as performatives. Instead of 
just describing, in these cases the verb performs the act. Examples include 
promising and ordering, for example, ‘I promise to keep your secret,’ or, ‘I order 
you to leave the room.’ In each case the person speaking has accomplished the 
action of the word in the speaking of it. There is no accompanying physical action 
necessary for the action within the word to take place.  If a physical action is 
required it is not a performative.  
While this initial distinction aimed to isolate the performative in its own 
category, the end result of Austin’s work is a general theory of speech acts in 
which ‘performative’ becomes a way to explain verbs as well as entire utterances, 
thus, ‘I command you to bow’ is a performative sentence. While there are many 
people who work in speech acts from the linguistic point of view, John R. Searle 
has provided the most extensive expansion of Austin’s work in relation to explicit 
performatives. Explicit performatives were, for Austin, verbs uttered in the first 
person, present tense, indicative or active form, e.g. ‘I accept your invitation.’ 
                                                
99 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 110.  
100 J.L. Austin, How to do Thing With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 8: “The 
uttering of the words is, indeed, usually a, or even the, leading incident in the performance of the 
act […] the performance of which is also the object of the utterance, but it is far from being 
usually, even if it is ever, the sole thing necessary if the act is to be deemed to have been 
performed.  Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words 
are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that 
either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether 
‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or event acts of uttering further words.”  
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Other speech acts could also be called performatives or implicit performatives, 
but these did not require the verb to name the act, e.g. ‘Please pass the salt’ which 
is implicitly a request, i.e. ‘I request that you please pass the salt.’ This idea of the 
implicit performative has been mostly abandoned by those who have continued to 
work with the theory of performativity. Searle has gone so far as to assert that 
only explicit performatives constitute performative action; “some illocutionary 
acts can be performed by uttering a sentence containing an expression that names 
the type of speech act, as in, for example, ‘I order you to leave the room.’ These 
utterances, and only these, are correctly described as performative utterances.”101 
In Searle’s evaluation there are five categories of performative statements. 
Assertives  The speaker commits himself in varying degrees to the 
truth of the expressed proposition.  Ex. statements, 
explanations, assertions 
Directives  The speaker attempts to get the hearer to do something. Ex. 
orders, requests, commands 
Commissives  The speaker commits himself to doing something, to some 
future course of action. Ex. promising, vows, threats, 
pledges, contracts, guarantees 
Expressives  The speaker expresses his feelings and attitudes about 
some state of affairs specified by the propositional content. 
Ex. apologies, thanks, congratulations 
Declarations   The speaker brings about changes in the world through his 
utterances, so the world changes to match the propositional 
content, solely in the virtue of the successful performance 
of the utterance. Ex. declaring war, adjourning a 
meeting.102 
In his essay ‘How Performatives Work’ Searle states that all performative 
                                                
101 John R. Searle, ‘How Performatives Work’ in Consciousness and Language (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 156-179 (p. 158). Keir Elam explains the three forms of 
performative speech in a clear and concise manner: “Austin ultimately decided that a separate 
category of verbs called performatives was untenable and opted for three sub-categories within 
speech acts; these are locutionary (any basic linguistic act that results in a meaningful utterance); 
illocutionary (the act performed in saying something such as asking a question, ordering someone 
to do something, etc. – it is the ‘illocution’ which constitutes the speech act proper); and 
perlocutionary (performed by means of saying something such as persuading, convincing, etc.). 
All perlocutionary acts are illocutionary acts, but this is not reciprocal.”(Keir Elam, The 
Semiotics of Theatre and Drama (London: Methuen, 1980), p. 158). 
102 John R. Searle, “Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality”, in Speech Acts, Mind and Social 
Reality, Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle, eds. (London: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 3-16 (p. 5). 
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sentences are declarations. The declaration, according to Searle, is special 
because its “point is to create a new fact corresponding to the propositional 
content. Sometimes those new facts are themselves speech acts such as promises, 
statements, orders, etcetera.”103 So the declaration produces a new state which 
would not have otherwise existed and is only possible through language. It is 
because Searle took performatives to be literal that this is possible.104 The 
utterance “I promise to keep your secret” is thus literally a promise in the moment 
it is made. It brings about a new state because the speaker has committed himself 
to future action. 
The use of the verb ‘to believe’ fits in the categories of assertives, 
expressives, and declarations. As an assertion it commits the speaker to the 
existence of a belief, e.g. ‘I believe that people are inherently good’; as an 
expressive it refers to the speaker’s dedication to the propositional content of the 
belief, e.g. ‘I believe what you told me’; and as a declaration it refers to the belief 
declared, e.g. ‘I believe in God.’ From these three sentences it is clear that belief 
is expressed in different ways depending on the context and object (or subject) of 
belief.  
This was a quick and brief introduction to a substantial field in linguistics. 
The ideas generated by Austin, Searle and others have proven useful to a large 
number of other fields.105 In particular critical theory where the work of Judith 
                                                
103 Searle, ‘How Performatives Work’, p. 170. 
104 There are many discussions around this topic into the nature of intention, truth conditions and 
linguistic conventions which are interesting but not directly applicable the argument I am 
following through this dissertation. For more on Searle’s understanding of performatives see: 
Searle, John R., Speech Acts, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), ‘Metaphor’, in 
Metaphor and Thought, ed. by Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
pp. 83-111; Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1983]); Expression 
and Meaning, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 [1979]). 
105 The variety of fields that have taken up aspects of theory of performativity in relation to belief 
is quite diverse. These fields use the term in many ways and do not always sufficiently clarify 
exactly what is meant. The following is an example from the field of communications from 
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Butler stands out as the most widely know and used. However, before Butler 
engaged the performative others were attempting to build theories that explained 
more than just linguistic utterances.  
An early philosophical analysis dealing uniquely with belief as a 
performative utterance came from Gerald Myers. In ‘Justifying Belief-Assertions’ 
he differentiates between the first utterance of ‘I believe’ and all subsequent 
utterances of the same. Myers explains that the first utterance is simply a 
statement whereas all following utterances are performative building on and 
validating the original and each other: 
The logical status of ‘I believe p’ differs from that of its reiteration. In any 
given context, the original utterance of a belief-assertion is an ordinary 
truth-claim, whereas its sincere reiteration is a performative utterance; it is 
a linguistic performance serving as the most accessible, as well as the 
most commonly resorted to, behavioral test for the truth of the original 
utterance. We need not deny to the reiteration the status of a truth-claim; 
that is, the sincere reiteration of ‘I believe p’ repeats at least the same 
truth-claim as the original utterance. The point is that the reiteration is not 
merely a repetition; it is, besides, a linguistic performance ordinarily 
countable as evidence for ‘I believe p’.106 
According to this argumentation belief becomes stronger and more serious with 
                                                                                                                                
Bernardina De Carolis’ article ‘APML, a Markup Language for Believable Behavior Generation’: 
“Therefore, the minimal unit of communication is a communicative act that is made up of two 
parts, two packages of beliefs: a performative and a propositional content. Any time we 
communicate we must have conceived of at least these two packages of beliefs, and to the extent 
to which these beliefs are beliefs we have the goal to communicate to an Addressee, we can say 
they form a meaning. A meaning can be viewed, then as a set of beliefs that a system has the goal 
to transmit to another system: that is, belief S has the goal that also A believes.” Bernardina de 
Carolis and others, ‘APML, a Markup Language for Believable Behavior Generation’ in Life-Like 
Characters: Tools, Affective Functions, and Applications, ed. by Helmut Prendinger and Mitsuru 
Ishizuka, (Berlin: Springer, 2004), pp. 65-86 (p. 68). Here belief is connected to performative and 
propositional content in communication. It is said to form the foundation for all meaning. Each 
piece of information communicated is given the status of a belief. This is clearly untenable in 
relation to performance studies, as much of what is communicated can simply not be accorded the 
status of belief. Nor can every statement be reliant on belief or the entire concept of belief as 
different from knowledge is undermined. And a final example from the field of medicine: Ted 
Kaptchuk argues that healing rituals in alternative medicine have “performative efficacy” that 
“relies on the power of belief, imagination, symbols, meaning, expectation, persuasion, and self-
relationship (Ted Kaptchuk, ‘The Placebo Effect in Alternative Medicine: Can the Performance of 
a Healing Ritual Have Clinical Significance?’, Annals of Internal Medicine (2002:136, 4), 817-
818. 
106 Gerald E. Myers, ‘Justifying Belief-Assertions’, The Journal of Philosophy, 64.7 (1967), 210-
214. 
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each repetition of the action, with each performance. The reiteration confirms the 
previous statements and affords the current statement relevance. If ‘I believe p’ is 
part of a frequently performed ritual it therefore comes to have more power and 
credibility over time. The combined assertions of all those present for each 
enactment coupled with weekly, monthly or yearly repetitions confirms the 
utterance’s performative power. As part of a ritual the utterance of belief is 
automatically taken seriously, at least within the ritual itself.107 Myers mentions 
‘truth-claims’ but in this case the use of ‘truth’ is not meant to relegate the 
utterance to the binary of ‘true’ or ‘false’.  Rather truth conditions are bound up 
with the performance of a successful declaration and this relies on the proper 
context and intent.108  
Thirty years after Myers was writing Judith Butler took up the same 
problem, although more generally, i.e. not specifically in relation to belief. Her 
account agrees with Myers in relation to the power of repetition, moreover she 
states that performative action is completely reliant on this structure for its 
effectiveness: 
If a performative provisionally succeeds (and I will suggest that “success” 
is always and only provisional), then it is not because an intention 
successfully governs the action of speech, but only because that action 
echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the 
repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices. It is not 
simply that the speech act takes place within a practice, but that the act is 
                                                
107 Many factors need to be taken into account in order for the statement to be taken seriously.  In 
the utterance ‘I believe p’ p has to be possible, reasonable and not an ‘I know p’ statement, for 
example, ‘I believe that Florence is the capital of Italy’ should really be expressed as ‘I know’ 
because it is knowledge based. It can be proven through empirical data. It is therefore not 
‘possible’ nor ‘reasonable’ as a statement. Examples which would work for p include ‘in God,’ 
‘that people are inherently good,’ ‘that she loves me,’ etc. 
108 Other philosophers have argued two additional ways to analyze performative sentences.  The 
first casts the performative verb as the illocutionary force and equates this with any other 
linguistic device.  In this case there are no truth conditions associated with the performative.  The 
second possibility holds that all performative sentences are statements.  In order to promise, the 
speaker makes a statement to the effect that he promises.  In this case there are truth conditions 
that must be met by the speaker. See John R. Searle and Daniel Vanderveken, Foundations of 
Illocutionary Logic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 1. 
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itself a ritualized practice. What this means, then, is that a performative 
“works” to the extent that it draws on and covers over the constitutive 
conventions by which it is mobilized. In this sense, no term or statement 
can function performatively without the accumulating and dissimulating 
historicity of force.109 
Whatever the situation in which the speech act is repeated, it draws its power both 
from the practice of which it is a part and from its own power as a repeatable and 
repeated act. Butler also usefully introduces the word ‘succeeds’ instead of the 
former ‘truth-claims’ into her evaluation of performative action. Success is more 
easily analysed in a relative manner, e.g. more or less successful instead of ‘true’ 
or ‘false.’110 In response to the question of how belief might be analysed as part 
of a performance, the performative ‘I believe’ can be analysed as any other 
speech act. It gains power and authority as with any other action that is 
performative.  
Another way to understand this functioning of the performative is to think 
of it as self-referential. Searle explains that performatives are “self-referential in a 
special way, they are not only about themselves, but they also operate on 
themselves. They are both self-referential and executive.”111 By self-referential 
Searle means that the verb refers to itself, to its own action and not to an ideal of 
the named action, or to the existence of such an action elsewhere – it names its 
act in the moment of execution. The execution of the action named by the verb is 
also carried out in the moment of speaking, and this is how the performative, as 
Searle put it, operates on itself, i.e. is executive. Thus, to return to Butler, each 
utterance of the performative contains its own new action and execution, while it 
echoes previous utterances. This echoing is not the same as mimicking or copying 
                                                
109 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 
51. [Original emphasis.] 
110 There is of course the binary of success and failure, but Butler introduces the idea of success as 
provisional and not, therefore, as an absolute. 
111 Searle, ‘How Performatives Work’, p. 172. 
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as each utterance needs to refer to itself in order to function, but the repetition 
over time shows that the utterance does indeed do what it says it will. Some 
performatives do commit the speaker to action in the future, e.g. ‘I promise to 
come to the party’ commits the speaker to attend a party in the future, but the 
promise itself is present tense and bound to the moment it is uttered. Performative 
action is created in the moment by those present. 
Judith Butler took the study of speech acts and applied the theories 
developed by Austin and others to the broader concept of gender in her books 
Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies That Matter (1997). Her ideas have 
subsequently been employed by many performance scholars to bridge the gap 
between the embodied and discursive sides of performance analysis.112 In her 
essay ‘Melancholy Gender-Refused Identification’ Butler explains how gender 
could be looked at in terms of the idea of performativity: 
I argued that gender was performative, and by that I meant that there is no 
gender that is “expressed” by actions, gestures, or speech, but that the 
performance of gender was precisely that which produced retroactively 
the illusion that there was an inner gender core. Indeed, the performance 
of gender might be said retroactively to produce the effect of some true or 
abiding feminine essence or disposition, such that one could not use an 
expressive model for thinking about gender. Moreover, I argued that 
gender is produced as a ritualized repetition of conventions and that this 
ritual is socially compelled in part by the force of a compulsory 
heterosexuality.113 
In this explanation performative action is effected through a complex 
combination of physical actions that together relay information about the person 
doing the actions. It is through observing the entire person that a picture of their 
                                                
112 Examples include: ‘Re: Blau, Butler, Beckett, and the Politics of Seeming’, by Elin Diamond, 
TDR: The Drama Review, 44 (2000), 31-43; Josette Féral, ‘The Dramatic Art of Robert Lepage: 
Fragments of Identity’, Contemporary Theatre Review, 19 (2009), 143-154; the collection of 
essays in The Ends of Performance, ed. by Peggy Phelan and Jill Lane (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998) 
113 Judith Butler, ‘Melancholy Gender-Refused Identification,’ in Gender in Psychoanalytic 
Space: Between Clinic and Culture, ed. by Muriel Dimin and Virgina Goldner  (New York: Other 
Press, 2002), pp. 3-20 (p. 13). 
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gender appears, thus the concept of retroactive production, i.e. only after 
watching a person for a period of time is it possible to say how that person 
performs their gender role. This knowledge is then applied back onto previous 
encounters and interactions. While the ritualized repetition of conventions is 
shared by all members in society in relation to many behaviours, it is the implicit 
coercion of compulsory heterosexuality that is key to how Butler’s argument 
works. By bringing this development of the concept of performativity into 
relation with psychoanalytic understandings of the function of repression, Butler 
traces a set of logical steps that involve the role of law in legislating behaviour. 
This in turn affects how she articulates agency. I briefly sketch out Butler’s 
theories before explaining how my use of the performative differs in relation to 
belief. 
In Gender Trouble Butler first developed the theory that gender is 
performative. As she writes, this view “sought to show that what we take to be an 
internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited 
through the gendered stylization of the body.”114 Therefore gender is not fixed 
because it is created through repeated actions. Of primary concern to her 
argument was the interplay between an internal essence and an external 
appearance of gender. One of the ways she explained this idea was through a 
corollary: “There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that 
identity is performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be 
its results.”115 This is the same way that Austin and Searle’s Speech Acts 
function: the performance of gender happens in the moment of its performance.116  
                                                
114 Butler, Gender Trouble (London: Routledge, 1999 [1990]), p. xv. 
115 Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 33. 
116 She discusses “gender as an enactment that performatively constitutes the appearance of its 
own interior fixity.” Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 89. 
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 A significant focus of both Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter is to 
show how society regulates human actions. Butler argues that gender would not 
exist if there were not a collective agreement to perform and maintain the cultural 
fiction of gender. She asks questions framed by the language of power and 
resistance: “If gender is constructed through relations of power and…normative 
constraints that not only produce but also regulate various bodily beings, how 
might agency be derived from this notion of gender as the effect of productive 
constraint?”117 Her aim is to interrogate agency in situations where the 
performance of gender constrained. In the quotation below Butler’s logical moves 
are clearly articulated from a general understanding to the enforced regulation of 
gender: 
Because there is neither an “essence” that gender expresses or 
externalizes nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because 
gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, 
and without those acts, there would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a 
construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit collective 
agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as 
cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those productions—and 
the punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in them; the 
construction “compels” our belief in its necessity and naturalness. The 
historical possibilities materialized through various corporeal styles are 
nothing other than those punitively regulated cultural fictions alternately 
embodied and deflected under duress.118 
This quotation traces a sequence of thought from an explanation of the 
construction of gender through to the punishment if the roles are not played 
adequately.119 
                                                
117 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter (London: Routledge, 1993), p. x. 
118 Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 178. 
119 I am aware that Butler furthers and defends criticisms of her theory of performativity from 
Gender Trouble in her later book Bodies that Matter. The conception of performativity as 
articulated by Butler in Bodies that Matter takes it even more into the realm of the punitive. At the 
end of that book she reasserts her position on performativity that is focused on power relations:  
Performativity describes this relation of being implicated in that which one opposes, this 
turning of power against itself to produce alternative modalities of power, to establish a 
kind of political contestation that is not a "pure" opposition, a "transcendence" of 
contemporary relations of power, but a difficult labor of forging a future from resources 
 100 
This idea of punitive consequences is important to the understanding of 
agency that Butler is forwarding because, as Saba Mahmood has argued, “Butler 
tends to develop the concept of agency primarily in the context of supporting 
resistance against social norms (e.g. her reading of drag’s significance).”120 It is 
her interest in resistance to social norms that leads Butler to a discussion of 
psychoanalysis and the law. She uses the perspective of psychoanalysis to present 
‘deviant’ sexualities as the ‘repressed’ that must be controlled through specific 
circumstances, which are enabled and helped by the law.121 The law protects that 
which it can identify and ironically, “[t]he notion of an “original” sexuality 
forever repressed and forbidden thus becomes a production of the law which 
subsequently functions as its prohibition.”122 Many expressions of gender are 
therefore punishable, or at least monitored and maintained, by the law and 
Butler’s theory explains how these laws are upheld by social norms. It is in 
relation to social norms that Butler’s project differs most significantly from other 
uses of the performative. 
Recent publications on Butler’s work, specifically the edited collection 
Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler, develop the application of the 
performative to religious practices. Saba Mahmood’s article, ‘Agency, 
Performativity and the Feminist Subject,’ focuses on female Muslim communities 
                                                                                                                                
inevitably impure (Butler, Bodies That Matter, p. 241).  
The argument in this dissertation does not rely on the same notion of agency. The focus on the 
religious sphere necessitates a different agency for performativity. I am interested instead in how 
the performative works autonomously in situations of self-production of action as articulated by 
Saba Mahmood in ‘Agency, Performativity, and the Feminist Subject’, in Bodily Citations: 
Religion and Judith Butler, ed. by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), pp. 177-221. I introduce Mahmood’s work in the next paragraph. 
120 Saba Mahmood paraphrased by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville, in ‘Introduction,’ in 
Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler, ed. by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. xiii-xxi (p. xviii). 
121 “[O]ne needs to read the drama of the Symbolic, of desire, of the institution of sexual 
difference as a self-supporting signifying economy that wields power in the marking off of what 
can and cannot be thought within the terms of cultural intelligibility.” Butler, Gender Trouble, pp. 
99-100. 
122 Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 97. 
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and shifts the notion of agency away from a position of defence:  
I want to suggest we think of agency not as a synonym for resistance to 
relations of domination but as a capacity for action that historically 
specific relations of subordination enable and create. This relatively open-
ended understanding of agency draws upon poststructuralist theories of 
subject formation and is indebted to Judith Butler’s work. However, as 
will become clear, my analysis of agency departs from Butler’s argument 
in that I want to explore those modalities of agency whose meaning and 
effect are not captured within the logic of subversion and resignification 
of hegemonic norms.123 
Mahmood rethinks Butler’s discussion of agency because the treatment of the 
subject in Butler is framed by the need to resist forces that repress expression. As 
Mahmood explains, Butler “claims that the iterable and repetitive character of the 
performatives makes the structure of norms vulnerable and unstable because the 
reiteration my fail.”124  
The subject in Mahmood’s research is not constructed in the same way, 
i.e. is not identified foremost with an outside adversary.125 Butler shows how a 
complex set of systems has controlled social understandings of gender, and made 
the performance of actions part of a larger resistance. Mahmood makes the case 
for instances where the understandings of performative actions are of a 
completely different nature. She defines agency in relation to historical and 
cultural specificities and writes that we “must detach the concept of agency from 
the trope of resistance so as to be able to explore other structures of desire, 
political imaginaries, social authority, and personhood.”126 In this way agency is 
presented as part of behaviours that are not immediately concerned with 
overturning or resisting forms of control or oppression. 
Mahmood’s conception of agency detaches it from a specifically resistant 
                                                
123 Mahmood, p. 180. 
124 Mahmood, p. 200. 
125 “Given Butler’s theory of the subject, it is not surprising that her analysis of performativity 
also informs her conceptualization of agency; indeed, as she says, “the iterability of performativity 
is a theory of agency”” (Mahmood, p. 189). 
126 Mahmood, p. 180. 
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conception of politics, and allows it a degree of autonomy in self-production, i.e, 
it accommodates the possibility that agency may be exercised on its own behalf 
rather than in response to pre-existing forms of suppression. This distances her 
work from other theories of agency and Mahmood has a good reason for doing 
so: “In order to grasp these modes of action indebted to other reasons and 
histories, I want to argue that it is crucial to detach the notion of agency from the 
goals of progressive politics.”127 Specifically, she makes the case that this is 
necessary in order to properly “attend to the specific logic of the discourse of 
piety: a logic that inheres not in the intentionality of the actors but in the 
relationships that are articulated between words, concepts, and practices that 
constitute a particular discursive tradition.”128 Mahmood’s research is on religious 
communities and I endorse this approach for examinations of religious and 
secular rituals. It allows for participants to have agency “in the multiple ways in 
which one inhabits norms.”129 Rituals are normalized cultural behaviours and, 
while some are, not every ritual is about breaking through cultural barriers. The 
performance of actions in the religious or spiritual environments that I detail in 
the case studies in this thesis are part of an examination of the “multiple ways in 
which one inhabits norms.” Belief cannot be ‘expressed’ by actions, gestures, or 
speech alone but is performed through “the relationships that are articulated 
between words, concepts, and practices that constitute a particular discursive 
tradition.”130 Western models of belief have been codified through repetition in 
language and behaviour as has gender, but belief is not socially compelled in the 
same way. The norms that exist in the performance of the Christian tradition are 
                                                
127 Mahmood, p. 186. 
128 Mahmood, p. 180. 
129 Mahmood, p. 186. 
130 Mahmood, p. 180. 
 103 
‘inhabited’ with agency and not ‘prisoner’ to the form, as I will show in the case 
study that follows. 
To return to the question of how belief can be analysed as part of a 
performance where the speech acts themselves are not part of the analysis, 
Butler’s and Mahmood’s work both point towards a combination of philosophical 
and anthropological methods. Butler links the individual act of gender with all 
social acts of gender, claiming that these are never completed in isolation, both 
because they are learned behaviours which exist before the individual learns 
them, and because they can only exist if people continue to perform them.131 In 
relation to belief this is once again a helpful way to engage with an analysis – the 
accepted ways of expressing belief already exist in Western culture.  
Mahmood presents anthropology as a field that has long advocated an 
understanding of cultural actions as part of but not limited to “discursive 
traditions”:  
My argument should be familiar to anthropologists who have long 
acknowledged that the terms people use to organize their lives are not 
simply a gloss for universally shared assumptions about the world and 
one’s place in it but are actually constitutive of different forms of 
personhood, knowledge, and experience.”132 
For the participant, the combined experiences in the ritual form the totality of the 
understanding carried from enactment to enactment. This links back to Asad, 
Ruel and Pouillon’s arguments about needing to incorporate more robust analyses 
of religion that take into account unacknowledged cultural biases about belief; 
that belief informs and indeed is action; that belief is not only an interior state; 
and that understanding belief is more complex than simply identifying the object 
of belief. 
                                                
131 Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution’, pp. 525-6. 
132 Mahmood, p. 180. 
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As with the way rituals function – with each iteration building on those 
that have come before and prefacing those that are to come – the approaches to 
the theory of performativity have built an argument for the relevance of 
performative theory to the study of rituals throughout this introductory chapter. 
Plato, Nietzsche and Derrida have pointed out the frameworks which shape how 
we conceive of metaphysical structures and how dependent our philosophy is on 
the continuance of such structures. Ruel and Pouillon have shown how the 
linguistic expression of belief is obviously learned through language acquisition. 
The physical actions and gestures of belief need to be examined in contexts where 
belief is performed.  
 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has investigated belief through philosophy and theology to highlight 
metaphysical assumptions and structures. The relevance of language to 
understanding Western belief and embodied practice has been discussed with 
examples from anthropological case studies. Vocabulary and syntax are mutually 
dependent and culturally specific and thus of great importance to descriptions and 
analyses of performances. While Western religious ritual has been primarily 
examined through semiotic and representational analyses, the rituals themselves 
have been shown here to be embodied and performative. To do justice to such 
rituals, and the performance of belief they entail, another approach to analysis 
should be included in current research methodologies. In Chapter 2 a literature 
analysis and introduction to methodologies is provided.  
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CHAPTER 2  
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF BELIEF 
 
The research focus of this dissertation was articulated in the previous chapter as 
interdisciplinary. To address the need for a literature review and some 
background to the methodological needs of performance research this chapter 
functions as the literature review. And as the dissertation is interdisciplinary, so is 
the review. Three sections are used to review both literature and methodologies. 
The first section is a literature review of theology as it has engaged with analyses 
of the performance of the liturgy. This section explains that the overarching 
approach in theology has been a normative one which seeks to establish meaning 
for liturgical action and to stipulate what constitutes a successful performance by 
reference to external criteria, the text, or norms. A typical analysis might take an 
historical point of view which contextualises contemporary enactments of the 
liturgy in light of historical tradition, patterns, and precedents. This kind of 
analysis is useful for its rigour in establishing historical continuity or 
discontinuity, but does not address the performative aspect of the liturgy.  
The second section is a review of methodologies used by anthropology to 
analyse ritual. Recent research in anthropology has shown that despite claims of 
being a secular science, anthropology is more indebted to, and indeed embedded 
in, its Christian past than has previously been acknowledged. In light of this 
methodologies themselves are being questioned. The third section focuses on 
audience reception theories from three perspectives – philosophy, theatre studies 
and performance studies – to show the importance of the conception of the entire 
event to any analysis of a performance. Together these three reviews provide 
examples from the most prominent disciplinary contributions to this dissertation. 
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Before introducing the literature and methodologies that impact how liturgy and 
performance are understood, I offer an explanation and description of the Roman 
Catholic liturgy.   
 
LITURGICAL FORM 
Liturgy is a type of ritual, but not all rituals are liturgies. Simply explained, 
liturgy is as specific as organised public religious worship following a prescribed 
form, and as general as a set of repeatable (and often repeated) actions, texts, 
ceremonies or performances. It is comprised of sections which, in the Christian 
tradition, focus on the celebration of the Eucharist (the ceremony of blessing the 
bread and wine and then the communal sharing of the meal which, depending on 
the denomination, either represent or transubstantiate into the body and blood of 
Jesus Christ).1 This one central ritual is surrounded by smaller distinct rituals 
such as prayers, responses, readings and songs which collectively make up the 
text of the liturgy. Within this framework, individual rituals can change or evolve, 
i.e. the words of the liturgy can change to suit the time of year or a particular 
focus of the congregation; or the style of music can change from tuning forks, to 
pipe organ, to pop music.2 Throughout, the integrity of the liturgy as a whole is 
maintained. Larger changes can be incorporated such as the addition of other 
elements for Easter or Christmas celebrations and the liturgy itself remains intact. 
                                                
1For Roman Catholics, strictly speaking, without the Eucharist there is no liturgy. Services of 
prayer can take place without there being a liturgy. The theology behind what happens to the 
bread and wine has evolved and changed over the centuries and even within one denomination 
each person may believe something slightly different about what happens when the objects are 
blessed by the person (priest, vicar, pastor, leader) leading the service. 
2 If the words of the liturgy are adapted, it is important to note that the central story of the 
Eucharist does not change. The retelling of what happened when Jesus first used bread and wine 
as symbols of the crucified body cannot and is not significantly changed, even across 
denominations. 
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Every Roman Catholic congregation develops its own way of worshiping while 
maintaining the central content of the liturgy which is Eucharistic celebration. 
The definition of the word liturgy comes from the Greek word liturgia 
which meant the “the work of the people.”3 As Patricia Wilson-Kastner writes, 
Originally in Greek the phrase did not mean “a work done by lots of 
people,” but some work undertaken for the community’s good (a public 
philanthropy). Building a bridge, doing military service, or putting on a 
public play was “liturgy.” The Septuagint translators used “liturgy” to 
describe the Temple worship. In the New Testament, “liturgy” identified 
Temple worship, but also received a uniquely Christian meaning—Jesus’ 
life and obedient death for us, and his risen life for our redemption (see 
Heb 8:6). Thus the Christian life lived in the spirit of Jesus is also a liturgy 
(see Phil. 2.30).4 
What Wilson-Kastner identifies in this explanation of liturgy is the application by 
the Greeks of the word liturgy to the Judeo-Christian religious traditions. Before 
the Septuagint5 and the advent of Christianity, liturgy brought to mind many 
types of work, but after these developments, liturgy was also associated with a 
specific type of spiritual ‘work’; a fully embodied (body, soul and mind) work. In 
her explanation ‘work’ is linked specifically with the body of Jesus, what he did 
in life and how he used his body in death and resurrection. She also links this 
notion of ‘work’ to all those ‘believers’ who follow the Christian religion. Thus 
the idea of liturgical work is associated specifically with a religious group whose 
identity, as I have shown in Chapter 1, is bound up with ‘belief’ as a concept, a 
linguistic manifestation, and an embodied practice. This understanding of liturgy 
as ‘work’ includes a huge variety of possible actions: physical (physical actions 
and speech actions), material (interaction with objects), mental and spiritual. This 
description of liturgy is clearly relevant to the discussion in the last chapter about 
                                                
3 Patricia Wilson-Kastner, Sacred Drama: A Spirituality of Christian Liturgy (Mineapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1999), p. 7. 
4 Wilson-Kastner, p. 7. 
5 The Septuagint is the Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures. It was translated between 300 
and 200 BCE (Before the Common Era instead of BC). 
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the ways in which belief can be performed. The performance of the Christian 
liturgy is one way in which beliefs are performed through the entire person and it 
has been the dominant religious form of embodied action in the West for close to 
two thousand years. 
To explain what happens in the liturgy, the following descriptions are 
meant to clarify basic aspects of the service, not to be an exhaustive explanation 
of all that is happening.6 The liturgy itself is structured in such as way as to 
involve and draw in the participant. Research in this area has been done by many 
theologians, establishing the meaning and reason for each element. The entire 
Roman Catholic liturgy is conventionally broken into five sections: Introductory 
Rites, Liturgy of the Word, Liturgy of the Eucharist, Communion Rite, and 
Concluding Rite (for a detailed description of each section see Appendix A).  
This structure may seem to be static, but the liturgy has changed 
significantly since the first time Jesus blessed the bread and wine, and the 
twentieth century brought in huge changes through liturgical reform. The origins 
of the Christian liturgy are in the first century CE.7 The liturgy has changed and 
evolved in each century, but it was not until the time of the Council of Trent in 
1563 that large scale, organised, liturgical reform was undertaken. Changes 
effected at this point set four hundred years of liturgical performance in motion, 
during which the liturgy continued to adapt to each generation. The next major 
reform was undertaken at the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) in 1963. 
Vatican II paid special and specific attention to the liturgy and its role in the 
                                                
6 For more on the structure of the liturgy see Denis Crouan, S.T.D., The History and the Future of 
the Roman Liturgy, trans. by Michael Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005); Theodor 
Klauser, A Short History of the Western Liturgy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Alcuin 
Reid, The Organic Development of the Liturgy (Farnborough: St. Michael’s Abbey Press, 2004). 
7 CE refers to the Common Era instead of using AD. 
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church. According to Annibale Bugnini who was “the key figure in liturgical 
reform [from 1949] until 1975”8:  
The reform that the Second Vatican Council inaugurated is differentiated 
from all others in the history of the Liturgy by its pastoral emphasis. The 
participation and active involvement of the people of God in the liturgical 
celebration is the ultimate goal of the reform.9 
The desire for active participation is key to understanding the performance of the 
liturgy because Vatican II recast the congregation as performative participants 
who effect the ‘work’ of the liturgy – completing the action of the liturgy by 
participating. 
The official stance of the church is that the liturgy is worship and action.10 
Whether explicitly or implicitly, Vatican II clearly placed value on the use of 
embodied practices in Christian worship. The liturgy has been examined as a 
devotional text, a sacred text, a literary text, and in relation to many aspects of 
church history such as church architecture, politics, morals, policies of control 
and indoctrination.11 All of these aspects are of scholarly interest, but do not 
address, except perhaps in passing, the importance of the performative dimension. 
Most analyses are textual and they fall roughly into three categories – theological, 
historical, and anthropological. There is, of course, overlap between these areas 
and other categories could be added if a closer differentiation was necessary. To 
                                                
8 Reid, p. 137. [Original emphasis.] 
9 Bugnini in Reid, p. 291. 
10 The documents of Vatican II describe the function of the liturgy in many ways but all return to 
the use of the body through actions undertaken as a group: “In the liturgy the sanctification of the 
man is signified by signs perceptible to the senses, and is effected in a way which corresponds 
with each of these signs; in the liturgy the whole public worship is performed by the Mystical 
Body of Jesus Christ, that is, by the Head and His members.” Sacrosanctum Concilium, Vatican 
Council, <http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html>  [accessed 16 April 2009] Chapter 1 
Section 7. 
11 For a helpful book on the interaction of church architecture and the Roman Catholic liturgy see 
Steven J. Schloeder, Architecture in Communion: Implementing the Second Vatican Council 
through Liturgy and Architecture (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1998). For more on liturgy and 
Christian morality see, Hamon L. Smith, Where Two or Three Are Gathered: Liturgy and the 
Moral Life (Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1995). 
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these analyses I add contemporary research, in a section on performance 
approaches, that is bringing attention to the idea of the performative as relevant to 
liturgical theology. 
 
TEXTUAL LITURGY 
Across fields the main mode of analysis of the liturgy has been textual. As the 
liturgy exists as a text, this is to be expected. However, when the liturgy is 
performed, the text is a guide to the performance which exists alongside the 
embodied form. The tendency has been to analyse the performance of an 
observed liturgical event on how well it represents the text, and thus, the text 
becomes the standard against which all performances are measured. Without 
analyses that address the difference between the performed and written text only a 
partial understanding of the physical actions can ever be achieved. An 
examination of performance can still refer to the text for the structure or clarity it 
provides the embodied work. Approaches such as theology, history and 
anthropology, all suffer from the same tendency to rely on, or revert to, the text. 
 
Theology 
The theology behind the liturgy is a topic which has occupied all denominations 
of the Christian church for the last two thousand years as evidenced by the 
plethora of books devoted to the subject.12 The field of liturgical theology 
concerns itself specifically with the liturgy and looks at the meanings – symbolic, 
                                                
12 A thorough and very useful series on the Roman Catholic Liturgy can be found in the 
Handbook for Liturgical Studies: Introduction to the Liturgy, Vol. I (1997); Fundamental Liturgy, 
Vol. II (1998); The Eucharist, Vol. III (1999); Sacraments and Sacramentals, Vol. IV (1999); 
Liturgical Time and Space, Vol. V (2000), Anscar J. Chupungco, ed., (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press). The classic text on the Anglican liturgy already mentioned is: Dom Gregory Dix, The 
Shape of the Liturgy (New York: Seabury Press, 1983 [1945]). 
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semiotic, and literal – and interpretations, relationship to scripture, and of course, 
theological implications of the liturgy.13 Theology as a field is understandably 
focussed on the spiritual aspects and implications of liturgy and has traditionally 
analysed the theological through the text. Theological questions, issues and 
concerns can be discussed and interpreted through the text of the liturgy itself 
with reference to the importance of the liturgical event, without requiring the 
reference of a specific performance moment. An example of a thorough and 
accessible work on liturgical theology is the five volume Handbook for Liturgical 
Studies, edited by Anscar J. Chupungco. It is a series of essays which 
systematically examine all aspects of the liturgy. The titles of the five volumes 
give an indication of the way information is organised - Introduction to the 
Liturgy, Fundamental Liturgy, The Eucharist, Sacraments and Sacramentals, and 
Liturgical Time and Space. Many parts of these volumes could be useful 
analysing performative action and some even point towards performative 
possibilities.14 Occasional references throughout the volumes to performance 
practices indicate an interest in the variety of ways people express themselves in 
relation to spirituality. In the opening section of Introduction to the Liturgy 
Chupungco links various forms of spiritual expression with the liturgy: “Today 
we speak more broadly of popular religiosity which includes also such acts as 
                                                
13 The role of liturgists and theologians in the shaping of methods, meanings and the liturgical 
renewal of the contemporary church are explored in:  K.W. Irwin, Context and Text: Method in 
Liturgical Theology (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1994). The wider implications of 
semiotics on meaning and understanding of the liturgy is covered in: Graham Hughes, Worship as 
Meaning: A Liturgical Theology for Late Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). For a helpful look on all aspects of how language functions in theology and liturgy see 
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian 
Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005); First Theology: God, Scripture ! 
Hermeneutics (Leicester: Apollos, 2002); and Is There a Meaning in This Text? (Leicester: 
Apollos, 1998). Also see Anton Baumstark, Comparative Liturgy, revised by Bernard Botte, 
O.S.B., trans. by F.L. Cross, (London: Mowbray, 1958); and Craig Bartholomew, Colin Greene 
and Karl Möller, After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation (Paternoster Press, 2001). 
14 A specific reference to “the performative and the prayer” is found in ‘Theology of the 
Eucharistic Celebration’, by David N. Power, in Chupungco, Vol III, pp. 321-366 (p. 355). This is 
quite a short section and does not delve into an examination of performative action. 
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pilgrimages, religious drama and dance, and processions. Several of these forms 
of religiosity have their roots in the liturgy.”15 Drama and dance are mentioned, 
yet they are contextualised in relation to the liturgy itself, and not given further 
examination in relation to performance theories. The focus of liturgical theology 
is the liturgy itself and how it manifests in various forms, not on the performative 
elements of its performance.16 
 Another way that theology engages with performance practices is through 
metaphor. The usefulness of drama, theatre and performance as means to explain 
the complex relationships of God to people have been well utilised by theology.17 
God can be thought of as the director, the playwright, and/or an actor depending 
on the point of view. Two examples of this style of writing in theology are worth 
noting here. Hans Urs von Balthasar’s three volume Theo-Drama is, as Trevor A. 
Hart has explained, the “most sustained and programmatic treatment of an 
analogia dramatis in theology.”18 Von Balthasar introduces his project as a way 
to “use the categories of drama to illuminate Christian theology.”19 However, he 
never intends this usage to exceed its capacity as a tool for better theological 
understandings: 
Thus it is already clear that, while the conceptual categories of secular 
drama provide us with a preliminary understanding, they cannot offer 
anything like a complete grasp. They remain at the level of image and 
                                                
15 Chupungco, Vol I, p. 9. 
16 Graham Hughes organises his book on liturgical theology and meaning around the question: “is 
it possible to give some account of the ways in which the meanings of worship are organized and 
transmitted by those who lead and are appropriated by those who participate in a worship 
service?” Hughes, p. 11. 
17 Trevor A. Hart discusses many aspects of this in the introduction to Faithful Performances, ed. 
by Trevor A. Hart and Steven R. Guthrie (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 1-9. 
18 Hart, ‘Introduction’, p. 7. 
19 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama I: Prolegomena, trans. by Graham Harrison (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 1988), p. 25. 
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metaphor, as is clear from their ultimate ambiguity; here too, the greater 
dissimilarity in the analogy prevents us from using any terms univocally.20 
What von Balthasar has identified is that the use of drama simply as a metaphor is 
limited. It might be productive in relation to some structures and aspects of 
theology but it is ultimately only a partial way into the subject.  
Another use of drama as metaphor is found in the recent publications of 
Kevin J. Vanhoozer.21 His book The Drama of Doctrine uses the metaphor of 
drama as a way to inform Biblical interpretation.22 Vanhoozer positions the 
actions of the church as performative actions which have far reaching 
consequences: “The church does not have to stage revolutionary performances; it 
is revolutionary theatre. For everything the church says and does in its liturgy and 
its corporate life continues the theo-drama.”23 This use of the words performance, 
theatre and drama is descriptive and does not differentiate between the modes of 
representation involved in each. While Vanhoozer asserts that the church “is 
revolutionary theatre,” which seems to claim performative force for the actions of 
                                                
20 von Balthasar, Theo-Drama I: Prolegomena, p. 18. Von Balthasar developed his theories in 
response to a problem in theology, namely that ‘rationalist abstraction’ had derailed 
‘methodological clarity:’ “The shortcomings of the theology that has come down to us through the 
centuries has called forth new approaches and methods in recent decades. Disciples and opponents 
alike have been quick to narrow down each of these approaches to a slogan, a catch phrase, 
although originally they were often conceived in broader and deeper terms; and they have one 
thing in common. They all see theology stuck fast on the sandbank of rationalist abstraction and 
want to get it moving again. Each of these attempts contains something right, even something 
indispensable. But none of them is adequate to provide the basis for a Christian theology.” (p. 25) 
21 Vanhoozer is an advocate of rethinking and rearticulating the inter-connectedness of theology 
and philosophy. This echoes some of what I was promoting in the first section of this dissertation 
in relation to performance studies:  “Of late, a number of theologians have enshrined ecclesiology 
as “first theology,” the source and norm alike of faith’s search for understanding.  Those who 
draw their theological first principles from ecclesiology have made what we may call the 
“cultural-linguistic turn.” This turn to the church’s own habits of speaking and acting is a 
welcome, and long overdue, change.  For much of modernity, theology has been in thrall to 
principles drawn largely from philosophy, resulting in what we may term a kind of “Athenian” 
captivity of the church.  To begin theologizing from the church’s own language and culture is to 
make a radical break from the modern tendency to start with some neutral methodology.” Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, p. 6. For more on philosophy and theology see Caputo, John 
D, Philosophy and Theology (Nashville: Abingdon, 2006) and Charlton, William, Philosophy and 
Christian Belief (London: Sheed and Ward, 1988). 
22 Another writer who has used the metaphor of drama extensively is Patricia Wilson-Kastner who 
was mentioned in the Introduction. 
23 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, p. 428. [Original emphasis.] 
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the church, the way theatre works (as I have already discussed in the introduction) 
is through representation.24 To follow through with the logic, this would mean 
that the liturgical and corporate life of the church are but representations, and this 
was clearly not the aim of his use of the word theatre. As we can see, both of 
these writers ultimately use performance/theatre/drama as useful metaphors to 
discuss the Bible, theology and liturgy. In this dissertation I am less interested in 
how spiritual performance might be understood through the metaphor of drama. 
My concern is to demonstrate the value of performative action in spiritual 
performances. 
In his book Context and Text: Method in Liturgical Theology, K.W. Irwin 
makes the case for analyses of the liturgy using methodologies from other 
disciplines such as sociology in order to better understand the liturgy as an ‘act.’25 
The book is concerned with methodology, and a “principal concern [is] to 
articulate how the study of liturgy is essentially pastoral theology in the sense 
that it concerns reflection on enacted liturgical rites which shape the faith and life 
of believing participants.”26 This use of ‘enacted’ is promising as it seems to be 
used congruently with my use of embodied. Irwin does reflect on enacted liturgy 
in order to analyse how the meanings are received and understood, but not on 
how to meaning is created through the use of performative action. He is aware of 
                                                
24 One essay that begins a productive examination of how theology can use theatre theory and in 
particular takes up Vanhoozer’s work is: Joshua Edelman, ‘Can an Act be True? The Possibilities 
of the Dramatic Metaphor for Theology within a Post-Stanislavskian Theatre,’ in Faithful 
Performances: Enacting Christian Tradition, ed. by Trevor A. Hart and Steven R. Guthrie 
(Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 50-72. 
25 Irwin, Context and Text: Method in Liturgical Theology (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 
1994), p. x. 
26 Irwin, p. xi. [Original emphasis.] The enactment of liturgy is something to which Irwin returns 
throughout the book: “In addition, this meaning of context seeks to determine the extent to which 
the setting for liturgy (i.e., assembly, environment) and the conducting of liturgy (i.e., preaching, 
music, gestures, other means of participation) facilitates and enhances the assembly’s 
appropriation and understanding of the scriptural texts, prayers, symbols and gestures of the 
liturgy” (Irwin, pp. 54-5).  
 
115 
the limitations of his analysis and lists concepts which he has not been able to 
include in the book: 
Among the things not sufficiently addressed here are the formulation of a 
precise method derived from the social sciences for interpreting and 
evaluating liturgical performance, the role of imagination and affectivity 
in both liturgical performance and liturgical theology and how to assess 
the liturgical assembly’s engagement in both liturgy and in developing 
theology derived from it.27 
In particular, this points to the importance of assessing the liturgical assembly’s 
engagement in relation to performance and practice.28 His last statement posits 
the potential for theology to develop further ideas in relation to the experience of 
enacted liturgy.29 
 
History 
Historical accounts of the liturgy tend to recount in chronological order the 
changes, adaptations and developments which have taken place over the last two 
centuries. To the extent that history takes account of every detail of the liturgy, 
the role of the performance of the liturgy is addressed.30 However, as with 
                                                
27 Irwin, p. xii. Irwin’s approach places the material experiences of liturgical performance on a par 
with the spiritual aspects. His study examines how the two inform each other continually. While 
his approach is important and a good attempt to come closer to a holistic view of liturgy it is 
heavily dependent on textual analysis and even with his emphasis on the context in which the text 
is performed, he still reverts at every point to the original text from which the actions stem. 
28 “A basic premise for this chapter is that liturgy is fundamentally orthodoxia prima, a 
theological event. In essence, liturgy is an act of theology, an act whereby the believing Church 
addresses God, enters into a dialogue with God, makes statements about its belief in God and 
symbolizes this belief through a variety of means including creation, words, manufactured objects, 
ritual gestures and actions.” Irwin, p. 44. 
29 Irwin provides a comprehensive introduction to and discussion of the various theologians who 
have addressed the role of liturgy in the formation of theology and of how theology should 
approach analyses of liturgy. A common differentiating factor between approaches is whether 
liturgy has been primarily looked at through text or through action in each successive generation 
and from each theological position. For a discussion of theological approaches to liturgy from the 
Reformation and Trent to the early 1990s, see Irwin, pp. 15-32. 
30 As already mentioned, see Theodor Klauser, A Short History of the Western Liturgy and The 
History and the Future of the Roman Liturgy, by Denis Crouan. 
 
116 
theology, the focus of the research is not to examine the performance itself and 
therefore the performative aspects are not analysed even if they are mentioned.31 
One book which attempts to incorporate the performance of the liturgy 
into its historical account is James F. White’s Roman Catholic Worship: Trent to 
Today. In the introduction White sets out how his project is different: 
we shall make an effort to write from the pew, not from the altar. This is 
easier said than done, since it contradicts the method of most liturgical 
studies, which are far more concerned about the priest with his chalice 
than the parishioner with her rosary.32 
It is in relation to the reforms brought in by Vatican II that White’s work offers 
the most interesting reflections. He quotes extensively from Vatican II documents 
which state that the aim of liturgical renewal was “full, conscious, and active 
participation” by the congregation.33 This desire to integrate all present at the 
service more directly into the performance of the liturgy found shape in various 
ways and White uses changes in church architecture as his theme in each section. 
As the architecture directly influences how bodies can move and circulate in the 
space this is a useful point of comparison which accommodates considerations of 
liturgical action from a performance perspective. White discusses the body and 
participation but the focus of his work is on the history and future of the liturgy 
from the perspective of the Roman Catholic church and thus, the body takes a 
secondary role in his account.34 
                                                
31 Paul F. Bradshaw’s The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship (London: SPCK, 2002) 
covers the first three centuries of Christian Worship as well as reviewing the various scholarly 
methods and opinions which have existed about liturgical development.  
32 James F White, Roman Catholic Worship: Trent to Today (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical 
Press, 2003), p. xiv. 
33 White, p. 111. Translations are from Austin Flannery, O.P., Vatican Council II: The Conciliar 
and Post Conciliar Documents, (Collegeville , Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992). 
34 For a specifically Roman Catholic discussion of the body and liturgy see Louis-Marie Chauvet 
and Francois Kabasele Lumbala, eds., Liturgy and the Body-Concilium (London: SCM, 1995) 
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Another perspective from which history has engaged with liturgy is 
through art. The links between art history and Christian theology are many, as 
Trevor A. Hart explains: 
Engagement between Christian theology and art has a long history. In 
practical terms, the relationship between Christian faith and artistry 
stretches back to the earliest decades of Christian history, and the 
subsequent history of art in the Western tradition is one in which the 
presence of the Christian church (its beliefs, its practices, its patronage) 
dominates the horizon for better or worse.35  
This long history of interaction is well documented36 and has looked primarily at 
the production of Christian art for the purposes of illuminating texts or stories, 
decorating churches or showing the wealth of the church.37 The dominance of this 
relationship has produced much research on painting, sculpture and music, but 
considerably less on drama, theatre and performance. Theology has primarily 
used the historical research into art as an extension of literary analysis which has 
led, according to Hart, to artistic practices being “addressed and analysed at the 
level of their existence as inert ‘texts’.”38 Textual analysis of a painting differs 
from that of embodied practices because the painting is the finished product of a 
process whereas the liturgy is process and product at the same time. 
                                                
35 Trevor A. Hart, ‘Introduction’,  p. 1. 
36 Many books are dedicated to religious art whether from an art history or anthropological 
background. For a short and focussed study on pictorial art with specific examples from each 
century see Beth Williamson’s Christian Art: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).  Objects, Images and the Word: Art in the Service of the Liturgy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), edited by Colum Hourihane offers a detailed look 
at the material aspects of liturgical practice which contribute to the overall performance.  None of 
these books addresses the actual performance of the liturgy as an enacted form.  
37 “Works of Christian art were categorized as follows: didactic images that taught ‘the faith’; 
liturgical objects used for ritual worship; devotional visions that nurtured prayer and 
contemplation; decorative entities whose beauty elevated the soul to the spiritual realm; symbolic 
forms that revealed coeval objective and subjective meanings; and works of art that combined any 
or all of the earlier categories.” Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, “Beyond Belief: The Artistic 
Journey”,  in Beyond Belief: Modern Art and the Religious Immagination, (Exhibition Catalogue), 
ed. by Rosemary Crumlin (Melbourne: National Gallery of Victoria, 1998), p. 21. For examples of 
Christian art see the catalogue of images and articles in Loverance, Rowena, Christian Art 
(London: The British Museum, 2007); and Peter Murray and Linda Murray, Oxford Dictionary of 
Christian Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). A closer examination of the interaction 
between art and liturgy is found in at the beginning of Chapter 4. 
38 Hart, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. 
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Anthropology 
Anthropological methodologies have been advocated by many who study the 
liturgy and I want to highlight the work of three people, beginning with the 
liturgical theologian Mary Margaret Kelleher. While not an anthropologist, she 
presents her integration of anthropological methodology as a necessary step for 
the study of liturgy. In the article, ‘The Communion Rite: A Study of Roman 
Catholic Liturgical Performance,’ her interest is to identify what happens in the 
liturgy during Sunday Mass in order to better understand how the performance of 
liturgy shapes the understandings of future performances. Kelleher uses the 
anthropological participant-observer method to conduct her research with a 
congregation over many months. From the beginning of the article she makes it 
clear that she is aware of the shortcomings of other analyses of liturgy. She states 
that “[a]lthough much attention has been given to studying the background and 
texts of new and revised rites, liturgical studies is only in the incipient stages of 
expanding its sources to include the actual performance of these rites.”39 She 
wants to present the liturgy as a performance and to examine what happens in the 
moments she observes with the congregation. 
Kelleher develops her own method based on various fields and a key 
concern is the perception of liturgy as action: “A method designed for the purpose 
of studying liturgical performance presupposes an understanding of liturgy that 
takes serious account of the fact that it is a form of action.”40 In other words, she 
is calling for liturgy to be understood as performative action, as action which 
accomplishes something in the doing, in the moment. She says that she will focus 
on the moment of performance and not the analysis of potential action based on a 
                                                
39 Margaret Mary Kelleher, ‘The Communion Rite: A Study of Roman Catholic Liturgical 
Performance’, Journal of Ritual Studies, 2.5 (1991), 99-122 (p. 99). 
40 Kelleher, p. 100. 
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text. At times she seems to be on the edge of a thorough performative analysis, 
such as when she asserts that “when assemblies engage in liturgical performance, 
they are involved in a process of revealing and shaping themselves and therefore 
the church.”41 
Ultimately, though, her article takes the information she has gathered from 
her participant-observer status and relates it to the meanings represented by the 
physical and material aspects of liturgy. Sometimes the meanings she identifies 
are accurate reproductions of the teachings of the church and other times the 
meanings are a product of that congregation and the way they celebrate the Mass. 
For example, she devotes substantial space to a discussion of how the host (the 
transubstantiated bread which becomes Jesus’ body) is given out only by 
appointed lay ministers in the main part of the church, whereas in the balcony the 
host is passed from one person to the other because it is easier. She uses this 
example to show how the congregation receive conflicting meanings about the 
importance of the host and how members in the balcony also display a relaxed 
and communal attitude to the sharing of the host. Her information about the 
distribution of the host is just a description of the event. The analysis immediately 
shifts to approved meanings – the dictated official meaning of the host, as 
opposed to what actually happens during Mass. The performative actions are 
identified, but not developed as part of the analysis.  
In Kelleher’s otherwise interesting and valuable study, she hypothesizes 
about how peoples’ beliefs are affected by the conflicting meanings demonstrated 
by the congregation and laity, but her article is not ultimately about the 
performance of belief. She focuses directly on whether the communion rite she 
                                                
41 Kelleher, p. 101. 
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witnessed represented an ideal of the rite, as well as whether it represented the 
doctrines of the church. Despite her awareness of what other analyses have failed 
to do, at the end of the article she reverts to a comparison based approach to 
establish the meanings at play in the text. Her research ends up repeating the 
normative methods for the analysis of performance as she compares what 
happened in the services with the official meanings as defined by the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
Another writer who is clearly interested in the same sorts of questions is 
anthropologist Gwen Neville Kennedy whose chapter on anthropology and 
liturgy takes up the study of the liturgy from a similar point of view to that 
adopted by Kelleher. Neville Kennedy is a trained anthropologist and practicing 
Christian who has chosen to research her own society, whereas Kelleher is a 
liturgical theologian. Neville Kennedy stresses the lack of work done in the West 
on Christian liturgy: “The particular problems associated with cultural 
marginality to one’s own religious community are, I am convinced, in part 
responsible for the absence of ethnographic work on cultural liturgy within 
Protestant and Roman Catholic Christianity.”42 Neville Kennedy expands the 
meaning of liturgy to include all the activities that establish rhythm and 
community amongst a religiously observant group, in this case amongst the 
Southern Presbyterians in North Carolina, from morning worship to communal 
meals, storytelling and family reunions. She explains liturgy thus: “The liturgy 
that accompanies the celebration of this summer-long worship experience is one 
                                                
42 Gwen Neville Kennedy and John H. Westerhoff, III, Learning Through Liturgy (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1978), p. 77. 
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based on family loyalty and religious allegiance, a liturgy growing from and 
feeding into the value system.”43  
Neville Kennedy emphases the objects used by those she studies, what 
they eat, where they gather, what they say, how they dress, the patterns to their 
daily life and worship. She is interested in the physicality and materiality of their 
religious life as well. The focus of her study in this book is on the role of the 
anthropologist in facilitating change and understanding religious cultures. She 
calls for more scholars to research their own religious cultures of origin for the 
depth of knowledge they can bring to the study itself, but also for the specialised 
role they can play within the culture. Neville Kennedy’s approach is broader in 
both its content and definition of liturgy than Kelleher’s, but is still not a 
performative analysis of a performance, so much as an analysis of a community. 
In contrast, Martin Stringer, while still not examining performative actions, seems 
to have found a middle ground between the two in his study of churches in 
Manchester.44 
Martin Stringer presents his research into religious communities and the 
liturgies they use in the book On the Perception of Worship. It comprises four 
case studies of churches in the Manchester area in the mid 1990s. Stringer’s 
historical approach is thorough and he justifies his use of terms and 
methodologies from his perspective as an anthropologist and a liturgist. The book 
looks at how congregations describe and explain what they do in relation to 
                                                
43 Neville Kennedy and Westerhoff, p. 81. 
44 Stringer describes himself as an ethnographer and has written another book on this topic: 
Stringer, Martin D., and Elisabeth Arweck, Theorizing Faith: The Insider/Outsider Problem in the 
Study of Ritual (Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 2002). A clear understanding of 
ethnographic methodologies is essential for anyone undertaking field research about liturgy and 
othe rritual practices. For more on this see: James Clifford, ‘On Ethnographic Authority,’ 
Representations, 2 (1983), 118-146 and James Clifford and George E. Marcus, ‘The Making of 
Ethnographic Texts: A Preliminary Report’, Current Anthropology, 26.2 (1985), 267-271. 
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worship, what and how they understand, and where this understanding comes 
from. He is interested in the interplay between what people do in worship services 
(he explains why he does not use the word liturgy45) and the meanings they 
associate with this behaviour. Given his criticisms of previous theological work 
from the 1980s that had tried to incorporate ritual theory he is clearly interested in 
the performed event:  
[Theological analyses] offered a suggestion about where worship should 
be going, rather than a discussion of how worship was actually being 
practised. The practice was simply taken for granted and was seen to be 
out of touch with secular society, theologically moribund and generally in 
a state of crisis.46 
His research does not just look at theologians who use some anthropology, but at 
anthropologists who examine Christian liturgies. As justification for his own 
work he shows how the anthropologists interested in liturgy privileged a 
consideration of structure and content over practical applications: “the debate was 
expressed in terms of what should or should not happen within liturgy rather than 
what was actually happening in ordinary churches either in Britain or America.”47  
Stringer provides an invaluable glimpse into four different styles of 
churches and the reader benefits from the fact that he was the primary researcher 
throughout. His comparisons from one congregation to the next highlight details 
only accessible through personal experience. He is also aware of how Christian 
ritual has historically been handled by anthropologists and seems to be intent on 
contributing scholarship that allows for personal reflections in professional 
                                                
45 Martin Stringer, On the Perception of Worship (Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 
1999), pp. 21-22. For more on the issue of contemporary worship see Stringer, A Sociological 
History of Christian Worship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and ‘Text Context 
and Performance: Hermeneutics and the Study of Worship,’ Scottish Journal of Theology, 53.3 
(2000), 365-279. 
46 Stringer, On the Perception of Worship, p. 5. 
47 Stringer, On the Perception of Worship, p. 7. For a broader perspective on worship, including 
articles on Old and New Testament concepts as well as systematic theology see D.A. Carson, ed., 
Worship: Adoration and Action (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 1993). 
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research. His comment on how anthropology was practiced in the past echoes the 
statements by Cantwell Smith, Ruel and Pouillon from Chapter 1: 
[W]ithin anthropology…it was considered perfectly normal to use 
personal reflections on the home society to explain or illustrate aspects of 
the society being studied on the assumptions that both the anthropologist 
and the reader of the analysis already knew about the home society and 
did not have to have it explained. Practically all references to Christian 
liturgy and worship have been of this kind.48 
Stringer’s book is a valuable resource with its detailed first person accounts of the 
experience of belonging to the various congregations, but its aim is not to provide 
an account of the action as much as to explore meaning. 
 
Performance Approaches 
In contrast to the approaches detailed above, the recent publication, Faithful 
Performances provides a full range of ways of looking at theology and 
performance and makes a strong case for the inclusion of performative analyses.49 
This collection of essays acknowledges the usefulness of collaborations between 
theology and performance as Trevor A. Hart explains in the introduction:  
                                                
48 Stringer, On the Perception of Worship, p. 8. 
49 Two texts that at least in their titles appear to be relevant are Richard D. McCall’s Do This: 
Liturgy as Performance (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), and Roger 
Grainger’s The Drama of the Rite: Worship, Liturgy and Theatre Performance (Eastbourne, UK: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2009). The differences outweigh the similarities and the most significant 
of these is the focus of both authors on the liturgy as part of the life of the Christian. Their texts 
presuppose a Christian reader who believes in God. They both promote ways of looking at the 
liturgy that will enable congregations to better engage with the liturgy. The ways in which they 
discuss liturgy as performance or drama or theatre is kept to the level of metaphor. McCall does 
engage with performance studies through the work of Marvin Carlson, Richard Schechner and 
Victor Turner, among others, but he uses them to discuss social drama and not performativity. He 
develops a way to read the performance of the liturgy, but applies it to an account of an early 
medieval liturgy. He also discusses performative action, but it provides an introduction to semiotic 
modes of analysis, which is a return to representation. His interest in performance theory is similar 
to mine, but his applications are historical and not contemporary. Much time is spent discussing 
the history of the associations of drama to the liturgy and there is no focus on belief. The focus of 
his theoretical section is on Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of ‘once-occurent-Being-as-event.’ (McCall, 
pp. 67-77)  Grainger’s book is a handbook for the worshipper. He is interested in what people do 
in liturgy and suggests ways to engage with liturgy that illuminate meaning and promote a holistic 
and theologically sound form of worship. There is no discussion of performativity and any linking 
of the research with wider issues such as anthropology or sociology is cursory. 
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Performance, in other words, is not secondary to these forms of artistic 
engagement with the world, but essential to their artistry. It is therefore 
very welcome that, in recent decades, there has been a growing 
theological interest in music and drama precisely as performing arts, and 
in the performative dimensions of them in particular.50 
The book includes essays that bring together theological interests with various 
themes. Among the theological interests are: actions, ethics, violence, the lived 
experience of faith and identity, Shakespeare, the Renaissance and artistic 
representations of the Transfiguration. The themes are mainly focussed on drama 
and theatre: theatre practices, actor training techniques, the dialogical nature of 
drama, drama as a metaphor, and performance theory. A couple of the authors 
engage directly with performance studies scholarship,51 and two of the sections 
stand out for their applicability to my research: the ‘Introduction’ by Trevor A. 
Hart, and Steven R. Guthrie’s ‘Temples of the Spirit: Worship as Embodied 
Performance.’ Hart discusses the role that drama, theatre and performance can 
play in scholarly research in theology. Specifically, his explanation of the 
relevance of performative theories to theology draws on the same kind of 
interdisciplinary grounding that is at the core of performance studies:  
Indeed, at its starkest, the post-modern appropriation of performance as a 
paradigm for our engagements with ‘reality’ insists – after the manner 
(though not necessarily the spirit) of J.L. Austin’s linguistic analysis of 
various sorts of ‘performative utterance’ in human discourse – that the 
meaning of and warrant for even ‘scientific’ knowledge gained through 
research and experiment, is not to be had by supposing (wrongly) that it 
produces an accurate or adequate model of the world. Rather, what is 
sought here, as Fredrick [sic] Jameson notes, is “a non- or post-referential 
epistemology” for which truth is a function of performance itself (putting 
the ‘story’ or ‘text’ into play through continuous fresh action) rather than 
                                                
50 Hart, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. 
51 The primary sources used are Richard Schechner, Performance Theory, 2nd edition (London: 
Routledge, 2003); Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskill (eds), Performance and Authenticity in the Arts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simon Shepherd and Mick Wallis, 
Drama/Theatre/Performance (London: Routledge, 2004);  but the book includes references to and 
analyses of Antonin Artaud, Samuel Beckett, Augusto Boal, Brecht, Marvin Carlson, Chekhov, 
Merce Cunningham, and others who are regularly discussed in performance studies.  
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being measured in terms of the alleged correspondence between some 
‘text’ and a state of affairs lying ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ it.52 
Hart positions the use of the performative in performance studies style and speaks 
to the relevance of the performative for theology.  
Guthrie’s article is an examination of worship and how worship is 
performed with the body as much as it is cognitively performed with the mind. 
Here he explains the role of embodied practice in the performance of worship: 
The music and movement of worship become, not an obstacle, nor a 
supplement to Christian transformation, but a means and resource for that 
transforming work. They are not the emotional complement to the rational 
content of worship, but do themselves fund our conceptual vocabulary. As 
we sing and worship together, Plato’s ancient fear is realized: 
[the soul] will, I imagine, be permeated by the corporeal, which 
fellowship and intercourse with the body will have ingrained its 
very nature through constant association and long practice. 
The old philosopher had it right. Just as mind and imagination may 
transfigure the flesh, so through long and constant association the body 
does indeed shape and transfigure the soul. But the image into which we 
are transformed it is not merely that of our own bodies. Rather, as we 
offer our bodies in worship (musical and of other sorts) we lay hold of 
resources the Holy Spirit may use to transform us into the image of Christ. 
These frail and mortal bodies become singing, dancing, kneeling temples; 
their very gestures and patterns of bodily experience tracing out the 
dimensions of a space in which the Holy Spirit may live and work.53 
Guthrie emphasises that embodied performance is not simply an expression of an 
interior state, but forms that person. Bodily experience is understood to be 
implicated in the state of the soul; not simply a by product of having a body. 
Theology is in the process of engaging more and more with approaches that 
include the role of the entire person. This can only be good for the field and for 
the breadth of research across related fields.    
 This literature review of theology takes various perspectives and 
approaches into account. Many of the philosophical issues raised in the previous 
                                                
52 Hart, ‘Introduction’, p. 4. 
53 Steven Guthrie, ‘Temples of the Spirit: Worship as Embodied Performance,’ in Hart and 
Guthrie, pp. 91-107 (pp. 106-7). 
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chapter have surfaced here as well. The relationship between and understanding 
of the body/mind/soul is just as relevant today as it was in Plato’s time. While the 
performative has begun to be referenced in more literature, it has still not been 
used systematically to analyse performances of the liturgy. The next section adds 
another perspective through an examination of both historical and contemporary 
anthropological methodologies employed to analyse ritual. 
 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND CHRISTIANITY 
In Chapter 1 we looked briefly at some of the ways in which anthropology and 
ritual studies deal with belief and meaning-making. In this section methodologies 
are the focus. Methodologies developed by anthropology have become standard 
practice around the world and adopted by innumerable other fields for field 
research and case studies. Performance studies is one of these fields heavily 
influenced by anthropology. The history of the collaborations between theatre 
studies and anthropology which is said to have led to the development of 
performance studies is well known. Retelling part of this history provides context 
before introducing recent shifts in anthropology that are changing how religious 
ritual is studied. 
Collaborations between anthropology and theatre studies began in the 
1970s. Anthropologists were interested in expanding their analyses of rituals to 
include elements of practice and to take into account theoretical concerns which 
theatre studies had long been examining. Theatre studies was interested in the 
methodologies of the participant-observer which had been developed by 
anthropologists working in the field, as well as the long history of the study of 
rituals. As many cultures do not differentiate between ritual artistic practices, 
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events which had come under the study of ritual, for example Indian styles such 
as Kathakali, were equally suited to be analysed as theatre or, the new term that 
was gaining in usage, performance.54 The powerful influence of anthropology on 
performance studies, with its emphasis on ‘other’ cultural systems has also 
affected the topics studied. 55 
During the foundational years of performance studies participant-
observation was used to study ritual/theatrical/religious practices in cultures 
where the boundaries between various art forms and religion were more blurred 
than in the West. The participant-observer provided information in two intimately 
connected ways: via an outside critical eye that maintained an almost scientific 
distance from the object of study, as well as from an inside subjective position 
that contributed, for example, feelings and embodied responses. For all of its 
benefits in relation to the study of other cultures, this approach tended to cast the 
culture in question as exotic or ‘other.’ While both anthropology and performance 
studies acknowledge the negative effects of othering in studying spiritual ritual 
practices few studies acknowledge that this methodology has also privileged non-
Western rituals.56 The participant-observer method does not, of course, preclude 
its use by those already part of a culture – an Indian can study the rituals of India 
                                                
54 There are many discussions of this history; see Richard Schechner, Ritual Play and 
Performance: Readings in the Social Sciences Theatre (New York: Seabury Press, 1977); 
Between Theatre and Anthropology (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), The 
Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance (New York: Routledge, 1993), 
Performance Studies an Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2002);  Victor Turner, Drama, 
Fields and Metaphors (Cornell University Press, 1975), From Ritual to Theatre: The Human 
Seriousness of Play (New York: PAJ, 1982), The Anthropology of Performance (New York: PAJ, 
1986); Peggy Phelan, and Jill Lane, The Ends of Performance (New York: New York University 
Press, 1998). 
55 Elements of this argument have appeared in: Megan Macdonald, ‘The Liturgical Lens: 
Performance Art and Christianity’, Performance Research: On Congregation, 13 (2008), 146-
153. 
56 See Rustom Bharucha, ‘Collison of Cultures: Some Western Interpretations and Uses of the 
Indian Theatre,’ in Theatre and the World: Performance and the Politics of Culture, (New York: 
Routledge,1993), pp. 13-41. And Fenella Cannell, ed., The Anthropology of Christianity (London: 
Duke University Press, 2006). 
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– but its history has been predicated on the idea that there is more value in the 
‘other.’ An outcome of this tradition is that Western scholars tend to explain the 
practices they do study in relation to other cultures (I will look at this in detail in 
Chapter 4 in relation to Marina Abramovi!’s work.) instead of looking at their 
own.  
The participant-observer method developed out of anthropology and the 
style of language use is indicative of a field trying to prove its secular-scientific 
credentials. The tendency is to use a slightly detached approach for description 
and evocative wording for personal experience. Performance studies adopted 
these methods and gained both the methods and the history of the development of 
the methods. As already discussed through Pouillon’s work, language carries 
within it more than just the dictionary definition of a term; cultural assumptions 
are embedded within. 
 Anthropologists had for decades been making culturally-specific and 
misleading assumptions similar to those highlighted by Pouillon in his analysis of 
Dangaleat. The impact of the participant-observer method meant that the 
spiritually significant experiences from the cultures studied by performance 
scholars were sometimes transposed into the language of the scholar to 
detrimental effects. Scholars overlooked the way language itself functions in 
relation to the concepts of belief, religion and spirituality.57 Far from only making 
this mistake when studying other cultures, they also repeated the error in relation 
to their own cultures.  
                                                
57 This will be picked up again in Chapter 4. 
 
129 
It was not until the end of the twentieth century that Western 
anthropologists began to examine the histories of their own cultures.58 From its 
origins, anthropology looked outwards and performance studies followed this 
paradigm. In contrast to this, and as already discussed early in this chapter, the 
study of religious rituals in Europe or North America has been the province of 
religious institutions and theologians. Where Christian practices have been 
examined in theatre or performance research, they are mostly discussed in 
relation to their theatricality, and not in relation to their belief systems, bodily or 
spiritual practices.59 In the last few years the topic of Christianity has been 
receiving more attention in anthropological research.60 One publication in 
particular has sought to redress the lack of research into Christian practices. 
Fenella Cannell’s The Anthropology of Christianity (2006), contains twelve 
essays by anthropologists researching manifestations of Christianity from around 
the world. This work is welcome both for the scope of the essays and for the 
                                                
58 There has always been work that has looked at Christian practices but rarely has the 
anthropologist been a practicing Christian. One notable exception to this is Victor Turner. He and 
his wife Edith published a book on pilgrimage after they had converted to Roman Catholicism. 
See Victor and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1978).   
59 For examples of this see Vicki Ann Cremona, ‘Re-Enacting the Passion during the Holy Week 
Rituals in Malta’, Theatre Annual: A Journal of Performance Studies, 51 (1998), 32-53; Harris, 
Max, ‘Saint Sebastian and the Blue-Eyed Blacks: Corpus Christi in Cusco, Peru’, TDR: The 
Drama Review: A Journal of Performance Studies, Spring 47.1 [T177], (2003) ,149-75; Harrison, 
Paul Carter, Victor Leo Walker II, and Gus Edwards, eds, Black Theatre: Ritual Performance in 
the African Diaspora (Philadelphia: Temple, 2002). 
60 For the full discussion of this re-emerging topic see Fenella Cannell’s The Anthropology of 
Christianity, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), Matthew Engelke and Matt Tomlinson, 
eds, The Limits of Meaning: Case Studies in the Anthropology of Christianity, (New York: 
Berghahn, 2006), and Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter, by 
Webb Keane, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). John Barker’s reviews of these 
books appear in ‘Toward an Anthropology of Christianity – Book Review’, American 
Anthropologist, 110.3 (2008), 377–381. As well, see Cannell’s article the ‘The Christianity of 
Anthropology’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 11.2 (2005) ,335-356; and 
Joel Robbins, ‘Continuity Thinking and the Problem of Christian Culture Belief, Time, and the 
Anthropology of Christianity’, Current Anthropology, 48.1 (2007), 5-38. As well, some 
precussors to these ideas can be found in Clifford Geertz, ‘Shifting Aims, Moving Targets: On the 
Anthropology of Religion’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 11 (2004), 1-15; 
‘Religion as a Cultural System,’ in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London: 
Fontana Press, 1993), pp. 87-125; and David Hicks, ed., Ritual and Belief: Readings in the 
Anthropology of Religion (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002). 
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provocative introduction by Cannell which challenges the role played by 
Christianity in the history and development of, and subsequent research in, 
anthropology.  
Cannell’s work describes a field that has been trying to ignore its religious 
roots to the detriment of its ability to objectively examine Christianity: 
Christianity has functioned as “the repressed” of anthropology over the 
period of the formation of the discipline. And, as the repressed always 
does, it keeps on staging returns. The complexity of the relationship 
between Christianity and anthropology has in fact been pointed out early, 
well and repeatedly, if only by a few.61  
Christian influences and logics have been ‘hiding’ within the field. Despite most 
anthropologists coming from a Western cultural background these logics and 
influences have remained largely unacknowledged. In fact, the study of 
Christianity has for decades been almost completely ignored by social scientists: 
The complex relationship between Christian theology and anthropological 
theory, a perception of which still lingers in early theory, was increasingly 
backgrounded as time went on. Anthropology came to believe without 
much qualification its own claims to be a secular discipline, and failed to 
notice that it had in fact incorporated a version of Augustinian or ascetic 
thinking within its own theoretical apparatus, even in the claim to absolute 
secularism itself.62 
This is the central point of Cannell’s thesis – that Christianity is embedded in the 
very theoretical foundations of anthropology through a version, albeit a fourth 
century version, of one strand of Christian thought. She substantiates this claim 
through examples both from the distant past, such as St. Augustine as well as 
from contemporary research. 
Cannell begins her introduction to the book, The Anthropology of 
Christianity, by asking, “What difference does Christianity make? What 
difference does it make to how people at different times and in different places 
                                                
61 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 4. 
62 Fenella Cannell, ‘The Christianity of Anthropology’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute, 11.2 (2005), 335-356 (p. 341). 
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understand themselves and the world? And what difference does it make to the 
kinds of questions we are able to ask about social process?”63 Her answers start 
with theoretical concerns by tracing part of the history of anthropological and 
sociological thought through examples from Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and 
Max Weber. These men are highlighted because their work was instrumental in 
the formation of the discipline as secular and contributed to Christianity being 
associated with social and cultural issues, and yet they still treated the religion as 
an important and distinctive element in Western history.64 For these three secular 
theorists it was not a problem to engage with the various forms in which 
Christianity was a part of Western society.  
In contrast, Cannell is troubled by the way Christianity has since been 
almost totally relegated to a shaper of social process in secular countries. She 
finds it ironic that the work of Durkheim, Mauss and Weber has also become 
caught up in narrow readings used to argue for teleological understandings of 
society that posit that all societies follow the same path from superstition to 
institutional religion to secularity.65 As such, Christianity, in its interaction with 
the social sciences, is understood as a “secondary or contributory aspect” of 
social changes, in this case, secularization and global modernity.66 The potential 
scope of Christianity as a dynamic form of religious and spiritual expression 
concerned with transformation is impeded when placed in a theoretical corner. 
Yet this, according to Cannell, has been the dominant perspective taken on 
religion by the social sciences in the last century. 
                                                
63 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 1. 
64 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 1. 
65 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 2. 
66 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 3. 
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 Cannell addresses another answer to the questions in her examination of 
the almost discipline-wide claim that anthropology is a secular science. Her 
criticism is mostly based on anthropology’s ‘exaggerated resistance’ to 
acknowledging the relevance of others religious beliefs and experiences.67 The 
results of this resistance are methods which allow for the documentation of 
religious experience and then question the entire nature of performance. This 
rejection is worthy of the tradition of the antitheatrical prejudice mentioned 
earlier. As Cannell explains: “Religious phenomena in anthropology may be 
described in detail, but must be explained on the basis that they have no 
foundation in reality, but are epiphenomena of “real” underlying sociological, 
political, economic, or other material causes.”68 In other words, any reference to 
religious/spiritual experiences must be interpreted and re-assigned meaning in 
relation to that which can be quantified. Any part of a religious/spiritual 
experience which is banal is acceptable, for example, the description of how 
adherents relate to each other over coffee or organise themselves into groups. 
Aspects that raise issues of religious/spiritual experience, transformation, or 
transcendence, must be accounted for in other rational ways.69  
                                                
67 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 3. 
68 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 3. 
69 Transformation in this dissertation refers to spiritual transformation. There are various ways to 
define what this means. Kenneth I. Pargament offers a good explanation of the breadth of the 
topic in ‘The Meaning of Spiritual Transformation’, in Spiritual Transformation and Healing: 
Anthropological, Theological, Neuroscientific, and Clinical Perspectives, ed. by Joan D. Koss-
Chioino and Philip Hefner (Oxford: AltaMira Press, 2006), pp. 10-24. As Pargament explains: 
“At its heart, spiritual transformation refers to a fundamental change in the place of the sacred or 
the character of the sacred in the life of the individual. […]The individual can reorient himself to a 
new religious group or to universal concerns” (p. 18). The reorientation of the individual is a key 
component in transformation and one that Cannell seems to be referring to above. She discusses 
the reluctance of the field to take seriously the reorientation that people experience. This is what 
Pargament would call a primary spiritual transformation, however there are also secondary 
spiritual transformations and these “have to do with changes not in goals or destinations, but in 
the pathways people take to the sacred” (p. 20). This seems to be more in line with the kind of 
transformation that happens through the encounters I describe in the case studies. These involve 
participating in events, or with groups, or in new experiences that relate to a set of values. As 
these values change people add and subtract the activities and practices that go with the values. In 
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What participants recount about their own transformative experiences is 
only admissible insofar as it provides a record of what happened. Any association 
of these phenomena with the spiritual is discounted. The spiritual aspects of 
religious practice are thus divorced from their sources – the rituals performed by 
believers are linked to social and cultural causes. Cannell points out the level of 
opposition that exists in the field: 
It is not necessary to be a believer in any faith, or to abandon an 
interest in sociological enquiry, to wonder why the discipline has 
needed to protest quite so much about such widely distributed 
aspects of human experience.70 
The exaggerated resistance to religious topics has, however, not resulted in the 
same treatment for all practices.71 Cannell reasons that all religious phenomena 
are difficult for the social sciences to accept, but writes that Christianity, as the 
dominant Western religion, has been treated simultaneously with extreme caution 
and derision: 
In the context of this disciplinary nervousness about religious experience 
in general, the topic of Christianity has provoked more anxiety than most 
other religious topics. It has seemed at once the most tediously familiar 
and the most threatening of the religious traditions for a social science that 
has developed within contexts in which the heritage of European 
philosophy, and therefore of Christianity, tends to predominate.72 
As Webb Keane says in the epilogue to the book, “Christianity has not only been 
avoided by the mainstream of the anthropological tradition, it also lurks as the 
suppressed core of much of what goes under the name of Western Culture.”73 
What was suppressed perhaps needed to be – in order to allow for the processes 
                                                                                                                                
this case, participants in the performance art piece in Chapter 4, if they experience any 
transformation, are opening themselves up to a non-traditional pathway to the sacred.  
70 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 3. 
71 For a detailed examination of all aspects of ritual and religion, including a section on liturgy see 
Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
72 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 3. 
73 Webb Keane, ‘Epilogue: Anxious Transcendence’, The Anthropology of Christianity, ed. by 
Fenella Cannell (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 308-323 (p. 308). 
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which brought about, among other things, a radical shift in conceptions of science 
and art. According to Keane modern secular society came to believe that “the 
defining practices of modernity such as scientific procedure, bureaucratic 
rationality, nationalist politics, free markets, and the liberation of art of art’s sake, 
both depended on and contributed to processes of secularization.”74 While this is 
no longer held to be completely accurate, the result of such thinking was that the 
process of secularization was severed from the cultural status quo which came 
before. In other words, the social sciences “had to forget the sources of their core 
questions and concepts in a world for which Christianity was both pervasive 
background and specific instigation for research and theorization.”75 This 
‘forgetting’ of the past has had its consequences; contemporary Western thinking 
is, according to Keane, “haunted” by “these repressed origins” and “this haunting 
is evident in their core concerns with and ways of conceptualizing the self, 
objectification, agency, authority, power, and materialism.”  
While Keane highlights these concerns to further develop his argument 
with examples from ethnographic research, the value of this analysis for the 
present study is its insistence that the preoccupations of modernity echo the 
concerns of Christianity.76 It is not a surprise that this should be the case, and 
many anthropologists have contributed to research which moves the study of 
Christianity back to a central position in the field. However, most of the studies 
from the 1980s and 1990s “share a tendency to subordinate Christianity as a 
                                                
74 Keane, ‘Epilogue’, p. 308. 
75 Keane, ‘Epilogue’, p. 308. 
76 It is important to note, as does Keane, that there are multiple reasons for any manifestations of 
social or cultural practices.  I am not advocating a position whereby any practice in Western 
society has to find its Judeo-Christian source, but in a time where theorists from a variety of fields 
are looking again at the roots of Western culture, it is necessary to re-evaluate accepted positions. 
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religion of transcendence to its institutional forms or its services to this-worldly 
problems with which the secular scholar, naturally feels more at home.”77   
What is it about Christianity which makes it so difficult to address as a 
religion of transcendence? Cannell raises one common misunderstanding which is 
at the core of Christian belief: the paradox of the relationship of the body to the 
soul: 
...as historians of the early church [...] have clearly shown, part of its 
distinctive character is that it is essentially built on a paradox. The central 
doctrines of the Christian faith are the Incarnation (by which God became 
human flesh in Christ) and the Resurrection (by which, following Christ’s 
redemptive death on the Cross, all Christians are promised physical 
resurrection at the Last Judgment). Although most writing on Christianity 
in the social sciences has focused on its ascetic aspects, on the ways in 
which Christian teaching tends to elevate the spirit above the flesh, 
Christian doctrine in fact always also has this other aspect, in which the 
flesh is an essential part of redemption. As Brown in particular shows, this 
ambivalence exists not just in theory, but as part of the lived practice and 
experience of Christians.78 
This paradox was already mentioned in Chapter 1, in the context of Nancey 
Murphy’s work. As the Resurrection is key to Christian belief its emphasis on 
physicality and materiality is also key to the performance of belief. To overlook 
one part of this paradox leads to false analyses of the practices of the church, and 
to compromised theoretical understandings. If the goal of the ritual is limited to 
freeing the soul from the body, or redeeming the body from the sins of the soul, 
the complexity and accuracy of the ritual is lost.79 Over years of reducing most 
references to Christian ritual to a discussion of ‘social causes,’ ‘secularization’ 
and ‘asceticism,’ its history and influence have been occluded, in part by a failure 
                                                
77 Keane, ‘Epilogue’, p. 309. 
78 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, p. 7. 
79 Dallas Willard makes the point that “any religion must be in some significant degree ascetic—
admitted or not, consistent or not.” If it were otherwise, “[i]t would mean that those conditions 
that constitute the nature of religious life are all attainable by “natural” growth, by external 
imposition, or by direct acts of will and that purpose-filled preparation and training and taking 
pains to learn are entirely irrelevant.” Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciplines (New York: 
Harper, 1988), p. 136. 
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to comprehend the significance of its physical and material practices as a 
component of belief. 
Asceticism is a physical and material practice which I want to briefly 
mention because it has been a factor in the misreading of the performance of 
belief in relation to materiality and performativity. Ascetic thought is itself 
complicated within the Christian tradition. It has mostly been conceptualised as a 
negative aspect of religious practice, but ascetic practices are not in and of 
themselves negative. According to Dallas Willard, “self-denial, the disciplining of 
one’s natural impulses – happens to be a central teaching of the New 
Testament.”80 Willard lists examples from the Judeo-Christian tradition of the 
ascetic including fasting, praying, seeking solitude, and the giving up of oneself 
to humankind and to God.81 It is not just secular society which has turned away 
from such practices, it is contemporary Christianity as well.82 Part of rejecting 
ascetic practices stems from a fundamental misconception about how Christianity 
understands the physical and material. The kinds of issues raised by both Murphy 
and Cannell seek to redress the balance of research into Christianity and to 
provide clearer analyses of the roles of the physical and material nature of belief.  
Before moving onto the case studies I want to mention one example from 
the social sciences of work that aims to address the entire person as a unit even 
while it acknowledges the effects of metaphysical thinking. Cultural and 
psychological anthropologist Thomas Csordas has undertaken research that 
understands the limits of representational models in relation to beliefs, but his 
psychological approach is at a significant remove from the performance theory 
                                                
80 Willard, p. 133. 
81 Willard, p. 136. 
82 This topic is of concern to this dissertation, but a full discussion of the problem is not needed in 
order to understand the relevance of ascetic practices. 
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that I am pursuing. In this passage he is talking about healing and calling for a 
way to break free from traditional methods of analysis:  
Understanding healing in terms of representation is not adequate because, 
even though concepts such as performance and persuasion have 
substantial experiential force, ultimately representation appeals to the 
model of a text. No matter how successful literary scholars might be in 
animating texts, in bringing them to life, textual(ist) interpretations remain 
inflections of experience, slightly to the side of immediacy. The missing 
ingredient is supplied by the notion of being-in-the-world, from 
phenomenological philosophy, insofar as it speaks of immediacy, 
indeterminacy, sensibility—all that has to do with the vividness and 
urgency of experience. My attempt to place these ideas in dialogue rests 
on the proposition that if studies of representation are carried out from the 
standpoint of textuality, then complementary studies of being-in-the-world 
can be carried out from the standpoint of embodiment.83  
Csordas positions representation and embodiment as elements to be analysed in 
much the same way that I position representation and performative analysis. He 
too wants to move away from the “model of a text.” Consonance across 
disciplines highlights a shift in thinking that is cross-cultural and immediately 
relevant. 
The methods examined in this section help to explain why Christian 
practices and performance have not been well analysed by the fields of 
anthropology and related social sciences. Anthropology’s awareness of its own 
lack is leading to new research and renewal in methodological approaches. 
However, the analysis of performance is still the purview of performance studies, 
to which we will now turn in the last section of this chapter.  
 
                                                
83 Thomas J. Csordas, Body / Meaning / Healing (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 3. 
See also: Language, Charisma, and Creativity: The Ritual Life of a Religious Movement (London: 
University of California Press, 1997); and Embodiment and experience: The existential ground of 
culture and self, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 
138 
THEORIES OF RECEPTION 
There is one other area of research to explore before proceeding to the specifics 
of the case studies. Audience reception and spectatorship theory focus on research 
that documents and explains the complex relations between the production and 
reception of theatre. As I have already emphasised, the liturgy is structured for 
active participation and yet it is most often analysed as if there is but one reaction 
and one set of meanings. This same problem recurs in theatre studies, where 
sweeping claims are made about what ‘an audience’ experienced and understood. 
In the following two case studies, and specifically in relation to the liturgies and 
the discussion of Abramovi!’s The House With the Ocean View, I argue for a 
mode of analysis that grounds actions and meaning production in the specific and 
unique moments of performance. To situate my analysis in the larger theoretical 
context, this brief outline of current discussions in the field of theatre introduces 
three writers: Jacques Rancière, Gay McAuley and Helen Freshwater.84 
 Jacques Rancière argues in The Emancipated Spectator for a shift away 
from the common understandings of the ‘spectator’ by telling a story of 
knowledge and ignorance.85 He uses examples of how theatre has been 
understood to illustrate the importance of examining intellectual emancipation 
and the question of the spectator today. The initial story is about a schoolteacher 
who attempts to show his student what lies between her and ignorance. He sets 
out to teach her what he knows and thereby provide her with knowledge. His 
                                                
84 Most of the quotations in this section use the terms spectator, audience and actor. In relation to 
the case studies on liturgy and performance art I use the terms facilitator and participant. It is 
awkward to continually restate the terms that I prefer while using a quote from another writer. For 
the purposes of this section, the reader should assume, e.g. that I do not think that a congregation 
in the liturgy is an audience or that the priest is an actor. 
85 Parts of this section appear in Megan Macdonald, ‘Performing the National Interest? Mother 
Courage at the National Theatre in London and Ottawa’, Performance Research, 16 (2011), 57-
64. 
 
139 
position is a difficult one because in order to teach the student what the teacher 
knows the teacher must remain at all times ahead of the student, consistently 
reaffirming the difference between their positions. This, argues Rancière, is what 
has happened in the debates about theatre from the time of Plato. Theatre has 
been defined in relation to the spectator and a gulf has been created between the 
stage and the audience that is constantly reified. 
 Rancière’s retelling of the historical perspective on the spectator reveals 
the complex set of relations surrounding art and the political. The model of 
rationality under discussion comes down to what he calls the paradox of the 
spectator: in other words, that there is no theatre without the spectator, and yet, 
being a spectator is always negative because viewing is positioned as opposite to 
both knowing acting. To be a spectator is to be in a position of ignorance. The 
two main approaches to solving this problem, that Rancière uses as examples, are 
demonstrated in Artaud’s theatre of cruelty and Brecht’s epic theatre. Rancière 
explains what Artaud attempted to do:  
The spectator must be removed from the position of observer calmly 
examining the spectacle offered to her. She must be disposed of this 
illusory mastery, drawn into the magic circle of theatrical action where 
she will exchange the privilege of rational observer for that of being in 
possession of all her vital energies.86  
The other option comes from Brecht’s theories. Either the spectator ‘will 
be shown a strange, unusual spectacle, a mystery whose meaning he must seek 
out,’ or, ‘he will be offered an exemplary dilemma, similar to those facing human 
beings engaged in decisions about how to act. In this way, he will be led to hone 
his own sense of the evaluation of reasons, of their discussion and of the choice 
that arrives at a decision.’87 
                                                
86 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator (London: Verso, 2009), p. 4. 
87 Rancière, p. 4 
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These theories are well known in the field of theatre, as are the various 
attempts that have been made to use them, indeed at times to combine them, to 
reach the spectator. Yet Rancière asserts that neither approach is sufficient, as the 
desire to abolish the distance between actor and spectator is to recreate it over 
again by reinforcing that it exists in the first place. Instead Rancière asks that we 
take the school teacher and the student as an example and approach the question 
from a different angle. The school teacher cannot suppose the student has no 
knowledge, as she has somehow managed to learn many things in life and is 
capable of learning more. And the way she learns is by comparing that which is 
new to that which she already knows, thereby creating her own links and 
understandings. The teacher thus needs to guide her, not to the knowledge that he 
already possesses, but to a fuller understanding of how to use her intelligence to 
translate signs into other signs. In this way distance is seen not as an evil to be 
abolished, but as the normal condition of any communication. 
To apply this to the theatre, and other performance forms, Rancière asks 
that we overcome the distance between spectator and actor by using performance 
to draw spectators out of a passive attitude, thereby transforming them into active 
participants in a shared world. To dissolve the prevalent dichotomies Rancière 
calls for action: ‘Emancipation begins when we challenge the opposition between 
viewing and acting. The spectator acts: she observes, selects, compares and 
interprets. She links what she sees to a host of other things that she has seen on 
other stages.’88 The traditional approach to this challenge is to try to redistribute 
those sitting in the theatre space by either physically moving them, or pointing 
out to them that they are in a theatre, but these methods do not assemble or build 
                                                
88 Rancière, p. 13. 
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a community or public. Rancière argues against a theatre experience that is 
explained only as community; for as much as those present are all in the same 
space, it is the ability of each person to engage as an individual that should be the 
goal. This theory offers a concrete avenue to move past representative analyses of 
spectators and their presumed passivity:  
What our performances verify...is not our participation in a power 
embodied in the community. It is the capacity of anonymous people, the 
capacity that makes everyone equal to everyone else. This capacity is 
exercised through irreducible distances; it is  exercised by an 
unpredictable interplay of associations and dissociations.89  
In other words, it is ultimately the possibilities of interaction created in the 
performance space that lead to embodied participation. Getting people involved is 
a recurrent theme in liturgical theology and Rancière’s insistence on anonymity 
and non-community as conditions for participation can help us think about 
liturgy. One can come together around, in and through a liturgy without actually 
being a community, and maybe that is important to the function of the liturgy, 
that strangers and visitors can take part. 
 Rancière’s writings are primarily theoretical, and so the next contribution 
to this discussion comes from performance studies scholar Gay McAuley whose 
work focuses on history and examples. In her book Space in Performance: 
Making Meaning in the Theatre, McAuley situates the role of the audience in the 
entire performance space from a historical perspective, as well as drawing out the 
key elements of spectatorship:  
The condition of spectatorship in the theatre thus involves the physical 
presence of both performers and spectators, the complex play of fiction 
and reality, the equally complex play of looks between performers and 
spectators, the multiple frames that enable this complexity to be 
experienced and the freedom for the individual spectator to foreground 
                                                
89 Rancière, p. 17. 
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one frame or another at different moments and to construct his or her own 
sequence of events and signs.90  
This list takes into account the various experiences that happen to all those 
present at an event, while still recognizing that each individual may have a unique 
perspective. One element that requires further explanation is the play of fiction 
and reality. McAuley lists three terms – dramatic fiction, presentational reality, 
and social reality of the total event – that she claims are constantly shifting in 
balance for the spectator during the performance. She also clarifies that some 
kinds of performance have “sought to accentuate one of these terms at the 
expense of the other two, [...] in task-based performance such as that of the 
Wooster Group [...] the dramatic fiction is displaced by the presentational, and in 
happenings the emphasis is on the reality of the spectator’s experience.91 The 
liturgy draws more closely on the ‘reality of the spectator’s experience, and the 
performance art of Marina Abramovi! on the presentational reality. While neither 
form has a sustained dramatic fiction they share the other two styles of 
presentation.  
McAuley focuses on how the entire performance situation is embedded92 
in the social: “The experience of the individual spectator, while always personal, 
is also occurring at group and collective levels.”93 The social experiences are 
foregrounded in both the liturgy (where a group of people interact socially both 
before, during and after a service) and Abramovi!’s gallery based events (where 
groups interact in the multiple areas of the gallery spaces). In the liturgy, and 
Abramovi!’s The House With the Ocean View, the participants and facilitators 
                                                
90 Gay McAuley, ‘The Spectator in the Space’. Space in Performance: Making Meaning in the 
Theatre (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 235-277 (p. 274). 
91 McAuley, p. 251. 
92 “The performance is embedded in a social event, and both the performance and the fiction it 
presents are constantly at risk of being overtaken by the social” (McAuley, p. 248). 
93 McAuley, p. 251. 
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can see each other, as well being able to observe other people in the room. 
Whether in the theatre or in these performance situations what is enabled is what 
McAuley calls the play of looks which are – Spectator/Actor, Actor/Spectator and 
Spectator/Spectator.94 It is clear that the spectator is in control of the direction of 
two of these looks. The play of looks is one indicator in the larger discussion of 
levels of engagement and participation. Among other results from an analysis of 
the play of looks, McAuley makes a strong case for what is often called an energy 
exchange in theatre writing:  
what is evident from the scattered references in published sources such 
as actor’s memoirs is that spectators in the theatre are far from passive, 
that the live presence of both performers and spectators creates complex 
flows of energy between both groups, and that it is even questionable 
whether what is going on can be discussed in terms of stimulus and 
response.95 
What is most interesting in this argument is her reluctance to attribute 
participation in the theatrical event to a ‘stimulus and response’ style of 
organization. Here McAuley’s ideas dovetail neatly with Rancière’s call to think 
past the traditional modes of understanding how information is created and 
transmitted in performance. There is no play of opposites in the performance 
situation in terms of who is active and who is passive – all are implicated. 
 Rancière and McAuley are both also interested in resisting broad claims 
made on behalf of the perceived power of the performance situation: 
                                                
94 There is also an Actor/Actor look but this is complicated by the difficulty of establishing 
whether the looks on stage are between characters or actors or both. In the case of the liturgy, 
there is usually a team of people facilitating the action whose ‘looks’ do not disrupt the 
presentational reality nor the social situation in the same way as the Actor/Actor or 
Character/Character could. In Abramovi!’s piece she is the only person performing so there is no 
other play of looks by the facilitator for which we have not already accounted.  
95 McAuley, p. 247. Historically, most claims on the experience of the audience “seem to be 
largely speculative” however, “theatre practitioners, notably actors, gain a great deal of intuitive 
knowledge about audience response through their years of performance practice” (McAuley, p. 
238). As well, she returns in the article to the idea that the actors can read what the audience are 
doing. “If actors can read the mood of the audience with this degree of precision, then it must be 
being signaled in some way” (p. 247). 
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Yet another factor that complicates the task of theorizing theoretical 
spectatorship is the way claims are made about theatre that seem to be 
based not on the experience of actual performances but on either a kind of 
virtual performance imagined on the basis of reading playtexts or on the 
assumption that theatre functions like some other performance practice. 
For example […] film.96 
Focussing on playtexts as the site of all knowledge about a performance is the 
same problem as analysing the liturgical text instead of the performance of the 
liturgy. The live event, and one that includes live facilitators as well as 
participants, is key to the kind of performance analysis that I am pursuing because 
it relies on the present actions of the bodies in the space.  
There is a huge variety of audience response and much of it can be seen 
and apprehended by others in the space. McAuley references a full range of 
behaviours written down by theatre producers, such as “laughter, sighs, whistling, 
people leaving, scuffling”97 as well as the actions seen in lithographs and 
drawings from Hogarth and Daumier which show audience members in various 
states of “active behaviour.”98 Bodies in any space prove distracting and are a 
constant reminder in participatory events of the demands put on all the bodies 
present: 
In the theatre the scopic drive is always being subverted or displaced, 
either because of the reality of the actors’ bodies and the performance 
space intrude themselves, thereby disrupting the fiction, or through the 
periodic return to the social due to the physical presence of other 
spectators and the institutionalized breaks in the performance, or because 
the performance itself demands active participation.99  
Liturgical action and performance art do not include the same kind of ‘fiction,’ 
but they each contain sections that require more or less attention from 
participants; either because the sections are demanding in terms of, e.g. call and 
                                                
96 McAuley, pp. 238-239. 
97 McAuley, p. 238. 
98 McAuley, p. 240. 
99 McAuley, p. 239. 
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response, or because there is a shift in style of action from, e.g. quiet to loud or 
stillness to lots of movement. All of this is visible to those in the space even if 
individual responses to these moments cannot be catalogued without interviewing 
each person. In the following analysis of the liturgy I am not interested in 
accounting for individual responses as much as demonstrating the potential of the 
event to create responses that implicate those present in multiple ways.  
Where McAuley provides primarily historical and theoretical examples in 
her study of audience reception, Helen Freshwater’s book Theatre & Audience is 
an overview of contemporary theatre and performance practice. This book 
incorporates both an historical review of theoretical positions and a thematic 
overview of the relationships that exist between performers and audiences with 
direct reference to contemporary performance practices. Freshwater lists the same 
arguments to which Rancière and McAuley draw attention:  
Several barriers block a better understanding of the relationship between 
theatre and its audiences. One is the tendency to confuse individual and 
group response; another is the persistent circulation of exaggerated and 
unsubstantiated claims about theatre’s influence and impact.100 
The issue of the relationship between individual and group responses is very 
important. Much audience response theory makes the case for systematic research 
incorporating audience interviews. While I do not disagree with this as one way 
to provide more balanced research, it is not the only method that will yield 
relevant data and perspectives on the experience of the spectator.  
                                                
100 Helen Freshwater, Theatre & Audience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 5. She goes 
on to further specify what a writer needs to take into account about the audience: “So, although it 
is possible to speak of ‘an audience,’ it is important to remember that there may be several 
distinct, co-existing audiences to be found among the people gathered together to watch a show 
and that each individual within this group may choose to adopt a range of viewing positions. 
Moreover, awareness of these differences requires that statements about audience response be 
framed in careful, conditional terms, sensitive to tendencies to generalise about audiences and to 
judge them without evidence” (pp. 9-10). 
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If the desired effect of a piece of writing is to review or analyse how a 
play or performance was received or understood, then interviews are imperative. 
However, even with audience responses collected, an analysis would still have to 
take place of the information provided. As I have demonstrated in the literature 
review, it is difficult for writers to break away from traditional, i.e. 
representational, approaches of analysis. Freshwater acknowledges that “there 
may be more substantial problems with using concepts, principles, and theoretical 
models to analyse theatre that were originally generated in response to reading, 
writing, or watching film.”101 Such models were not developed with spectators in 
mind, as Marvin Carlson explains “a frustrated reader may simply put the book 
aside and turn to something else. The theatre, as a social event, encourages more 
active resistance” or as Freshwater adds, “more frustrated submission.”102 It is in 
this regard that a performance analysis that accepts the performance situation as 
the norm, and assumes that what happens to each person in the space is important, 
is better positioned to analyse the elements specific to an event. When coupled 
with an awareness of the dynamics of audience reception this approach can reveal 
other elements of the event that are otherwise overlooked. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has brought together three types of literature reviews from 
three disciplinary areas – theology, anthropology and performance studies. They 
all contribute to some common threads in the dissertation: 
1) There is a lack of serious academic work acknowledging liturgy as 
performative. 
                                                
101 Freshwater, pp. 14-15. 
102 Marvin Carlson, quoted in Freshwater, p. 15. 
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2) Christianity historically has been sidelined as a relevant topic of 
study, one that has recently been re-energized by anthropology. 
3) Analyses of liturgy and performance demand that all the 
participants present in the space, whether facilitators or 
congregation, be taken into account for both their experience and 
their contribution to the event.  
Contemporary writing on the role and nature of the performance event, as 
evidenced by Rancière, McAuley and Freshwater, shows that there is a need for 
other methodological approaches to performance analysis. It is both necessary 
and possible to provide an analysis that foregrounds the performative action of 
participation. In the next chapter I apply the theories developed in the opening 
chapters to a case study of Christian ritual. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PERFORMING THE SPIRITUAL THROUGH THE MATERIAL 
The Roman Catholic Mass is a performance form that has been handed down 
through generations linking participants with both historical moments and people. 
As a present-day event it is used many times in the course of one week and 
adapted to the individual country, language, area and building in which it is 
presented. When performed, it is both the realisation of the Mass as an entity unto 
itself, and an act “rendering a service to [the Mass], which [is] assumed to have 
an existence over and above any possible performance of [it].”1 The original 
source of this quotation is from Christopher Small’s book Music of the Common 
Tongue where he discusses contemporary understandings of the performance of 
classical music. Small concludes that Western understandings of music place the 
meaning of the event in the individual piece of music rather than in the work done 
by those present to produce to the music. Small suggests that instead of asking, 
“What does this composition mean?” the question should be “What does it mean 
when this performance takes place at this time, in this place, with these 
musicians, before this audience?”2 This question fits nicely when thought of in 
relation to the performance of the liturgy that occurs thousands of times each 
week in churches around the world. 
 This chapter is a detailed case study of my experiences of the Roman 
Catholic liturgy over Easter week in the Czech Republic in 2005. I begin by 
providing historical background to the development of the liturgy that focuses on 
changes brought in by both the Council of Trent and the Second Vatican Council. 
                                                
1 Christopher Small, Music of the Common Tongue (London: John Calder, 1987), p. 50. The 
original reads, “the act of performance is seen as rendering a service to those [sonic] objects, 
which are assumed to have an existence over and above any possible performance of them.” 
2 Small, Music, p. 51-2. 
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I also develop the various ways meaning is made through physical and material 
means, i.e. through the embodied practices of the liturgy (physical), and with use 
of the main objects of the Eucharist (material). In this section I also rehearse the 
theological meanings of the Eucharist. This chapter begins to address the 
philosophical and theoretical issues raised in Chapter 1 as well as the disciplinary 
issues of analysis and methodology from theology, anthropology and 
performance studies raised in Chapter 2. 
 
ROMAN CATHOLIC LITURGY AS PHYSICAL AND MATERIAL PROCESS 
 
History 
 
The origins of the Christian liturgy are in the first century CE and aspects of early 
church practice have already been mentioned. While the liturgy changed and 
evolved in each century, it was not until the time of the Council of Trent in 1563 
that large scale, organised, liturgical reform was undertaken.3 Changes effected at 
this point set four hundred years of reformed liturgical performance in motion. 
While there were still wide ranging differences to be found between practices in 
various countries, the church had started to think through the implications of the 
performance of worship, which was subsequently adapted in each generation.  
The Roman Catholic Church’s position on the development of the liturgy 
is important for our understanding of the rites and rituals examined in this 
chapter. As Alcuin Reid explains, an organic development is the ideal: 
Organic development holds openness to growth (prompted by pastoral 
needs) and continuity with Tradition in due proportion. It listens to 
scholarly desiderata and considers anew the value of practices lost in the 
passage of time, drawing upon them to improve liturgical Tradition 
gradually, only if and when this is truly necessary. Ecclesiastical authority 
                                                
3 The Council of Trent started in 1545 and ended in 1563. It was not until 1563 that the reforms 
were announced and implemented. 
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supervises this growth, at times making prudential judgements about what 
is appropriate in the light of the needs of different ages, but always taking 
care that liturgical Tradition is never impoverished, and that what is 
handed on is truly that precious heritage received from our fathers, 
perhaps judiciously pruned and carefully augmented (but not wholly 
reconstructed), according to the circumstances of the Church in each age, 
ensuring continuity of belief and of practice.4  
The overall intention, then, of the Roman Catholic Church towards the liturgy, is 
to match official changes to the contemporary needs of congregations while 
maintaining the traditions of the past. The performances of the liturgy that I 
describe later in the chapter are a combination of traditions and the current needs 
of the congregations. 
“Ensuring continuity of belief” is difficult to measure over time, and other 
writers have argued that the belief held by practitioners has little to do with 
theological concerns as articulated by those who study and implement church 
doctrine. The theological concerns do, however, shape the written text of the 
liturgy and the meanings that are taught to priests and congregations. The official 
meanings may not always be understood by every participant, but they 
nevertheless impact upon the performance that takes place each week. While the 
Council of Trent could not have accounted for every liturgical participant over 
the subsequent 400 years, the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), took the 
Christian performance of the individual very seriously. 
The last major change to the liturgy was undertaken as part of Vatican II 
in 1963, exactly four hundred years after the council of Trent. The official 
development of the Roman Catholic liturgy, its meanings and modes of 
participation, are weighed carefully by a committee whose job it is to oversee the 
                                                
4 Alcuin Reid, The Organic Development of the Liturgy (Farnborough: St. Michael’s Abbey Press, 
2004), p. 290. 
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liturgy.5 Vatican II was made up of many committees, including the 
Sacrosanctum Concilium which was responsible for the liturgy:  
[Where the Council of] Trent had been essentially conservative, trying to 
fit broken pieces back together in a familiar form, the second Vatican 
Council went in the other direction, shattering many time-worn patterns of 
Roman Catholic worship, yet at the same time trying to recover much of 
value from the totality of tradition.6 
What James F. White addresses are two major strands of changes that the council 
decided upon. One strand integrated some of the oldest surviving traditions of the 
Church. These are based on what is known about the first communities of 
Christians and much has come to light since the time of Trent. Because they 
presuppose and privilege the idea that there is an ‘original’ way to worship, these 
additions were seen as conservative and in some ways oppositional to the organic 
development of the liturgy. The second strand included quite radical changes 
such as translating the liturgy from Latin to the vernacular in each country. This 
kind of change was seen as liberal and in tune with contemporary life in the 
1960s. As Reid states: “modern man, Catholic or not, was increasingly becoming 
a private citizen in an even more secular world. The Liturgical Movement was 
well aware of this obstacle.”7 The church had clearly expressed reasons for 
looking both to the past and to the future while developing the liturgy. 
 This historical perspective on the development of the liturgy is relevant to 
this dissertation because every performance of the liturgy is in constant tension 
between trying to be faithful to the past and fully present at each new 
performance. My emphasis on the historical is not to try to ground the liturgy in 
the past, but to show how recent developments have begun to take into account 
                                                
5 Some changes happen at the local level of the church and to a certain extent the Roman Catholic 
Church allows for culturally specific modes of worship to happen within the overarching 
framework of the prescribed liturgy. 
6 James F. White, Roman Catholic Worship: Trent to Today, (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical 
Press, 2003), p. 1. 
7 Reid, p. 285. 
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the performative nature of liturgical action. Paul Connerton has written 
extensively on rituals and commemorations. Here he identifies a problem with 
focussing too much on the history of a ritual: 
The Passover and the Last Supper have for long been remembered without 
there being any living generation who can [...] remember their originating 
historical context. The one-sidedness of the approach which insists upon 
the invention of traditions results from an inability to see the 
performativity of ritual. The effect is to obscure the distinction between 
the question of the invention of rituals and the question of their 
persistence. The historicists demand that we fully review the intentions of 
the creators of a ritual, a demand which in some cases is not only not 
sufficient but is often not even a necessary condition for understanding 
ritual. For I would argue that that notion of ‘reading’ a ritual is here being 
taken too literally; as a result, the identifying and partially constitutive 
features of ritual – such as formality and performativity – tend to be 
largely ignored in the attempt to approximate as closely as possible the 
interpretation of ritual to that of, say, a literary political tract.8 
Connerton’s point, that the persistence of a ritual is the more interesting element 
when it comes to analysis, is at the heart of performative approaches. While the 
‘organic development’ mentioned earlier and the extensive research undertaken 
as part of Vatican II do try to maintain a clear connection with the past, in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the focus on participation in the Roman 
Catholic liturgy has started to shift in ways commensurate with performative 
action.9 
At the end of Vatican II changes established by the Council were sent out 
to all Roman Catholic congregations. These were not all adopted at once, as some 
                                                
8 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 
103-4. 
9 The question of whether an original performance exists is straightforward in the case of the 
Roman Catholic liturgy. The liturgy is built around the Eucharist and the celebration of the 
Eucharist was instantiated by Jesus. However, Jesus was actually using a pre-existent form, that of 
the Passover meal (which in and of itself holds significance for both the Jewish and Christian 
traditions). So although his use of the objects was ‘new’ the entire form was not. Also, while the 
use of bread and wine to ‘remember’ Jesus was instigated by him, the subsequent performances of 
this event were quite different from his version, mostly because he was no longer physically 
present. Added to this are the continual changes in form and content of the entire Eucharistic 
celebration that has taken place over 2000 years. No contemporary performance of the liturgy can 
claim to re-produce or re-perform exactly what Jesus did, nor what his followers did in the first 
occurrences of what has become the liturgy. 
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of the changes involved architectural adaptations as well as shifts in dress, music, 
the words of the liturgy, etc. Among the vast number of changes put in place by 
Vatican II, the congregation was thrust into the role of participant by the use of 
the vernacular, new architectural ideas10 and the way the Mass was celebrated.11 
The congregation, now able to fully listen, hear and understand what was being 
said because of the change in language, were engaged in more of the active 
performance through call and response, recitation and singing. The new liturgy 
altered the kind of participation that was needed to perform the liturgy.  
As already mentioned in Chapter 2, the reform brought in by Vatican II 
was concerned with the participation of the congregation. Participating in any of 
the individual parts of the liturgy can be performative; the speaking of texts, 
singing of songs and corporeality of kneeling and praying ‘perform’ the written 
liturgy. As Connerton explains, it is through the enactment of the liturgy with 
embodied actions that the liturgy occurs:  
We can [say] that liturgical language is a certain form of action and puts 
something into practice. It is not a verbal commentary on an action 
external to itself; in and of itself liturgical language is an action.”12 
The liturgy is thus ‘constructed’ or essentially ‘performed’ each time by the 
people present in a completely unique fashion. From the priest through to the 
youngest member of the congregation the liturgy is a unique performance of 
embodied actions because its completion is dependent on and enacted with the 
‘other,’ both the other of God and the other of the fellow participant. This 
engagement with the other is a specific way of being present, of participating, of 
                                                
10 As already mentioned in Chapter 2, for a detailed examination of the impact of architecture post 
Vatican II see Steven J. Schloeder Architecture in Communion: Implementing the Second Vatican 
Council through Liturgy and Architecture. 
11 Other Christian denominations have also undergone significant changes in liturgical practice 
since the 60s, however the same defined moment in time offered by the Vatican II Council does 
not exist in Protestant or Orthodox Churches. 
12 Connerton, p. 57. 
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doing the work, alongside the obvious work of the body, mind and soul to kneel, 
stand, sit, eat, sing, listen, speak, pray, think, focus, forgive, trust and believe.13 
The contribution of each participant to the work of an embodied 
performance is necessary for a successful Mass. One of the ways the individual 
contributes is through their unique enactment of each section. As White explains, 
after Vatican II people came to a new understanding of their role: “People were 
beginning to grasp the difference between praying at Mass and praying the Mass 
itself.”14 When the participants understand themselves as integral to “praying the 
Mass” they consciously undertake the performance. If they consistently engage 
with this process from one week to the next, the range of meanings available to 
them increases. Embodied, performative participation and the production and 
assimilation of meanings are reliant on each other. From its beginnings the liturgy 
has been formed, challenged, embraced and developed by those who do 
participate. The continued relevance of it as a way to perform belief is reliant on 
those same people.15 
                                                
13 The nature of embodied performance means that it is impossible to assign actions solely to one 
part of the body, as the whole body is involved in singing, praying or listening, but this list 
demonstrates many types of work that are part of the liturgy. 
14 White, p. 114. [My emphasis.] 
15 For those who believe in the teachings of the church, performing the liturgy on a Sunday 
morning is not simply the performance of the text by a group of people. For the Christian there is 
one other aspect of the performance which is important to the liturgy as a whole – the eternal 
liturgy. The eternal liturgy, which is part of church doctrine, is understood to be performed all the 
time in heaven – a constant celebration of God by his creation. (The eternal liturgy is a concept 
that is part of accepted Roman Catholic doctrine. The Sacrosanctum Concilium states: “In the 
earthly liturgy we take part in a foretaste of that heavenly liturgy which is celebrated in the holy 
city of Jerusalem toward which we journey as pilgrims, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of 
God, a minister of the holies and of the true tabernacle; we sing a hymn to the Lord's glory with 
all the warriors of the heavenly army; venerating the memory of the saints, we hope for some part 
and fellowship with them; we eagerly await the Saviour, Our Lord Jesus Christ, until He, our life, 
shall appear and we too will appear with Him in glory” (Sacrosanctum Concilium, Vatican 
Council, <http://www.vatican.va/archive/ hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
i_const_ 19631204_sacrosanctum -concilium_en.html> [accessed 16 April 2009] Chapter 1 
Section 8). The implications of this for believers are manifold: when the congregation performs 
the liturgy they are joining with all people (those living, dead and those not yet born) in praising 
God. Reminders of this are built into the service itself and the Sanctus is the main instance of this. 
The Sanctus (which is normally sung by the participants) is part of the text that precedes the 
Consecration. Depending on the church and which version of the liturgy they are using, the text 
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The work of the liturgy is constantly being performed, whether in a 
church service or in heaven. Anscar Chupungco explains the nature of the 
relationships the performance of the liturgy instigates: “The liturgy can be 
defined also from the angle of encounter between the faithful and God. This 
implies that through the Church’s worship the faithful both as a body and as 
individual members enter into the presence of the triune God.”16 The meanings 
understood by those who participate each week are thus multi-layered as meaning 
is found through the participation of the entire person. It is the physical and 
material aspects of meaning production that are the focus of the next section.  
 
Meaning Through Action 
Meaning, and the attempt to define it, has fuelled research in many disciplines. 
Especially in theology the ‘meaning’ as perceived and understood by the 
                                                
immediately before the Sanctus ends with words similar to “we join with the angels…” (For more 
on the Sanctus see www.newadvent.org/cathen/13432a.htm [accessed 18 May 2009]). The 
participants then sing the Sanctus, the text of which is taken from the book of Revelation and 
effectively links the eternal and earthly liturgies. Singing ‘with the angels’ reminds the 
participants that the eternal liturgy is continuous while their involvement is partial. God is 
participating with the congregation in the entire liturgy through the Holy Spirit. Christians 
understand God to be three parts, God the Father (the God of the Hebrew Scriptures), God the son 
(Jesus who died on the cross) and God the Holy Spirit (the spirit of God who dwells in each 
believer). This tripartite understanding of God is complex and constantly debated by Christians. 
How it works is not clear; it is accepted as a divine mystery. This is how Christians believe God 
has chosen to explain his identity to humans. What is important in relation to liturgy is simply that 
all three aspects of who God says he is are present in the performance of the liturgy. The 
Trinitarian understanding of God as being three parts, distinct parts that are nonetheless only one 
God, is one of the mysteries of faith.  For a short, but helpful book on this topic see Nicholas 
Lash, Believing Three Ways in One God: A Reading of the Apostles Creed (London: SCM, 1992). 
The Holy Spirit is believed to be present in every church, with the congregations and, whether it is 
felt or not, contributes to the enactment of the liturgy each time. 
16 Anscar J. Chupungco, ‘A Definition of Liturgy’, in Handbook for Liturgical Studies: 
Introduction to the Liturgy, Vol. I (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1997), pp. 3-10 (p. 6). In the 
eternal liturgy Jesus is the offering/sacrifice made on an eternal scale, i.e., this one offering is 
enough for all people who have lived, are living and will live. The earthly liturgy, then, is 
understood as a material manifestation of what is happening eternally; the sacrifice of Jesus is re-
performed by those who believe – each time – not simply as a re-presentation, but as a reiteration, 
i.e., Jesus is the continual offering and this offering is ‘produced’ at every performance (it is 
important to make clear that Jesus is not re-sacrificed during the Mass). While the eternal liturgy 
is not the immediate focus of my analysis of the materiality of the Roman Catholic Liturgy, it is a 
factor for those who practice and believe. 
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practitioner is highly contested.17 The individual elements in the church liturgy do 
have meanings. An accepted meaning behind any one aspect of the liturgy can be 
predetermined (such as saying the Lord’s prayer), but the individual experience 
differs from person to person, or from one enactment to another.  
The belief that comes with the understanding of meaning is vital for the 
liturgy to be effective. People rarely believe in something in which they find no 
meaning. But personal experiences with belief are difficult to assess. It is 
possible, however, to investigate ways of approaching and engaging with the 
performance of belief. The various aspects that impact upon the performance of 
the liturgy include the metaphorical (the liturgical text affirms that the 
participants together make up the ‘body of Christ’), physical and material (the 
liturgy cannot be performed by one person and demands the presence of 
participants and objects), and spiritual (the relationship between the participants 
and God is the reason for the performance to take place). The participant has a 
relationship to objects and the form of the liturgy. 
The following scenario is one example of how two people can find very 
different meanings in an experience of the liturgy. During a first experience of a 
Mass understanding the realm of spiritual relationships and the performance of 
belief may be too much to take in. For someone walking into a Mass who had 
never attended before, the experience would be, at most, one of responding 
because some form of sense would first have to be made of the events unfolding 
in the space. Responding is active and the first response to an event affects all 
subsequent responses. Without the ability to understand the liturgy it is difficult 
to participate and thus engage with the intended performance. This performance 
                                                
17 For more on this debate see Martin Stringer, On the Perception of Worship (Birmingham: 
University of Birmingham Press, 1999) and Graham Hughes, Worship as Meaning: A Liturgical 
Theology for Late Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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situation is thus somewhat reliant on participants having either an understanding 
of the language or a pre-existing understanding of the form. It therefore seems as 
if an educated participant is necessary, but I suggest that this is not always the 
case. As an example consider two first time participants in a Roman Catholic 
Mass. One speaks the language and belongs to another Christian denomination, 
the other does not speak the language, has never been in a church and does not 
know the story of Jesus. While an initial conclusion could be that the person who 
‘understands’ Christian worship will ‘engage’ or ‘enjoy’ the service more, this is 
not the only outcome. The person with a Christian background has preconceived 
ideas about what is appropriate to do in a church.  
– The formal style might not correspond to anything that they consider 
worship.  
– Eating the bread and drinking the wine might be something they normally 
do four times a year, not every week.  
– Not being able to fully participate in the call/response sections could be 
alienating.  
While this person has some knowledge of the form and the language the 
differences between the two styles have the ability to frustrate as much as the 
similarities have the ability to aid identification. 
 For the person who knows nothing and anticipates nothing (and decides to 
engage with the event) the experience is one of being in response. By ‘in 
response’ I mean that as everything is new, the only way to engage is to respond 
to the embodied experiences of seeing, hearing, tasting and touching. The Roman 
Catholic liturgy engages all the senses and a person who ‘understood’ nothing 
about the form or language would still be able to gain a rich embodied 
understanding through active participation. Fully participating would take effort, 
but is possible. While similar arguments exist for the second person as for the 
first, i.e., the style of liturgy might not correspond to anything they consider 
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worship, it is just as likely for the second person to engage more with the 
performance. 
The performance situation calls on those present to use the body in 
behaviour learned through imitation and repetition. The forms can simply be 
copied until a memory is created in the body. The participant must be convinced 
by the religious tradition enough to bother attempting to learn both the 
performance form and the relevance behind the form. Otherwise the participation 
in the form will remain pretence – the ability to worship is learned. Learning a 
form before being able to worship does not mean that a person cannot believe 
before they worship. But the performance of the belief with the social group of 
believers is precluded when the form is not known.  
Christians understand the need to worship God through the instructions in 
the Bible, both those from the Old Testament that explain how to both build and 
worship in the Temple, and those from the New Testament that encourage 
members to meet and instruct one another.18 Worship during the liturgy is not 
undertaken alone, and is always participatory. The idea of a static performance 
situation is perhaps difficult to imagine as the people and places which perform 
the liturgy are diverse and constantly changing. Individual elements of the Mass 
are static: readings from the Bible, inclusion of songs/hymns, the Lord’s prayer, 
the Creeds, the celebration of the Eucharist. However, the style of music, tone of 
voice, and linking sections can vary significantly from church to church and 
culture to culture. From the architecture, to the decorative stoles, to the manner of 
sharing the peace,19 each group is able to specify some aspects of how it wants to 
                                                
18 This is a short list of examples of passages in the Bible that discuss the building of the temple 
and how to worship: 1 Kings 6-8; 2 Chronicles 2-6; Psalm 24, 35, 48, 66, 95, 96; Luke 4:8; 
Hebrews 9; 10:25; and Romans 12:1. 
19 Sharing the peace is a part of the service where people generally shake hands and say “Peace be 
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perform the liturgy. It is through years of performing together that the group 
establishes this defined performance situation which includes where, when, what 
and how they perform.  
The case study that follows looks at three examples of performances of 
the liturgy. Each description focuses on the physicality and materiality of the 
embodied performance of the participants and is an attempt to avoid an analysis 
that relies on representation and metaphysical meaning in order to engage with 
the performance. 
 
MEANING IN THE EUCHARIST 
The Eucharist is the centre point of the traditional Christian liturgy and 
the orthodox understanding is that God is present20 in the elements of bread and 
wine. Although the manner of God’s presence is variously, even contentiously, 
articulate, I introduce examples from writers who treat this complex topic well 
and with great clarity. The range of meanings in liturgical action exceed the scope 
of this dissertation with its focus on embodied action, nevertheless, this 
introduction to some of the major discussions about meaning will prove helpful in 
the later case study on the Roman Catholic liturgy.  
One of the best known writers on the liturgy in the last century was an 
Anglican monk – Dom Gregory Dix.21 His major work The Shape of the Liturgy 
emphasized the structure of the performance as intrinsic to meaning-making. He 
argued that content alone did not convey the scale and scope of meanings, and 
                                                
with you” or some variation on this idea.  In some churches people turn to those in their 
immediate vicinity while in others people leave their pews, greet each other with a hug and 
engage in discussion. 
20 This kind of presence is different to the general sense that God in the form of the Holy Spirit is 
received by people when they believe. And also that Christ is understood to be present where two 
or three people (or more) are gathered together in his name.  
21 Dom is a title and Dix was a monk in the Benedictine Order. 
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that the form in which this content was delivered was equally important. While 
the book delves into history in intricate detail, Dix begins with the earliest texts 
available to us which discuss the meanings of the Eucharist – Christian Scripture. 
Dix lists the “rich variety of meanings” which were mentioned in the New 
Testament in relation to the ritual of the bread and wine.22 These include:  
- the solemn proclamation of the Lord’s death 
- the familiar intercourse of Jesus abiding in the soul, as a friend  
- the ‘true’ and the ‘secret’ manna 
- the meaning of all sacrifice  
- the truth of all Passovers 
- it looks forward to the future beyond the end of time 
- the anticipation of the final judgment of God  
- a foretaste of the eternal Messianic banquet of heaven 
- a tasting of the powers of the world to come 
- it foreshadows the exultant welcome of His own at that Second 
Coming.23  
From a form of remembrance to the understanding of sacrifice to the anticipation 
of an ultimate meeting with God, the New Testament references span a huge 
range of associations. This list is not exhaustive, however, and Dix mentions a 
few more which are more directly related to the person of Jesus as he is 
understood in the elements of bread and wine: 
By the time the New Testament came to be written the Eucharist already 
illuminated everything concerning Jesus for His disciples—His Person, 
His Messianic office, His miracles, His death and the redemption that He 
brought. It was the vehicle of the gift of His Spirit, the means of eternal 
life, the cause of the unity of His church.24 
These combined meanings focus specifically on the bread and wine, in relation to 
the person of Jesus, and more pan-biblically in relation to Jewish and Christian 
rituals and expectations, e.g. Passover and a final judgement. It is striking that the 
meanings found early in the New Testament are so numerous and is therefore 
obvious, with so much scope for disagreement, why there has been such sustained 
                                                
22 Dom Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy (New York: Seabury Press, 1983 [1945]), pp. 4-5. 
23 Dix, p. 5. 
24 Dix, p. 5. 
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discussion over the centuries.  The plethora of associations and meanings has 
been fruitful ground for theology. Even with all of these inherent meanings there 
are still more discover as we will see later. However, a closer look at a few 
examples will provide a better understanding of how meaning functions as it 
changes in relation to the bread and wine. 
 An example that highlights why there is so much room for various 
interpretations and associations of meaning is offered by Alasdair I.C. Heron. In a 
discussion of Betz’s analysis of the four Gospel narratives Heron focuses on a 
shift that happens internally to the Gospels themselves from the person of Jesus to 
the ideas of his flesh and blood: 
The four narratives fall into two pairs, Paul and Luke’s longer version, 
and Mark and Matthew. The first pair are generally closer to the oldest 
Greek account of Jesus’ original words and actions, and so enable its 
provisional reconstruction. In it, Jesus describes himself in terms drawn 
from the Servant passages in Isaiah, and attention is concentrated upon his 
person and the covenant in him. In the later narratives, his flesh and blood 
and sacrificial death come increasingly to the fore. In this way, the centre 
of gravity shifts under the impact both of theological reflection upon the 
meaning of his death and of controversy concerning the meaning of the 
Eucharist itself.25 
Here the four writers present not only slightly different versions, but the changes 
that occur from one text to the other are affected, so argue Betz and Heron, over 
time. Because the writers (and other members of the early community) had had 
time to reflect on the events, their understandings of these events had shifted. 
This is not presented as a problem to be solved, but as the natural outcome of a 
process of experience. This pattern of multiple and adapting meanings continues 
through history, beginning with those closest to Jesus and the original ritual. 
Heron continues with insight into the danger of a limited focus: 
                                                
25 Alasdair I.C. Heron, Table and Tradition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), p. 15. [Note: 
Heron is discussing Paul’s contribution to a narrative description and is not discussing the four 
Gospels.] 
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In the West at least, both Roman Catholic and Protestant thinking have 
sometimes concentrated attention so exclusively on Jesus’ death as to lose 
sight alike of his incarnation and human life, of his resurrection and 
ascension to be present for us at the right hand of the Father, and of his 
future coming.26  
When the Eucharist is seen only, or focally, as death it loses the full range of its 
meanings. If understood as only a ritualistic remembrance of death, it's meaning 
is limited: “The meaning of the Eucharist has then been located solely in the 
cross, with the result that a choice has come to force itself between seeing the 
Eucharist as a ‘repetition’ of his sacrifice and understanding it as a ‘mere 
remembering’ of it.”27 The dynamic of participation is affected by the nature of 
the ritual action. If this is only a repetition or a remembrance then it 
commemorates but does not impact anyone. If Christ is not present then 
participants are not implicated in a meaningful way as there is therefore no 
encounter with God. Heron reminds the reader “that from the earliest recoverable 
tradition of the Last Supper it is indeed ‘the whole Christ’ who gives himself to 
us in the Eucharist as ‘the new covenant’ made by God.”28 
 A further example discussed by Heron is that of the bread and its role in 
constituting the community, which is a key meaning for contemporary Christians. 
Those present are valued for their contribution to the performance of the liturgy – 
they are important in its execution and they constitute the body of Christ in the 
world. Heron reiterates the standard meanings: “In Christian thought the breaking 
of the bread has of course been generally regarded as a representation of the death 
of Jesus; and the symbolism does obviously suggest itself.”29 The bread breaks in 
the Eucharist as a clear reminder that the body of Christ was broken through 
                                                
26 Heron, p. 16. 
27 Heron, p. 16. 
28 Heron, p. 16. 
29 Heron, p. 25. 
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beatings and crucifixion. However, the point is not the death, but what that death 
effected in the world for people and more broadly the relation brought about 
between people and God: “the main point of the whole action was the blessing of 
God and the receiving and eating of the bread as a gift from him. Its breaking was 
a necessary but incidental element in the pattern.”30 The meaning of the death 
thus encompasses a death which is in turn treated symbolically through the use of 
bread and wine, which in turn become a means through which God’s grace and 
blessing are received by believers. This extra layer of meaning takes the 
performance of the ritual from mere repetition to an event with meanings that 
implicate the participant in a relationship with God; one where the participant 
receives from God.  
This is not the end of the layers of meaning as the participants themselves 
also play a role – how and what they receive, both from God and from the event 
are all important considerations, as Heron explains: 
The pattern as a whole, however, reveals a striking and rather different 
connexion with Jesus’ words. For there is a marked parallel between the 
whole action of the grace and what Jesus says about the bread. In the 
grace it is given to be eaten as a gift from God; and Jesus identifies it as 
his own person, whom God will give for many. The link thus seems to be 
not simply between the bread and Jesus himself: it is between bread 
received and shared and Jesus given up by God for many.31 
Sharing and being ‘given up’ or sacrificed are also layered meanings, and ones 
which impact even the most mundane of activities – eating a meal. For early 
Christians coming out of the Hebrew traditions, to share a meal was to create a 
bond: 
The meal itself established a bond between those who shared in it: it did 
not merely symbolise the bond, but actually constituted it. Thus the bread 
used in the grace in the ordinary way of things in Jewish practice 
                                                
30 Heron, p. 25. 
31 Heron, p. 25. 
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represented the blessing of God for the meal as a whole, the receiving of 
the whole as his gift, and the fellowship of those taking part.32 
This understanding strengthens the idea of corporate action being of utmost 
importance. If sharing in the meal constitutes the bond then those who partake are 
bound to each other, having entered into relationship with each other as well as 
with God. This aspect is balanced with the significance of what is being eaten 
because this is the sacrifice of God who gave his son. The sacrificial meal of the 
Eucharist echoes the Passover taking on much more complex and cosmic 
meanings which have also been subject to reappraisals by subsequent generations 
of theologians.33  
 Catholic theologian Edward Schillebeeckx wrote in The Eucharist about 
how we should understand these changing interpretations of Eucharistic meaning. 
As part of an analysis of the Tridentine dogma of transubstantiation he asserted 
that, 
an analysis of this kind should not be viewed in isolation. In this analysis, 
not only should we take into account the celebration of the Eucharist by 
the primitive Christian community and its reflection on it, as given to us 
in various stages in the Bible—we should also keep constantly in mind 
how the Church continued to celebrate and think about the Eucharist.34 
As previously mentioned by Dix, there are many meanings associated with the 
Eucharist in the New Testament and Schillebeeckx asserts their relevance in 
tandem with how the Church embodies the rite throughout history. His point is 
that the nature of evolving rituals, as mentioned earlier in relation to the organic 
development of the liturgy, involves successive generations using the ritual in 
their own way, while staying true to doctrine.  
                                                
32 Heron, p. 25. 
33 There is some disagreement as to whether the first Eucharist as celebrated by Jesus before he 
died was in fact the day of Passover or the day before. Current arguments place it as the Passover 
itself and account for the Gospel of John’s alternate timeline through other means.  
34 Edward Schillebeeckx, The Eucharist (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 89.  
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In The Eucharist Schillebeeckx explained that as he was unable to treat 
the entire context and development of the Eucharistic rite he had therefore chosen 
to focus on the aspect he felt was “fundamental,” namely, “a specific analysis of 
Christ’s presence.”35 For Schillebeeckx, in this instance, the most important 
contributor to meaning is the presence of God in the Eucharistic act and he 
explains it thus: “There is in the Eucharist, as distinct from the other sacraments36, 
a specific earthly real presence of the Christ who is nonetheless heavenly and 
remains heavenly in the sacrament.”37 By earthly presence he is referring to “a 
sacramental earthly presence, due to Christ’s real act of making himself present 
in the gift of the holy bread.”38 This concept of a sacrament is one of the most 
discussed issues in theology and is key element to the development of meaning in 
all of the Christian denominations over the years.39  
Schillebeeckx uses the Tridentine dogma as the basis for his discussion of 
“the true reality in the Eucharist” which “is no longer bread, but simply the body 
                                                
35 “I have therefore concentrated my attention on only one aspect of the Eucharist, which I regard 
as fundamental. The path we follow here may not be considered as the model of a theological 
approach. The hermeneutical question about the real nature both of the biblical way of speaking 
about the Eucharist and of the way in which the magisterium of the Church speaks about must, of 
course, in any case be asked” (p. 89).  
36 The following is a definition of sacrament according the usage in the Christian tradition. The 
Roman Catholic Church endorses the seven sacraments: “The English use before the Reformation 
adopts the enumeration of seven sacraments (believed to have been first formulated by Peter 
Lombard in the 12th c.; the same list is recognized in the Eastern Church): viz., Baptism, 
Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order, Matrimony. …while the seven 
sacraments were viewed as eminently entitled to the name, it could be applied in a more general 
sense to certain other rites. From the 16th c., Protestants generally have recognized two 
sacraments only, viz. baptism and the Lord's Supper. The formal definition of sacrament depends 
on the answer to the question what is the distinctive feature common to the seven or to the two 
‘sacraments’, on account of which they form a separate class from all other observances. Those 
who accept the number seven, and many of those who admit only two sacraments, say that the 
sacraments differ from other rites in being channels by which supernatural grace is imparted.” 
‘sacrament, n.’, OED Online, (March 2011), Oxford University Press, 
<http://www.oed.com.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/view/Entry/169523?rskey=9tXZTR&result=1&isAdv
anced=false> [Accessed 21 April 2011]. 
37 Schillebeeckx, p. 85. 
38 Schillebeeckx, p. 89.  
39 Disagreement over if there are sacraments and what constitutes a sacrament has been a 
distinguishing feature of various Christian denominations.  
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and blood of Christ in a sacramental form.”40 As one of the seven sacraments, the 
Eucharist is not simply another Christian ritual. These are the only rites which are 
understood to be have been ordained by God and through which God’s grace is 
given to his people. As such the Eucharist shares in these meanings – however, 
these are far from stable. Schillebeeckx reiterates that current analyses must and 
do take a modern perspective on the meanings of the Eucharist: 
Apart from this modern approach we, as believers, should never be able to 
seize the full implications for us of our Catholic faith. After all, we simply 
cannot formulate our belief as Christians did in the Middle Ages, or even 
as the apostles did; yet it is the same faith which we possess and 
experience—exactly the same faith, but with the dynamic identity of a 
living faith which is caught up in the movement of history.41 
He asserts continuity of faith throughout history and allows for the shifting needs 
and circumstances to shape the precise meanings for different generations:  
the contemporary context of our life leads us to reinterpret the world of 
ideas with which the dogma of transubstantiation has come down to us, 
precisely in order to be able to preserve in a pure form the basic meaning 
of the dogma and to make it capable of being freshly experienced by 
modern man.42 
This essentialist view of dogma allows for the same core idea to shape belief even 
as cultural developments in science, changes in language usage, and new 
theological understandings come to the fore. Meaning in relation to the Eucharist 
is thus stable and also able to respond to changes in culture over time.43 
 Thus far we have examined meanings from early Christian writers and the 
New Testament texts through to the Council of Trent and how faith and meanings 
                                                
40 Schillebeeckx, p. 89.  
41 Schillebeeckx, pp. 85-86. 
42 “It is difficult to see how simply repeating the dogma word for word in our present age could do 
anything but impose an unnecessary and unjustified burden on our Christian faith” (p. 90).  
43 Heron provides clear examples of the kinds of understandings that have changed in various time 
periods simply based on cultural norms and understandings of science. For more see pages 80-107 
on medieval Eucharistic theology. Schillebeeckx also provides examples throughout his text, 
specifically pages 53-75 where he discusses the tradition in the church over time. For example: 
“The early Christian vision was much more dynamic – corporeal things were, for the earliest 
Fathers of the Church, what they were because they were controlled by Powers, and a change of a 
thing meant that other Powers seized it and took possession of it. They said therefore that a 
Christian was a person whose flesh had been seized by the Pneuma, by God” (p. 67). 
  
 
167 
 
have been maintained over the centuries even as understandings have shifted. 
This has touched on practice, but only lightly. At the very beginning of his book 
Dix asserts: “This understanding of the rite, as essentially a corporate action, is 
clearly expressed in the very first christian description of the way in which it was 
performed.”44 As this dissertation is itself arguing for the relevance of 
performative action I agree with Dix’s statement. However, in “Calvin and Barth 
on the Lord’s Supper”, Trevor A. Hart reminds us that it is important not to 
analyse the work of the liturgy and then extrapolate all meaning from such an 
analysis:   
The meaning of the Eucharist…whatever theological view of it is 
entertained, could never be ex opere operato in the strictest of senses. […] 
in numerous ways Eucharistic theology necessarily affirms that God’s 
presence and activity are basic to the meaning of the rite.”45 
Meaning comes through the execution of the work in which God is present, but as 
previously mentioned, it is the way in which God’s presence is understood to 
manifest which informs the meaning. As Hart explains, even across 
denominations there is a consensus that the Eucharist “involves a special, and not 
just a general, presence and action of God, and that this special presence and 
action is in some way focused upon the physical elements of bread and wine, and 
what is done with these – taking, breaking, eating, drinking, and so on.”46 The 
elements plus the actions, plus the presence of God together converge to effect 
meaning.  Liturgical action points towards the need for active participation in the 
moment of accepting and eating the Eucharist to fully receive the special 
presence of God.  
                                                
44 Dix, p. 1. 
45 Trevor A. Hart, ‘Calvin and Barth on the Lord’s Supper,’ in Calvin, Barth and Reformed 
Theology, ed. by N. B. MacDonald and C. Trueman (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2008), 29-56, p. 31. 
46 Hart, ‘Calvin’, p. 32 
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The participation of the congregation is a topic that has been treated by 
theologians of many denominations. We have already heard from an Anglican 
and a Roman Catholic, and now from John Calvin as well, that the “importance 
of human activity in the ceremony” is set “within the context of a logically prior 
divine action which under-girds ours and makes it meaningful.” 47 The actions of 
the people are held within a framework set up by and contributed to by God. 
Calvin also mentions that topic which is also of such concern in speech acts – 
intention or, in relation to belief – faith. While it is impossible to monitor the 
intention of those present, one would hope that regular participants in the liturgy 
have faith and do believe in what they are doing. Hart explains that for Calvin 
there is something at stake in participation without faith:  
only those who eat and drink in faith truly receive what is offered to them. 
While the offer is indiscriminate and the table open, unbelief stops short at 
the level of a merely physical participation, the bread and wine being for 
it ‘cold and empty figures’…devoid of that divine signification which, for 
faith, renders sharing in them an actual sharing in the body and blood of 
Christ. 48 
For the person who does not have faith partaking in the rite is the straightforward 
receiving of bread and wine, but not the divine aspects. Meaning is truncated not 
because of what it can contain, but because of limits put in place by others.  
While maintaining this focus on the bread and wine, and their appropriate 
use and meaning, Calvin does not lose sight of the entire liturgy. Hart explains 
Calvin’s position: “we should note the importance which he ascribes to the event 
of the Supper as a whole (and not just the bread and wine) in this regard.”49 
Calvin returns to an emphasis on the overarching action of the liturgy to frame 
                                                
47 Hart, ‘Calvin’, p. 34 
48 Hart, ‘Calvin’, p. 40. 
49 Hart, ‘Calvin’, p. 41. “Eucharistic theology has always insisted that it is the bread and wine as 
they are set apart, taken, broken, poured out, received and consumed which are the focus of what 
God does here” (Hart, p. 39). [Original emphasis.] 
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the parts and put them in context: “the ceremony is…a synthesis in which objects, 
actions and words are juxtaposed and related to one another. So, while Calvin 
insists that the material signs are vital, he also refuses to detach their meaning 
from the accompanying immaterial symbolics of narrative.”50 The importance of 
sharing the event with others was also mentioned by Schillebeeckx who 
emphasized that we should not forget how the early church celebrated the meal 
itself, and by Heron who reiterated that a bond is created between participants.  
As with Hart’s warning that the actions themselves not become the focus 
for meaning-making, Heron also distinguishes between two potential models of 
“a sacrament”:  
One is controlled by the thought of God acting through the action of the 
church, the other by that of God communicating by his Word to faith. Yet 
each model has its strengths and its inherent dangers. The first is based on 
the sound recognition that a sacrament involves action and not merely 
words: ‘Do this …’ is performative and not merely declaratory. The 
second builds upon the equally fundamental awareness that God does not 
act upon us dumbly or impersonally, but in acting also communicates and 
evokes an answer. To this extent the two models may be seen as 
complementary and mutually corrective. Taken on its own, the first can 
lead to an uncritical identification of God’s action and ours, and so to a 
magical view of sacramental efficacy, and the second to a reduction of 
‘sacrament’ to a ‘naked and bare sign’, or to an activity of our own in 
which God is no longer believed to be involved directly. Yet the Word 
and the action of God cannot be sundered from each other; our own 
speech and action rest and depend on his; and both the activity of the 
church and the response of faith have their necessary place in the horizon. 
Each of the two models has something necessary and valuable to 
contribute – provided they are held together in proper complementarity 
rather than torn apart into stark opposition, in which each becomes opaque 
and absolute, with its more dubious aspects setting the tone.51 
The two models show that there are not only different ways to understand God’s 
presence in the liturgy, but there are indeed at least two larger complementary 
ways in which God’s action is accomplished. However, neither should overtake 
                                                
50 Hart, ‘Calvin’, p. 41. 
51 Heron, p. 155. [Original emphasis.] 
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the other in theological discussions as the best or most efficient model, as both 
are necessary for a robust rite.  
In this section I have introduced discussions of meaning from theologians 
across denominations. Their work on the Eucharist provides background to the 
various debates and ideas that have engaged Christians since the days of the early 
church. There is a marked difference between this section and the rest of the 
dissertation. In the other chapters I do not discuss how or whether God is actually 
present in the rituals and performances that form my case studies. My 
contribution to the fields of theology and performance studies is strictly focused 
on discussions of the performative and how the performances function from an 
embodied standpoint. I did not undertake interviews to ascertain what individual 
participants experience in relation to God’s presence and I will not make 
assumptions. The academic hole that I am filling is concerned with where these 
two fields meet up in terms of the study of performative action in relation to 
performance and belief.  
I want to conclude this section with Rowan Williams’ book On Christian 
Theology. In it, Williams discusses the intricacies of understanding sign-making 
throughout history and in relation to contemporary practices of belief. He shows 
this to be complex, necessitating and utilizing a philosophical framework to order 
the signs used by a culture: 
The difficulty…is to hold on to the conviction that sign-making is a 
material and historical practice, without making it seem like an arbitrary 
imposing of form on passive stuff ‘out there’; and to counter this we need, 
of course, the kind of philosophical framework which reminds us that the 
world is never neutral and passive in a simple sense, but already, 
primitively, known and thought in signs (in language and meaningful 
action). Symbolic forms are not just lying around, nor are they thought up 
as arbitrary glosses on straightforward experience of the world; they are 
what we live through as humans – as being capable of recalling and re-
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moulding what is given us, taking it forward and so re-moulding 
ourselves, the horizons of our understanding and our hope.52 
In Williams’ explanation signs and symbolic forms are intentional tools used by 
humans to make sense of experience, and how that experience is thought, as well 
as integrated into a culture. And the signs used by a culture are specific to that 
culture’s needs. Seen in this light, the symbols of the Eucharist, and indeed the 
entire liturgy, have larger meaning applicable outside of the practices of the 
Church itself. This echoes Pouillon’s argument about the language of belief being 
specific to the needs of Western culture and the rituals and philosophies that are 
at its foundation. The Eucharist contains some of the founding symbols of 
Western culture and their usage has been and continues to be pervasive.53  
Williams clarifies overarching ideas and then moves into a more specific 
application in relation to the Eucharist. The Church uses the signs of the 
Eucharist not only to make meaning – as all humans do with signs, regardless of 
their provenance – but also because they are understood as enabling the presence 
of God in the event. There is a special nature to what “the Church signifies in 
doing these things – the new covenant and new creation in the life, death and 
raising of Jesus. In these acts the Church ‘makes sense’ of itself, as other groups 
may do, and as individuals do; but its ‘sense’ is seen as dependent on the creative 
act of God in Christ.”54 The difference in meaning-making in the Eucharist is this 
extra presence and action and Williams returns to the importance of action 
throughout. As with the other writers, Williams too explains the role of the 
sacraments, and he makes a case for action in particular: “the primary concern 
should be for sacramental actions rather than an attempt to focus on ‘sacralized’ 
                                                
52 Rowan Williams, ‘The Nature of a Sacrament’, in On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2000), 197-208, p. 201. 
53 I will return to this idea in Chapter 4. 
54 Williams, p. 205. 
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objects.”55 This puts the focus on the context in which objects are used and the 
form the actions take in relation to the objects. The objects are themselves man-
made and Williams warns against too much weight being placed solely on the 
material. Again, as with the others, Williams advocates a balanced understanding 
and performance of the Eucharist within the liturgical action.  
In the end, Williams links the reasons a sign is used in the Eucharist back 
to the same reasons used by all humans: “All sign-making is the action of hope, 
the hope that this world may become other and that its experienced 
fragmentariness can be worked into sense.” 56 This is true of human behaviour but 
there is a difference that is present when the use of the symbols is connected to 
belief. Williams describes how this works for a Christian: “The sacramental 
action of the believer is, at one level, a working into sense like any other; the 
difference is that this ‘working’ is done to open us to the sense already made by 
God as creator and redeemer.”57 There is an underlying belief held by Christians 
that God is trying to impart other knowledge. As we now move on to look at 
instances from three services over Easter week it will be useful to keep these 
concepts of meaning-making in mind. 
 
PERFORMING EASTER 
From very theoretical ideas about how theology functions, the focus now shifts to 
a case study heavy in description. All the examples in this chapter are from 
church services in Olomouc and Rade!inska Svratka in Moravia in the Czech 
Republic in 2005. I attended Roman Catholic services on Wednesday in the 
                                                
55 Williams, p. 206. 
56 Williams, p. 207. 
57 Williams, p. 207. 
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Cathedral in Olomouc, Maundy Thursday and Good Friday in a Dominican 
Monastery church in Olomouc, and Saturday, Sunday and Monday in the village 
church in Rade!inska Svratka. The explanations and examples provided in 
Appendix A may be useful as a point of reference while reading this section. 
 
Easter Monday 
St. Václav Kostel (St. Wenceslas Church) 
Rade!inska Svratka, Monday 28 March 2005 
 
Although the Easter Monday service is the last of those I attended, it is the most 
normal of all the services over Holy Week because it consists of the same liturgy 
that takes place each Sunday during the year. I explain it first to provide a point 
of comparison for the other performances of the liturgy. In the village of 
Rade!inska Svratka this service took place at 7.30am and was well attended. 
Upon entering the church, participants were immediately implicated in rituals. 
Inside the church door were bowls with blessed water, hymn books and the 
wafers used for the Eucharist. All three elements were used by almost everyone 
who came through the door. People dipped their fingers into the water and then 
made the sign of the cross on their forehead or in front of their body. After using 
the blessed water, the next action was often choosing a hymn book and maybe 
picking up a book containing the order of service. The wafers were often the last 
object to be engaged with. It is common for the wafers that will be blessed for 
communion to be in a bowl at the back of the church so that each participant 
moves a wafer to a second bowl using a flat ‘spoon.’ In this way only the wafers 
in the second bowl (plus a small surplus) will be blessed during the Eucharist rite.  
 These rituals immediately place those present in a web of connections that 
emphasize personal choices and individual responses, as well as awareness of 
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collective action. As per Rancière’s theories of spectatorship, the spectator selects 
and in this case the selection is of a book and a wafer. These might not seem like 
huge choices but the later use of the book and of the wafer are paramount in the 
service. The book is used for prayers and songs. After years of participation most 
people know the prayers by heart, but the songs change from week to week and 
the book enables fluid participation in the singing.  
 Selecting a wafer is more layered as the selection of a wafer is actually the 
selection of a unique wafer - one among many. Yet after the person makes that 
selection, perhaps with awareness, perhaps not, the wafer becomes one of many 
that are blessed and distributed. There is almost no chance that the person who 
selected that wafer will receive it during the service. In a sense, the selection of 
the wafer implicates the individual in the experience of another person at the 
Mass. Each wafer is meant for a person, that person’s participation, and the 
importance of facilitating the experiences of all present.  
 The objects that were used, water, wafers and a book, all require an 
individual for the uses to be fulfilled. Yet these objects do not reflect back on the 
personalities or specific circumstances of any one person. One book or wafer is 
not more or less useful and the water is simply wet. These are task-based actions 
that start off a larger series of tasks that are done either one at a time or 
simultaneously throughout the liturgy. There is no punitive element to not 
completing these tasks at the door and there were no obvious abstentions to the 
participation in these actions. While the occasional person can slip in the back of 
the church and not engage with these objects, it would eventually draw the 
attention of others if people abstained altogether. These actions impact the overall 
completion of the Mass as enough wafers are necessary for everyone or the 
  
 
175 
 
Eucharist will be delayed and without books it is difficult for people to sing at the 
appropriate times. The “reality of the spectator’s experience,” to draw on 
McAuley, is primary in the liturgy and these opening actions reinforce the need 
for the participant to engage in the performance from beginning to end. 
 With these three rituals complete, the participants then proceed to the 
main aisle of the church where most people bow their head, or lower themselves 
to one knee, showing reverence to the altar. As they walk to a pew, some people 
greet others in hushed voices. When they reach the pew they want to sit in, they 
kneel again (while facing the altar) next to the pew. Upon sitting down many 
people immediately kneel and pray. These small rituals are carried out 
individually and are not formally prescribed (each person can choose how and 
what to perform). The result of these is a sense of constant, yet calm motion in 
the space. This motion feels preparatory and the more people join the space, 
participating in the small rituals, the more those present create the performance 
parameters for that particular day.  
 This section of the service involves observing others and oneself; 
selecting where to position the body geographically within the architectural space 
and in relation to other bodies; the comparison between this Mass and other 
instances; and the interpretation of the totality. As this service took place on 
Easter Monday, the potential exists to interpret this service through the previous 
four or five Easter services. This is the ‘normal’ weekly service, but it has just 
been preceded by services which are quite different. The possibility exists for 
those present to see the ‘normal’ aspects anew because of the opportunity for a 
close comparison of recent experiences. At the very least, the church space will 
have changed in appearance to the other Easter services because of the removal of 
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some objects (vestments and hangings) and addition of others (draping of crosses 
in black). The ‘scopic drive’ mentioned by McAuley is involved at every service 
and is busy during Easter because of many changes to normal routines.   
Choosing to enter the building indicates intention, although whether that 
is to watch or to participate depends on the individual. Once inside the church the 
actions that are undertaken demarcate the space and prepare it for the communal 
performance. The actions build, one upon the other, e.g. the use of water and a 
sign (crossing oneself) change the person such that they become part of the space 
because they have performed for/in/with the space. Picking up a hymn book and 
moving a wafer might not receive much thought after years of repetition, but 
these actions attest to familiarity and belonging. Kneeling and bowing can be 
done with reverence and thought or automatically through familiarity; however 
they still contribute to the overall performance. Making the sign of the cross, 
kneeling and bowing, are physical engagements that signal participation in the 
performance and an understanding of the embodied demands of the belief. 
The following analysis of the liturgy is presented in the order of the 
service itself and the titles of each section of the liturgy are placed before the 
analyses. The overarching action of the liturgy consists of a rising action to the 
climax of the Eucharistic rite and then a falling action to the end. The liturgy 
starts and ends with prayer and music. From the first communal prayers and 
call/response in the Introductory Rites through to the Readings a sense of 
communal performance is established. Speaking together as well as responding to 
cues links individuals to each other and to the performance. From time to time I 
mention the representational meanings that could be or are traditionally 
associated with various sections of the liturgy.  
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Introductory Rites – Hymn, Sign of the cross, Opening prayers, Greeting, 
Act of Penitence, Kyrie, Gloria in Excelsis Deo, Silence, Collect 
The opening of this service followed the prescribed order. These elements 
continue on from the actions undertaken at the door with water, wafers and books 
to engage the individual in the performance. Some actions foreground the 
individual (silent prayer and listening) and others address the group even while 
asking for individual action (singing, reflection, making the sign of the cross). 
This kind of training of those present in basic actions is an element of all ritual 
performances. No part of the liturgy is extraneous as each provides the tools 
necessary for participation at subsequent occasions.  
Liturgy of the Word – Bible reading, Psalm, Alleluia, Gospel, 
Sermon/homily, Creed, Intercessions, Offering 
The readings are a time of reflection and preparation for the sermon which is 
always short, five to ten minutes. The readings were done by members of the 
church, except the Gospel which is always done by the priest. The rhythm of this 
section leads into the Eucharist and involves the congregation more at each step. 
The participants listened to the readings and when the reader said the phrase ‘This 
is the word of God (or the Lord)’ they all responded ‘Thanks be to God.’58 The 
Psalm was introduced by the choir singing a single line which was then repeated 
by everyone after each verse. For the Gospel the participants stand and turn to 
face the Bible as it is carried into the centre of the aisle. They remain standing 
throughout the reading and afterward the response is sung in unison. The sermon 
was especially short at five minutes. The priest made eye contact with many 
people. Afterward the priest sat down and there was thirty to forty seconds of 
silence. The sermon is a time of mental focus and preparation and leads directly 
into prayers which are about the congregation, the church, the city, the country 
                                                
58 This was in Czech. By the end of the week I was able to identify these phrases both because of 
where they happen in the service as well as through the spoken rhythm.  
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and the world, generally in that order. Each section of Intercessory prayer ends 
with a call/response from the participants to the reader, such as: Reader – We 
pray. All – Lord hear our prayer. Everyone stands for the prayers and the 
Offering is taken up during a hymn. At this point in the service all the children 
came forward and the priest made the sign of the cross on each child’s head in 
turn.  
 This is the section of the liturgy that requires the most sustained listening 
from those present. It is a time when the participant has time to reflect on the 
ideas in the Bible readings and those presented in the sermon. It is also a point 
where the play of looks is very much in evidence. Each part of this section is led 
by a different person or group (the choir often leads the Psalm) and the various 
facilitators look at the participants while they look back. As well, this is a prime 
section for the scopic drive to be “subverted or displaced” by what is happening 
in the church. It is naive to think that participants look without ceasing at the 
person who is speaking. The actions I noticed at this point included looking 
around the church at others, adjusting the position of the body on the pew, giving 
tissues to another person, calming babies who were making noises. There were 
also actions happening in the sanctuary where laypeople were preparing for what 
would come next, e.g. readying the Bible for each reading, checking candles, 
adjusting robes before walking. When the congregation turns to face the Bible 
during the Gospel reading everyone suddenly has a different view of the space as 
those in the front see people who came in after they did and those in the back see 
the faces instead of the backs of those seated ahead of them. There were a few 
faces that registered recognition of someone further back in the church. While the 
focus of that moment was the Bible reading, the gaze of each person registered 
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individual aspects only visible from that position. The ‘reality of the spectator’s 
experience’ during the Gospel reading is played off the ‘presentational reality’ of 
the task-based performance the priest is doing during the reading. The breadth of 
the gaze that allows for unexpected eye contact with others as the person turns to 
face the Bible could disrupt the gaze of the individual spectator towards the 
Bible. Or it could be argued that the reality of the spectator’s experience is an 
integral part of this section of the liturgy as participants listen to excerpts of text  
that are believed to relay the recorded actions and sayings of the head of the 
Church: Christ.   
Liturgy of the Eucharist – Eucharistic Rite starts, Prayer, Call and 
response text, Sanctus, Consecration 
From the Intercessory prayer into the Eucharist the action builds towards the 
climax of the blessing of elements and taking of Communion. It is in this section 
that the facilitators prepare the altar area and tell the story of Jesus breaking the 
bread and offering the wine. During the narrative of the Eucharist, incense is 
swung over the altar in a censer (also called a thurible), and bells are rung. The 
smell of the incense wafts slowly over the congregation so that depending on 
where you are sitting the smell could arrive minutes after the censer was swung. 
The bells that are rung during the Eucharistic Rite were originally used to call 
attention to the Eucharist when churches used Latin; the congregation stood 
during the service and there was no amplification system. The bells are rung 
during the blessing of the bread and wine. Each object is held up in turn so that 
all can see (a tradition that was started when people had trouble seeing to the 
front of the church as everyone stood throughout). In this service almost everyone 
was watching during this section.  
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 The retelling of the Eucharist is the closest the liturgy comes to the 
presentation of ‘dramatic fiction.’ No one takes on a character role, but the priest 
does use the words of the Bible as a script - ‘Take and eat in remembrance of 
me.’ He also stands in for Christ by performing the actions of the breaking of the 
bread and the pouring of wine. These actions lead into the participants receiving 
the bread and, in some instances of the Mass, the wine. The dramatic fiction, 
presentational reality and social reality of the total event are all at play in this 
section and compete from moment to moment for the participants’ attention. The 
‘fiction’ or pretence is the least strong of the three, but is none the less at play as 
people are asked to place themselves imaginatively into the time and space of the 
Last Supper. The presentational reality is evident in the priest and lay people 
preparing the table for the blessing of the elements and the subsequent serving of 
food. Everyone in the church is preparing at this point for the most evident 
performance of the social reality of the total event - namely the taking of 
communion itself.  
The Communion Rite – Lord’s prayer, Peace, Agnus Dei, Call and 
Response, Taking of Communion, Prayer 
The blessing of the Eucharistic meal is followed by the Lord’s Prayer which 
maintains the same rhythm in Czech as in English such that it is possible to say it 
in time in the other language. In this church the sharing of the peace was relaxed 
as everyone knew the person next to them in this little village. There was much 
smiling, and some people hugged or touched cheeks, as well as shaking hands 
and saying ‘Peace be with you.’ After the sharing of the peace the participants 
kneel for the rest of the Eucharistic preparations. While this is the section of the 
service which has the most to see, hear and smell, some people prayed through 
the set text with their eyes closed. The set text is always followed immediately by 
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the short recitation of the confession. This short burst of group speech directed to 
God directly precedes the receiving of communion. The participant comes into 
contact with the physical and material realities of the Eucharistic action through 
their hands and mouth. The bread is given out from many points throughout the 
church. Participants lined up behind one of the people distributing the bread and 
received it on their tongue by opening their mouth.59 After eating people make 
the sign of the cross in front of their body and return to their seats and generally 
pray silently. When all have eaten, the bread and wine (which is drunk by the 
priest) are cleared from the altar. Throughout this section there is much activity 
accomplished alongside people praying. This represents the most active moment 
of the service for the participants as a group. When the Eucharist is complete the 
energy and focus in the room change sharply and the atmosphere shifts back 
towards a more individual, reflective state compared to the previous energised 
state of the group.  
 The social reality of the total event comes to a high point during the 
taking of communion. As the name indicates, those present are meant to be in 
communion with God and with each other at this moment, yet each person 
interacts individually with the element of the Eucharist, i.e. the bread or wafer. 
Almost all the people at a Mass go forward to receive communion (those who do 
not are often visitors, children who have not yet gone through the confirmation 
rite or those who cannot walk to receive it – the bread is often brought to people 
unable to walk once everyone else has been served). The communal aspect of the 
event is emphasised through the almost complete participation. The event also 
                                                
59 Although Jesus said to eat the bread and drink the wine in remembrance of him, in the Roman 
Catholic tradition wine is only drunk by all present a few times a year.  Theologically this is 
accounted for by the idea that Jesus is no longer a ‘divided’ human entity, so the bread/body 
incorporates the body and the blood. 
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represents communion with all other Christians around the world who participate 
in the Mass. The social reality of the total event encompasses all people in the 
church sharing in the defining physical and material elements of the ritual. This 
extends to the reality of the choices those present have made to come to a church, 
to commit to the duration of the event, to be in communion with one another (in 
whatever form), and to return again. Yet, it is important not to rely on this idea of 
the communal as a way to explain participation. As already mentioned in relation 
to Rancière’s ideas, it is the ability of each person to engage as an individual that 
offers a concrete avenue to move past representative analyses of spectators. The 
presumed passivity of the group cannot then be taken for granted or treated as a 
whole representing a certain kind of engagement. What can be analysed or 
assumed, is the unpredictable interplay or interaction created in the performance 
space.  
Concluding Rite – Announcements, Blessing, Final Hymn 
The priest made some announcements which, I was told, were about the services 
during the week. When this was finished he paused, his stance became more 
formal, and his arms, which were at his sides, were hanging so that his palms 
were open to the congregation. He then pronounced the blessing in a tone of 
voice different from that in which he gave the announcements. The Final Hymn 
was played on the organ, the participants all sang and the priest and ministrants 
recessed out of the sanctuary. When the hymn had finished people started reciting 
a text. This was the first time I had heard this text and it was explained to me that 
in this village the service always ends with a group recitation of a text which is 
not part of the official liturgy. It is quite long and takes at least ninety seconds to 
recite. 
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Those who believe in its efficacy and its meanings perform this service 
week after week. Many who do not understand all the details of theology or 
necessarily even know what they believe also participate. Some participation is 
based on tradition and habit, for others it informs the rest of their week and is a 
vital part of the rhythm of daily physical, material and spiritual life. The 
descriptions of the Monday service are a base line from which we can better 
understand the details of the other services, the demands on the body and the 
meanings created in the space.60 
 While I have tried to keep my descriptions free from broad claims as to 
the effects and affects of the Mass on an individual, I have from time to time 
claimed that participants would find a specific section important or meaningful. I 
do this as a participant-observer who is well versed in church participation 
myself. However, I would be remiss to not raise one of the objections of 
Rancière, McAuley and Freshwater, namely, “the belief that participation 
empowers has become a compelling orthodoxy in theatre and performance 
studies. And, like most orthodoxies, it often seems to be applied reductively and 
uncritically.”61 Liturgy is about belief and worshipping God is a large component 
of expressing this belief. Empowerment, as it is used in the above quotation, is 
linked with the political. The kind of empowerment that is often discussed in 
theology is that liturgy empowers through the grace of God, the work of the Holy 
Spirit, and the power of Christ. It is participation in the liturgy that brings the 
individual into contact with God in physical and material ways both through the 
                                                
60 I include textual references from the Bible in a few instances. While I did not understand any 
Bible reading that took place during the service, because I do not speak Czech, I was familiar with 
the Bible verses, which I have included, before I attended the services. These stories are well 
known and whether they were read out in full in Czech or simply referenced, the participants at 
these services would have known the relevance of the passages. 
61 Freshwater, p. 56. 
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Eucharist and through the ‘body of Christ’ who are the other participants. From 
the point of view of an outsider who does not believe in the Christian religion, 
this argument is subjective. However, there is another way to approach this issue 
of the reductive and uncritical analysis. 
 From a performance studies point of view the liturgy is by nature an 
ongoing performance practice which is performative and dependent on the visible 
and active participation of many people for its completion. With the history of the 
event reaching back close to fifteen hundred years (as the Council of Trent 
decided many of the forms still used today), it is hard to deny its efficacy. What 
these services accomplish is what Rancière defines as emancipation, i.e. “the 
blurring of the boundary between those who act and those who look; between 
individuals and members of a collective body.”62 In the liturgy both facilitators 
and participants look and act, and all are simultaneously individuals and members 
of a collective body who are present at a performance event. Rancière explains 
that in order for this emancipation to occur between all those in the space a third 
thing that belongs to no one is needed. In relation to the teacher and student this 
would be a text that neither has written that they can both read and then discuss. 
The two people are distanced from each other because of the difference in their 
knowledge, and both are distanced, according to Rancière, from the text to similar 
effect. In the liturgy the third element is the performance itself and it subsists 
between the people.63  
 The experience of the liturgy of both those who prepare and those who 
participate is the unique shared aspect to which they can refer afterwards. The 
text of the liturgy is available as a point of reference but it does not reflect the 
                                                
62 Rancière, p. 19. 
63 Rancière, p. 14. 
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unique details of the performance that is experienced at each Mass or service. The 
liturgical text can be read anytime while it is the performance itself that can only 
be examined or analysed afterward. The performance provides this opportunity to 
blur boundaries which are ultimately reaffirmed by the irreducible distances 
between each individual, but without which there would be no opportunity for 
interactions. The specific experience is only available to the individual, but the 
performance event is only possible through group participation. As the following 
examples show, those present at the Easter week services are involved in a 
complex performance where participants and facilitators act, and look, 
reciprocally in, and at, the performance itself. 
 
Maundy Thursday 
Majetek Konventu, Dominikán" v Olomouci 
Olomouc, Thursday 24 March 2005 
As already mentioned, the liturgical performance of Easter is not limited to one 
day, but takes place over nine days – from Palm Sunday to Easter Monday.64 
Each liturgical enactment is slightly different over the nine days as each 
addresses aspects of the Christian story. Maundy Thursday is the main day of 
preparation for the weekend services. The church as well as the service are 
marked by changes for Easter. Some changes affect objects in the building, e.g. 
crosses are draped in cloth in preparation for the commemoration of Christ’s 
death, and the organ and bells are only used at the beginning of the service (for 
the first hymn and procession, respectively) and are next used for the Saturday 
Night Vigil. (Hymns are still sung and wooden clickers are used instead of bells, 
as tradition says that the bells symbolically fly off to St. Peter’s in Rome until the 
                                                
64 For a discussion of the impact of Easter beyond Holy Week see Nicholas Lash, Easter in 
Ordinary, (London: SCM Press, 1988). 
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Saturday Night Vigil.) The physical changes to the space are immediately visible 
and the lack of musical instruments stands out as a clear difference from the 
normal weekly routine. These services are special and many of the actions and 
objects are only performed or used once a year. The churches I visited for each 
service over Easter week were completely full of people to the point that more 
than once there was standing room only at the back.  
 
Foot Washing 
Changes to the service which affect the body include the washing of feet, i.e. 
either members of the clergy or members of the congregation have their feet 
washed at the front of the church in view of the rest of the participants. This is 
paired with a reading from the New Testament (John 13:1-17) in which Jesus 
washes the Disciples’ feet and commands the Disciples to continue: “I have given 
you an example so that you may copy what I have done to you.”65 (John 13:15). 
In this church it was the Dominican brothers whose feet were washed. Eight 
brothers sat on two wooden benches which were placed in front of the pews. 
They removed their socks and shoes. The Celebrant took a large silver bowl and 
knelt in front of the first man placing the bowl under the man’s feet. Another man 
carried a pitcher of water and a cloth.  The Celebrant poured the water over the 
feet of the men and then dried them off with the cloth one at a time. Children 
came to the front to watch the washing and the first man to have his feet washed 
grimaced and smiled at the temperature of the water. The foot washing was not 
rushed and the pitcher of water was refilled after each washing. Members of the 
congregation took pictures of the washing and the choir sang.  
                                                
65 All Biblical quotations are taken from the New Jerusalem (NJB) version of the Bible. 
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 In this example a well known story from the Bible was read and enacted. 
Many possible meanings can be read into or through the story: service, sacrifice, 
love for others, obedience to God, etc. However, the action also provides a clear 
moment of blurring between those who act and those who watch. The facilitators 
of the service, the priests and brothers, shift positions and take on participant 
roles. The foot washing was not a literal re-enactment. It did not seek to cast 
individuals in the roles of individual Disciples or as a stand in for Jesus (although 
a church could stage a dramatization of the event). The foot washing was a 
performance that reflected a belief in the value of the actions because the actions 
themselves are valuable; through the foot washing feet were washed. One person 
invested time and effort in others – washing a foot is a physical act that takes 
planning and intention. The actions may represent or bring to mind other 
meanings for the participants in the room, but they also simply and clearly show 
the performance, and performative action, of belief. This church chose to 
highlight the teaching of Jesus through the repetition of an act that had been done 
thousands of times before; its performative power achieved through ritualized 
repetition.  
 This also highlighted the presentational reality of the performance through 
task-based foot washing. The brothers who came forward to have their feet 
washed had been part of the group of facilitators. As they each sat down and took 
off their socks and shoes they became individuals with unique ways of moving 
and reacting to what was happening. The other facilitators became lookers as they 
watched these individuals engage in the actions. The congregation exhibited 
individual responses as they came forward to engage in actions such as taking 
pictures, some led children forward to watch which changed the nature of the 
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looking, some laughed at the reactions to the cold water on feet. Participants 
demonstrated their ability to create their own “unpredictable interplay.” 
 It is not enough, however, to simply repeat an action in order to generate 
performative effects. Agency, in Butler’s account of the performative, is 
dependent on resistance. Whereas, according to Mahmood’s analysis of 
performative action, agency is found in the “specific logic of the discourse of 
piety” which is demonstrated through “relationships that are articulated between 
words, concepts, and practices.”66 The Christian liturgical tradition is a discursive 
tradition of piety rich in words, concepts and practices. The embodied practices 
of Easter week allow for participants to have agency “in the multiple ways in 
which one inhabits norms.”67 In the example of Maundy Thursday the participants 
have agency throughout the service as they negotiate their own participation. 
They fulfil performative norms from eating and drinking to praying and leading 
children forward to watch the washing of feet. In this situation the foot washing 
practice is taken to be authoritative by the church as an institution as well as its 
members because it is from a Biblical narrative. The church has repeated these 
actions in many circumstances over the last two thousand years. Each subsequent 
repetition is a citation of the previous actions and experiences of the actions of all 
those present.  
The foot washing of Maundy Thursday is an example of the physical and 
material aspects of Christian tradition which place emphasis on performative 
behaviours which are self referential (i.e. the foot washing does not need to 
represent an ideal of foot washing. It refers to the act that takes place in the 
church itself). Any symbolic or representative meanings that are read onto the 
                                                
66 Mahmood, p. 180. 
67 Mahmood, p. 186. 
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event are secondary to the meanings of the event itself and belief functions in this 
example in various ways. Primarily there is a belief in the Bible as a text, as well 
as a belief in following the teachings and commands of Jesus, therefore there is a 
belief in using embodied practices to perform that which is believed. The 
command to follow the example Jesus set is related to the earlier explanation of 
speech acts. The command was not framed as an explicit performative ‘I 
command you,’ or ‘Do this,’ yet the use of language is in line with Searle’s 
categories, as discussed in Chapter 1, of Directives and Declarations.68 The 
original material act combined with the speech act is the impetus for the 
performance in the church. 
The social reality of the total event comes to the fore during the foot 
washing. Besides the fact that it happens once a year, the event has many aspects 
that make it unusual in a church; with water spilling onto the floor it is messy; it 
encourages people to get out of pews to look closely which rarely happens during 
a Mass, baptisms being an exception; and people take pictures of the facilitators 
whereas families and babies are the focus of pictures at a baptism. This event 
foregrounds the experience of performative action. Another important form of 
action is that which is centred on the material objects used in ritual. The next 
section examines the use of one object in particular and its function in 
performative action. 
 
                                                
68 “The speaker attempts to get the hearer to do something,” and, “The speaker brings about 
changes in the world through his utterances, so the world changes to match the propositional 
content, solely in the virtue of the successful performance of the utterance.” John R. Searle, 
“Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality”, in Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality, ed. by Günther 
Grewendorf and Georg Meggle (London: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 3-16 (p. 5). 
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Ciborium 
The most noticeable, and for me surprising, change in the participants 
came at the end of the service. Normally after the Eucharist people are either 
calm, praying and reflecting, or they are starting to become more animated as 
they know they will be leaving soon. Instead of either of these, the focus 
increased and was directed at the altar. The following description is a detailed 
account of what they knew was going to happen. (I do not know whether they all 
knew what was happening because they were used to it from previous years, or 
because an explanation was given from the front of the church which I did not 
understand because of the language barrier.) This description is based on what 
could be seen, heard, and felt in the room. The words themselves did not directly 
impact my understanding but their tone and delivery did, as well as the reactions 
of those around me to the words (the tone and rhythm were useful as they made it 
easy to identify when a prayer was being read versus instructions given). 
In a normal service the altar is full of activity and objects; however, in 
preparation for Good Friday (a time when Jesus’ death is remembered) the altar 
area is cleared of decorations. The altar area was already fairly empty during the 
Eucharist in the Maundy Thursday service, and at the end of the Eucharist all but 
two metal ciboria remained. A ciborium is similar to a chalice, but rounder with a 
shorter stem, and has a lid that is decorated with a cross or other designs. It can be 
made of many materials and in this church the two used for the service were gold 
(if not completely made out of gold, their colour at least gave the impression of 
precious metal). Inside the ciboria were the blessed wafers which had been 
transubstantiated into the body of Christ. It is used to hold the host before and 
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after it is blessed, but it does not undergo any sort of transubstantiation itself. 
When just the ciboria were left on the altar, all the priests bowed low.  
During the service a book was used for readings, which seemed to be 
prayers. This book was brought out again to a lectern at this point and a short 
reading was given by a priest. When finished, another brother69 at the sanctuary-
right70 lectern, read from what seemed to be general information for the 
congregation. The atmosphere in the space shifted at this point as though what 
was happening was new. Without having to turn around and look at the others I 
could tell that the focus was directed by all towards the altar. The two priests 
behind the altar knelt and waited while embroidered stoles were brought in and 
placed over their shoulders. The priests wrapped their hands in the stoles before 
picking up the ciborium. They rose, carrying the ciborium around the altar where 
a procession formed behind them. At the same time incense was brought in by 
one of the brothers from sanctuary-right to in front of the altar. The cross and 
candles which led the procession into the church were brought out in front of the 
altar.  
These actions were not startling or strange; there were no extra noises to 
accompany them which would highlight that something new and different was 
happening. Actually they were quite contained and subdued. Throughout this 
section everyone including the priests were directing their gaze towards the 
ciboria. Background noises seemed to diminish as people all but stopped moving, 
or shifting position. The actions were laden with a directed energy unexpected for 
such small, slow movements. The movements were reverent, careful and 
deliberate. Each moment weighed and considered; thought had gone into how this 
                                                
69 I was told by my Czech host that this man is in training at the monastery but is not yet a priest. 
70 The Sanctuary is the part of the church which is usually elevated by a few steps and always 
houses the altar.  This is a substitution for the theatre term stage-right. 
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should best be accomplished. The priests’ concentration on the objects drew 
other’s attention. 
The entire sanctuary was cleared of any remaining objects (books, cloth 
and Eucharistic item) by the other priests, then all present in the sanctuary formed 
a double line; the cross and candles in front of the two men holding the ciboria. 
Only two people carry the ciboria, yet revering the body of Christ is an act that 
each person decides to participate in or not. From the balcony in the back the 
choir started the singing (no organ or other instrumental accompaniment) and the 
congregation joined in the hymn. The altar boys with the wooden clickers were 
also in the recession and started by clicking three times.71 They continued to click 
throughout the recession. The recession started with all in the sanctuary walking 
slowly down the aisle. The congregation knelt when those holding the ciboria 
passed by. At the end of the aisle they continued toward the chapel on the 
congregation’s right. Those at the front of the recession (cross, candles, incense 
and ciborium holders, as well as a few others) entered the chapel.  
The brothers and altar boys who did not enter the chapel waited outside, 
kneeling on the floor facing the chapel door. The altar boys continued clicking 
throughout until the ciboria were symbolically ‘put to sleep’ by the celebrant and 
priests.72 Nothing was heard from within the chapel over the singing of the hymn 
and the clicking. Singing of the hymn by the congregation and choir continued 
the whole time they were in the chapel. Upon emerging those who had been in 
the chapel turned to face the chapel and knelt on the floor. The cross, candles, and 
incense were left in the chapel. Then all those who had recessed to the chapel and 
                                                
71 One movement of the wrist results in multiple (five or more) distinct sounds.  So each ‘click’ is 
a burst of sound. 
72 The ciboria will be under constant prayer vigil until the next service which is Good Friday. 
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had prayed, stood, reformed the lines of the recession, and recessed out of the 
church, with the celebrant as the last to leave the church. 
With the recession complete, members of the congregation either 
continued to pray or started to file into the chapel to pray in the presence of the 
transubstantiated bread and a statue of Jesus. The chapel had been redecorated 
and renamed (my Czech hosts explained that this had been announced during the 
service) the Holy Sepulchre until Easter Sunday, which is the name of the tomb in 
which Jesus was placed. A life sized stone statue of a dead Jesus was laid out in 
the chapel in an illumnated box with glass sides. Jesus, in the form of the 
consecrated bread in the ciboria, was placed in a small decorated box on the wall 
above the statue. The smoke from the incense was visible coming out the door of 
the chapel. Those who went into the chapel stayed for a minute or up to twenty 
minutes. Others, who could not enter or chose not to, knelt on the floor in line 
with the door of the chapel, or stayed praying in pews close to the chapel. It was 
only when looking directly in the door of the chapel that it was obvious why the 
focus and sense of direction continued even though the service ended. 
A vigil was kept for the next nineteen hours until the Good Friday service 
began. The Maundy Thursday service is the beginning of three days called the 
Tridiuum. Thursday, Friday and Saturday function together so that the liturgy 
does not effectively end from the time it begins on Thursday to either the 
midnight service on Saturday or the dawn service on Sunday. Without realising 
that this was the case, I was able to feel the progression from one to the next and 
noticed that the services did not have formal ends to them. They were 
continuations, not new beginnings. Each time the participants gathered it was as 
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if they were picking up where they had left off, not starting a new and distinct 
event.  
During this part of the service the ciborium played a key role in the 
performance. I want to focus on this object and how it functions in relation to the 
Easter services. Objects are used in the liturgy as vehicles for action, e.g. they 
facilitate the distribution of communion which allows the participants to eat the 
bread. While all the objects used in the liturgy may have symbolic meaning or 
other personal meanings that individuals associate with the objects, the objects 
are also always part of the meanings created in the space during the performance. 
The ciborium is used each week during the Eucharist, but on Maundy Thursday 
its use continues in a highly visible way after the Eucharistic celebration is over. 
Normally any leftover blessed and transubstantiated bread is placed in the 
ciborium and stored near the altar, or in a side chapel.73 On Maundy Thursday it 
becomes an object used for its performance capabilities; the ciborium is intrinsic 
to the liturgical and performative action. 
A clear purpose is served by the ciborium and it is brought into the liturgy 
through performative actions, i.e. linguistic actions and physical actions. When 
the priest retells the story of the Last Supper and Jesus command’s to eat bread as 
a sign of his body and drink wine as a sign of his blood, he reiterates Jesus’ 
speech acts, e.g. ‘Take,’ ‘Eat’ and ‘Drink.’74 As with the foot washing this 
                                                
73 This is a practice that I saw in many churches. When transubstantiated bread is present in a 
church there is often a red light lit near the altar or at a side chapel or side altar. People will often 
visit churches during the week to pray in the presence of Christ. 
74 While the Roman Catholic Church teaches that when these elements are blessed they are 
transubstantiated into the body and blood of Jesus, he did not spell out that procedure in the few 
sentences recorded in the Biblical accounts and therefore I have used the phrasing ‘sign of.’ 
Matthew 26:26-28: “Now as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and when he had said 
the blessing he broke it and gave it to the disciples. 'Take it and eat,' he said, 'this is my body.' 
Then he took a cup, and when he had given thanks he handed it to them saying, 'Drink from this, 
all of you, for this is my blood, the blood of the covenant, poured out for many for the forgiveness 
of sins” (NJB). The phrasing here corresponds to implicit speech acts because the verb is 
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example is part of the interplay “between words, concepts, and practices that 
constitute” the Christian liturgical “discursive tradition.”75 The blessing of the 
bread is a combined speech act and embodied performative action (blessing 
requires the body as well) that has been repeated for thousands of years. Similarly 
the physical action of eating the bread calls on the bodies of the participants to 
repeat and perform the ritual instigated by Jesus.76 The participants inhabit the 
norms of Eucharist participation in multiple ways (eating, praying, reciting) and 
thereby demonstrate their agency. By the time the Maundy Thursday service 
comes to a close the bread is already laden with meanings that go far beyond the 
performative aspects mentioned.  
In the final recession the ciborium produces other new meanings that it 
does not usually claim from week to week. As the final recession out of the 
church is one of taking the ‘body’ to the tomb of the Holy Sepulchre, the ciboria 
(both of them, in this instance) become the sarcophagus that holds the body. The 
object becomes the site of the remembrance of actions – those of Jesus breaking 
bread, and of Jesus’ broken body being taken to the tomb.77 The relevance of the 
object in the liturgical action at the end of the service is significant because it 
allows participants to both mourn and celebrate by engaging in communal prayer. 
This section of the service, from the draping of the stoles to the time in the 
chapel, is short; no longer than five minutes for the recession and five minutes in 
the chapel. The actions and objects used can be easily listed. Everything on this 
                                                
imperative instead of first person singular, e.g. I command you to take and eat, vs. take and eat. 
75 Mahmood, p. 180. 
76 As a symbol for the type of object Jesus would have used during the Last Supper it represents 
continuity with the past, but also discontinuity because its use developed in the church, and not 
because of the original act, i.e., Jesus did not use little wafers and did not use any vessel like a 
ciborium to store bread in. The ciborium as an object points to an original ciborium and to all the 
ciboria used in every church. It is a visible link with the past, with all other Christians and with 
the future use of the object. 
77 For those who believe, the body of Jesus really is in the Ciborium and so the body is being 
taken to the chapel to be ‘put to sleep.’ 
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list happens in view of the congregation. They are enacted by the priest or another 
person who is part of the lay ministry and leads sections of the service. As it is 
impossible to create an altar big enough for all to worship at, the priest is the 
performer who uses the main altar. He performs for the rest of the performers 
who participate from their pews. The actions undertaken by the priest, with the 
exception perhaps of blessing the bread and the people, are performed as if the 
congregation themselves have also performed. By this I mean that the 
congregation feels as if they are implicated in the production of these actions, 
although they watch what is happening.78 There is a linking of action from those 
who ‘accomplish’ it to those who watch it, so that those who watch are 
responsible as well. Some actions are done by the congregation, others shared by 
all, and sometimes while the action may be done by all, a unique response is 
produced by the individual. Some of these actions are performative and others 
simply facilitate the performance. All those present for the Mass accomplish both 
kinds of actions. The following is a list of all the actions that took place at the end 
of the service. 
List of actions: 
1. clearing the altar of everything but the cloth and the ciborium and bread  
2. putting the host in the ciborium  
3. putting the lid on the ciborium  
4. bowing to the ciborium  
5. bring out order of service  
6. all stand  
7. reading from the order of service  
8. book taken away  
9. reading from red book with instructions/clarifications for the participants 
10. kneel behind altar  
11. bring in cloth stoles  
12. drape stoles  
13. wrap hands in stoles 
                                                
78 The participants are completely implicated in every part of the service, but they do not have the 
authority to undertake certain actions such as blessing the bread and wine. This is linked to 
Rancière and shows some of the unique positions held by facilitators versus participants which are 
never altered.  
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14. pick up ciborium  
15. incense brought in  
16. cross and candles brought to the centre  
17. form recession  
18. singing begins  
19. clicking starts, always in threes  
20. recess down aisle  
21. waving of incense  
22. congregation kneel as the recession passes them by  
23. kneel in front of the chapel  
24. enter the chapel  
25. incense the chapel  
26. put host away in chapel  
27. exit chapel  
28. kneel in front of chapel  
29. pray  
30. recess out of church  
31. congregation enters chapel  
32. pray in chapel  
33. kneel in front of chapel to pray  
34. vigil  
Given the number of actions which took place in such a short space of time, this 
section might have seemed rushed, but it felt as if it was one long, held note or 
breath. There was no break in the energy or focus of the group as they observed 
and participated in the placing of the ciborium in the chapel. As people came and 
went from the chapel in prayer the energy started to dissipate a little, but there 
was still a sense of focus as people moved to exit the church building. The actions 
built upon each other and somehow maintained the performance space, even 
though the ‘performance proper’ had finished. The combination of all these 
actions is an example of how the liturgy works. It is not an unending series of 
performative actions and speech acts that makes the liturgy performative, but the  
relationships “articulated between words, concepts, and practices” in this 
discursive tradition.” They are undertaken with the intention to enact both a 
repetition and reiteration of the liturgical ritual itself, and the rituals of all 
believers from the Last Supper onwards. The last ten minutes of the Maundy 
Thursday service are special because they highlight the burial in symbolic and 
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performative ways. Participants create and embody the actions thus enabling the 
performance. 
 Thursday, Friday and Saturday are about the past as they focus on Jesus’ 
last night with his followers, death the next day and the mourning on Saturday. 
The liturgy is used to re-play the past in these three days. Jesus is dead and the 
congregation will do as his first followers did and mourn his passing. Although 
Jesus did not die on the Thursday, but on the Friday, Thursday was the first day 
that he made his death explicit through a pre-enactment of (what was to be) the 
ritual of remembrance.79 This first enactment (of the Last Supper) was done by 
the person for whom the ritual would later be performed. According to Roman 
Catholic tradition even these first actions transformed the symbols into Christ’s 
flesh and blood. The real (the person of Jesus) and the symbolic (the bread and 
wine) – and for some, the real again in the transubstantiated bread and wine – 
were present in the same space. 
Fittingly, Maundy Thursday is in fact a pre-remembrance of what is 
celebrated on Friday and Sunday. Instead of waiting for the day (Friday) of 
remembrance, Maundy Thursday is used as a pre-remembrance of a pre-
remembrance of death. This original meal, where bread and wine were linked to 
body and blood, became the ritual of remembering a sacrificial crucifixion. 
Repeating the ritual through the celebration of the Eucharist and then putting the 
bread ‘body’ with a statue ‘body’ makes the link explicit, physical and material. 
Where the Eucharist is normally used as way to remember Jesus, on Maundy 
Thursday it becomes a way to follow him through his last day. Watching the 
bread be ‘put to sleep’ and maintaining a vigil over it is a way to performatively 
                                                
79 I am indebted to Rebecca Schneider for a discussion about this idea which helped me to 
articulate this section. 
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wait with Jesus in the garden for the soldiers to arrest him.80 Performing the vigil, 
praying with the stone ‘body’ as well as the bread ‘body’ connects the believers 
with the Jesus of the past as well as with their belief in a resurrected Jesus. 
Because this service ends, not with a hymn and a blessing, but with a time of 
prayer leading into a vigil, the actions of the service do not have a formal end in 
the space. These actions effect further actions of the participants as they leave the 
space and make their way home. When the priests and servers leave the space the 
rest of the participants take over the praying and revering.  
For those who take part in the vigil overnight and the following morning 
the linking of services is concrete. For the others the service time follows them 
home and creates a sense of waiting for the next service to begin. Whether aware 
of it or not, participating in the performance of Maundy Thursday prepares the 
participant for the series of five days of services. It helps to link the actions of the 
liturgy with the day to day actions of the participant. In this way the liturgy 
creates a sense of continuity for the participants as they imagine themselves in the 
past at the first Eucharist while also reminding them that the actions of belief are 
relevant to contemporary life.  
This recasting is applicable to actions in the Maundy Thursday service. 
Aspects of it, such as the foot washing, show a daily activity in Jesus’ time that is 
not often performed today (although people still need to wash their feet today, it 
is unusual to have someone else wash your feet every day). The carrying of the 
ciborium to the Holy Sepulchre is an action which is important within the service 
although mundane at its most basic level (because it is a means to an end – 
getting the bread from the altar to the chapel) yet as part of the ritual it is 
                                                
80 In the Bible Jesus went to a Garden to pray after the Passover meal.  He was betrayed by one of 
his followers and Roman guards came to arrest him there.   
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elevated. The ritual is not necessary or useful, it exists because of the hundreds of 
thousands of times it has been undertaken before. Recessing with the ciborium is 
not simply putting the ‘bread’ away for the vigil. It is the carrying of the body of 
Jesus to the tomb. The actions taken by his followers after his death are re-created 
in the church with the ‘live’ body. The use of the statue reinforces the interplay of 
“words, concepts, and practices” through which the discursive tradition makes 
sense to the participants; the reality of the death of Christ is spoken, listened to, 
prayed together, eaten and seen by providing a visual prop. The prop is not itself 
necessary to belief as those who come for the ritual already believe in the death 
and resurrection. The procession and reverence of the ‘live’ in the ciborium with 
the ‘dead’ of the statue is relevant to belief through its use of objects. The 
contemporary objects can be associated with objects used by the first believers as 
well as all those who have previously participated in the ritual. The combined 
actions of all who have come before have created a situation wherein the actions 
of the past, present and future are layered. 
The co-existent states (past, present, future) which create the liturgical 
action function together seamlessly. The action of recessing with the ciborium 
recasts those in the space as re-creators of the past through the re-production of 
mimetic acts. Instead of simply producing a representation of the original, the 
recession is an example of the “specific logic of the discourse of piety” whereby 
participants engage in present action that performs their belief.81 
These performative acts happen in a present day procession, which draws 
on all previous meanings in order to exist, but also adds to these meanings in 
order to make meaning in the present enactment. The new meaning that is created 
                                                
81 Mahmood, p. 180. 
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in the present provides the basis for the next set of performative acts. Each 
subsequent re-production does not use the first enactment two thousand years 
ago, but uses a conglomeration of all the enactments including the last known 
actions performed by the community. This is not a commemoration; this is 
present action.  
The Maundy Thursday procession is different from the expected 
procession and recession of the priests and servers that happens at every Mass. 
The purpose is not simply to enable the entry/exit of many people or to provide a 
beginning/ending for the service. This procession accomplishes an action – that 
of putting the ‘body’ in the place where it is ‘dead.’ Once a year this ‘body’ is not 
just talked about as dead, but is physically put in a space that is prepared for the 
dead. The interplay of life and death which is so much a part of rituals around the 
world is most clearly shown in the Christian tradition throughout Easter and it is 
possible because of the physicality and materiality of the ritual. The live of the 
bread ‘body’ is placed in the same space with the dead of the statue ‘body.’ The 
renaming of the chapel to Holy Sepulchre recasts it as a site of remembrance of 
the dead (both Jesus and those who visited the tomb the first time) and produces a 
physical space in the church. This physical space of the ‘tomb’ enables the layers 
of the performance of belief to exists together: the past (two thousand years ago), 
the past of every subsequent Easter, the present expression of belief and the 
future hope of resurrection. Again, the actions of belief are used to act, to be 
present, to create – not simply to represent.  
The actions in the liturgy are relevant to each member of the community 
for their immediate use and for the implications of the actions in the past, in the 
future and eternally. The experience of the Eucharist happens in the present but is 
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‘doubled,’ to borrow a common phrase of poststructuralists, or even ‘tripled’ in 
the moment of performance. This tripling happens in two directions from the 
moment of performance – into the past where the first employment of the 
symbols happened, and into the future where they will continue to be used. In the 
entire liturgy the Eucharist is the only concrete action which is known to have 
been done by the first Christians.82 The first enactment of the Eucharist, 
performed by Jesus, was a pre-enactment of a ritual of remembrance that was to 
come; as such each enactment is a pre-enactment of the next. Therefore the belief 
in each weekly service influences all performances to come. So participating in 
this event involves engaging the ‘belief in’ the ritual, in its meaning in the 
moment, in its continued meaning for those in the future and for the realization 
that each enactment is part of the pre-remembrance as well as the end 
remembrance. 
 Throughout this section there is a constant interplay of the presentational 
reality, social reality of the total event and a kind of dramatic fiction. The 
procession with the ciboria does mimic a funeral procession and the laying to rest 
of the body of Christ. This is as close as it comes to dramatic fiction because no 
one is actually cast in a role and no one ‘plays’ Jesus. The facilitators carry the 
ciboria and lead the procession, but they are the stand in for everyone who sits in 
the pew. Everyone in the room is implicated in the procession which is part of the 
social reality of the event; to be present is to agree to the conditions of 
performance.  
 The presentational reality asserts itself in the task-based nature of the 
actions. Preparing the ciboria, cleaning the altar and sanctuary spaces, processing 
                                                
82 Early Christian worship services are believed to have been made up of elements of the Jewish 
tradition involving readings from the scriptures and singing of psalms as well as the added ritual 
of the Eucharist. 
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in a large group, organising the interaction with the material objects in the chapel 
– all of these require bodies to do real work that is not a pretence. The social 
reality is also at the fore as those in the pews crane their necks to see the 
procession as it goes by, wait for a turn to enter the chapel to pray and talk with 
friends after the service ends. It is the tension between these elements that each 
individual in the space has to contend with throughout the performance. From 
moment to moment each person makes decisions about which element will 
receive focus. 
 To return to Rancière, the blurring of those who act and those who look 
was again at play. We have already established that the congregation are not 
passive receivers of the liturgical action. Likewise, the facilitators, whether 
priests, the choir, or the boys who use the wooden clickers are all equally 
engaged in looking and interpreting while they are also engaged in actions that 
enable the service to take place. Those in the recession look at the people they 
pass in the pews on the way to the chapel. They pay attention to stand in the 
correct positions so that those in the chapel can exit easily. They look at the 
transformation of the church that has taken place. Those in the pews make 
associations between this service and others, they interpret what they see, 
compare ideas or experiences, find themselves distracted by other people and are 
also taken away by the events that unfold in the church. The recession is one 
element of a larger service and in this short example there are a multiplicity of 
elements that shape each person’s unique experience.  
 
  
 
204 
 
Easter Sunday 
St. Václav Kostel (St. Wenceslas Church) 
Rade!inska Svratka, Sunday 27 March 2005 
The central performance of the liturgy during Easter Week is the Sunday service. 
During this service the musical instruments (organ and bells) that were silenced 
on Thursday are used at every opportunity, there is often a baptism, and the 
words ‘alleluia’ and ‘hosanna,’ which were proscribed during the forty days of 
Lent, are used to start the service. The greeting that believers say to each other on 
Sunday is “Alleluia, the Lord is risen” and the answer is “He is risen indeed, 
alleluia!”83 The joyful nature of this service was no different in the Czech 
Republic; however, there was one added ritual which is unique to this country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When I arrived in the village of Rade!inska Svratka there was a cake in 
the shape of a lamb sitting on the sideboard in the house where I stayed (Figure 
1).84 The cake was decorated with powdered sugar, had raisin eyes, and a ribbon 
with a bell around its neck. The explanation of the cake was that it was to be 
                                                
83 This is what is said in English. My Czech hosts’ translation of what was said in Czech was very 
similar. 
84 Photograph taken by Megan Macdonald, 2005. 
 
Figure 1 
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taken into church on Easter Sunday to be blessed.85 It was important to bake the 
cake on or before Maundy Thursday so that the baking was finished before the 
formal remembrance of Jesus dying was enacted. The name for this cake is 
‘Beranek’ which is literally ‘lamb.’ The cake is kept at home from the time it is 
baked until Sunday morning when it is taken to the church to be blessed by the 
priest in front of all participants. Once blessed, it will be carried home and eaten. 
The importance of the cake is how it shows that material elements are 
incorporated into and a vital part of the performance of belief. The performance 
of belief is produced not only during the liturgy through liturgical elements but 
also by elements which are brought by participants and intersect with liturgical 
elements. As an object the cake is part of a layering of representative meanings 
that are added to over the course of Easter: it represents Jesus who is often 
referred to as the Lamb of God, as well as representing believers who are spoken 
of as lambs following Jesus, the good shepherd. The actions undertaken in the 
home on Thursday are part of the larger preparations for Sunday. What starts as a 
cake that celebrates the end of abstaining from sugar and fats during the forty 
days of Lent becomes a reminder in the kitchen of the sacrificial meaning of 
Easter. Once it is taken into the church, and in this case, placed around the altar, it 
is part of the service and receives a blessing, as do the participants and the body 
(bread wafers) of Christ. This object is not just a site of representation because of 
                                                
85 The Beranek is a custom only carried out in the Czech Republic and is allowed by the Roman 
Catholic Church. The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy makes provision for such deviation: 
“Popular devotions of the Christian people are to be highly commended, provided they accord 
with the laws and norms of the Church, above all when they are ordered by the Apostolic See. 
Devotions proper to individual Churches also have a special dignity if they are undertaken by 
mandate of the bishops according to customs or books lawfully approved. But these devotions 
should be so drawn up that they harmonize with the liturgical seasons, accord with the sacred 
liturgy, are in some fashion derived from it, and lead the people to it, since, in fact, the liturgy by 
its very nature far surpasses any of them” (Sacrosanctum Concilium, Vatican Council, 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/ hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-i_const_ 
19631204_sacrosanctum -concilium_en.html> [accessed 16 April 2009] Chapter 1 Section 13). 
  
 
206 
 
how it is created and consumed. The cake is a representation of the body of 
Christ, but this object is created by the participants outside of the church. It is not 
an object like the ciborium which is provided by the church, and the actions 
which bring it into being are not carried out in the church but in the home. The 
Beranek makes the same journey as the participants – from their houses into the 
church and back to the house. The participants in each house are part of creating 
the interweaving of worship space with home life. The blurring of distinct spaces 
is ongoing throughout Holy Week. 
The use of the Beranek is not just representative, however, as it also 
functions performatively. The cake remains just a cake, and is caught up with 
being a cake – it can only be baked so many days before the service or it will 
mould, it has to be stable enough to sustain transportation to the service, and it 
must be delicious enough to be eaten. Its entire purpose from beginning to end is 
to be eaten. It is not a pretend eating, a staged eating, or a symbolic consumption. 
It is not like the communion wafers which are blessed during the service and 
provide spiritual sustenance but no substantial nutrients; this cake, which is also, 
‘a sign’ for Jesus’ body does provide nutrition. The eating of the cake does not 
happen during the service and so is not strictly a part of the liturgy. Eating the 
cake in the home places importance on the actions related to it, which are equated 
with those performed in the liturgy: the baking and eating of the cake become 
acts of worship, acts of the liturgy, accomplished in the home. The entire cake 
must be eaten because it has been blessed (just as the transubstantiated bread 
must be eaten), although not necessarily on the Sunday. The liturgy makes room 
for the blessing of the cake to happen during the Easter celebration and the cake 
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is likewise dependent on the liturgy to fulfill its performative function of being 
eaten. 
With the Beranek each baker completes a task-based action. Once placed 
in the church all together they present a tangible reminder of both the 
presentational reality of the liturgy as an event that needs people in order for it to 
exist as well as the social reality that the cakes were baked by individuals in the 
church congregation. The cakes bring the social reality of the village into the 
church building. After returning to the houses the cakes continue to act as 
material reminders of the events over Easter week. The presence of the cakes 
emphasizes the individuals who brought them as contributors to the preparation 
and facilitation of the event. This creates a different dynamic between those who 
look and those who act in relation to the cakes. The bakers are not singled-out for 
their contributions, nor asked to self-identify with the individual cakes that they 
have produced. The results of the actions are seen by everyone in the space and in 
these moments everyone is a ‘looker’ including those who baked, because they 
are also looking at the cakes made by others and each cake is unique in 
appearance. 
In relation to the material aspects of belief in the life of the believer the 
Beranek is part of the unending nature of liturgical action that precedes and flows 
from the weekly reiterations of the liturgy. The lives of participants are full of 
actions that come from and feed back into liturgical action. The performative 
action of the liturgy is not just predicated on what happens week by week, but on 
what happens in the lives of those who participate. Christian belief is an action 
that continues beyond the confines of the space or of the participants’ gathering. 
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The experience of the body in the space is not to be overlooked in this situation 
where the role of the body is not to observe, but to participate.  
The potential exists for the participant to feel that the liturgy somehow 
‘performs’ them, or ‘performs through’ them, as once the liturgy is memorized it 
is possible to be immersed in the flow of the ritual and engage with the 
experience instead of worrying about what happens next. This can be an intense 
spiritual experience and it can also slide into physical passivity towards the 
liturgy. Ideally most participants do not stay in a passive mode while performing 
but find that some weeks one aspect of the service seems more relevant that 
another. If they continue to engage with at least some parts of the service each 
week, whether this be with the music, the sermon, the prayers or the receiving of 
the Eucharist, they continue to perform the liturgical action in an active way. On 
some level as long as the body is performing the action the action happens, 
regardless of the intention. Whether intention can return once it has been ‘lost’ is 
an ongoing issue for believers around the world. 
All of these examples from Easter week highlight how the performance of 
the liturgy is material and performative. The performance of belief as it happens 
through the liturgy is dependent on performative actions which are not reliant on 
representative meanings for their power and relevance. The liturgy encourages 
the participant to continuing enacting the performance in the rest of their lives. 
The demands the liturgy makes on the body do not end when the person leaves 
the space. The practices of confessing and forgiving, eating and drinking, 
kneeling, sitting, standing, and singing are all used in the everyday life of the 
participant. When these actions surface in daily life they act as citations of the 
service, just as their occurrence in the service cites daily life. The 
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interconnectedness that can exist through these activities links all action for the 
participant. The last line of the liturgy is imperative – “Go, in peace.” This speech 
act which is a Directive orders the participant to take that which has happened in 
the liturgy out into the world. The experience of the liturgy ends with yet more 
action. 
The separateness of actor and spectator in Rancière’s theories are 
profitably applied to the priests/facilitators and participants/congregation. In the 
liturgy, it is through their separateness from one another that they possess an 
equal capacity; the congregation is not passive and do not need to lead the liturgy 
in order to participate. All are equal in the eyes of God, but each takes specific 
roles, performs specific and different actions in the practice of liturgy. 
The congregation is not passive, neither physically nor intellectually, 
because each person observes, selects, compares, interprets and links information 
and experiences. Those facilitating do the same, from a different vantage point. 
The sheer variety of actions that take place over the course of the Easter services 
creates a different viewing environment for those who attend. Actions which do 
occur each week in the normal Mass are placed before and after other actions 
which are seen only once a year. This changes the relationship of the participant 
to the action and offers the opportunity to interpret it differently. This multiplicity 
of liturgical actions alongside the larger numbers of participants amplifies the 
importance of each action; more people are watching, more people are 
participating.  
The frames through which the performance is experience shift throughout 
for each person in the room. As I have shown, the presentational reality and the 
social reality dominate the performance and there are also moments where 
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aspects of dramatic fiction are also at play. The traditional comparison of the 
congregation to an audience and the priests to actors are simply not tenable. 
There is sufficient evidence to argue for active participation by all who are 
present. The enactment of the liturgy is an event that challenges oppositions and 
blurs boundaries. 
 
Conclusion 
I began this chapter by positioning the liturgy in its historical context to 
show how the most recent decisions, made by the Roman Catholic Church during 
Vatican II, took into account the importance of the liturgy as action. As 
mentioned earlier, “the ultimate goal” of Vatican II was the “participation and 
active involvement of the people of God in the liturgical celebration.”86 The 
elements that I have examined show various ways that people are cast as 
participants in the liturgy as well as how active performative involvement is one 
important way that meaning is made. What I have done is but one attempt to view 
the liturgy, as Trevor A. Hart wrote, as “putting the ‘story’ or ‘text’ into play 
through continuous fresh action…rather than being measured in terms of the 
alleged correspondence between some ‘text’ and a state of affairs lying ‘beyond’ 
or ‘outside’ it.87 There is no way to completely escape the kinds of analysis that 
dwell on representative meaning. Western culture has excelled in applying 
metaphysical frameworks in all areas of knowledge. Yet there is much that goes 
unacknowledged by such an approach. This case study is an important step 
towards redressing that balance and demonstrating the relevance of performance 
approaches to the religious rituals in Western culture. 
                                                
86 Anibale Bugnini in Reid, p. 291. 
87 Trevor A. Hart, ‘Introduction’, p. 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FORM AND SPIRITUALITY IN PERFORMANCE ART 
 
The interplay of various conceptions of the physical and material has thus far 
been examined through philosophy, language, anthropology and theology. The 
chapters have shown that the treatment of metaphysical versus embodied ideas is 
a persistent problem. To this point most examples have been taken from Christian 
practices. As part of this focus, I have shown how performance approaches are 
notably absent from theological engagements with the performance of the liturgy. 
And I have demonstrated that Christian thought is embedded in the academic 
fields from which performance studies has drawn its influence. Since theology 
has not been employed by performance analyses, my objectives in this chapter are 
to examine contemporary performance art as part of the Western paradigm and to 
show how performance analyses benefit from an awareness of Christian theology.  
 This chapter begins with a section on the tradition of art as it has been 
used in the liturgy. The section focuses on the historical shift from art as divine 
presence to secular creation. The change in art was part of a larger social shift that 
radically affected the role of ritual and the role of art in religious/spiritual matters. 
This section links the theology of the last chapter with the case study on 
performance art of this chapter. The case study begins with an introduction to 
Marina Abramovi!’s artistic practices from the 1960s to the present in order to 
provide some background to her work. Over the years her work has often been 
compared with spiritual practices, but not always in critical or accurate ways. 
Two are highlighted and discussed: Shamanism and New Age practices. From 
there the case study of Abramovi!’s work begins with descriptions of three of her 
pieces, followed by her explanations of her work. The chapter concludes with an 
extended analysis of not only her work but of the critical responses written by 
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artists and academics about Abramovi!. 
This chapter acts as the last piece of the answer to the opening question of 
how to discuss the performance of belief. The ideas from the previous chapters 
are employed here to strengthen the argument for the relevance of considering 
Christian practices in relation to contemporary performance art. The second case 
study is not meant to act as a comparison with the first on liturgy, instead it is a 
continuation of the challenge set by the first. By this I mean the challenge to the 
conception that Western culture, and thereby also cultural products like 
performance art, have somehow evaded their Christian spiritual history. To begin 
I turn to the interaction of art with Christian liturgical practice.  
 
VISUAL ART 
The history of art overlaps with the history of religion in the Western tradition 
because most art was produced for religious purposes. When society’s religious 
needs change, so does the art associated with the religion. In the West art had 
long been used not only to think about human relationships with the divine, but as 
an actual avenue to the divine; specific kinds of art were understood to be imbued 
with divine presence. Any interaction with such art was also an interaction with 
the divine. And it is to the question of interaction that I now turn. To do so, I 
draw on Hans Belting’s book Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image 
before the Era of Art.  
Belting explains in detail that there are distinct differences in the present 
day distinctions between images and art, and the previous understandings which 
existed for most of Western history. The religious image was used in fairly static 
ways from late antiquity (sixth century) to the time of the Renaissance. During 
the Renaissance it underwent a significant shift as societal views on art changed 
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such that the ‘era of images’ gave way to the ‘era of art.’  
During the ‘era of images’ the use of images was widespread and most (if 
not all) were, as Belting explains, associated with the ‘Holy Image’:   
The image, understood in this manner, not only represented a person but 
also was treated like a person, being worshipped, despised, or carried 
from place to place in ritual processions: in short, it served in the 
symbolic exchange of power and, finally, embodied the public claims of a 
community.1   
The image was part of rituals and practices and it was believed to contain a 
presence, whether that of a person, God, or some other form of spiritual power. 
These early worship practices were part of a larger web of meaning creation that 
was far from autonomous; they assumed the work of painting and sculpture was 
being carried out either in the service of religious institutions, or as a form 
of worship in itself. The interaction of the person with the object began with the 
creator/artist and included the owner or observer of the image. The use of the 
image as a means of connecting to the divine was also used in churches during 
this period.2 
 A specific use of the image existed in relation to the liturgy itself as 
images were painted in the interior of churches. Some of these images were 
portraits of major figures such as Jesus or the saints. These were used for 
veneration and worship, as with the ‘Holy Images’ that people carried on their 
person. However another specific kind of image existed almost exclusively in the 
church building and was an important part of the liturgy. Narrative scenes were 
painted on walls as well as on altarpieces, and Belting emphasises the importance 
of the location: “the narrative images exist nowhere else than in the very church 
                                                
1 Hans Belting, Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art, trans. by 
Edmund Jephcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. xxi. 
2 This was not without problems at various points. Belting goes into great detail about the tensions 
that existed between pagan practices using images and the eventual acceptance of images as part 
of the Christian tradition.  
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interior—that is, the site of the liturgy.”3 The images were not extraneous to the 
liturgy but another participant who “paradoxically brings about an enhanced 
sense of reality.”4 Instead of being seen simply as a static representation of the 
past, these images were understood to interact with the present moments of 
liturgical action. The most important part of Christian worship, the Eucharist, was 
framed by images that were believed to contain divine presence.  
 However, there is another layer of meaning implied in these images which 
would have been taken for granted at the time and is no longer assumed today. 
The narrative images were not understood as representations of the people and 
events they depicted; they were painted as present action and understood as 
dynamic elements of the liturgical action. Belting provides the example of a 
church in Macedonia to reinforce his point that the images were perceived as the 
present and not the past: 
The Communion of the Apostles in the apse of St. Sophia in Ohrid 
(Macedonia), a fresco from the mid-eleventh century, does not portray the 
historical event of the Last Supper in Jerusalem, but a contemporary 
ritual, which reenacts the event every day. The communion of the faithful, 
which took place in the room before the image, is literally prefigured in 
the apostles’ communion.5 
The fresco was conceived of and executed as an active part of the liturgy. 
Participants were meant to understand that what they did in the church was an 
important contemporary event with spiritual relevance. The painting was not just 
a prop, but also another form of the original event. This is not simply a discussion 
of whether or not images were important, but of how those images were 
understood in relation to the worldview of the people at the time. Participants 
enacted the Eucharistic rite while interacting with the images. 
                                                
3 Belting, p. 173. 
4 Belting, p. 174. 
5 Belting, p. 174. 
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 An important aspect to this relationship with images is the nature of the 
participants’ conception of time and reality. In order for images to ‘interact’ with 
people and for narrative scenes to be understood as active, a different ordering of 
reality is necessary. Belting clarifies how the divine world was more ‘real’ to the 
participants because it was the most important: 
The liturgy created its own experience of time, which embraced both the 
revelation of God in the past and the fulfilment of time in the future. The 
present was only a transition to timelessness, which had already begun in 
the liturgical sphere of the icons. In this way the image took on a social 
function. It made visible the world that the prevailing worldview had 
defined as the only true reality.6 
The present, in Belting’s explanation, is only a place of transition, and the 
destination is the fulfilment of time and being with God. Reality is the divine 
existence and it is glimpsed through participation in worship, through meditation 
and interaction with ‘Holy Images.’ The images are important because they 
provide access to moments when God was present on earth, such as the fresco of 
the Apostles, and also make the desired heavenly sphere accessible. These 
explanations should recall the descriptions of Plato’s conception of ‘reality’ as the 
‘ideal place’ to which the soul would one day return. However, where everything 
on earth was but representation for Plato, these ‘Holy Images’ were seen as 
reality. As well, participation with the images was meant to bring the entire 
person into contact with the divine and not just the soul. 
The location, as well as the presence, of the images in the church 
encouraged interaction as part of the ongoing actions of the liturgy. In the 
worldview Belting describes reality is found in the presence of the divine and the 
images were understood to contain that presence. The entire interior of the church 
is liturgical space and the use of the images allows the space to “tak[e] on the 
                                                
6 Belting, p. 174. 
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quality of an immense, universal pictorial space in which all the individual 
images participate.”7 This is then brought together with the actions of the liturgy 
and the “two levels of reality—the historical event and its liturgical reenactment 
within the church” become “virtually inseparable.”8 The images and the actions 
together create the space and the dynamic forms of participation. 
 The composition of the images was important because they needed to be 
visible from a distance. Belting highlights “equal dimensions,” “a symmetrical 
arrangement,” an “overall gold background,” and a “standard size of the figures” 
as key features that “create a sense of internal order.”9 The layout of the images is 
also key as they interact with each other and with the space: “The images are 
conceived as single icons and at the same time form part of a sequence following 
the architectural structure, as if the scenes depicted were taking place within the 
same space and against a common horizon.”10 In this way images, the liturgical 
calendar and the enactment of the liturgy worked together to create a totality. 
Participants then became part of the larger spiritual reality. However, as Belting 
demonstrates throughout the book, images were constantly shifting in their uses 
and meanings. With changes in art came changes in the notion of the image, 
which impacted its religious use. 
 The shift in art that happened during the Renaissance was part of larger 
social changes that included the effects of the Reformation.11 During the 
Reformation, while images were not banned altogether, a main argument for their 
                                                
7 Belting, p. 179. 
8 Belting, p. 179. 
9 Belting, p. 178. 
10 Belting, p. 178. 
11 Each country in Europe has its own history as to when and how the use of images changed in 
relation to the form of Christianity practiced and any reforms that happened to church practices. 
Belting looks in detail at many countries from north to south and accounts for changes in 
Protestant as well as Catholic countries.  
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removal from churches was to prevent them from being “set in God’s place.”12 
German reformer Martin Luther was against the images having a power in and of 
themselves. He thus argued that, “they should be stripped of their function. It is, 
after all, the beholder who is free to use the image.”13 Part of the new conception 
of images was that they were inert and only contained meaning if and when 
imparted by the beholder.  
The impact of these changes immediately altered the average person’s 
relationship to art. People started to collect images in their homes, at least those 
who could afford to, and the images they collected were focussed on the secular 
sphere: “Images, which had lost their function in the church, took on a new role 
in representing art.”14 Interaction with images was taken from the religious sphere 
and moved to an initially more private arena. 
 As the presence of the image and its use changed so too did the 
overarching concept of images. This is not as simple as saying that the religious 
gave way to the secular or that the old images lost their “aura”, or that a new 
definition was simply applied to everything.15 Religion was no longer accorded 
special status within society which meant that artistic prestige was lost for artists 
who produced religious paintings. Art associated with the church was subsumed 
into this “segregated area” of the religious, and art in general “ceased to be a 
religious phenomenon in itself.”16  
Art had been concerned with showing divine reality and connecting 
participants in religious worship to God’s presence. All art had been understood 
as working towards this main goal. When the “unified concept of the image was 
                                                
12 Belting, p. 458. 
13 Martin Luther in Belting, p. 458. 
14 Belting, p. 458. 
15 Belting, p. 458. 
16 Belting, p. 458. 
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given up” art changed, but there was little recognition as to what had been lost.17  
Belting explains that when all images were brought together as ‘art’ the 
understanding of how to interact with art in a religious way was lost as well; this  
“loss was obscured by the label “art,” which now was generally applied.”18 From 
this point on art was associated with representation and secular images. Where 
earlier images had been understood as inspired creations meant for worship and 
imbued with presence, the new images were purely creations of the imagination.   
Belting’s retelling of this historical moment points to a problem which 
continues to plague the creation and reception of spiritual and religious art: there 
is no shared understanding of how to identify and then interact with art that may 
be religious/spiritual in nature. Image-literacy was lost in the shift from the ‘era 
of images’ to the ‘ear of art.’ The ability to ‘read’ the image was strongly linked 
to the ability to find meaning in the image: “the painter now became a poet and as 
such had the claim of poetic freedom, including that of interpreting religious 
truths. The religious subject, in the end, could be invented only by the artist, since 
it could not actually be seen, like the objects in a still life or landscape.”19 A piece 
of art now only contained the meanings that the painter had in mind, and thus 
could be interpreted in a myriad of ways by those who looked at the image.  
The concept of a presence, a specific spiritual presence, was no longer 
possible. What replaced it was the presence of the work itself: “The new presence 
of the work succeeds the former presence of an idea that is made visible in the 
work.”20 The process that took place in order to accomplish this shift made it 
                                                
17 Belting, p. 458. 
18 Belting, p. 458. 
19 Belting, p. 459. 
20 “The new painting called for a hermeneutics of art of the sort that had been applied previously 
to literature. It now is no longer enough to tell the stories of images, as was done in this book as 
well. Images find their place in the temple of art and their true time in the history of art. A picture 
 219 
seem ridiculous that an image might have a deeper meaning, for example, “[a]n 
image of Venus that was not a work of art would have been outright nonsense.”21 
This makes sense in our contemporary society where art can be anything the artist 
can imagine, but there was a time when this was still a new concept. And it 
caused significant confusion because art went from showing spiritual reality to, 
“fictions [and] beautiful illusions.”22 This then changed how older images were 
viewed; they too were seen as “beautiful illusions.” Understandings of older 
images had all been based in the ‘real,’ but this ‘real’ was based in religious 
meanings and traditions. The combined change of religion and art meant that 
there was no longer a shared base of meanings. Art was no longer ‘real,’ instead it 
represented the real, as in portraits, or it imagined a different kind of reality. 
The old narrative panels depicted what was believed to be real scenes that 
had taken place. The new pieces of art, which could be drawn completely from 
the imagination of the artist, “invited the beholder not to take its subject matter 
literally but to look for the artistic idea behind the work.”23 Credence was given 
to images that depicted the beautiful and profound regardless of the inspiration 
for the image. Belting argues that this created a “crisis of the image.”24 From the 
late 1500s to the mid 1600s there were dissenting opinions on how to understand 
religious iconography in images. Conflicting understandings and interpretations 
existed side by side throughout this period and continued to change over the 
centuries.25 While Western society has moved past this initial crisis of the image, 
                                                                                                                                
is no longer to be understood in terms of its theme, but a contribution to the development of art.” 
Belting, p. 459. 
21 Belting, p. 472. 
22 Belting, p. 472. 
23 Belting, p. 472. 
24 Belting, p. 472. 
25 In the Orthodox tradition Icons are still used for prayer and meditation, and people refer to 
praying in the presence of icons. 
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there is still a general unease when it comes to spiritual art. If art is identified as 
religious/spiritual it is often subject to clarifications, justifications and 
historicizations that aim to make it accessible to all regardless of religious 
affiliation. As we will see in the case study on Abramovi!’s art, it is still difficult 
to find a shared base of meaning when discussing art as spiritual. I will return to 
these ideas when analysing Abramovi!’s work in the following case study.  
 
THE ART OF MARINA ABRAMOVI! 
 
But I also don’t believe…that living through art we can change society. I 
really think that deep spirituality is the real key, and not art. Art is one of 
the tools, but not the only one. Marina Abramovi!, 200626 
 
In November of 2002 a performance event took place in the Sean Kelly Gallery in 
New York City which would become a reference point for performance art that 
year. Not only widely reviewed in the press,27 Marina Abramovi!’s The House 
With the Ocean View was also written about by artists, academics, and 
Abramovi! herself in a book documenting the entire event, as well as entering the 
pop-culture consciousness when it was used for an episode of Sex and the City.28 
It is precisely because of the volume of commentary that exists about her work 
that Abramovi! is both interesting and useful to my dissertation. In this case 
                                                
26 Marina Abramovi! in ‘Pure Raw Performance, Pedagogy, and (Re)presentation: Marina 
Abramovic; interviewed by Chris Thompson and Katarina Weslien’, Chris Thompson and 
Katarina Weslien, PAJ, 82 (2006), 29-50 (p. 29). 
27 Steven Henry Madoff, ‘A Viewable Fast, Enforced by Knives,’ New York Times 10 November 
(2002), <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/10/theater/a-viewable-fast-enforced-by-knives.html> 
[Accessed 10 March 2009]; Roberta Smith, ‘When Seeing Is Not Only Believing, but Also 
Creating,’ New York Times 22 November (2002),  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/22/arts/art-review-where-seeing-is-not-only-believing-but-
also-creating.html> [Accessed 10 March 2009]; Steven Henry Madoff, ‘Reflecting on an Ordeal 
That Was Also Art,’ The New York Times 28 November (2002), 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/28/arts/reflecting-on-an-ordeal-that-was-also-art.html> 
[Accessed 10 March 2009]; and Catherine Saint Louis, ‘What Were They Thinking: The Way We 
Live Now,’ New York Times Magazine 15 December (2002), 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/15/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-12-15-02-what-they-were-
thinking.html> [Accessed 10 March 2009]. 
28 ‘One,’ Sex and the City, HBO, Season 6, Episode 86, (2003) 
<http://www.hbo.com/city/episode/season6/episode86.shtml> [accessed 15 April 2009].  
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study I begin with an overview of Abramovi!’s life and artistic practices.  
 
Embodied Practices 
Marina Abramovi! was born in communist controlled Yugoslavia in 
1946. Abramovi!’s personal history includes family members devoted to both the 
religious and the political extremes of the spectrum: her mother was a tireless 
worker for the CPY and was the Director of the Museum of Art and Revolution, 
her father was also a decorated member of the party and her maternal grandfather 
was a patriarch of the Orthodox church murdered for his beliefs who later 
received sainthood. Yugoslavia at this time was not the most encouraging 
environment for a young artist, but Abramovi! had been exposed to art practices 
through her mother’s work at the musuem, and she had been taken to every 
Venice Biennale from the age of twelve.29 University programmes were open 
enough that Abramovi! was able to study art and to experiment with forms 
through installations and collaborations with other artists. The state did not make 
continuing in this direction easy: 
I was part of a circle of artists who were strongly engaged in performance, 
but the support structure never materialized. Nothing happened. We were 
deeply engaged and by then we certainly knew about people on the 
outside….But there was no support mechanism for us to continue….In the 
end, we felt totally isolated in that this type of work was still not accepted 
in that society.30 
Artists were marginalised through the state apparatus that provided them funding 
and then only provided opportunities to work in the state controlled academies. 
Marina Abramovi!’s first artistic explorations in the 1960s were in 
painting and drawing. It was not until Abramovi! started to work with 
                                                
29 Marina Abramovi! and Nancy Spector, ‘Marina Abramovi! Interviewed by Nancy Spector’, 
7 Easy Pieces (Milan: Charta, 2007), pp. 13-31 (p. 15). 
30 Abramovi! and Spector, p. 15. 
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installations while at university that she found the direction for her art which she 
continues to pursue. From 1965-70 she attended the Academy of Fine Arts, 
Belgrade where she created her first installations. In the early 1970s Abramovi!’s 
approach shifted to primarily using her body. In 1976 she left her teaching 
position in Novi Sad and moved to Amsterdam. Her performance has taken on 
many incarnations since then, the most well known of which was her 
collaborative work from 1976 to 1988 with German artist Ulay (Uwe Laysiepen). 
Their explorations were physical, often pushing the limits of embodied practice 
and stressing endurance. The working relationship ended at the conclusion of 
their piece The Lovers in 1988 when they walked across the Great Wall of China, 
starting at opposite ends and meeting after ninety days. Their parting, after this 
meeting, led to Abramovi! exhibiting and performing as a solo artist.  
Throughout the walk Abramovi! had felt a connection with the elements 
and minerals which are found along the wall, from amethyst and quartz to wood 
and metal. Within a year of returning from this walk she was creating what she 
calls ‘Transitory Objects,’ incorporating the elements and minerals, primarily in 
the form of furniture; chairs, beds and pillows (some of these appear in the piece 
The House With the Ocean View). From 1990 to 2005 a full range of projects, 
from staging her life in a ‘show’ which was conceived to be performed in a 
theatre (Biography),31 to a permanent outdoor display of mineral pillows in Japan, 
to publishing books, to solo and group performances have kept her body of work 
growing. 
Among her most famous pieces are two in which themes from her 
upbringing are clearly present. Balkan Baroque, for which she received the 
                                                
31 This show is documented in the book Marina Abramovi!: Biography, by Marina Abramovi! 
with Charles Atlas (Ostfildern, Germany: Cantz, 1994). 
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Golden Lion Award, 1st Prize, was presented at the Venice Biennale in 1997. In 
this piece Abramovi! sat in a room full of fresh beef bones and cleaned them 
while singing folk songs from her childhood. 
For twenty years Abramovi! has made reference to the Yugoslavia she 
left behind in the early ‘70s, but none so forcefully as her most recent 
performances Cleaning the Mirror (1995) and Balkan Baroque (1997). 
Wearing a long white shift and seated in a dank, poorly lit basement (in a 
New York gallery in Cleaning, and in a cellar in Balkan for the ‘97 
Venice Biennale) Abramovi! scrubbed endlessly at massive cowbones, 
removing the grit and blood with a large scrubbing brush dipped regularly 
into a large pail of water at her knees. Increasingly bloody and distraught, 
Abramovi!, who began the process as a kind of “religious rejuvenating 
ritual,” was soon mesmerized and overwhelmed by the horror of her task. 
The metaphor for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was lost on none who 
observed the artist sink uncontrollably into deep sadness as the work 
progressed. Weeping and exhausted, Abramovi! created an unforgettable 
image of grief for her times.32  
The collapse of Yugoslavia and the fall into war in the 1990s was a situation 
which Abramovi! felt compelled to address through this work, and Balkan 
Baroque was compared to religious ritual by many who were present. While this 
piece was constructed in response to a specific situation, her most recent 
performances look to her personal artistic past included the reworking of the well-
known Thomas Lips (1975). 
The reworked version was presented as part of Seven Easy Pieces and was 
performed at The Solomen R. Guggenheim Museum, New York, 9-15 November, 
2005. Seven Easy Pieces consisted of seven performances over seven nights; six 
were previously performed – five from other artists and one of her own. The 
seventh piece was newly devised to be part of the exhibition. Thomas Lips was 
presented on the sixth night. In the original Thomas Lips, which lasted no more 
than an hour, Abramovi! ate a kilogram of honey with a spoon, drank a bottle of 
                                                
32 RoseLee Goldberg, Performance: Live Art Since 1960 (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1998), p. 
114. 
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red wine, broke the wine glass in her hand, cut a five pointed star on her stomach 
with a razor blade, whipped herself until she felt no pain, laid down on a cross 
made of blocks of ice and put a heater over her cut stomach causing the wound to 
bleed more. 
In the version performed in 2005 the duration of the performance was 
seven hours so it was no longer practical to break a glass or to cut the entire star 
at once. Instead parts of the piece were repeated throughout the seven hours 
including the eating of the honey, drinking of the wine and cutting of the star. 
New aspects were also added including Abramovi! donning the hiking boots she 
wore, and holding the walking stick she used, on the Great Wall of China. She 
also wore her mother’s partisan cap from 1941 which was decorated with the 
communist five pointed star and sang a song from her childhood.  
On 13 October, 2006 Abramovi! delivered a talk, at the Frieze Art Fair in 
London, titled ‘Seven Easy Pieces or How to Perform,’ which focussed on the 
history of performance art and her performance at the Guggenheim Museum. 
Abramovi! commented on her decisions to change Thomas Lips and explained 
that the star cut into her body, the ice cross, as well as other aspects, were 
included because of the presence of both the religious and political influences in 
her life: “[the] whole piece was very much to do with the religious context of 
Orthodoxy and Communism together.”33 The influence of communist 
Yugoslavia, its political, religious and artistic policies on her art is not 
insignificant; implicit as well as explicit references surface in much of her work: 
“I had so much to do with the Russian culture as a young [person], that was the 
culture we were in, [...] to really understand the whole Russian culture and 
                                                
33 Marina Abramovi!, ‘Seven Easy Pieces or How to Perform’, Frieze Art Fair (2006) 
<http://www.friezefoundation.org/talks/category/year_2006/> [accessed 9 April 2009] 
transcribed by Megan Macdonald. 
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literature was a big influence on me.”34 It is important to note that Abramovi!’s 
recent work uses this range of influences in an overt way. She made a point of 
telling the audience at Frieze that she had wanted to perform at the Guggenheim 
because she identified the performance space in that building as a spiritual 
space:35 
Look at the spiral [in the Guggenheim]. Why did I wait fifteen years? I 
didn’t want any other building. It’s amazing. To me, it was the only place 
I could think of, this spiral with its different vantage points. […] There are 
two kinds of spaces that produce energy: the spiral and the pyramid. I 
think it’s interesting how in the beginning of this project, we started by 
thinking of very complicated stage designs, and then at the end we built a 
simple circular podium and that’s it….This simple structure was 
transformed each night for each piece until in the end, the circle was 
literally elevated towards the spiral, towards the spiritual.36 
Abramovi! thinks of the spiritual in relation to every aspect of the performance 
from the framing provided by the architecture to the content. While she does not 
impose one reading onto the work, she provides background information for the 
pieces and audience participants make their own connections by reading the 
program and website. 
As I researched Abramovi!’s work it became clear that everyone who 
wrote mentioned the spiritual nature of her work and listed many possible 
influences. It was surprising to me that there were few references to and no 
discussions of Christian practices, except for the information about her 
grandfather. Abramovi! makes clear and explicit references to spiritual themes in 
her work including her experiences with Australian Aborigine practices, Tibetan 
Buddhism and Sufi rites. 
                                                
34 Marina Abramovi!, Frieze Art Fair, transcribed by Megan Macdonald. 
35 She said that the spiral (the part of the museum in which she performed was a large spiral 
spanning the height of the museum so the audience could view the performance from many 
heights and angles) was a spiritually relevant metaphor. Marina Abramovi!, Frieze Art Fair, 
transcribed and paraphrased by Megan Macdonald. 
36 Abramovic and Spector, p. 30. 
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Yes, when I was in Tibet, or when I lived among the Aborigines in 
Australia, or when I learnt some of the Sufi rites, I understood that these 
cultures have a long tradition of techniques of meditation which lead the 
body to a borderline state that allows us to make a mental leap to enter 
different dimensions of existence and to eliminate the fear of pain, death 
or the limitation of the body.37  
Abramovi! references other traditions and what she has learned from them, but 
does not claim to be a student of these practices. Other writers almost exclusively 
associate Non-Western practices with her work. Rarely mentioned by others are 
the influences of her mother who worked for a museum (or other family members 
who were religious), Orthodox Christianity, Yugoslavian communism or other 
Western practices.38 When these are mentioned it is almost always as background 
information and does not inform the analysis of the work. Yet, as can be seen 
from the description and Abramovi!’s account of Thomas Lips, she considers the 
piece to be spiritual performance as well as intertwined with her own experiences 
of spiritual practices from her childhood. 
While Abramovi! mentions these practices, she generally does not 
                                                
37 Marina Abramovi! in conversation with Dobrila Denegril in Marina Abramovi!: Performing 
Body (Milan: Charta, 1998), p. 18. 
38 One of the few articles to engage with Christianity and Abramovi!’s work is an article by 
Maureen Turim, ‘Marina Abramovi!’s Perception: Stresses on the Body and Psyche in 
Installation Art,’ Camera Obscura, 54.18 (2003), 99-116. Turim uses film, psychoanalysis and 
feminist models of analysis to discuss the work. Her reference to Christianity is part of her 
argument for masochistic tendencies in Abramovi!’s work but not as a relevant spiritual practice. 
As well Turim incorrectly states that Abramovi! is Jewish and uses this false information to posit 
Abramovi! as an outsider to the Orthodox and Roman Catholic traditions and thus that her work is 
somehow a reaction to these practices, but in no way part of the tradition. This results in a flawed 
analysis, as seen in this quotation from the article: “I wish to suggest that the masochistic aspects 
of Abramovi!’s performances take on a heritage of Christian and particularly Eastern Orthodox 
moral masochism, along with any traditional links this may have to a feminine position. When 
such acts are performed or represented by a contemporary woman artist, when they are seen in 
relationship to early performance art that has been linked to masochism by Kathy O’Dellin her 
Contract with the Skin: Masochism, Performance Art, and the 1970’s, it seems that what emerges 
is an active intervention into the representation and acting-out of the submissive subject. As a Jew 
who was raised in a Communist country and as a modern woman of Europe, Abramovi! less 
partakes of the traditions of moral masochism directly than interacts with them as an outsider. The 
artist confronts the limits comprised by our expectations of pleasure in aesthetic experiences of 
theatre and art. She tests those limits as a collective, ritual act in which audience reaction becomes 
very much an element of meaning within the work” (p. 103). I do not disagree with the 
observation that the audience become part of meaning making in the performance, but I do not 
agree with Turim’s assessment of why Abramovi! creates such pieces. 
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affiliate herself with any one practice. The only exception to this is Tibetan 
Buddhism: 
Over the years I have turned to a spiritual search that is closer to the 
techniques of Tibetan Buddhism than to the more mental practice of 
Japanese Buddhism. Tibetan Buddhism has an imaginary world that I 
would define as almost Baroque. It is precisely this Baroque, understood 
as a wealth of contradictory and opposing states and of images, that I 
examine in my own work.39  
Even in this quotation Abramovi! does not claim to be a member of a religion or 
to have committed to regular practice. Instead she relates aspects of the practice 
of Buddhism to her artistic/performance practices. She does not say that she is a 
Buddhist, just that her own spiritual activities have something in common with 
Buddhism. As if to prevent being identified with a specific type of practice, 
Abramovi! also states that she cannot follow any discipline for longer than the 
preparation for a performance piece demands:  
I am unable to do anything regularly. I always do things as part of a 
project. If I have in my mind that I have to do something, then I generate 
an enormous discipline and willpower and I get into the space I have to 
enter to make the performance. But it is impossible for me to do 
something like wake up every morning at six to run, as people do. I like 
to make rules and change them all the time. Even when I buy the milk in 
Amsterdam, I find new ways to go around the canal. The idea of habits, 
of discipline—there is something within me that can’t function that 
way.40 
This explanation of her personal relationship to the practices that she uses to 
make work makes it clear that Abramovi! draws from many sources when she is 
creating. To associate her work with only a few practices is questionable, 
especially when neither she nor the critics who write about her work are from the 
cultures where these spiritual paths are typical. In other words, while there is no 
reason not to discuss how various practices are evident in Abramovi!’s work, 
                                                
39 Denegril, p. 22. 
40 Laurie Anderson, ‘Marina Abromovic’, Bomb Magazine, 84 (2003), 
<http://www.bombsite.com/issues/84/articles/2561>  [accessed 30 March 2009]. 
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there is also no reason to leave out the dominant practices of the cultural tradition 
– the Christian tradition – in which both the writers and Abramovi! live. 
 
Analysing Documentation 
All of my exposure to Abramovi!’s work is from reading articles and interviews 
and looking at photographs. I have not purposefully avoided live performances; 
from early 2004 to 2009 Abramovi! has not performed in the UK. My first 
opportunity to see her was at the Frieze Art Fair in London, October 2006. At the 
event Marina Abramovi! was introduced and then took the stage where she talked 
and showed images and video clips for close to two hours. It proved hard to 
remain impassive and disconnected from the woman talking on stage. She spoke 
with authority and humour about performance art and her work.  
While she was entertaining and at times provocative – making claims 
about what constitutes good art – it was obvious that she was not ‘performing.’ 
So many of the articles about her speak of her ability to transform a situation with 
her presence. While those listening to the lecture were clearly paying attention, 
there was no obvious ‘energy exchange’ taking place. Yet, this talk did influence 
my perception of her performance persona. In contrast with the last chapter in 
which I described an series of events at which I was present, this chapter is a 
reading of documentation of performances available through books and articles.  
Critical literature about performance is an important topic in this dissertation 
because of how it is impacted by the methodologies used by performance 
academics.  
On some level all the writing that is produced in relation to a performance 
constitutes a form of documentation of the event. The tone of this writing can 
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vary greatly and the influence of such discourses is a problematic topic in 
performance studies as Susan Melrose explains: 
From this point of view what is at stake, from the perspectives of 
professional performance making, is what writing in certain genres and 
registers, in particular sites, performs upon the body (so to speak) of 
complex, mixed-mode, multi-participant professional practices. It is 
licensed to perform this in the university, with a confidence and an 
authority which ontologise in terms of spectator experience – as though 
the writing were naming ‘the show itself’.41  
Such critical writing does not simply explain or discuss but acts, and in that 
action defines the performance, such that all those who read the writing must by 
necessity rely on the written word for their understanding.  
Critical discourses control the reception of information about the event for 
both those who were there and those who read about it later, as Amelia Jones 
points out, “even for those events I also experienced “in the flesh”; I view these 
through the memory screen, and they become documentary in their own right.”42 
All subsequent writing is affected as documentation, to use Jones’ word, and sets 
out what can and cannot be understood about the work.43 All those who were not 
present at the original have to ‘make do’ with the personal choices and interests 
of those who were.  
Abramovi! mentioned an example of how the accumulating documents 
affect the reception and understanding of a piece of work in her Frieze talk. The 
television show Sex in the City had used her set from The House With the Ocean 
                                                
41 Susan Melrose, ‘‘Constitutive Ambiguities’: Writing professional or expert performance 
practices, and the Théâtre du Soleil, Paris,’ in Contemporary Theatres in Europe: A Critical 
Companion, ed. by Joe Kelleher and Nicholas Ridout (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 120-135 (p. 
125). [Original emphasis.] 
42 Amelia Jones, ‘Presence in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as Documentation’, Art 
Journal, Winter (1997), 11-18 (p. 12). 
43 Peggy Phelan’s theories about how performance criticism and writing function have been 
influential within the field of Performance Studies. In ‘The Ontology of Performance’ she makes 
the case for the importance of the person who documents, as well as for the writing to go beyond 
simply retelling the actions of the performance. Peggy Phelan, ‘The Ontology of Performance’, in 
Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 146-166 (pp. 147, 149). 
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View for an episode and hired an actress to play Abramovi!.44 In the episode a 
discussion of the piece between two main characters and a fictional well-known 
artist revealed much about the influence such documentation can have. One 
character reacted to Abramovi!’s work with praise saying that it took art and 
performance to a whole new level and that it was ‘profound.’ While the other 
character took an opposing view and critiqued the premise of the work saying that 
the woman in the piece was just like hundreds of other women in New York, 
trying not to eat and waiting for a man to call on a Friday night. Both comments 
were made by main characters in the series, but the second comment carried more 
weight as it was made by the character who narrates the episodes. 
Through its appearance in the episode, the ways in which the work and 
the discourses around it circulate in a wider culture were highlighted. What 
appeared on television became the definitive version of the performance. The 
critiques presented in the show were part of shaping the work and potential future 
responses to performance art. While two differing positions were shown, the 
opinion which made light of the work with humour was no doubt most easily 
understood by many viewers. The more serious critique of issues arising from the 
performance in the show was undermined by the main character’s flippant 
comments. As the gallery and Abramovi! allowed the use of the set, this is not a 
defense of Abramovi!’s piece, but an example of the potential power of 
documentation to influence understandings of the piece by those who rely on 
documentation.45 
One of Abramovi!’s main comments about the show was that the actress 
                                                
44 I discuss this piece in detail later. Briefly, Abramovi! lived in a gallery in New York City for 12 
days, did not talk, write, eat or drink, except water, and invited the public in to have an ‘energy 
exchange’ with her.  
45 For more on this topic see Philip Auslander, ‘The Performativity of Performance 
Documentation’, PAJ, 84 (2006), 1-10. 
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looked nothing like her and was ‘ugly.’ While this elicited laughs from the 
audience at Frieze, it highlights the more serious point of who decides what a 
performance is about and how it should be presented. In the episode the actress 
playing Abramovi! had very messy hair and was wearing quite a bit of makeup. 
During the original performance Abramovi! showered up to three times a day, 
which left her hair quite controlled, and did not wear any makeup. The 
documentation done by the television show was incomplete and inaccurate. The 
choices made in this presentation of the work point to other agendas than those 
which were of interest to Abramovi!.  
The preoccupations of the television industry are not of concern here, but 
the ways in which performance is theorised by those who document it is; the 
person who creates the documentation, whether in the form of a photograph or an 
article, always has a point of view.46 Abramovi! is clear about how she perceives 
her work and how it should be understood by others. Academics and artists are 
responsible for shaping interpretations and analyses by which the work and its 
documentation is understood. We have already seen how methodologies such as 
the participant-observer method can sometimes lead to unanticipated biases. 
Religious/spiritual points of view can equally influence critical discourses in 
unanticipated ways. I return to this idea at the end of the chapter in a detailed 
analysis of articles about Abramovi!’s pieces.  
In Chapters 1 and 2 anthropological methodologies were discussed at 
length and their influence on the field of performance studies was emphasised. 
These methods are used alongside other theoretical models in this 
                                                
46 Of course, any photograph, video or description will necessarily be tied to a point of view, but 
performance scholars rely on the accuracy of such details such as colour, shape, size, positioning 
and in the case of descriptions, what it felt like during the performance. Individual, personal 
opinions are not considered to be inaccurate. 
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interdisciplinary field. A survey of writing on performance art since the 1980s 
reveals a variety of methods and approaches. Books such as Richard Schechner’s 
Performance Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2002), Adrian 
Heathfield’s Live: Art and Performance (London: Tate Publishing, 2004), Victor 
Tuner’s From Ritual to Theatre (New York: PAJ, 1982), Marvin Carlson’s 
Performance: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 1996), and RoseLee 
Goldberg’s Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present ( London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1988) and Performance: Live Art Since 1960, (New York: Harry N. 
Abrams, 1998), all position performance as interdisciplinary with historical roots 
in art practices as well as philosophy and theory.47  
When performance art and performance studies were in their inception, 
practitioners and academics alike were looking beyond Western theatrical 
traditions for forms which would add depth and substance to both the 
performances and the analyses. Performance traditions have never existed in a 
vacuum and the influences that we have been discussing from the beginning of 
this dissertation are all evident in academic research in theatre and performance.48 
From an emphasis on representational analyses to the framing of other cultures as 
the ‘exotic’ other, theatre and performance studies demonstrate Western modes of 
thinking. Many of the cultures from which these forms were borrowed have more 
fluid categories to describe artistic and religious expression than in the West 
where dance, drama, theatre, art, music, ritual, etc., are often kept strictly apart. 
From Indian dance drama such as Kathakali or Baratanatyam, to African tribal 
                                                
47 Theories which are often used in performance analysis, include: feminist theory, cultural theory, 
semiotics, historiography and others. See also: Campbell, Patrick, ed., Analysing Performance: A 
Critical Reader (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) and Alice Rayner, To Act, To 
Do, To Perform: Drama and the Phenomenology of Action (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994). 
48 For more on this see The Intercultural Performance Reader, ed. by Patrice Pavis, (London: 
Routledge, 1996). 
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rituals and Native North American rituals, other cultural forms put a different 
focus put on the relationship between art and belief. Or to put it another way, they 
allow for interplay between religion and spirituality, on the one hand, and cultural 
expressions of art, on the other, in a way that Western practice generally does not, 
at least not since the emergence of art as a supposedly autonomous category.  
Analysing such forms proved difficult for researchers using traditional 
Western theatre methods with their more limited focus as to what constituted art. 
Theatre practitioners realised that anthropology, which had been analysing the 
rituals of ‘foreign’ cultures since the nineteenth century, often included aspects of 
what they were interested in understanding; e.g., anthropologists had been 
applying the term ritual to practices which incorporated dance, drama and music, 
etc.  The anthropologists had developed methods, vocabulary and theories to 
account for the rituals (religious or not) they observed and in which they, at 
times, participated. The participant-observer method discussed in Chapter 2 is 
perhaps the most well known and widely used in performance studies. Theatre 
practitioners identified that these already existent methods would prove useful to 
the study of rituals from a theatre/drama perspective, and the use of the 
methodologies within performance studies has had far reaching effects. 
 However, as we have already discussed in the earlier section on Fenella 
Cannell’s research, religious/spiritual aspects of ritual were often discounted. If 
addressed at all, the religious elements were compared with Christianity as the 
‘known’ against which all other occurrences could be measured: 
What travellers and missionaries first discovered when they 
travelled to India, or the South Seas, or Africa were ‘rituals’, 
that is acts of worship which could be observed and described 
in journals, but which, to the outsider, appeared totally 
meaningless and bizarre…There were essentially two 
responses to these activities that went on to provide the origins 
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of the distinction between ‘ritual’ and ‘worship’. Either the 
acts were considered as something different from, and entirely 
other than, Christian worship (especially as understood by the 
Protestant missions) and were therefore defined as ‘ritual’, or 
they were of the same kind as Christian worship but were 
wrongly focused, and were therefore defined as ‘worship’, but 
as ‘wrong’ worship.49  
Rituals did not fit the structures used in the West and proved difficult to describe 
or explain, as we have already seen in Pouillon’s example of the Dangaleat. A 
metaphysical approach to belief was the norm. The over simplification of ritual 
into categories of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ has had far reaching implications such that, 
as Martin Stringer explains, the word ritual “still has too many overtones of the 
dancing savages to be a term which ordinary Christians would be happy to use of 
their everyday worship.”50 
This referencing of Christian ritual as the ‘true’ or ‘right’ ritual has had a 
profound effect on analyses of ritual, which have been uncritically used in 
performance studies as well. The problem with this for performance studies is 
that the methodologies Cannell claims must be re-examined because of their 
inherently Christian foundations have been accepted as both secular and 
unbiased. Yet they are really neither and their application in performance studies 
results in biased accounts of performances. Little has been done from within the 
field of performance studies to question this inheritance and perhaps because 
anthropology was not advocating a complete reassessment it was not seen as 
necessary.51  
Christian practices have been under-researched and non-Christian 
                                                
49 Stringer, On the Perception of Worship, p. 22. 
50 Stringer, On the Perception of Worship, p. 38.  
51 Some might say that this problem only affects those who study ritual or other cultural 
performance styles. I would argue that at the very least many performance scholars use the 
participant/observer method when describing performance, or the work of a company or 
performer, and this methodology is not as unbiased and free from the trappings of its Christian 
history as it might seem. 
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practices have been subjected to analyses that presuppose Christian logics. In 
both instances, this limits the capacity of the analysis to engage properly with 
certain kinds of performance material. As Cannell’s and other anthropologist’s 
work is now actively engaged in unearthing and discussing the Christian roots of 
the discipline, perhaps the results of this work will start to be taken into account 
within performance studies. This new research cannot but benefit the study of 
religious and spiritual practices for both disciplines.  
The result of this disciplinary blindness to Christian practice is that writers 
reach to other religious practices for examples. Comparisons are made which 
seem reasonable, but upon closer inspection prove problematic. In this next 
section I introduce and examine two practices which are often used in relation to 
Abramovic’s work, but which I argue, should not be (or at least not without 
significant qualification). These help to demonstrate how the blindness to the role 
of Christian practices on Western performance operates in the critical discourse 
around her work. 
 
SHAMANISM, NEW AGE AND VISUAL ART 
Of the many practices which are mentioned in relation to Abramovi!’s work 
shamanism and New Age are particularly problematic: they are consistently 
employed by performance scholars and yet are never explained. Other practices, 
such as Buddhism, are also mentioned, but where Buddhism is seen as a world 
religion, shamanism and New Age are practices that many diverse groups and 
individuals around the world follow. Their use in critical discourse is generally as 
shorthand and this is problematic for the assumptions that go with it as well as for 
the historical and background information that is covered over by such uncritical 
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reference. 
Shamanism and New Age are consistently compared with Abramovi!’s 
performances and not without reason. The obvious connection between 
Abramovi!’s work and the practice of shamanism is her role as a facilitator of 
audience/participant experience. The major similarities with New Age practices 
are her incorporation of materials for their supposedly spiritual potential 
(including the stereotypical use of minerals and natural elements such as wood 
and metal) and the refusal to name any one practice as formative of her own 
spirituality. There are, however, more subtle points of comparison and criticism 
and it is these that will be examined in what follows. 
 
Shamanism 
Theatre and ritual are closely linked, at least this has been the common claim, as 
David George explains: “Ritual has been a popular explanation for the otherwise 
puzzling fact that theatre clearly originated at different times and in different 
places that had no connection to each other; hence it seems to invite some 
transcultural theory of unitary origin.”52 Origin theories take different trajectories, 
but many link the shaman with the actor arguing that a shaman, “must have 
derived from somewhere the value of dressing up, the efficacy of assuming 
another persona; he must have either learned or been born with that ability and to 
have noted it at work all around him.”53 Such examples link ‘old’ cultural 
practices with theatre as if the age of the tradition somehow lends it more 
credibility as an art form. 
                                                
52David George, ‘On Origins: Behind the Rituals’, Performance Research: On Ritual, 3.3 (1998), 
1-14 (p. 1). 
53 George, p. 1. “Acting (or, more strictly speaking, performing) is older than shamanism – which 
depends on it.” 
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 Rachel Karafistan is a theatre practitioner who seeks to legitimate the 
comparison of theatrical practice with the shaman. Karafistan’s article,‘‘The 
Spirits Wouldn’t Let Me Be Anything Else’: Shamanic Dimensions in Theatre 
Practice Today,’ argues that the global existence of shamanic practice points to an 
“evolution” from shaman to actor. Karafistan writes, “[i]t is possible for all 
cultures to trace a tribal, shamanic heritage.”54  Indeed, for those who study ritual 
this is an oft repeated truism.55 Most writing on shamanism focuses either on the 
history and possible roots of the shaman, or addresses specific contemporary case 
studies of shamans through the field of anthropology or various branches of 
medicine.56 George and Karafistan both write from a performance perspective 
and their articles highlight some inherent problems with easy comparisons 
between different sorts of cultural performance.  
 It is clear from Karafistan’s article why the term would be appealing to 
performance academics (as much theatre is touted as spiritual), but it is equally 
clear that such an uncritical usage is also deeply problematic. Karafistan explains 
the spiritual elements of shamanism, as she understands them: 
The work of shamans across cultures is both fragmented and often 
culturally specific. However, there are also striking similarities between 
shamanic practices and ceremonies across regions that have never 
encountered one another. One general feature of most shamanic cultures is 
that the shaman has the ability to transport his soul out of his body and 
travel to other parts of the cosmos, to the upper and lower regions. He/she 
is also able to enter altered state [sic] of consciousness and be able to 
control these states and communicate with spirits whilst in trance. The 
shaman has a duty to serve his/her community, often at the risk of their 
sanity. The universality of shamanism is an indicator of one of its primary 
functions, as a healing source in its society.57 
                                                
54 Rachel Karafistan, ‘‘The Spirits Wouldn’t Let Me Be Anything Else’: Shamanic Dimensions in 
Theatre Practice Today,’ in New Theatre Quarterly, 19: 2 (May 2003), 150-168 (p. 151). 
55 For examples of work that discusses this idea see Performance Research: On Ritual, 3.3 (1998). 
56 Examples of ethnographic research which focus on shamanism include Arne Røkkum’s, 
Nature, Ritual and Society in Japan’s Ryukyu Islands (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005). 
57 Karafistan, p. 151. 
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The universality that Karafistan claims for shamanism is actually a discursive 
construct, produced by the decision to apply the term ‘shaman’ to anyone who 
can ‘heal.’ This broad definition of shamanism is used at the beginning of the 
article and establishes two ideas which become central to her argument; that all 
shamanic expression has similarities and that shamanism is universal in its 
function within society. The next step in her reasoning is to conclude that 
shamanism is therefore necessary; because it appears in all cultures it must also 
be an ‘original’ form of expression.  
Her next discursive move is to connect specific theatre practices with 
shamanism. Among the most important, in her opinion, is Eugenio Barba’s 
method which is called Theatre Anthropology. Here she quotes from Barba to 
describe the kind of theatre she associates with shamanism. This is a style of 
theatre that, 
lives on the fringes, often outside or on the outskirts of the centres and 
capitals of culture. It is a theatre created by people who have seldom 
undergone a traditional theatrical education and therefore are not 
recognized as professionals. But they are not amateurs. Their entire day is 
filled with theatrical experience, sometimes by what they call training, or 
by the preparation of performances for which they must fight to find an 
audience.58   
While Barba uses the word theatre, he is defining an alternative style of 
performance. Some of the practitioners Barba had in mind and whom Karafistan 
references are Antonin Artaud, Jerzy Grotowski, Tadeusz Kantor, Richard 
Schechner, Ariane Mnouchkine, and Joseph Chaikin. All of these artists produced 
“new forms” and “avant-garde” theatre developed with the influence of what 
Christopher Innes calls “primitive drama styles.”59 Barba and Karafistan use the 
word primitive to indicate that there is value in older forms because they are more 
                                                
58 Eugenio Barba quoted in Karafistan, pp. 150-151. 
59 Christoper Innes quoted in Karafistan, p. 154. 
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authentic, original. It is a desirable quality to achieve because the “primitive” is 
simultaneously other than what is currently known yet still part of the collective 
memory of society. 
The usefulness of this approach is that makes a case for the value and 
authenticity of an artist’s work. However, simply because work was “primitive” 
or seems to have been because of photographs that exist is not enough of a reason 
to label it shamanistic or the performers shamans. Abramovi! addressed this issue 
in her 2006 talk at Frieze in relation to producing performance art in the early 
1970s. While arguing against nostalgia, she says that it was hard work, attracted 
few audience members, and took place in strange and difficult venues: 
You know, in the 70s, even if we always are nostalgic, thinking how good 
a time it was, it was not such a good time. But we think about it as a good 
time because all we have seen from the 70s is some photographs – black 
and white with a lot of damage. So they look really ancient, 
anthropological material, very pleasing to the eye. We are also confronted 
with video material with bad sound, bad image, too long. And then we 
have the stories and the witnesses. [...] And it is like almost everybody 
saw something in the 70s. But it is not true at all because in the 70s we 
hardly had any public or very little. And there were very few people, 
sometimes friends you knew or actually some passers-by, who came in by 
accident and saw the piece. We are talking about the early 70s, later on it 
starts being different.60 
Abramovi!’s early work is often cited for its demands on the body, her 
incorporation of audience members as participants, and her ability to change her 
state of consciousness. These aspects fit with what George and Karafistan 
describe as shamanic, but as Abramovi! says, performances need to be examined 
in context, not just through nostalgia or hearsay.  
Theatre or performance that can lay claim to primitive, original and 
universal qualities is validated as useful, necessary and important. Karafistan 
spells it out thus: “What the performance of the shaman and [this] theatre has in 
                                                
60 Abramovi!, Frieze Art Fair (2006), transcribed by Megan Macdonald. 
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common is that, without the use of arduous narrative, they both succeed in 
appealing to something deeper and primal within their audiences.”61 This appeal 
to the depths of emotion is another way Karafistan tries to argue for the 
importance of shamanistic work not only in the theatre but in every culture. This 
is unfortunately the common level of critique and rhetoric often used by those 
who seek to justify the power of theatre. Karafistan’s article reaches for historical 
data to prove the relevance of theatrical practices as more than just entertainment.  
In order to convince the reader Karafistan goes further and claims that 
theatre is shamanism: “while the shaman of old was the director, designer, and 
actor of his/her performance, these roles (and often many more besides) have now 
become fragmented and delegated – and constitute what we now call theatre.”62  
Following this logic theatre is part of a greater lineage which shares its inception 
with important and necessary forms of universal expression. Thus contemporary 
comparisons of Abramovi! to a shaman do not just compare her to a form of 
spiritual practice, but claim for her work a history and logic which are 
fundamental to human expression. This is clearly simplistic reasoning, but it is 
often accepted as an argument.  
Some of Abramovi!’s descriptions of aspects of her work do use terms 
similar to that of the shaman, but this is at best a superficial comparison. It does 
not ‘prove’ anything substantial about the work. I do not want to say that it is 
unreasonable to find similarities between practices, but these always need to be 
properly contextualised. The majority of work that uses ‘shaman’ or 
‘shamanistic’ in relation to theatre or performance does so with no explanation as 
to the critical implications of the comparison.  
                                                
61 Karafistan, p. 153. 
62 Karafistan, p. 152. 
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New Age 
Another highly problematic term with spiritual associations is New Age. There is 
much debate about New Age religion is, if it is indeed a religion at all. Michael 
York writes: 
The perplexity involved in attempting to understand New Age 
phenomena, however, has divided practitioners and scholars alike. There 
is no general consensus over what exactly New Age is, whether it is a 
movement or not, whether a congeries of separate movements, whether a 
cultural phenomenon, a cultural emblem, a codeword for post-1960s 
popular religion, a ‘fake’ etic formulation/projection, or even a genuine 
spirituality.63  
Fully aware that there is no agreement on terms or titles within the field of 
Alternative Spiritualities, I have chosen to use the definitions of Wouter J. 
Hanegraaff for the historical perspective they afford. His framework is 
theoretical, focusing on the ideas behind New Age as they fit into the larger field 
of Western Esotericism.64 He uses specific understandings of “religion – religions 
– and spiritualities”65 to clarify New Age:  
Religion [is] any symbolic system which influences human action by 
providing possibilities for ritually maintaining contact between the 
everyday world and a more general meta-empirical framework of 
                                                
63 Michael York, ‘Wanting to Have Your New Age Cake and Eat It Too’, Journal of Alternative 
Spiritualities and New Age Studies, 1 (2005), 15-34, (p.17). 
64 “The modern study of Western esotericism…uses the term very differently: as referring to a 
number of specific currents and traditions from Antiquity to the present, which can be shown to 
share certain “family characteristics” and are historically related. These currents include 
gnosticism and hermetism in antiquity, the so-called “occult sciences” (esp. astrology, alchemy 
and magic), the hermetic revival of the Renaissance and the emergence of a new “occulta 
philosophia”, Christian kabbalah, Paracelsianism, Rosicrucianism, Christian theosophy, 
Illuminism, 19th-century occultism, and various related currents up to and including the New Age 
movement.” Wouter J. Hanegraaff, ‘Spectral Evidence of New Age Religion: On the substance of 
ghosts and the use of concepts’, Journal of Alternative Spiritualities and New Age Studies, 1 
(2005), 35-58, (pp. 38-39). Another area that is related to this is that of the self-help book where 
similar rhetoric to that used by Abramovi! and those who write about her work can be found. An 
example can be found in, Inger Askehave, ‘If Language is a Game - These are the Rules: A 
Search into the Rhetoric of the Spiritual Self-Help Book If Life is a Game - These are the Rules,’ 
Discourse Society, 15.1 (2004), 5-31. 
65 Hanegraaff, ‘Spectral Evidence’, p. 43. 
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meaning.66 
 
Spiritualities, in contrast, can be defined as any human practice that 
maintains contact between the everyday world and a more general meta-
empirical framework of meaning by way of the individual manipulation of 
symbolic systems.67  
 
We can speak of a religion if the symbolic system I just referred to is 
embodied in a social institution. [...] New Age, according to this approach, 
is not a religion because it is not embodied in a social institution. It does, 
however, qualify as “religion”, and it manifests itself as a multiplicity of 
individual “spiritualities”.68  
While the definitions are broad and leave room for many types of symbolic 
systems to qualify as ‘religion’ or ‘spiritualities’ it is clear that the defining 
difference between, for example, Christianity and New Age is whether symbolic 
systems are manipulated by institutions or individuals. Christianity would 
therefore be defined as a religion. Those who practice it could also be involved in 
Christian spiritualities where the individual manipulates the symbolic systems 
outside of the institutional framework. There need be no attempt to change 
institutional Christian practice in so doing. The same would be true for any 
practitioner of any religion. It is not that the former system (institutionalized 
religion) is static while the later (spiritualities) is fluid, as religions do shift over 
time, but it is the way those systems change that is important. However, there is a 
difference between Christian or Jewish practices and New Age spiritualities. 
Hanegraaff clarifies further: 
The crucial characteristic of New Age religion, I suggest, is that it 
consists of a complex of spiritualities which are no longer embedded in 
any religion — as was the case with all spiritualities from the past — but 
                                                
66 Hanegraaff explains the origin for this definition in footnote 13 (this was already mentioned in 
the Introduction): “This is a critical reformulation of the famous definition proposed by Clifford 
Geertz in 1966 (‘Religion as a Cultural System,’ ‘Religion as a Cultural System,’ in The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London: Fontana Press, 1993), pp. 87-125).” Wouter 
J. Hanegraaff, ‘New Age Religion and Secularization: Examining the Phenomenal Popularity of 
Esoteric Spiritualities and Literature in Contemporary Western Culture and Society’, Numen-
International Review For the History of Religions, 47.3 (2000), 288-312), p. 295.  
67 Hanegraaff, ‘Spectral Evidence’, p. 42. 
68 Hanegraaff, ‘Spectral Evidence’, p. 42. [My emphasis.] 
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directly in secular culture itself. All manifestations of New Age religion, 
without exception, are based upon what I have called an “individual 
manipulation of existing symbolic systems”. In this way, new syntheses 
are continually being created, providing the very thing which religion has 
always provided: the possibility for ritually maintaining contact with a 
more general meta-empirical framework of meaning, in terms of which 
people give sense to their experiences in daily life.69 
New Age is a product of contemporary secular culture in the West where for the 
first time in history individuals are choosing which symbols, both secular and 
religious, to include and manipulate in relation to spiritual life.70 The “meta-
empirical framework” which each person constructs in order to understand and 
mediate the world around them is thus created with the use of any and all symbols 
which the individual finds meaningful to their experience. Aspects of 
institutionalized religion may be included in this selection especially when the 
individual was raised within such a system.  
The explanations provided by Hanegraaff are ways to understand the ideas 
behind New Age practice, not ways to explain the reasons behind each 
individual’s manipulation of the chosen symbols. Based on these alone 
Abramovi!’s work fits the framework of New Age; she does create symbolic 
systems which she associates with spiritual truths and then manipulates for her 
own purposes. She both provides symbols for others to manipulate according to 
her instructions and performs with the systems herself; manipulating the symbols 
in front of and with ‘participants.’  
Abramovi!, however, consistently rejects any comparison of her work 
with New Age: “Because I use minerals, some people label this work New Age. I 
                                                
69 Hanegraaff, ‘New Age Religion’, p. 303-304. 
70 “If the processes of secularisation…are taken seriously, we find that there is an enormous 
difference between Western esotericism in the pre-Enlightenment period and the profoundly 
secularised kinds of esotericism found in New Age. New Age cannot be adequately understood if 
we do not see it as the outcome of complex processes of secularisation within the much wider 
domain of Western esotericism. This is an approach which, obviously, implies that the two terms 
are not conflated.” Hanegraaff, ‘Spectral Evidence’, p. 39.  
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definitely do not like to be related to this, because my work is really about 
something else.”71 This raises the question: How are academics and other writers 
using this term such that she refuses the comparison? 
 It is not possible to know exactly why a given writer chooses New Age as 
a comparison for Abramovi!’s work. It is, however, possible to investigate 
known assumptions about New Age and the inherent implications of its use. As 
Hanegraaff’s definitions show, New Age thinking is part of a larger cultural shift 
where the individual (as the manipulator of symbolic symbols) is at the centre of 
the meta-narrative traditionally held in place by larger religious institutions. New 
Age is not regulated, nor is its inclusivity purposeful; a label has been applied to a 
set of practices that is constantly expanding, no one has tried to make it thus. 
Individuals choose to be associated with the term; New Age practices are not 
contained by an institution and cannot actively seek new members. As such, 
Abramovi!’s desire to distance herself from New Age does not eliminate the 
similarities that cause the comparisons but it does change how those comparisons 
can be interpreted. When others make this comparison with her work it can only 
be taken as highlighting the social trend to acknowledge New Age.  
 Abramovi!’s refutation of New Age means that authors cannot claim that 
she engages with a purposeful application of practices or methods. Artists are 
influenced by their surrounding culture and New Age ideas and language are 
pervasive – it would be hard for most people to deny having heard of New Age, 
but this does not mean that any similarity automatically proves an influence. In 
the same way that artists throughout the ages have mirrored societal changes 
Abramovi!’s art may not aim to endorse popular religion and yet still be in line 
                                                
71 Marina Abramovi! in ‘Elevating the Public: In Conversation with Adrian Heathfield’, in Live, 
ed.by Adrian Heathfield (London: Tate, 2004), pp. 144-151 (p. 147). 
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with some of its developments. Writers who use the term New Age need to 
qualify or explain its use in relation to her work.  
 I want to highlight two commonly held assumptions about New Age 
which would lead writers to use it as a form of shorthand in relation to 
Abramovi!’s work: New Age and performance art can both be linked to an 
historical moment, and New Age is understood as an alternative to Western 
culture and institutionalized religion. Both of these have an element of truth, but 
are ultimately superficial versions of what New Age really represents. New Age 
is generally understood as either very old or as having come into existence in the 
1960s. The ‘very old’ theory comes about through the idea that there is “an inner 
core of true spirituality...behind the outer surface of all religious traditions, and 
that the knowledge of it has been kept alive by secret traditions throughout the 
ages.”72 Those who follow this thinking believe that New Age practitioners are 
privy to these traditions and have ‘inherited’ the secret knowledge. All traditions 
are linked through this kind of thinking which often adopts the word ‘holistic.’ 
New Age is thus called a universal religious path with a wide variety of 
spiritualities available to all. 
 Both age and the label of universality are thought to validate New Age 
practices. However, according to Hanegraaff: 
the historical roots of the New Age movement actually have a more recent 
origin....the New Age movement can be regarded as a contemporary 
manifestation and transformation of Western esoteric currents and 
traditions which originated in the early Renaissance.73 
So the earliest century to which New Age can be traced is the fifteenth when 
ideas which went counter to the dominant Western Christian tradition started to 
                                                
72 Hanegraaff, ‘New Age Religion’, p. 292. 
73 Hanegraaff, ‘New Age Religion’, p. 293. 
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be explored throughout Western Europe.74 This may be the historical root, but 
nothing like the contemporary manifestation of New Age was possible until at 
least the nineteenth century. To be more specific, 
the 19th century produced radically innovative mixtures of traditional 
esoteric and modern rationalist and scientific ideas. The result was a new 
phenomenon, which is best referred to as “occultism”. Occultism may 
therefore be defined as secularized esotericism. It is this 19th-century 
phenomenon, and not some supposed universal gnosis, which forms the 
historical foundation of New Age.75 
The concepts of what we understand as New Age reach back to the Renaissance 
but the contemporary expression came about through cross disciplinary influence 
that was first possible in the nineteenth century. What started in the Renaissance 
were ideas, not necessarily practices; the bringing together of strands of religious 
and spiritual thought which to that point had not had the opportunity to meet. If 
writers think that by using New Age as a reference point that a long, universal 
spiritual tradition is being evoked, they are mistaken. This is an important point 
for those who research the history of religious thought, and another historical 
moment of specific interest and potential confusion is the 1960s.  
 As with so many ‘countercultural’ developments in the 1960s a “popular 
revolution of religious consciousness” also took place.76 Where performance art 
had the earlier movements of futurism and dadaism, New Age had intellectual 
and artistic precedents representing a variety of practices stemming from the 
nineteenth century.77 The academic and intellectual interest in the practices and 
ideas along with the specific “popular revolution” came together under the name 
                                                
74 The Italian Renaissance started in the late thirteenth century and spread slowly to other 
European countries. Hanegraaff mentions it in relation to the changes that took place in the 
fifteenth century. 
75 Hanegraaff, ‘New Age Religion’, p. 294. 
76 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, ‘Beyond the Yates Paradigm: The Study of Western Esotericism 
Between Counterculture and New Complexity,’ Aries: Journal for the Study of Western 
Esotericism, 1.1 (2001), 5-37 (p. 5). 
77 For more on the various influences which developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
see Hanegraaff, ‘Beyond the Yates Paradigm.’ 
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New Age in the 1960s. 
 Popularly held ideas that New Age is either a universal spiritual tradition 
with a long history, or a new countercultural manifestation of spiritual energy 
both have an element of truth to them, but they are also extremely flawed if 
presented without clarification and qualification. Whether Abramovi! is reacting 
specifically to either of these ideas when she refuses to be associated with the 
practices is not clear. Regardless of the reason, an academic comparison to New 
Age without qualification is not a rigorous application of the term. The use of 
New Age as a form of shorthand to bring to mind certain types of practices is 
equally uninformed. 
 One other idea worth mentioning in relation to New Age: there are 
inherent dualisms in the logic of the moment that position it squarely as a product 
of Western culture. Since the 1960s many concepts have come to be accepted as 
stereotypical of New Age. These include, a focus on ‘healing,’ ‘holistic thinking’ 
and ‘alternative spirituality.’ Such attributes are neither inherently positive nor 
negative in contemporary Western society; healing and holistic approaches are 
generally understood as beneficial. Yet, behind all practices there exist inherent 
logics. If New Age is synonymous with ‘healing’ and ‘holistic thinking,’ and if it 
is an alternative to mainstream Western approaches, than it is also inherently 
critical of Western approaches, in the assumption that it provides what is missing 
from Western practices.  
 While New Age thinking does not always articulate a position of cultural 
criticism, a position is nevertheless inherent: 
New Age thinking in general is characterized by a pervasive pattern of 
implicit or explicit culture criticism. Within a New Age context one may 
encounter a very wide variety of ideas and convictions, but underneath 
there is a general dissatisfaction with certain aspects of Western thought 
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such as one may encounter in contemporary culture.78 
That New Age is critical of aspects in society is not a problem, but the way in 
which these criticism are manifested is important. When Abramovi!’s work is 
called New Age the superficial comparison might be with a known stereotypical 
practice such as the use of crystals in her piece Shoes For Departure. According 
to the quotation, even this seemingly small aspect – the use of crystals – in New 
Age is part of the “pervasive pattern of...cultural criticism.” And to a large degree 
this kind of cultural criticism finds expression in dualism: “New Agers usually 
ascribe dualist and reductionist tendencies in Western culture to the influence of a 
dogmatic, institutionalized Christianity on the one hand, and an overrationalist 
science on the other.”79 This dualism may focus on religion (omniscient God 
against humans), ecology (humans against nature), and health care (treating the 
body but not the spirit) among others.80 In opposing traditional dualisms, new 
ones are created, i.e., institutionalized religion is wrong and, thus, New Age is 
right. This pattern is congruent with Plato’s Theory of Forms and shows New 
Age to be rooted in Western patterns of thought.  
 In this respect Abramovi!’s work does not bear out the comparison. She 
might well be critical of aspects of Western culture, but to take Shoes For 
Departure as an example, it is a stretch to say that by asking people to use shoes 
made of crystals as a starting point to meditation that she is criticizing all of 
Western culture for its ignorance of meditation practices. She refers to her work 
as enabling or facilitating, not as trying to ‘fix.’81 Abramovi!’s specific rejection 
                                                
78 Hanegraaff, ‘New Age Religion’, p. 291. 
79 Hanegraaff, ‘New Age Religion’, p. 292. 
80 Hanegraaff, ‘New Age Religion’, p. 291. 
81 Abramovi! has often spoken of the lack of time in society to reflect, to meditate, to let the soul 
experience things. One aspect of Western culture that she has attacked is the amount of fear in 
comparison with other cultures such as the Aborigines in Australia. Her response is to facilitate 
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of the term New Age in relation to her work signals, not that there is no 
comparison to be made, but that the work was not created with principals of New 
Age in mind.82 The writers who use New Age to describe her work do not explain 
whether they are using the term in a popular sense or in relation to academic 
research on the topic.  
Writing on New Age differs from that on shamanism as almost every 
aspect of New Age, including the term itself, is currently being debated by 
scholars within fields which examine religious and spiritual practices.83 Whereas 
shamanism is an accepted term and concept which is relevant to many cultures 
around the globe, but is not up for debate and definition in the same way. What 
the two have in common in relation to performance writing is their use as 
shorthand to denote practices which are participatory, open, personal, linked to 
universal practices and simultaneously uniquely appropriate for contemporary 
society. Looking in depth at Abramovi!’s work with these explanations in mind 
helps to situated how performance is being theorised in contemporary writing. 
                                                                                                                                
experiences for those who cannot go and live with the Aborigines, but not to implicitly or 
explicitly claim that only by adopting such practices will Western society be viable. 
82 Abramovi! is aware of her own rhetoric: “But of course if you talk too much about this you 
become “spooky” or “new age.” Spirituality in art is sometimes seen badly.” Abramovi! in Delia 
Bajo, and Brainard Carey, ‘Marina Abramovic in Conversation With Delia Bajo and Brainard 
Carey’, The Brooklyn Rail, Winter (2003) <http://www.brooklynrail.org/2002/11/art/marina-
abramovic> [accessed 15 April 2009]. 
83 New Age is associated and confused with other practices: “If countercultural/religionist 
approaches were accepted in the academy at all (a development which took place in the United 
States, but has always remained alien to Western Europe[an] universities), they tended to 
understand “esotericism” as more or less synonymous with “spirituality”, “the sacred”, or even 
“religion” in general—thus blurring from the outset the specificity of Western esotericism as a 
separate domain consisting of a definite number of specific historical currents. On the other hand, 
to the extent that Western esotericism was presented as a separate field of study, academics were 
bound to suspect religionist agendas implying apologies for esotericism rather than an academic 
study of it; and as a result, they would tend to reject it. In many cases their suspicions were 
correct, but in other cases they were mistaken: to this day, scholars studying Western esotericism 
from an academic perspective may encounter opposition because they are incorrectly assumed to 
be apologists. Finally, even if this does not happen, the field still runs the risk of being perceived 
as some self-enclosed and out of the way pursuit with little or no relevance to problems of general 
importance to academics.” Hanegraaff, ‘Beyond the Yates Paradigm’, p. 26. For a discussion of 
major trends in academic discourse on New Age see Liselotte Frisk, ‘Is “New Age” a 
Construction? Searching a New Paradigm of Contemporary Religion,’ 
<http://www.cesnur.org/2005/pa_frisk.htm> [accessed 29 March 2007]. 
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Practices which can be called participatory, open, etc., are understood as positive 
and of interest to participants. Those who write about performance associate 
Abramovi!’s pieces with these kinds of experiences and believe that others will 
understand these forms of shorthand. These are two examples of what happens 
when terms are latched onto for their utility with little regard for the larger 
implications. There are many other terms that are also problematic and some of 
these will become clearer in the final analysis of this section. 
 
MARINA ABRAMOVI!: PROCESS AND ACTION 
The case study on Abramovi!’s work has three main parts. Firstly, background is 
provided through a factual description of each of three pieces: Shoes for 
Departure, In Between, and The House With the Ocean View. Following this, I 
present Abramovi!’s comments on her own work. Her rhetoric is important to the 
final analysis because it provides context for my critique of other writers and their 
assumptions of her work. Finally, I analyse her work, with a focus on The House 
With the Ocean View as an example of contemporary performance art that shows 
its embeddedness in the Western and Christian logics of ritual structure and the 
rhetoric of spirituality.  
 
Descriptions 
Shoes for Departure 
Shoes for Departure (hereafter Shoes) is an installation piece consisting of a pair 
of non-traditional shoes made from hewn amethyst that are too heavy to ever be 
used for walking. Six pairs were created in 1991 and they have been displayed in 
galleries around the world. Abramovi! provides instruction for the participants 
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who use the shoes. These instructions are simple and specific (see Figure 2  
 
instructions). The public are invited to use 
the shoes under these terms. Participants 
are encouraged to use the shoes for as 
little or as much time as they want (during 
the opening hours of the gallery). When 
an installation opens, Abramovi! is often 
present and uses the objects herself along 
with participants in the gallery. However, 
when she is not in the gallery the only 
reminder of her physical presence, is the 
Shoes for Departure (Amethyst, Artists 
Studio, Berlin,1991) 
Instructions for the Public 
Enter the shoes with bare feet 
Eyes closed 
Motionless 
Depart 
Time: Limitless84 
fact that she created the objects. The 
documentation of this piece emphasises 
the creative process used to make the 
pieces. On a trip to Brazil in 1990-91 she 
visited the amethyst mines where, among 
other things, she spent time meditating.  
Two images from those meditations appear in her books. One appears to be inside 
the mine while the other is outside; both images show her lying down or sitting in 
front of a huge wall of amethyst. A little camp bed isused in both pictures and her 
eyes are closed. In both pictures Abramovi! is dressed in the same drab green 
clothing, her hair is loose. The captions say that she meditated for an hour in one 
instance and a day in the other. She believes that natural elements have certain 
powers which can be felt by people who take the time to ‘listen.’ The shoes are 
                                                
84 ‘Shoes for Departure’ and ‘Inner Sky for Departure’, Rest in Space, (2003) <http://www.rest-in-
space.net/basis/abramovic.html> [Accessed 9 April 2009]. 
Figure 2 
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her way of providing an opportunity for others to interact with the minerals.  
The documentation of this piece is useful to situate how she works and to 
read what she has to say about her work. Crystals also feature in The House With 
the Ocean View so it is helpful to know how she conceives of their importance to 
her pieces. While Abramovi! does not dictate the kind of experience one must 
have when participating in her pieces, she does provide strict instructions as to 
the proper methods of engagement. The concept of using an object as a trigger for 
an experience can be extrapolated and applied to other objects, e.g. one could 
stand on or in some other object and still follow the instructions and attempt to 
have an experience. Ideally this is what Abramovi! says participants should 
eventually be able to do – experience transformation without the need of the artist 
or an object.  
What caught my attention about this piece was its simplicity. Most of the 
other objects which Abramovi! started to create out of minerals after her time in 
China involve some other material such as wood or metal and the participant 
often just looks at the mineral, or e.g., sits in a chair in which a mineral ‘pillow’ is 
embedded.85 Shoes is different in that the mineral is the object which has been 
shaped into an easily identifiable form and its use is takes an everyday object and 
turns it into something spiritual. 
 
In Between 
As an example of an installation piece, In Between (1996) is neither strictly an 
object, nor strictly a performance. Placed in galleries this piece was mounted in a 
room that participants entered after signing a contract wherein they agreed to 
                                                
85 One other piece which appears in various guises involves mineral ‘pillows’ attached to the wall 
at various heights. These are usually grouped in threes and the instructions are to press the head, 
heart and sex into the pillows and wait for the energy exchange. 
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abide by Abramovi!’s instructions. As they left, the participants also received a 
document, from Abramovi!, thanking them for their participation. With its 
reciprocal exchange of documents, Abramovi! facilitated an experience that was 
based on expectations; hers, that the participant would and could agree to the 
terms; and theirs, that the piece was worth the commitment of signing and 
abiding by a document. The piece has two parts, 1) an audio recording of 
Abramovi! reading out instructions, which the audience listened to through 
earphones while blindfolded, and 2) a video of Abramovi! and objects. The 
audience entered the space, sat down and donned the blindfolds and headphones. 
Instructions were listened to through the headphones and were to be followed 
precisely – see Appendix B. Towards the end of the instructions the audience 
were told to remove the blindfolds and look at the projection of the video on the 
screens. The video installation consisted of Abramovi! tracing lines on her hand 
and fingers and eyes with a needle. 
In this piece the participants’ performance is scripted by Abramovi!. She 
dictates what can be heard and what should be done (by following the 
instructions) before seeing the video. The text which is listened to through the 
headphones is a kind of meditation. Although different in style from Shoes, both 
pieces are about a meditative state. These examples of Abramovi!’s work both 
offer an experience which is contingent on following instructions – a script. The 
script implies that there is a purpose to the objects/installation and an outcome for 
the participant. 
Again with this piece it is possible to follow the instructions given to the 
original participants, but the experience would be fundamentally different without 
Abramovi!’s voice giving the instructions, the video at which to look, nor a room 
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full of co-participants with whom to participate at the same time and share 
reactions at the end. What is different about this piece from other installations are 
the instructions. The style and structure of the text interests me because of the 
structural similarity to liturgical text. The progression through awareness in the 
body and the final instruction to ‘Go’ reminded me of Christian uses of the body 
in liturgy.86 After reading the instructions for this piece the instructions for other 
pieces, such as Shoes, took on added significance. 
 
The House With the Ocean View 
The House With the Ocean View (hereafter House) was performed over twelve 
days at the Sean Kelly Gallery in New York City from 15-26 November, 2002. 
Abramovi! performed in the gallery space for the audience/participants during the 
days and slept there at night. The line between audience and participant is not 
obvious in this piece, for reasons which will become clear. House consisted of 
three suspended rooms, six feet deep, constructed in one section of the gallery. 
Each white box was hung next to but not touching the next other. Peggy Phelan 
describes the performance space: 
Abramovi! spent her time moving across three stages, each suspended 
about six feet from the floor, and buttressed with center ladders with 
butcher knives for rungs. The stage to the viewer’s left had a toilet and 
shower, the center stage had a wooden table and chair with a large crystal 
embedded in its back, and the right stage had a wooden platform for a 
bed. Each day the artist wore a different color linen jacket and trousers.87 
 
In addition to the glass and water pitcher, there was also a metronome 
tapping out the passage of time, and sometimes pacing Abramovi!’s 
breathing. In the back of the gallery, a telescope was set up, focussed to a 
                                                
86 For a short article on Eastern Orthodox liturgical practices see Chryssavgis, John, ‘The prayer 
of liturgy in the Orthodox Church,’ in Theology Today (October, 2001), 
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3664/is_200110/ai_n8961920> [accessed 30 March 
2009]. 
87 Peggy Phelan, ‘Marina Abramovi!: Witnessing Shadows’, Theatre Journal, 56 (2004), 569-577 
(p. 574). 
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magnification that made it possible for the audience to discern each hair 
of her eyebrows.88 
As with the chair, (Figure 3), the bed also had a crystal pillow embedded in it 
(Figure 5). Also, the white and blue clothes are shown in these images. 
 
Throughout the performance Abramovi! maintained a strict regime, not eating or 
drinking anything besides water and not communicating (no reading, writing or 
speaking) except to hum and sing.89 The stated aim of the installation was to 
engage participants in “an energy dialogue” — “This consisted primarily of an 
exchange of gaze between the artist and her spectators (usually one at a time). 
This exchange, in turn, was observed by the other viewers.”90 Two other rooms 
were part of the event. One showed a video of Abramovi! and the ocean,91 the 
other room was called the ‘dream room’ and participants could sign up for an 
hour slot to sleep/dream. Participants came into the space and could stay for as 
long as the gallery was open.  
                                                
88 Phelan ‘On Seeing the Invisible: Marina  Abramovi!’s The House With the Ocean View’, in 
The House With the Ocean View, Marina Abramovi! (Milan: Charta, 2004), pp. 171-179 (p. 176). 
89 Phelan ‘On Seeing’, p. 176. 
90 Phelan, ‘Witnessing Shadows’, p. 574. 
91 “Stromboli, a single channel 30 minute video, is named for the island south [sic] of Sicily that is 
the only permanently active volcano in Europe and has experienced small eruptions 
approximately every 15 minutes for the last 2000 years. In the video the artist lies at the edge of 
the ocean, between land and sea, her head moving in response to the waves.” The House With the 
Ocean View, ‘Press Release’, Sean Kelly Gallery (2002) <http://www.skny.com/exhibitions/2002-
11-15_marina-abramovi/pressrelease/> [accessed 9 April 2009] paragraph 5 of 6. 
Figure 3 
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There was a line drawn across the main room dividing Abramovi!’s space from 
the rest. People came and watched from any part of the room, either standing, 
sitting or lying on the floor. Abramovi! spent the time making eye contact with 
those who came as well as repeating actions such as singing, dressing, showering, 
drinking and peeing. She occasionally rearranged the furniture. Articles written 
about the event report that both Abramovi! and participants cried at certain points 
in the performance: “As I looked, my eyes burned, laughed, cried. I became 
untied.’92 Crying is the only experience (besides looking) which both Abramovi! 
and the public shared in the space.  
House With the Ocean View is the most written about and photographed 
of the three pieces. Besides being the subject of many articles, Abramovi! has 
published a book solely on the installation which includes a day by day 
breakdown of every moment as she remembers it or as it was documented. 
The book recommends that the reader either read the documentation of one day of 
the performance each day for twelve days or that the book be read through in one 
                                                
92 Phelan, ‘On Seeing’, p. 173. [Original emphasis.] Another response from Goldberg also 
mentions tears: “It stems from a personal challenge so unlikely, to make her world a stage, and is 
constructed with such restraint, the artist installed on a suspended platform only six feet deep on 
one wall of a gallery, that its success is almost uncanny, especially given the broad sweep of 
audience members who were moved, some to tears, to sit with Abramovi! for a large part of her 
twelve-day vigil.” RoseLee Goldberg, ‘The Theater of the Body’, in The House With the Ocean 
View, by Marina Abramovi! (Milan: Charta, 2004), pp. 157-159 (p. 157). 
Figure 4 
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sitting. The idea is that the reader will get a sense of the “full duration of the 
event.”93 The most recent of her large scale works, at that time, its physical size 
and duration were relevant to the study of ritual. Many longer articles about this 
piece included descriptions and personal anecdotes from the writers. All the 
written accounts seemed to be in agreement that this piece had been profoundly 
spiritual. I had already seen hints of liturgical rhythms in the other pieces, and 
House put them into practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Everything that Abramovi! claims about her work – that it is about the 
participant, that transformation is the goal and that the body is the focus – is 
evident in this piece. The piece has also been compared to a wide variety of 
religious and spiritual practices making it a good example with which to bring 
together the strands of this dissertation. 
Together Shoes for Departure, In Between and The House With the Ocean 
View provide examples of how Abramovi!’s performance art relies on ritual and 
incorporates structures reminiscent of Western liturgical action; Shoes uses an 
object in a liturgical manner; In Between uses text to focus awareness on the body 
                                                
93 Marina Abramovi!, The House with the Ocean View (Milan: Charta, 2004), p. 41. 
Figure 5 
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in a directed group meditation; and House combines objects and text in 
performance with the aim of changing the awareness of the participants.  
 
Abramovi" in Her Own Words 
I want to do more long durational pieces because there is an amazing 
possibility for transformation and elevation of spirit. Not just for the 
performer but also for the audience.94  
Now that all three pieces have been introduced and put in context, Abramovi!’s 
own ideas are added to provide background to her processes. What she says and 
how she says it is important to understanding how her work has been interpreted 
and understood. I have avoided applying an analysis, but have clarified comments 
or elements of pieces. Abramovi! constantly uses the term transformation to 
explain why she performs, what she experiences and what she wants others to 
experience.95 She wants to facilitate profound experiences that allow for 
something new to happen to the participant, which would not have happened 
without the experience. Abramovi! prizes transformation above all else in her 
performances; she wants to be transformed as much as she wants participants to 
be transformed. 
 
Shoes for Departure, In Between and The House With the Ocean View 
Abramovi! has explained her objects many times in her books and in interviews 
since she and Ulay first started to exhibit them in the 1980s. It was in the 1980s 
that she and Ulay spent a year living with the Aborigines in Australia; an 
                                                
94 Abramovi! and Spector, p. 27. 
95 For a definition of transformation see Chapter 2. The term transformation is used widely in 
performance studies. In a recent book Erika Fischer-Lichte undertakes a close analysis of the term 
in relation to performance art practices. In particular she discusses the importance of the 
experience of the participants. They must have a performance experience and not just an 
interpretive one (pp. 17-18). Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance: A 
New Aesthetics, trans. by Saskya Iris Jain (London: Routledge, 2008). 
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experience they credited with a shift in their focus: “After searching for physical 
limits, as in body art, we have arrived in a world that is completely unknown to 
us….we have changed from seeking for physical limits to seeking for spiritual 
limits.”96 One way of encouraging others to search for their own limits was 
through the use of objects and Shoes For Departure fits into the larger discussion 
of her ‘transitory objects.’  
After walking the Chinese Wall I realized that for the first time I had been 
doing a performance where the audience was not physically present. In 
order to transmit this experience to them I built a series of transitory 
objects with the idea that the audience could actively take part. The basic 
structure was sitting, standing and lying.97 
Abramovi! conceives of her objects as a way for others to enter into 
transformation. At first the person learns how to achieve transformation with the 
object, although ideally, as she explains here, the participant will learn to achieve 
the desired state without the object: 
As I was building the objects I paid a lot of attention to the 
materials I used. I limited myself to materials like copper, iron, 
wood, minerals, pig blood and human hair. I believe these 
materials contain certain energies. I do not consider these 
works as sculptures, but as transitory objects to trigger physical 
or mental experiences among the public through direct 
interaction. When the experience is achieved the object can be 
removed.98 
The aim of the objects is to create participants out of the audience who have to 
use the object while seated, standing or lying down, depending on how the object 
is constructed. Abramovi! does not think of the experience facilitated by the 
objects as being less valuable than her experience. While it is not the same, she 
places these two kinds of experience next to each other and calls both 
performances.  
                                                
96 Marina and Ulay quoted in Art From Europe (London, Tate Gallery Publications, 1987), p. 8. 
97 Marina Abramovic, Marina Abramovic: Public Body, Installation and Objects, 1965-2001 
(Milan: Charta, 2001), p.84. 
98 Abramovi!, Public Body, p. 84. 
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The materials are important and their textures and weights are used in the 
design and use of the objects, e.g. the shoes, although somewhat polished, are 
made entirely of rough hewn amethyst and are too heavy and large to actually be 
used for walking. The purpose behind the object dictates its size and composition. 
In this case because the shoes are not meant to be used for walking, they preclude 
walking: 
I have crystal shoes. I have instructions for the public to take 
off your shoes and, with naked feet, put on the two crystal 
shoes, close your eyes, don’t move, and make your departure. 
I’m talking about a mental, not physical, departure. So the 
public can enter certain states of mind helped by the material 
itself. Material is very important for me....The materials 
already have a certain energy.99 
As the person recognizes how to achieve a ‘state of mind’ and makes 
the connection to the personal work required to get to the state, the 
object as means-to-an-end is made obsolete. Abramovi! calls attention 
to the material of the shoes, to the physicality and materiality of the 
experience, and the everyday object of a shoe is made strange, or 
special, because it cannot be used as a shoe: 
Of all my objects, the ones that have had the best reception are 
the Shoes for Departure, 1991. They’re impossible shoes, 
because they weigh 65 kilos (143 lbs.) and nobody can move 
them, but nevertheless they’re described as being “for 
departure.”100 
By making it impossible for the participant to connect the object with normal use 
it is the performative experience takes precedence; the process behind 
transformation becomes visible, the moment of experience is set apart.  
This manner of interacting with the audience seems quite different from 
                                                
99 Abramovi! in Janet A. Kaplan, ‘Deeper and Deeper: Interview with Marina Abramovic’, Art 
Journal, Summer (1999), 6-21 (p. 9).  
100 Marina Abramovi! and Germano Celant, ‘Towards a Pure Energy’, Public Body: Installations 
and Objects, 1965-2001 (Milan: Charta, 2001), pp. 9-29 (p. 21). 
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performances which place Abramovi!’s action as the focus of an event. 
Abramovi! often mentions the problem of audience passivity: 
Many people think that with my work on Transitory Objects I 
abandoned performance. For me the Transitory Objects are a 
further journey into performance, only that here the objects are 
made for the audience, and for me they become a work of art 
when they are used by someone.  
Abramovi! is clear that the use of objects is an important part of her work and her 
focus on the entire person in performance. In House she used some of the original 
Transitory Objects, i.e. the chair and bed with mineral pillows, thus incorporating 
her live performance with her desire for audience participation. While 
performance is still her main form of engagement with an audience she is critical 
of the traditional relationship this creates: 
In traditional performance the role of the spectator is always 
that of passive observers, but my desire is that everyone should 
have their own experience. I think that individual physical 
experience is extremely important, since it is the only way of 
changing our awareness of things. No one has ever been 
transformed by watching a performance, or by reading a good 
book, but a real experience can change awareness.101 
The goal of her performance, according to her, whether with or without objects is 
transformation, an experience, a shift in awareness. All of these terms can point 
to the spiritual, but are not precise enough. Abramovi! does not claim a spiritual 
heritage or connection, yet her choice of words is very close to those used by 
religious and spiritual practices and her own research is inspired by religious 
people.102 Learning how to pray, meditate and participate in religious and 
                                                
101 Denegri, p. 19. 
102Talking about a different piece of work from 1998, Abramovi! describes her fascination with 
prayer.  “In the other part of the installation…I shot repetitive moments in prayer ceremonies. I 
show a sixty-year-old Tibetan woman who prayed by prostrating herself, repeating this moment 
over and over through the day. This is ten or fifteen hours of work. If you asked anybody even in 
the best physical condition to do such a thing, it would be impossible. But if you cross a threshold 
into a certain state of mind, you can push your body over this limit. My whole research in this 
piece is to find the limit. How can a Western body have this experience, and how can an Eastern 
body push much farther into an area unknown for us? I am interested in this because for me 
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spiritual rituals also often involves the use of objects to facilitate early 
experiences. In many traditions the longer a person practices the less they rely on 
specific objects or places to engage in spiritual behaviours.103 Abramovi! uses her 
work to achieve transformation and encourages others to find their own points of 
transformation.  
It was through experimentation with various art forms that she started to 
focus on the body as her medium. She realised after her first performances in 
Yugoslavia that to work with painting or sculpture would not result in the kinds 
of intense reactions she desired. Performing in front of people gave her an 
experience, but those present were still mostly left to watch. The objects are 
meant to bridge this divide and they operate firstly as aids to transformation and 
later are meant to be triggers for the individual to go through their own process 
and experience of transformation. 
I was performing and I was giving them the energy. Now there 
is a trigger….But that is not enough. What it must be is a 
synergy between the object and yourself. You think it is in the 
object, but at some point you realize, after you go away, that it 
is in you. So it is you and not the object, that’s why I call them 
transitory objects.104 
Abramovi! places responsibility on the participant as she wants the individual to 
be in control of their own transformation, but she is simultaneously very specific 
about how to appropriately use the objects: 
[T]he instructions are fundamental because the object mustn’t be used in 
any other way. I want the objects to have functions connected with our 
own basic body positions, which may have to do with sitting, or lying 
down or standing, having your eyes closed or open, not eating or not 
                                                                                                                                
performance is a means of research to find mental and physical answers.” Marina Abramovi! in 
Kaplan, p. 8. 
103 As an example, Christians learn various forms of prayer, such as individual prayer at home and 
corporate prayer in churches, but all of these lead to the individual being able to pray in any space, 
place or circumstance as needed throughout life.  
104 Marina Abramovi! in 19 Projects: Artists-in-Residence at the MIT List Visual Arts Center, 
(Cambridge MA: MIT List Visual Arts Center, 1996), p. 65. 
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moving. They are almost requests for a commitment; a wrong use would 
make them meaningless.105  
Commitment to the promise of the experience is something that Abramovi! 
reiterates; she commits and expects the same from those around her. 
  Abramovi! identifies two parts to the performance with the objects: firstly 
where she first came in contact with the elements – she performed at the Great 
Wall and in mines in Brazil where she developed ideas for these performances; 
and secondly the creation in her studio and the demonstrations in galleries where 
they were installed. She asserts that a performance can impact those who use the 
objects created through performance processes if they commit to the experiences 
triggered by these objects. In House a new performance brought together the 
objects, a durational piece, and aspects of the walk in China as Abramovi! wore 
her walking boots from the trip and used the crystals which she became aware of 
during the Great Wall Walk. Over time she layers aspects of different pieces, 
bringing together the parts that are of most importance to her. 
Abramovi! talks of the promise of her performance in terms of being 
open, if the participant can find a way to be open, an experience will likely take 
place. Ideally the object acts as a tool for the participant and over time 
conditioning happens such that it becomes ‘easy’ to reach the promise of 
transformation: 
So it is a way to come to another state of mind. All our work is about 
transforming a state of mind. It is not important what you are doing, what 
is important is the state of mind from which you do what you are doing. 
My own work is always based on this idea — how to condition the 
audience, the participants and myself to get into the right state of mind. 
Then everything else is just the means you are using whether it is 
performance, video or Polaroids, they are, in a sense, interchangeable. It’s 
                                                
105 Abramovi! and Celant, p. 10. 
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the state that’s important.106  
Although Abramovi! cannot control the state of mind of her participants she 
stresses the importance of a good state of mind to allow for transformation. In 
order to facilitate this Abramovi! demands much of her own state in performance 
– she says that she tries to maintain a state which will show others what is 
possible. 
The transitory object is a means to an end, a state of mind, and yet it is not 
the end product which is of most interest, but the process that leads to the 
transformative state; “You need discipline and then something else can 
happen.”107 For her the state enables further experiences which are useful in the 
everyday: 
I go through this transformation in the work; work transforms me, and 
then I use this experience in ‘real life’. Normally it is the other way round: 
you do something, you get experience in life and then you use it for your 
performance. My work is basically a learning process.108 
While there are many possible types of ‘transformations’ in the field of 
performance Abromovi! consistently invokes the spiritual in both her own solo 
work and in the pieces developed for participants. The nature of her search for the 
spiritual is not related to a religion and not even necessarily based in traditional 
methods of seeking the spiritual. 
The whole idea is that in the coming century it will not be enough for only 
the artist to be transformed. My idea of the future is finally art without 
objects. You must remove the objects because they are only temporary. 
There must be a communication of energy on a higher level, a direct 
transmission between the artist and the public.109 
Exactly what this spirituality is, is not defined by Abramovi! as she does not 
subscribe to one type of practice. In fact her own practice is constantly shifting 
                                                
106 Abramovi! in 19 Projects, p. 63. 
107 Heathfield, p. 147. 
108 Heathfield, p. 148. [Original emphasis.] 
109 Abramovi! in 19 Projects, p. 65. 
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based on the piece she is developing or has just performed. Throughout the last 
forty years of performing Abramovi! has repeatedly disciplined her body and yet, 
she does not think that she is capable of using this discipline in everyday life. As 
previously mentioned, she only maintains the discipline needed for a performance 
project for the length of the project itself. Her repeated search is interesting given 
that she also tries to impart discipline to others so that they can benefit from what 
the performances bring to their own lives: “for me performance is a means of 
research to find mental and physical answers.”110 
Living in the Sean Kelly Gallery for twelve days was a perfect example of 
the kind of work that forces Abramovi! into a pattern. In a minimalist space the 
body was the primary focus of all those who entered the gallery; the body has 
been Abramovi!’s focus throughout her career: “the whole idea [is] of the body 
as a material, the body as a material through which you transmit something.”111 
Having refrained from talking during the performance, at the end Abramovi! 
“came down from the stage and told the gathered crowd that she wanted to come 
to New York to give the busy island time. Time to heal, time to think, time to 
love, and time to live, despite death, with death.”112 She also told the assembled 
crowd: “This work is as much you as it is me.”113 She told them they had been 
‘working’ alongside her through the twelve days. The repeated search for 
something spiritual, in this case amid the continuing social and cultural disruption 
from the events of September 11, 2001, is what Abramovi! returns to in each of 
her pieces: 
“With most fasting, you’re not eating because you're protesting 
something. But in my case, I wanted to draw on fasting in the ancient 
                                                
110 Marina Abramovi! in Kaplan, p. 8. 
111 Abramovi!, Cleaning House (London: Academy Editions, 1995), p. 83. 
112 Phelan, ‘On Seeing’, p. 25. 
113 Goldberg, ‘The Theater of the Body’, p. 158. 
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times -- Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, you name it -- any culture has 
fasting as a ritual of purification of the body and the mind. I wanted 
people to stop and live in the here-and-now and reflect. And it was 
important that I was there, all the time, in the present.”114  
 
Analysing Abramovi"’s Performances of Belief 
To this point Abramovi!’s work has been presented in her words, or the words of 
those who have been present at her performances, and who have interacted with 
her objects. There are still important questions to be asked of what the work does, 
how it does it, and what that performative action can mean. This is the last piece 
of the dissertation and it is an extended analysis of not only Abramovi!’s work 
but of the analyses done by other writers. Woven together here are the 
discussions on: liturgical art from the 1600s, metaphysical structures, the impact 
of belief systems on language, and the repercussions of anthropological 
tendencies to ‘other’ practices that are not Western. The performance of belief as 
it is found in liturgy and performance art will be shown to be physical, material, 
and necessarily embodied. 
 
Shoes for Departure 
In Shoes, Abramovi! provides an object with a descriptive title and specific, if 
short, instructions. Firstly, I want to look at the objects. The shoes are easily 
identified as shoes by the shape and size. The title and instructions repeat the 
word departure and shoes are normally used for travelling by foot, departing from 
one place to arrive at another. Yet the way in which the shoes are used is 
tangential to the normal use, i.e. people stand in the shoes, but cannot walk in 
them. In the liturgy many objects are used in this fashion. Bread is still bread but 
                                                
114 Saint Louis, ‘What Were They Thinking’. 
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not for a meal. Wine is drunk, but not for flavour, for socialising, or to quench 
thirst. The bread and wine are cast as being part of the Eucharistic meal, but the 
meal does not provide enough nourishment to make a difference. The objects are 
important in relation to their physical and material presence. 
The material of the shoes prohibits movement and forces the wearer to 
engage with the performative nature of the encounter. If anything is going to 
‘happen’ the participant has to perform according to Abramovi!’s instructions. 
The ‘departure’ of the title, and in the instructions, is the main action that is 
required. It is not meant to confuse the participant, but to clarify the action as that 
of meditation. And at the end of the encounter the user will depart from the 
gallery or museum.  
The shoes are also similar to the use of the ciborium in the liturgy. Both 
objects can only be used by a person according to the instructions provided, 
however, the spiritual interaction is completely open in both cases; something 
will happen, but whether it will be transformative, or spiritual is unknown. The 
many potential representative meanings that a person will associate with the 
objects, e.g. the ciborium could be thought of as a bowl, gold, a sarcophagus, an 
artefact, etc., are all dependent on previous participation in performances of the 
liturgy. In the case of the shoes, most people will only ever see an exhibit once 
and will most likely not meet Abramovi!. In Shoes the object is the focus of any 
encounter as it is present and it is through the use of the object that the 
performance happens. The ciborium is similar in that it is not the designer of the 
object, nor the baker of the bread which is then put in the ciborium who is the 
focus for the participant. The object facilitates the performative encounter which 
is only possible through the actions of the participant. 
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The shoes are available to be used, for people to stand in, but they do not 
define the parameters of the entire experience. Much as the ending of Maundy 
Thursday puts in motion three days of liturgical performance, stepping out of the 
shoes does not end the effects of the experience. ‘Depart’ is also similar to the 
end of the liturgy – ‘Go in peace.’ In both cases the participant takes that which 
they have experienced with them and into the rest of their day, week, month, etc. 
The person who entered the gallery is different to the person who leaves the 
gallery; by virtue of having participated a transformation has occurred.  
 
In Between 
In Between also uses a text to define the parameters under which the performance 
and participation can happen. The participant is given a contract, a blindfold, and 
headphones and told to follow instructions. The physical state of the participant is 
more defined than in Shoes because of these objects and what they demand of the 
body, and because signing the contract is the only way to enter the installation. 
Once in the installation the body of the participant is then subject to outside 
forces which restrict the senses (blindfold and headphones). These restrictions are 
understood by the participant as necessary because of the contract.115 At the 
beginning the instructions are prescriptive and based on bodily responses – relax, 
breath. Just before telling the participant to remove the blindfold the kind of 
instruction changes from demanding (e.g. breath), to asking the hearer to engage 
the sense of smell, to feel with awareness what is happening mentally and 
physically. When the blindfold has been removed the language acknowledges its 
own limitations to command a response. Where before the instructions were 
                                                
115 The placing of the work in a gallery also accords the gallery a certain degree of trust from the 
participants who may base their participation on the reputation of the gallery to choose relevant 
and interesting artists. Also, some participants may want to participate in an Abramovi! piece. 
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specific – ‘take off your shoes, loosen your belt’ – now they require the 
participants to interpret and take control of the situation. The participants have 
agency in this moment, but there is no guarantee that they will do anything. 
Thus, ‘Observe’ is less of a command and more of a request as the participant has 
to choose what to observe and how. This instruction is the vaguest of the entire 
sequence and relies on the hearer to understand what kind of observation is 
meant. From this point the rest of the instructions assume the participant has 
chosen to act on the agency available and that this has changed the experience. 
Some might call this a ‘transformation,’ i.e. it could be assumed that the 
participation of the participant has altered their state and that they are now 
different from when they first entered the space.116  
It is the last request that indicates the expectation that the participants will 
engage with the agency available and be open to transformation. ‘Go’ is 
reminiscent of ‘Depart’ from Shoes but carries with it an immediacy which 
presupposes that the participant will take everything that has happened and that 
has changed them out into the world as they leave, if only for a little while. 
Abramovi! negates any interaction but a ‘correct’ interaction, and the resulting 
actions are performative in their self-referentiality and repetition. 
 
The House With the Ocean View   
In The House With the Ocean View Abramovi! offered a situation wherein the 
participants were taken out of the normal activities and offered the chance to 
experience their own transformation through engaging with her experience and 
everyday actions. It was crucial to this performance that she lived in the gallery 
                                                
116 As with the shoes, the participant can follow along actively or listen passively without 
breathing in time or trying to understand the instructions. 
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twenty-four hours a day, because in contrast to the liturgical context, where the 
majority of participants know what is required of them, visitors needed guidance 
to become participants. The gallery changed what were everyday actions 
(sleeping, drinking, dressing, sitting, etc.) by setting them apart. Through 
Abramovi!’s decision to abstain from all but the most basic activities these 
actions were both completely recognizable, and made special, perhaps even 
sacred by elevating them. In the liturgy a group comes together to create and 
perform the liturgical action, and Abramovi! too was looking for this level of 
participation. However, as she was starting a new ritual, to succeed she needed 
participants and therefore had to establish a performance space that would allow 
anyone to engage. In this case there was no training or familiarity possible, but 
neither was there language and thus any barrier to participation through language 
was removed. This left the actions as the way for the participants to engage with 
the performance, or not.  
The actions she chose to include highlighted the demands on the entire 
person, herself as well as all those who visited. As with the liturgy, participation 
had to be learned but this learning was refined to one main action; that of 
engaging with Abramovi! through looking into her eyes. Again, the main form of 
participation centred around performative action. To engage with Abramovi! by 
looking into her eyes was to enter into a simple yet unpredictable performative 
action which could only be accomplished in the moment by those present. 
Maintaining eye contact was not a reference to any other behaviour that had 
happened previous to this installation. To sit or stand in the space with her was to 
perform the self simultaneously with her performance of self. Abramovi! did not 
offer a performance to be copied, but facilitated a performance that would allow 
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others to have their own performative experiences. Each person in the room had 
to relate the use of Abramovi!'s body to their use of their own body. In relating 
the performance context thus, I have identified aspects of Abramovi!’s work that 
can be directly compared with liturgical rhythms and actions. 
Of the three pieces it is The House With the Ocean View which 
approached the audience participation most holistically. The title is the most 
evocative; ‘house’ and ‘ocean’ mean different things to different people. Thus 
each person entering the space brings their personal ‘houses’ and ‘views’ to the 
space. In some ways House is more directed to the audience/participant than the 
other two pieces simply because Abramovi! performs continuously as a way to 
enable others to engage with the performance as a means to transformation. 
Abramovi! provided access to herself twelve days in a row in a gallery space in 
New York. Three distinct spaces were provided so that the participant could 
watch Abramovi! perform, watch a video or sign up to use the sleep/dream space. 
Each room had a visual element and two rooms enabled active physical 
participation. In the main space people could choose where to sit, where to stand, 
to use the binoculars and whether or not to make eye contact with Abramovi!. As 
Gay McAuley asserts, “[t]he experience of the individual spectator, while always 
personal, is also occurring at group and collective levels.”117 The social 
experience is foregrounded in Abramovi!’s piece where groups interact in the 
multiple areas of the gallery spaces. In House, the participants and facilitators can 
see each other, as well being able to observe other people in the room. Each 
person decided what type and level of participation to undertake. The continuum 
from audience to participant was open to all who entered the space.  
                                                
117 McAuley, p. 251. 
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The most detailed space was where Abramovi! performed, and here there 
were many objects and images for the participant to examine. The rooms were 
white with wooden furniture, pieces of minerals, a metronome, a jug and a glass. 
Some participants may have come across the furniture in the space in a previous 
installation. In Shoes the types of associations that could be made with the actual 
objects were limited by the object itself, i.e. only associations with shoes or 
amethyst or heaviness, or with a word in the instructions were immediately 
obvious. Whereas in House there were many more objects, textures and colours 
(especially because Abramovi! wore a different colour of clothes each day) 
allowing for an infinite number of personal associations. Where Shoes and In 
Between were somewhat restrictive, this piece was more open to both 
representative meaning and performative responses. 
The instructions for House were more restrictive for Abramovi! than for 
the participants. The restrictions she imposed on herself also impacted those who 
joined her in the space as they could not speak to her, touch her or be in the 
rooms elevated off the floor. She provided the possibility of participant 
experience concurrent with her own experience of performing and because of the 
restrictions the most available action to both performer and participant was to 
have an exchange through eye contact. 
The agency in this performative ritual action, to return to Mahmood, is 
found in “the relationships that are articulated between words, concepts, and 
practices that constitute a particular discursive tradition.” The discursive tradition 
of performance art is not what Mahmood meant as she was discussing piety. 
However, piety is about practices that are directly related to religion, veneration, 
faith, spirituality, duty, fervour and zeal. Abramovi!’s piece is not part of a 
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religion, but her actions in the piece are very similar to those undertaken in 
religious ritual. Living in a gallery and maintaining an ascetic practice is a 
performance of piety. In House Abramovi! drew on the same embodied modes 
used in the liturgy. She did this through disciplined actions, her use of objects, the 
performance and repetition of actions, and the incorporation of other people in 
what became a corporate performance. The audience had to learn the ritual in 
order to participate. 
For the participants who came to the gallery, what the ritual lacked in 
history was slightly made up for in duration and consistency over the course of 
the twelve days. Those who visited more than once were able to count on 
Abramovi! repeating what was already familiar which created a recognizable 
discourse. In this case participants knew that Abramovi! had committed to twelve 
days in the space. People responded to this by coming in every day before work 
or during lunch or on their way home. Some came in for fifteen minutes and 
ended up staying for hours. Some actively used their agency through the 
production of images shown to Abramovi! or by returning her gaze. Many 
participants chose to conform their use of time to that of Abramovi!’s. People 
contemplated the everyday actions repeated before them in the gallery, or their 
own lives, or nothing at all.  
Living in the gallery twenty four hours a day set Abramovi! apart from 
things such as telephone calls and cooking meals, while not removing her from 
sleeping, drinking, dressing, showering and going to the toilet. The role of the 
body as it is used over time and to accomplish actions, as well as the needs of the 
body were thus revealed through the presence of all the bodies in the space.  
Abramovi! alone in the space for twelve days would not have had the same 
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effect. This piece suggested that among the needs of the body is the need for 
interaction on a level that speech alone cannot attain. 
The same elements that are in Shoes and In Between are also in House. 
The meditation asked for in Shoes is present here as well, but amplified by the 
concepts of personal discipline over time and not just for a few moments while 
standing in shoes. House implies that the state (mental or spiritual) which 
participants achieve while in the gallery can be replicated in daily life despite and 
due to the structure of actions undertaken every day. The necessity of daily 
activities and the transforming of these in community highlights the potential of 
any person to use the structure of life to change their reality. Making participants 
aware of their own rhythms was part of a text heard through headphones in In 
Between while in House it was shown directly through Abramovi!’s repetitions. 
These repetitions, which had the potential to acquire and layer meanings with 
each successive action, recall repetitive corporate liturgical actions. Abramovi!’s 
commitment to repeat actions with full intent and focus despite desires to eat or 
talk or read, recalls the commitment of congregations to perform together the 
liturgy in an embodied fashion despite any personal physical or material needs 
that may arise during a given Mass or in everyday life. There is, of course, no 
guarantee that participants will understand what is required of them in order to 
have an experience in either the Mass or in one of Abramovi!’s pieces. Sufficient 
instructions are given to any willing participant in either circumstance so that 
participation is possible. Ultimately it is the participant who is responsible: 
facilitator and participant, are both invested in a successful performance process. 
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WESTERN LITURGICAL REREADING OF PERFORMANCE: The House With the 
Ocean View 
 
The development of this chapter has built on the previous three to construct a 
platform from which to discuss the relevance of considering Christian practices in 
relation to contemporary performance art. The main elements discussed 
throughout the dissertation from the fields of art, philosophy, linguistics, 
anthropology and performance studies come together in these final pages. To 
begin my reading of Abramovic’s work as necessarily Western, I return to Hans 
Belting’s account of liturgical art and engage for a moment in a semiotic reading 
of House. This serves to show that there are aesthetic similarities between the 
performance and the liturgical tradition.  
Performance art clearly differs from the liturgical art of the 1600s 
described in the opening of this chapter, in size, location and the scale of public 
involvement. Belting discusses the larger implications of shifts in liturgical art, 
but he confines his analysis of the paintings to a semiotic reading. He names the 
elements that represent religious or mythological ideas and explains how these 
would have been understood in various decades. While not meant to be used in a 
Christian liturgy, a piece of performance art such as Abramovi!’s House contains 
many semiotic points of comparison with the religious images of the past, and 
specifically with the liturgical uses of images. The piece encourages an embodied 
response from participants and suggests that people should engage in their own 
ritual acts. Abramovi!’s role is both as the subject and the facilitator of the art. 
Abramovi!’s House aligns well with many aspects of the ‘Holy Image’ 
that Belting describes, e.g. the structure of the piece, which is a triptych with 
three inter-related panels. Triptychs were used in churches, often behind the altar 
where the Eucharist was celebrated. The three panels usually depict different 
 276 
people or scenes. In each case the person in the painting stares out at the viewer 
making eye contact, which is part of what facilitates the interaction with the 
divine presence. House differs in that only a person animates only one panel at a 
time. As with liturgical paintings where the faces look outward, Abramovi! too 
stared at those assembled in the room making eye contact.118  
Liturgical icons were believed to be themselves in the sense that an icon 
of a saint did not represent the saint, but actually contained the presence of the 
saint.119 In this aspect, Abramovi!’s presence is similar. She is present in the 
panels as herself; she is not a representation of anyone. Where the images were 
designed to show a spiritual reality and contain a presence, Abramovi!’s House 
has a real presence and ‘shows’ a spiritual possibility. Many people who attended 
the piece have attested to having experienced something spiritual, but this is not a 
claim that can be made for all those who participated. The possibility of 
interaction in House returns us to the problem mentioned earlier by Belting about 
the crisis of the image. It is difficult for a Western audience to ‘read’ images as 
spiritual in any agreed upon manner. There is no longer an agreement as to what 
is spiritual and what is not, and how or even if it is acceptable to interact with 
such art. As we will see in the articles written about House, the topic of a 
religious experience was important to many who participated in the performance. 
However, because the writers seem at a loss to confidently associate the work 
with a religious tradition there is no clarity to be gleaned from reading these 
articles. Written reactions to the work identify that something was or could be 
                                                
118 She did not maintain eye contact at all times as she also moved around the space, took 
showers, dressed and drank water.  
119 Even as they are simultaneously showing something that cannot be tangibly present (Christ has 
been resurrected and thus his body cannot be on earth), it is believed that Christ can be present in 
the image. These icons are not representations of something that is not present, but presentations 
of presence. 
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experienced by interacting with the performance but are unable to agree on what 
this might be. 
The artists and academics who write about Abramovi!’s performances 
adopt her language and rhetoric; what is important to Abramovi! becomes 
important to them. Of course, Abramovi! has provided access to her opinion 
through her own publications which always include interviews as well as 
academic articles or reflections on the pieces. She controls much of the 
documentation of her pieces and it is clear that she is concerned with what and 
how information is communicated about the pieces she performs and facilitates. 
Those who write about her work are mainly drawn from a relatively contained 
group; artists, critics, academics. There are always new audience members but 
people in this group tend to come upon her work because of the location, e.g. the 
recent performance of 7 Easy Pieces at the Guggenheim in 2005 made her 
performance accessible to anyone who entered the museum in the evenings. The 
product of this educated group of audience members is written pieces that usually 
endorse Abramovi!’s perspective. 
The following is an example of a response to some of the early transitory 
objects that was included in the exhibit brochure for Objects Performance Video 
Sound: 
Abramovi!’s latest work is evidence that, twenty years on, she is as 
obsessed with the present as she ever was. The current work contains the 
richness of a consistent but complicated history, with its own detailed 
iconography and autobiographical detours…. the new objects she has 
made embrace the viewer, supporting him or her at the base of the neck or 
along the length of the back: this is a quality that was not there 
before….Abramovi! says….“it is also about the question of how to come 
to a peaceful state of mind.”120 
                                                
120 Chrissie Iles, ed., Marina Abramovi!: Objects Performance Video Sound (Oxford: Museum of 
Modern Art, Edition Hansjorg Mayer, 1995), p. 18. 
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Chrissie Iles endorses Abramovi!’s seeming departure from earlier kinds of work, 
unquestioningly accepting the new ‘gentler’ version of interacting with the 
public. Abramovi! says the work is about coming “to a peaceful state of mind” 
and Iles analysis supports without a challenge. This short excerpt focuses on how 
the work is located in the present and is concerned not with representing the past 
or predicting the future, but with performing the present. It also emphasises that 
the work is about the state of mind, or spiritual state of the artist and the 
participant. This is a pattern that is repeated by almost all those who discuss 
Abramovi!’s work. 
Another person who has written extensively on Abramovi!’s work is 
Germano Celant. In Public Body: Installations and Objects, 1965-2001 he goes 
beyond describing the potential of the transitory objects as ‘transformation’ using 
the word ‘transcend’ instead: “Rather than implements, they’re metaphors of 
potential energy, which a person can develop. They’re an invitation to transcend 
the limits of one’s own sensory and spiritual capability.”121 Celant makes the 
spiritual claim for the work and attests to the relevance and usefulness of 
engaging with Abramovi!’s pieces. 
Artists and academics have said that Abramovi! can transform situations 
with her presence.122 Fellow artist Laurie Anderson commented on the power 
inherent in House: 
The House with the Ocean View reminded me that Marina can actually 
transform and direct thoughts. She understands and uses the ecstatic. And 
she creates transformation out of the simplest materials, featuring her own 
body. An intensely physical person, she combines it with the spiritual in a 
completely unique way.123 
                                                
121 Abramovi! and Celant, pp. 21-22. 
122 Parts of this section have appeared in Megan Macdonald, ‘The Liturgical Lens: Performance 
Art and Christianity’, Performance Research: On Congregation, 13 (2008), 146-153. 
123 Anderson, ‘Marina Abramovi!.’ 
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The first aspect mentioned here is the transformation and direction of thought. 
This implicitly places mental/spiritual changes over physical ones. The soul is 
primary and the body secondary, echoing the antagonism highlighted by Murphy 
(in Chapter 1) and Cannell (in Chapter 2). There is no definition of what 
constitutes something spiritual or even a general idea of what is meant by that 
term. The binary structure of metaphysics asserts itself and is taken for granted. 
Anderson’s appraisal of the piece is entirely positive; she endorses the 
process, content and effects of Abramovi!’s work: 
Recently I saw the truly transformative House with the Ocean View at 
Sean Kelly Gallery in New York. The spirituality that has driven much of 
Marina's work was now central. Confrontation with the audience no 
longer had any props. For 12 days she lived in full view on a shelf in the 
gallery. She showered, drank water, sat on a toilet, brushed her hair, but 
mostly sat and looked at the people who came to see the show. It was 
about as direct as it gets. She was fasting for the duration and said later 
that this increased her sensitivity and connection to the audience. When I 
went to see her there I had a very powerful wordless encounter. I also was 
able to experience the passage of time in a unique way—at a tempo 
somewhere between music and meditation.124 
Crediting her with not just a strong performance presence, but the ability to direct 
people’s thoughts Anderson adds spiritually inflected language such as ‘ecstatic’ 
and ‘unique’ to her description thereby elevating the piece. Any commonalities 
with known religious practices are swept away with the claim that her physicality 
combined with ‘the spiritual’ is a new manifestation of possible spiritual 
experiences.  
Peggy Phelan explains her personal understanding of the work and how 
performance art functions in spiritually relevant terms while crediting the 
audience with much of the resulting meaning in the performance. Yet while this 
could lead to a comparison with the liturgy, and the role of the congregation to 
                                                
124 Anderson, ‘Marina Abromovic.’ 
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act alongside the facilitator (Priest), the transformative aspect of Abramovi!’s 
performance is not compared to a known spiritual experience: 
What distinguishes performance art from other arts, both mediated and 
live, is precisely the promise of this possibility of mutual transformation 
during the enactment of the event. By accepting both her audience’s care 
for her safety and her audience desire to hurt her, Abramovi! transformed 
her relationship to the event. She was as moved by the performance as 
were any of her audience. Or, to put it differently, Abramovi! had the 
capacity to allow her spectators to transform her intended performance to 
such a degree that they became co-creators of the event itself.125 
These analyses accept and promote how Abramovi! wants to be seen. She says 
that she does not want to be tied to any one spiritual practice to explain her work, 
so a plethora are mentioned – the work can thus remain spiritual but escapes 
specific categorisation. When the words that Abramovi! uses, such as 
transformation, are repeated by those who write about her work her vision of the 
work is recognized and validated.  
Phelan’s analysis also points to the kind of facilitator/participant 
relationship that we looked at in the last chapter in relation to Rancière’s theories, 
i.e. “the blurring of the boundary between those who act and those who look; 
between individuals and members of a collective body.”126 As we have already 
seen in the liturgy, and as is described here, both facilitators and participants look 
and act, and all are simultaneously individuals and members of a collective body 
who are present at a performance event. The third thing that Rancière stipulated 
as necessary was something that belongs to no one, but can be referenced. As 
with the liturgy, in this case unique shared aspect is also the performance event. 
Abramovi!’s experience of the event is radically different from that of the 
participants, and the two viewpoints can come together if and when the 
                                                
125 Phelan, ‘On Seeing’, p. 173. 
126 Rancière, p. 19. 
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opportunity arises to discuss the experience. Similarly to the liturgy, this 
performance provides the opportunity to blur boundaries which are ultimately 
reaffirmed by the irreducible distances between each individual, but without 
which there would be no opportunity for interactions. The specific experience is 
only available to the individual, but the performance event is only possible 
through group participation. 
Phelan wrote extensively about her own experience of House and 
attributes the spiritual aspects of the piece to a search for deeper, more universal 
themes: 
Abramovi!, who has been deeply influenced by Tibetan Buddhism and 
shamanic wisdom from disparate traditions, learned during the early ‘70s 
that the border crossing traversed within performances that work on the 
art/life divide might be seen as a kind of rehearsal for that other crossing, 
the one between life and death.127 
Specific mention of spiritual practices is a way to link the work with Buddhism 
and casts Abramovi! as a shaman able to deftly navigate the borders of both 
art/life and life/death. This quotation is an example of an unqualified use of 
shamanism lending to House a sense of the eternal with its supposed art/life/death 
resonances. The reference to Tibetan Buddhism is accurate, insofar as Abramovi! 
acknowledges her own relationship to Buddhism, but again it is not explained in 
relation to the work in question.  
Anderson and Phelan both mention the unique and personal nature of the 
work, while others have claimed that Abramovi! has taken art to a new place on 
the continuum of performance practice, especially with relation to audience 
interaction: 
As Thomas McEvilley notes, Abramovi!’s decision to live in the gallery 
repeats and extends similar decisions made by performance artists in the 
                                                
127 Phelan, ‘On Seeing’, p. 173. 
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seventies, including Chris Burden, Linda Montano, Gerard Richter, 
Gilbert and George, and others. But in these works, the artists performed 
“for” the audience, rather than “with” the audience.128   
McEvilly claims the performance acts as a challenge to the normal functioning of 
art in the manner in which it engages the audience. In this reading Abramovi! 
does not use others’ ideas in different ways, she ‘extends’ the understanding of 
what contemporary performance can achieve. In these estimations Abramovi!’s 
approach is both part of the topics being debated in contemporary artistic practice 
and somehow simultaneously reaching towards a new form of intentional 
participation. She is part of and pushing the boundaries of what participation 
means and can mean.  
Again and again comments place her work in relation to art practices, 
spiritual practices, performance practices, literature and the theatre.  In one 
paragraph Johannes Birringer highlights almost all of the problems I have 
identified as he compares her work with all of the above: 
Abramovi! has performed alone, shifting her attention ever more 
relentlessly to the exploration of states of presence and consciousness, 
while also pursuing more explicitly her fascination with shamanic 
energies and spiritual practices, perhaps influenced by her visits to Tibet 
and Brazil and her research into minerals. [Her work] has shifted from the 
symbolic to a highly reduced, minimalist existentialism which, to some, 
may be infuriatingly close to an uncritical and unreflected new age 
spiritism. The asceticism of fasting and silence now belong to her 
strategies of creating works which ritualize very basic actions of everyday 
life like lying, sitting, standing, dreaming, and thinking. The asceticism, 
as a ritualized practice of being hyper-present, separates her work from 
merely task oriented actions, in the tradition of the Judson Church 
performers, the phenomenological interests of anthropological art, or the 
neo-concretist focus, in Lygia Clark’s actions, on the manipulation of 
objects (through the body). This Zen-influenced practice also stands at the 
opposite end of the highly theatricalized actionism of the Viennese 
Orgien-Mysterien-Theater.129 
                                                
128 Phelan, ‘Witnessing Shadows’, pp. 573-4. 
129 Johannes Birringer, ‘Marina Abramovi! on the Ledge’, PAJ: A Journal of Performance and 
Art, 74.25 (2003), 66-70 (pp. 66-7). 
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This response to House has potential as there are interesting points which could 
be expanded to provide a useful examination of what spirituality means in 
contemporary performance work. However, Birringer does not go any further 
than to list. The list shows just how prevalent the tendency to ‘other,’ adapted to 
some extent from anthropology, has become in relation to performance work. He 
is not alone in this style of writing. Peggy Phelan also provides a paragraph which 
tries to fit in a large number of possible inspirations for House: 
Whether one calls it environmental theatre or social sculpture, House 
extends something of the repetition and serialization at work in Warhol’s 
Shadows into the realm of live art. While Warhol was operating within the 
economy of the object and setting up repeating copies of the same image, 
Abramovi! was theatricalizing the repetitive everyday acts of sleeping, 
showering, eliminating waste, and sitting at a table. But these acts, each 
perhaps an homage to the quotidian, did not render the performance a 
literal treatment of these common acts. On the contrary, the symbolic and 
metaphorical associations were dense, ranging from Kafka’s Hunger 
Artist to the prayerful acts of a Sufi mystic. The accumulation of 
associations and meanings people brought to bear on the art quite literally 
added to its energetic force.130 
While simultaneously showing how open the work is to individual identification, 
these comments also continue the othering I have discussed in relation to 
anthropological studies. The work may well bring to mind shamanism, or Sufism, 
but what will such a comparison mean to those who read the article in the West? 
Lack of knowledge about what a Sufi is and how and why that is mystic serve to 
make Abramovi!’s work mysterious. This comparison complicates more than it 
clarifies. However, what could be put in its place? If Phelan had said ‘Christian 
mystic’ it would not necessarily have been crystal clear for an average reader, 
because any mystic practice is hidden, unknown, and secret. However, the 
descriptive term ‘prayerful acts’ together with ‘Christian mystic,’ should offer the 
potential for a Western audience to engage with what a prayerful act might entail, 
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even if mysticism is not fully understood. It is not the use of Sufi in and of itself 
that I find problematic - but the constant use of examples that serve to make a 
performance exotic which can easily and profitably be framed by Western 
spiritual practices. 
RoseLee Goldberg offers an example that hints at Christian practice but 
she does not contextualise it at all. She focuses on how the audience became 
participants throughout the work, once again commenting on examples 
highlighting spiritual aspects of the piece as well as the influence of the 
participants.  
While the performer followed no script—there was none, only a set of 
restrictions—random members of the audience became spontaneous 
players in this work. One young woman mimicked Abramovi!’s 
movements with the precision of an understudy. A man held up a small 
drawing he had made of her, tinted gold, as in an offering to a saint.131 
The use of the word mimic underscores that what the woman was doing was not 
real, was not the same as what Abramovi! was able to achieve. The implication is 
that the body alone is not enough; the woman used her body but was not able to 
transform her state of mind. The duality of metaphysics is at play here when 
Goldberg implies that to try to be like Abramovi! is to play act – to only 
represent.  
 The picture is also interesting given the historic role of icons in art. 
Goldberg introduces the image the man made as a picture offered to a ‘saint.’ Yet, 
as we have seen, icons contain presence and work against a simplistic reading of 
representation. Saints are also known for denying the physical and material needs 
of the body for food and comfort in their pursuit of God – both examples point to 
the kinds of understandings of the body in ritual that Cannell and Keane link to 
                                                
131 Goldberg, ‘The Theater of the Body’, p. 157. 
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repressed Christian influences in anthropological theory. However, one review in 
the New York Times did directly mention Christianity: “when viewers move close 
to the platforms, she stares down, directly into their eyes. The angle of sight 
recalls portrayals of the Crucifixion.”132 Other comments on the performance 
mention Egyptian formality, compare the furniture with sarcophagi and thrones 
and the gallery itself with a pilgrimage site.133 The commentary leads no further 
and this review remains at the level of observation.  From crucifixion to Egyptian 
art is a fairly large jump to make and yet it is not questioned or explained.  
Another example of the uncritical use of language in documentation of the 
performance is provided by Phelan: 
Thomas McEvilley argues that Abramovi!’s work ‘is dedicated to 
preserving the traditional shamanic/yogic combination of ordeal, 
inspiration, therapy and trance’. Moreover, he astutely claims ‘that this 
approach to performance art is both the most radically advanced – in its 
complete rejection of modernism and Eurocentrism – and most primitive 
– in its continuance of the otherwise discredited association of art with 
religion.’134 
Besides the problematic use of term shamanic/yogic, McEvilley's claim that the 
performance is a ‘rejection of modernism and Eurocentrism’ makes me uneasy. 
The piece was, after all, performed by a European woman, to a predominantly 
white audience in New York City and written about almost exclusively by 
Western academics and artists. McEvilley said that Abramovi! had enough 
knowledge and expertise to ‘preserve’ traditions in which she had no cultural 
history, limited training, and to which she claimed no membership or long term 
observance. Both McEvilley and Phelan list forms of spiritual engagement which 
are neither part of their culture, nor part of Abramovi!’s. Phelan uses McEvilley’s 
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133 Smith, ‘When Seeing Is Not Only Believing.’ 
134 Peggy Phelan, ‘On Seeing’, p. 174. 
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writing to reference her own reading of the work, yet does not define any of the 
terms more specifically, nor ask whether he was accurate in his analysis. 
McEvilley claims that Abramovi!’s piece was influenced by – and is an example 
of – ‘universal’ rituals that transcend cultural distinctions across centuries if not 
millennia, as well as simultaneously crediting her with creating a new 
phenomenon hitherto unimagined in the history of performance. This is similar to 
the problems discussed in relation to shamanism and New Age earlier in the 
chapter. Without actually calling the piece an ideal marriage of art and 
spirituality, it was accorded the status of something capable of ‘saving’ people.135 
Can it really be as old as the first people who expressed spirituality and radical 
enough to escape the bonds of cultural determination? 
McEvilley also compares the piece directly with a vipassana retreat: 
The House with the Ocean View could be described as a meditation retreat 
made public. Specifically, it seems to have been based on what in the Pali 
tradition of Theravadin Buddhism is called a vipassana retreat. These 
retreats (which are given here and there around the world) usually last 10 
to 12 days (Abramovi! chose 12), with no talking, reading or writing, and 
very limited eating; one can fast, as Abramovi! chose to do, or eat one 
meal at about noon every day.136 
In his article McEvilley goes into detail about the Pali tradition and another 
Buddhist tradition of meditation, linking Abramovi!'s work to both. In this 
quotation McEvilley indicates that Abramovi! did nothing but borrow an already 
existent meditation practice and put it in a gallery. The major change that she 
incorporated was looking directly at people, which would not normally be part of 
a silent retreat. Yet the overarching idea is that Abramovi! accomplished 
                                                
135 Another writer who also referenced the idea of salvation was James Westcott, “She breathes 
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something quite incredible and unique.  
This is the most thorough and convincing comparison of her work with 
any one spiritual practice that I read. Given, however, that even McEvilley chose 
to use a range of practices as points of comparison in his article I still find that 
something is missing. One might equally well think of the work in relation to 
Christian traditions: a twelve-day meditation, fasting and silence, recalls Christian 
retreats, monasticism and ascetic practices. The number twelve echoes the twelve 
days of Christmas, twelve disciples of Jesus and twelve tribes of Israel to name 
but a few. Abramovi! mentioned that twelve was important to her because the 
number three was a significant number and 1+2=3.137 Again three is a number of 
importance in Christianity, not least because it is used for the trinity of God the 
Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. McEvilley was not wrong to 
explain something of vipassana, but where are the other comparisons to traditions 
closer to Western culture? The point is not that my analysis is more accurate or 
applicable than McEvilley’s. I am making the point that House is just as open to 
interpretations that call on Christian logics as those of occidental practices. 
In a section mentioned earlier, I questioned the use of both shamanism 
and Buddhism as a form of shorthand. I want to return to this quotation and focus 
on how Phelan linked spiritual practices with concepts of eternity:  
Abramovi!, who has been deeply influenced by Tibetan Buddhism and 
shamanic wisdom from disparate traditions, learned during the early 
1970s that the border crossing traversed within performances that work 
on the art/life divide might be seen as a kind of rehearsal for that other 
crossing, the one between life and death.138 
There is nothing surprising in the idea that artists are interested in the themes of 
life and death, however, Phelan revealed some implicit assumptions about how 
                                                
137 “I am very much connected to the idea of three and in twelve, one and two make three. Three 
creates a triangle and there is tension in a triangle” (Abramovi! in Bajo). 
138 Phelan, ‘On Seeing’, p. 173. 
 288 
belief is constructed. The concept of crossing from life to death supposes a 
certain kind of construction of the soul: that we have souls, that when we die our 
souls go somewhere else, and that life and death are separate stages of 
experience. The two spiritual practices included in the quotation are explicitly 
linked with life and death, but are not similar to each other in their understandings 
of life and death.  
There is not room here for a detailed discussion of how Tibetan Buddhism 
approaches reincarnation or how the hundreds of types of shamanism deal with 
death and spirits, but neither set of practices assumes absolutely that a soul has 
one life and then passes on to eternity, as does Christianity. Neither assumes a 
mono-theistic God, or that the soul can have a personal relationship with a god, or 
that the soul is linked to an individual who will remain that individual for all 
eternity. The idea that a soul can cross from life to death implicitly carries within 
it the understanding, at least in the West, that the soul leaves the body and travels 
to heaven, hell, the universe in general or (in more recent history) just to 
nothingness. That Phelan used a phrase completely related to belief but did not 
more closely define how those differing belief systems operated in relation to life 
and death is an example of Pouillon’s argument. He argued that Western 
language and religious history are intertwined such that the languages cannot but 
reproduce the logics of the Christian influence of the last two thousand years. To 
compare the practice of Western religion with any other forms, and to do so in a 
Western language, is therefore to risk blindly applying the logics of Christian 
spiritual practices. 
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Conclusion 
Where the ‘Holy Images’ of the pre-Renaissance period were created 
under specific conditions and assumed clear places in societal use, contemporary 
performance art is created autonomously. It is not part of any religious tradition. 
It is often understood as a fine art practice, i.e. as operating within the 
overarching category of art. However, performance scholars also claim it as part 
theatre/performance/installation/live art practice, specifically when it necessitates 
the live presence of either the artist’s body or some other performer’s body. 
Abramovi! departs from the traditions of Christian images themselves in that she 
does not try to show any major figures such as Jesus, the saints or Mary. Neither 
does she enact any stories from Christian heritage. Yet, this piece has aesthetic 
similarities with Christian art from previous centuries. It also attempts to engage 
participants in a manner comparable to that of a liturgy with a formal structure 
that demands durational embodied practices of repetition. There is a pattern to the 
nature of the performance of belief in the West. 
The pattern of Western thought is also discernable in the ways in which 
people engage with artistic practice. Metaphysical structures, whether binary 
oppositions, or assumptions of a body/soul divide permeate the written accounts 
of the work. These tendencies are often paired with the use of examples from 
non-Western traditions that serve only to make exotic, or ‘other’ the performance. 
On closer inspection these methods of analysis are not the most relevant, and 
their use should at the very least be justified and contextualised. As we have seen 
in the analysis of liturgy, inherent in Christian thought is the insistence that the 
person is a whole and not just a body, and thus all experience are necessarily 
embodied. This information seems to have all but disappeared from contemporary 
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thought and needs to be re-inserted.  
The audience reception theories show that both liturgy and performance 
art treat the participation of the ‘audience’ as a key element. The relationship 
between the facilitator and the participant is very similar in these two 
performance forms and more work should be done to analyse the specifics of how 
all present experience and perform the events. Of primary importance is the fact 
that corporate performative action is what enables these performances.  
Western scholars are not only ignorant of the importance of embodied 
practice to Christian performance, they have almost lost the ability to read 
culturally specific Western references in performance art which is spiritual. When 
confronted with a piece like Abramovi!’s which contains many convincing points 
of comparison it is almost as if a blind spot exists blocking out that which is most 
familiar. Or perhaps the Christian traditions have become so unfamiliar in 
contemporary Western societies that researchers are simply unaware of what they 
are watching. Either scenario needs to be rectified; we need to be aware of the 
history of our own traditions and how they continue to shape us today.  
Yet, this dissertation is not about proving that all European art can be 
compared to aspects of Christian liturgy. I am interested in the ways in which 
Western understandings of the spiritual and religious, of ritual and art continue to 
shape how these practices are viewed, analysed and thus understood. If a critical 
framework unaware of its own Western biases frames all of the academic and 
critical evaluations of such practices then the kinds of analyses possible are 
severely limited. This case study serves to open up one topic in performance 
studies, namely belief, and questions long held assumptions about the neutrality 
of the discipline in relation to ritual and spiritual practices. 
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CONCLUSION 
I began this dissertation with a question as to what constituted the performance of 
belief. This was paired with the claim that the performance of belief was 
misunderstood primarily because of a focus in the west on metaphysics and 
representational analyses. The path I have taken to support this claim has led 
from theoretical and philosophical discussions to case studies. Throughout, I have 
built upon my argument showing the disciplinary breadth that the study of belief 
requires. The philosophical and theological underpinnings of western culture 
were discussed through the work of Plato, Nietzsche, Derrida and Christian 
teachings. These highlighted the conflicting understandings of the body, mind 
and soul in western metaphysics. The fields of linguistics and anthropology were 
used to show how actions and language are interconnected: actions need words to 
articulate meaning and words also shape the kinds of actions that are used. The 
theoretical aspects were drawn together in a discussion of performative theory. 
Belief was shown to be relevant to linguistic, philosophical, physical and material 
analyses involving the theory of performativity and performative action.  
 The case studies of the Roman Catholic liturgy and Marina Abramovi!’s 
performance art are the examples to which these theories were applied. Starting 
with the development of Christian liturgy, I argued that this is an important 
performance form in the western tradition which is not often examined in light of 
performance theory. I also used examples from liturgies that I attended to 
highlight the performative actions present in the liturgy. These actions speak to 
patterns and uses of embodied action which have long be used and practiced in 
western culture; they have taken on meanings beyond the liturgy itself. In the 
case study on performance art I first examined liturgical uses of art and then dealt 
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with the problems of weak comparisons to spiritual practices, i.e. shamanism and 
the New Age. In the analysis of Abramovi!’s work I brought forward both a close 
examination of how Abramovi! views her own performances and the kinds of 
writing done by other academics and artists on her work. The close reading of 
responses to The House With the Ocean View is one example of how the layers of 
philosophical, theological, linguistic, anthropological and performance responses 
can be peeled back to highlight the structure of the performance of western belief.  
 To bring the dissertation to a close, this section formally compares and 
discusses the case studies in the context of the thesis overall. To facilitate this 
discussion I have chosen headings that enable comparisons between the 
philosophical/theoretical discussions and the examples of embodied performance. 
These headings are: rhythm & structure; meanings & content; engagement; and 
participants. There is overlap between the categories which further strengthens 
the overall argument for the performative nature of belief. 
 
RHYTHM & STRUCTURE 
Rhythm underlays both the liturgy and Abramovi!’s The House With the Ocean 
View.  It is one of the most obvious similarities between the two performances. 
The liturgy is built on long and short rhythms; the long ones include yearly, 
monthly, weekly and daily rhythms and the short ones are contained by the 
performance itself, e.g. alternating between singing and Bible readings, and call 
and response. The rhythms of speech are also an important aspect that links back 
to the kind of work done by Pouillon, Ruel and their colleagues. When listening 
to the liturgy in Czech I was able to pick out specific prayers, and sections of text, 
because of the rhythm. All European languages translated the liturgy from Latin 
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into the vernacular and the rhythms of Latin have shaped the sound of all 
contemporary liturgies. The understanding of the liturgical texts is not simply 
accomplished through words; the rhythms of the texts, as they are apprehended 
by the ear and felt by the body when spoken, also create meanings for the 
participant. 
 In House rhythms are set by Abramovi! on the first day of the 
performance and are focussed specifically on her interactions with the objects and 
people in the space. Some examples of the rhythms she establishes are the 
movements of the objects and her patterning of actions so that each time she 
dresses or showers or sits down to watch people it is done in the same order. She 
emphasizes rhythm through the use of a metronome, and the opening hours of the 
gallery make overt the rhythm that extends throughout the performance. While 
these rhythms only existed for the time that she was present in the space it has 
been noted by all who wrote about the piece that participants who came to the 
gallery either copied Abramovi!’s rhythms or changed their own daily rhythms to 
be able to visit the gallery frequently during the twelve days. House engendered a 
rhythm for Abramovi! as well as for those who witnessed the event. 
 The structure of the liturgy is evident in its textual form which is 
annotated and reviewed on a regular basis. The Roman Catholic Church’s 
approach to the organic development of the liturgy promotes a structure that can 
respond to theological and cultural needs. This includes theological structures that 
introduce the Christian story of belief. The biblical narrative of what happened to 
Jesus is recounted during each liturgy both by the facilitator during the Eucharist 
and by the participants in the creed. At the centre of liturgical action is the 
reiteration of Jesus’ recasting of Jewish ritual. The liturgy also includes 
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statements of belief and key prayers; the communal structures through which the 
participants engage with the belief. 
 House is also tightly structured, but this is not linked to a pre-existing text. 
Although the video of the event has been used to produce a text that catalogues 
all the actions that happened over the twelve days it is not a performance script to 
be copied. To reproduce the event in the same spirit as Abramovi! it would be 
necessary to use her structure of time and space, but not to memorise and 
reproduce her movements. If she is seen as a facilitator of an experience, in the 
same vein as the priest, then it is her presence and contact with the participants 
that is important, and not her exact actions. The actions have not been codified 
over time and taught, so they do not have the same resonance as those from the 
liturgy. They are still capable of eliciting responses from those who attend, 
especially those who come every day and become acquainted with the liturgical 
action. 
 The liturgy is also shaped in such a way that it reflects how salvation 
functions as a structural principle in Western discourse. As discussed in the 
beginning, both in relation to Plato and to Hebraic thought, the intelligible place 
(for Plato) or heaven (for the Jews) is intangible. God or the Good is outside of 
our understanding. People believe in things that they cannot see and it is through 
practices such as liturgy that the body can be trained to apprehend the divine. The 
structure of the liturgy reminds the participants that they are engaged in an 
activity which brings them into contact with the unseen divine. It trains the entire 
person to seek experiences of the divine through every aspect of their being. 
 
MEANINGS & CONTENT 
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How meaning is created and understood by the participant of a performance has 
been a major theme throughout this dissertation. The association of meaning to an 
event or an object is, as we have seen, both learned over time and also unique to 
the participant. Each individual manipulates the symbolic system both inside and 
outside of the institutional frame (as per Hanegraaff). Examples of manipulation 
inside the frame include the foot-washing in the liturgy, while an example from 
outside would be the Beranek cake. In Abramovi!’s performance the participants 
who signed up to ‘dream’ in the room next to hers manipulated from within the 
frame. The person who brought hand made images to show and give to 
Abramovi! was manipulating the symbolic system from outside. Although it 
could be argued that Abramovi! did not officially identify her work with an 
institutional frame, the performance was nonetheless held at a high profile art 
gallery. She also subjects the work to oversight and tightly controls the use of her 
work by others. 
 I have focussed on performative meanings and how these come into 
being. Although I have avoided a detailed representational analysis much of the 
meaning taught to and understood by the participants relies on representation. 
Performative understandings arise whether representative ones are known or not, 
as in the example of the participant who happens by a church or a performance art 
piece and decides to stop and watch. For the passer-by many meanings need to be 
made in the moment, as there is little or no foreknowledge of the unexpected 
event. For the regular participant the representative meanings work alongside the 
performative and can even spur new meanings.  
 Regular participants in the Roman Catholic liturgy and those who often go 
to performance art know what is expected both in terms of the content they 
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interact with and the meanings they receive. Perhaps details might be different 
from one church to another in terms of exactly where communion is taken, or 
where people normally sit within the building, and no two pieces of performance 
by Abramovi! will be the same, yet there are norms which are learned and 
expected. Deviation from these can disrupt the event and lead to uncertainty 
about whether the performance was properly executed. During an unexpected 
disturbance to either the liturgy or a performance art event the facilitator would 
be stopped, at least momentarily, from maintaining the rhythm, and following the 
structure. Participant focus would be drawn to the unstructured element that does 
not correspond to the meanings and content that are known or expected. Yet, this 
is not the only possible outcome if there is a disturbance. The unexpected can also 
add layers of meaning that create new and positive connections for those 
involved. This is part of the nature of the performative moment - it is necessary to 
be there because the event requires participation to exist and each iteration is 
unique.  
 Content in both kinds of events is preset and changeable. Elements which 
are preset in the liturgy include prayers, linking actions, and physical 
engagements of the participants. In Abramovi!’s pieces the objects are preset, 
styles of interaction are dictated and long lengths of time are provided to 
performer and participant. What is changeable in the liturgy includes music, 
prayers of the people, seasonal requirements and the people who come to 
participate. In House Abramovi! herself changed significantly from the beginning 
to the end as she lost weight and grew used to the imposed rhythms of life in the 
gallery. The people who came also changed the performance during each day and 
from day to day. What is hard to gauge in both situations is the awareness of 
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participants to changes in content. Some elements would be immediately 
perceived as missing from the liturgy, e.g. leaving out a section. However, since 
some prayers change weekly it is unlikely that anyone would notice if one wrong 
prayer was read on a given week. For House there are similarly aspects which 
would be glaring and others which would not be noticed. And in both cases there 
is the unexpected content, such as the shower not working during one of the 
twelve days of House, or a microphone not working during the liturgy.  
 Content is both absolutely necessary and also very malleable. How 
participants engage with content is vital because this is the main way in which 
meanings, both representational and performative are created. In relation to the 
performance of belief content can seem mundane, because it is repetitive, and yet 
it is exactly such repetition which can lead people to use adjectives such as 
transcendent and spiritual. The meaning behind each of these words is used to 
describe both the planned content and the unplanned content of the event. The 
words describe the experience of the participant and this experience is evaluated 
based on the facilitation of rhythm, structure, meanings and content: the entirety 
of the event. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
I made the case earlier that liturgy and performance art have more in common 
than might initially be thought based upon the kinds of participation that happen 
in each. While comparisons are traditionally made between the liturgy and theatre 
or drama, and between performance art and theatre or installations, these 
comparisons do not reflect the nature of the interaction between facilitator and 
participant. Audiences are not as passive as was thought (or at least asserted) for 
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many years. Philosophical and theoretical contributions from Helen Freshwater, 
Gay McAuley and Jacques Rancière demonstrate that the conception of audience 
passivity is changing. My analysis of performative action is another example of 
how performance theory can rethink traditional roles of active and passive and 
recast the nature of the action in the space.   
 The liturgy and House only succeed through facilitated participation. 
Those who are in the space, clergy, congregation, artist and gallery visitors are 
embedded in and responsible for the action. In the case of the liturgy the ritual 
must be enacted in order to happen and the ideal is that those participating feel 
facilitated in their contributions. This facilitation is characterized by embodied 
demands made on the entire person to listen, respond and take action.  
 In the liturgy this is achieved through the use of objects and actions that 
take the person through a series of encounters. These include touching metal, 
wood, paper (flipping pages), shaking hands, eating, being sprinkled with water, 
smelling incense, sitting, kneeling, standing, speaking, reciting from memory, 
engaging in call and response, praying silently and praying aloud in a group. The 
entire group perform the same actions (or almost all of the same actions, as some 
people may not be able to, for example, kneel). The senses are not called upon in 
isolation – while being sprinkled with water people can also hear the sound of the 
object used, hear the ripple of the robes of the priest, see people moving as they 
are hit with water, etc. While the priest and lay people visibly lead the liturgy the 
congregation know the performance. The blessing of the Eucharist and the 
absolution of sin cannot be performed by anyone but the priest (the sanctioned 
and trained person). Excepting these actions (because practising Catholics would 
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not think it appropriate to enact these) most members of the congregation could 
step in and facilitate the saying of prayers and call and response if necessary.  
 People congregate for performances of belief, and while participants are 
so familiar with the actions that they could repeat them anywhere, they are 
unlikely to do so anywhere but, e.g. in the church building at the appointed time. 
As previously mentioned, the performative nature of the liturgy dictates that the 
correct people, with the proper intention, at the appointed time, with the 
sanctioned leaders perform the liturgy. To return to Searle’s explanation of 
performative utterances, infelicitous performatives do not allow for the action to 
be fulfilled (even if I break a bottle over the hull of a ship and say the appropriate 
sentence for a christening, I do not have the power to christen a ship). In the same 
way, there are certain liturgical actions which are allowed to happen in the church 
(because the space is consecrated) and others that cannot. The participants 
interact with the space as the frame for their performance as they manipulate 
symbolic systems. 
 In House the facilitation happens through Abramovi!’s presence in the 
space. She manipulates the symbolic system that she has created as an example 
for those who participate. Participation happens by being present at the exhibit 
and specifically through engaging with Abramovi! by holding her gaze. Both 
holding Abramovi!’s gaze and being present require a certain type of attention 
that is not achieved through a few minutes standing in the space. The facilitation 
includes taking those present through a series of encounters. As Abramovi! does 
not speak these include the sounds of her body moving in the space, the sound of 
the metronome, or furniture moving and of her taking a shower. Anyone who 
stays for more than a few minutes has to stand or sit for long periods of time. Any 
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loud, fast or unexpected movements of participants would be easily noticed. 
Sounds other than those made by Abramovi! would be easily categorised as 
‘extra’ or accepted as part of the nature of such a public event. People experience 
the space by sitting on a hard floor or leaning up against the wall, standing near 
others when it is full or far away from others when it is empty. Abramovi! is the 
example that stands out and as people watch her they become aware of the 
stresses she has placed herself under. Many become completely absorbed in the 
performance and many senses are activated: people stand or sit, whisper, smell 
others in the room, feel the humidity of water after the shower, and hear the 
metronome. As a few of the reviews/articles mentioned, people worried about 
Abramovi! falling, that she looked tired, or they became so involved when they 
made eye contact with her that they lost all track of time.  
 Part of Abramovi!’s aim, as she articulates it, was to be completely 
present to the moment, fully available to the people in the room. She credits those 
who came with making the piece with her and for breaking down the divide 
between performer and audience. She wanted to change her own awareness and 
through this other people’s awareness, or to open them up to experiences that 
they might never otherwise have had. As the many articles attest to, people found 
the piece moving, transformative and very personal. People often returned more 
than once because they experienced the unexpected and ineffable in the space.  
 In House her demonstration of embodied action was the trigger for other 
people to use such activities in their daily lives. There is more to the facilitation 
than simply looking at Abramovi!, as the performance requires that people spend 
enough time in the space to become aware of the demands on her entire person. 
Abramovi! is strained physically and mentally by living in the space and the 
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restrictions she has made on herself. Those who enter become aware of the 
difference between her state and the states of everyone else in the space.  
 In the liturgy developments in action echo, to some degree, the 
developments in language and rituals over time. Language feeds into the creation 
of actions and actions require new language to articulate changes. Does 
something similar happen with performance practices? There is much to show 
that Abramovi! is always trying to find new ways to articulate her beliefs about 
the power of embodied action. She has taken more and more to publishing over 
the years and controlling the documentation of her pieces. Yet, she relies 
primarily on her pieces in order to communicate. She allows others to find the 
words or to respond with actions of their own. It might seem as though liturgical 
changes take a very long time when compared with performance practices. Yet, 
Abramovi! has been working for forty years and her pieces have continued to 
lengthen, to rely more and more on audience presence and to incorporate more 
reiterative elements. These two performance styles have more in common in 
terms of participation than might at first glance be discernible.  
 
ENGAGEMENT 
The other elements already discussed – rhythm and structure, meaning and 
content, and participants – all contribute to engagement. There is individual and 
group engagement and both of these are active in any performance situation. 
Many groupings are possible, such as young, old, men, women, how people are 
dressed, or even how tall they are and thus how much they can see from where 
they are sitting or standing. Needless to say, from one moment to another any 
person in the room will be more or less engaged in what is happened depending 
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on what is going on around them and what has already happened to them that 
day. As discussed by Helen Freshwater what actually goes on between all the 
people present for a performance is much more intricate than has historically 
been acknowledged. As audiences cannot be thought of as unified or stable a 
performative approach is very useful. A performative analysis takes each moment 
as it happens and examines what elements are/were at play. What is happening as 
people enter, as they find seats, talk to others, as the performance begins, etc.  
 Engagement is dependent on so many personal factors and it is impossible 
to tell the level to which each person present is able to focus on what they are 
watching/participating in. However, one benefit of the use of a performative 
approach is that being present is part of the qualification for the event taking 
place. Those present in the space for the duration of the liturgy were part of its 
accomplishment even if they were thinking about the rest of their day instead of 
the event. The nature of liturgical action, that is, the fact that it can be memorised, 
is part of what is interesting when examining the nature of performative action. 
Engagement is required to learn the form – the rhythms, structure, meaning and 
content. This is seen throughout the examples from the liturgy that we have 
looked at in this dissertation. I have shown that the people present did engage 
with their bodies. I found myself being caught up in their actions, aware of their 
directed energy, aware when they relaxed or when they were intent on finishing 
something. Often times I had no idea what it was that they were actually doing, 
but they were reciting something, or obviously praying or meditating about 
something which was evident from their postures. The same kinds of reports are 
evident in the articles and essays about House. Embodied engagement can be 
observed.  
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 A key element of the engagement with a piece is the role of the facilitator.  
In the liturgy the priest has to be there. It is not a sanctioned liturgy that complies 
with the necessary elements if the priest is not present. Similarly Abramovi! must 
also be there in order for the event to take place. However, in both cases there are 
elements to the performance which do not require these people, and further 
demonstrate the engagement of the participants. The cake baking of the Beranek 
is a liturgical element, and a performative one, that does not require the presence 
of the priest. As well, participants in House can take the concept home with them 
and use objects as meditation triggers. If they chose to commit to the concept of 
the piece they can continue to meditate on changing their energy fields and 
eventually the energy of the city (this was one of the goals of the piece as 
articulated by Abramovi!). In these ways they are continuing the work but in a 
way that does not require her facilitation. 
 Engagement in a performative event also entails the use of the props, 
objects, and material practices. Just thinking through the ideas that are part of a 
performance is not enough. Even while meditating in a seated position or praying 
in a church pew, the entire person is involved. Sitting still for hours becomes its 
own challenge and is an intensely physical action. Praying while maintaining 
stillness is a physical and material practice that involves the entire person. This 
kind of embodied engagement unites physical and mental engagements if only for 
a few seconds or moments. This state does not have to remain the same in order 
for the event to take place, or to have been participated in. Moment to moment is 
how the performative is achieved; the participation of all is part of how the event 
unfolds. Otherwise it would not be possible to count the participation of the non-
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initiated in the event; those people who happen upon the gallery and come in and 
watch have been part of what is going on.  
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
All of these points of comparison serve to answer the question “What is the 
performance of belief? As I claimed at the beginning, belief is instantiated and 
manifested through embodied practices that engage the entire person. The 
discussion of this idea has taken an interdisciplinary approach through 
philosophical ideas and examples from case studies. In each section, whether on 
historical, philosophical, theological, or cultural positions and practices, the 
outcome of the research has been a focus on embodied practices. Belief has been 
shown to be culturally specific and this investigation has taken an in depth look at 
Christian logics. Through this dissertation the question has become not one of 
whether belief is a relevant category of research, but how and in what manner. 
Belief and its performance is a major topic in philosophy. This statement may 
seem surprising, but whether or not they use the term performance, every thinker 
I have discussed has established a critical position based on the presumption that 
they know something about the conditions of belief and experiences involved 
therein. This dissertation has contributed to an understanding of belief as 
implicated not only in the metaphysical, but just as completely in physical and 
material practices. The Western performance of belief in liturgical and artistic 
practices is embodied and dynamic. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
The following is a brief listing of the actions in each part. These are 
annotated to explain the function of the action; I have not included a full 
description of possible theological meanings and associations. A full description 
of a Mass that I attended is found in Chapter 3, along with more information 
about the meanings connected with the actions in that particular Mass. 
Roman Catholic Liturgy: 
Introductory Rites 
This section of the service starts with all those attending seated in pews which 
normally face the altar (sometimes choir pews face each other). The clergy, choir 
and all those facilitating the service begin at the back of the church or in a side 
room so that they can then process into the main body of the church and to the 
altar during the first hymn. Some elements, such as the sign of the cross, happen 
throughout the service at pre-determined times. These times are learned through 
attendance. Other elements, such as the collect, are always changing depending 
on the time of year and other aspects of church life.  
 
Hymn – the procession of the cross, candles, incense, clergy, bible, altar servers, 
and choir happens at this point 
Sign of the cross – priest invokes the trinity and all cross themselves 
Opening prayers – said by the priest 
Greeting – call/response, call by the priest and response from the participants, this 
formally establishes the presence of God and the community as a group 
Act of Penitence – confession and absolution (although another rite is used for 
full absolution of sins outside of the liturgy) 
Kyrie – asking for mercy, this is sung by choir and participants 
Gloria in Excelsis Deo – hymn sung by choir, or all, praising God 
Silence – the length of this is determined by the priest 
Collect – prayer which changes every day of the year 
 
 
Liturgy of the Word 
This section is mostly focussed on the readings from the Bible and the sermon. In 
some ways it is the most recognizable for people not familiar with the form 
because it involves listening to text and a short lecture on a topic. Most often the 
sermon is closely related to one of the readings. 
 
Readings – either two or three (when three are used one is from the Old 
Testament, one from the New Testament and the last one is always from one of 
the four Gospels – Matthew, Mark, Luke or John) depending on the service 
(during Easter this fluctuates greatly: one service has eight readings and eight 
psalms) 
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Bible reading – all stand, thus giving focus to the reading, learning, listening. The 
reading is meant to instruct and provide material for the sermon/homily. 
Psalm – this is led by the choir, and can either be participatory, call and response, 
or a time of silent reflection for the congregation 
Alleluia – all stand and sing together before the Gospel reading 
Gospel – all stand and face the reader/priest if the priest has moved into the centre 
of the church with the Bible (which is common). This is generally used as the 
inspiration for the sermon. 
 
Sermon/homily – instruction and reflection as a community (while one aim of the 
sermon is to clarify the faith, many weeks one verse or theme is explored in detail 
meaning that a person attending on only one occasion would receive a specific 
and perhaps politically weighted message). 
Creed – Nicene or Apostles’ – both are affirmations of faith 
Intercessions (Prayers of the Faithful) – focus of the group on issues of relevance 
in the group, the town, the country, and the world. There is often a response to 
each section of the prayers such as “Lord hear our prayer” 
Offering – a song accompanies the collecting of money.1 
 
Liturgy of the Eucharist 
In this section there is a lot of action to watch at the altar as objects are brought 
out and arranged. The objects are used to highlight the retelling of the Last 
Supper Jesus had with his followers. 
 
Eucharistic Rite starts – bringing of objects (wine, bread, chalice, paten) to the 
alter 
Prayer – formal beginning of this section 
Call and response text – starts the text which includes the retelling of what Jesus 
did when he started the ritual on the night before he died 
Sanctus – invokes the eternal celebration of the liturgy, after this point all 
generally kneel until the peace is shared 
Consecration – formal blessing of the bread and wine at which point 
transubstantiation of the elements takes place and they become the body and 
blood of Christ.2 
 
 
                                                
1 The Bible teaches the giving of 10% of income to the church/organisations. 
2 This is the official teaching of the Catholic Church. Other churches and other times in history 
have viewed this differently. 
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The Communion Rite 
This section involves the most movement on the part of the congregation who 
leave their pews both to shake hands with those around them as well as to receive 
communion at various points around the church. The speaking of the Lord’s 
prayer also happens in this part of the service which is among the most well 
known texts of the Christian tradition. 
 
Lord’s prayer 
Peace – shaking of hands and speaking “Peace be with you.” Contact and 
acknowledgment of all in the space 
Agnus Dei – affirmation of Jesus who takes away sin and gives peace 
Call and response – preparation to take communion 
Taking of communion – every week the bread is eaten, on special occasions wine 
is drunk as well 
Prayer – different prayer each time to close this section of the service 
 
Concluding Rite 
This section is short and often followed by music on the organ as people sit 
quietly and meditate or pray.  
 
Announcements – plans the group has for itself 
Blessing – encouragement and affirmation of the group to affect and effect the 
world. “Go in peace” is a typical blessing. 
Final hymn – the recession of the priest and all those who processed at the 
beginning. Often the final hymns have a focus on the life outside of the spiritual 
group. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
In Between 
 
 Part I  Without Public 
   Performance 
A. I sit on a chair talking to the camera as if I were the 
 public.  
B. I lie on a table performing. 
1. Tracing the lines on my open palm with a sharp needle. 
2. Pricking my middle finger with a sharp needle. 
3. Smearing blood over my finger with a needle. 
4. Helper holding the needle very close above my wide 
 open eye tracing the veins. 
5. Tracing the moles on my neck with a sharp needle. 
 
 
 Part II  With Public 
 
Before entering the space the audience is asked to sign an 
agreement to spend 40 minutes inside the video installation 
without leaving. Before entering blindfolds and 
headphones have been given to them.  
 
On their way out each of them is given a certificate, in 
which the artist thanks them for their time and trust. 
Without fulfilling these conditions, the work cannot be 
seen.1 
 
 Soundtrack 
Sit on the chair. Put your headphones on. Make sure that your 
clothes are loose and comfortable. Take off your shoes, glasses 
and jewelry [sic]. Loosen your belt. Put the blindfold over your 
eyes. Listen to my voice. Now turn your head very slowly to the 
left. Then turn it slowly back to the middle, and just as slowly to 
the right. Feel your neck relax. Now slowly come back to the 
center. Listen to my voice. Your whole body should now be very 
comfortable. Feel the chair pressing against you. Sense how warm 
or cold your body feels. Feel the texture of your clothes against 
your skin. Feel your skin. Now shift your attention to your feet. 
Make sure both feet are firmly touching the ground. Feel the floor 
supporting you. Take a deep breath right now and exhale. Again, a 
deep full breath. Exhale. Breathe in, breathe out. Breathe in, 
breathe out. Feel your chest gently rise and fall with each breath, 
establishing a smooth rhythm. Now I will count for you. One, 
breathe in. Breathe out. Two, breathe in. Breathe out. Three, 
                                                
1 Marina Abramovi!, Artist Body (Milan: Charta, 1998), p. 348. This was 
performed in 1996 in Dallas Texas and in Macedonia in 1997. 
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Breathe in. Breathe out. Four, Breathe in. Breathe out. Five, 
Breathe in. Breathe out. Six, Breathe in. Breathe out, Seven, 
Breathe in. Breathe out, Eight, Breathe in. Breathe out, Nine, 
Breathe in. Breathe out, Ten, Breathe in. Breathe out, Eleven, 
Breathe in. Breathe out, Twelve, Breathe in. Breathe out, Now just 
continue to let your breath flow naturally in and out following 
your own rhythm. Listen to my voice. Now feel again the presence 
of the chair and your body pressing against it. Feel your feet 
touching the floor. Feel. Slowly, very slowly, raise your hand and 
take your blindfold off. Keep your eyes closed for a few moments. 
Feel, the space around you. Smell the smells around you. Take one 
more deep breath. Slowly open your eyes. Take a few moments to 
examine your surroundings. Let your awareness gradually take in 
more and more of your environment. Use all of your senses. 
Observe. Take a deep breath. In and out. Slowly start to focus on 
the screen. Look. Focus your mind in the here and now. We are 
coming to the end of the journey. Slowly blink your eyes. Slowly 
Shift your feet and extend your legs in front of you. Continue to 
stretch and breathe. Now, slowly sit upright and take one more 
deep relaxed breath. Slowly stand up, remove your headphones. 
Go.2 
 
                                                
2 Soundtrack for In Between (1996) by Marina Abramovi!, in Ninety: art des années 90 / Art in 
the 90’s. (Paris: Eighty Publications, 1999), p. 33. Also in Artist Body: Performances 1969-1998 
(Milan: Charta, 1998), pp. 350-1. 
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